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EXECUTIVE MESSAGE
“What is the value of the Naval Postgraduate School?”
This simple and straightforward question, in times of budgetary challenges and difficult decisions, has 
been posed to leaders of NPS many times. And rightly so, for when an institution is the steward of public 
funds and trust, it simply must ensure there is persistent value in everything it endeavors, at all times. 
This is also a question that the leadership of this institution, and many others, have answered many times, 
and in many forms, throughout the university’s history. Whether it be written word or spoken thought, 
detailed analysis or alumni testimonials, the value of NPS has been documented many times over. 
In early 2011, recognizing the collective intellect within the academic halls of our campus, I asked 
CDR Doug Burton to form the Question-Team, or Q-Team, to study the intricacies of determining 
value for an institution such as NPS. The charter of this team was to “produce research questions about 
the value of NPS” while considering “all relevant perspectives.” 
After several weeks of detailed examination and research, the Q-Team presented their report to NPS’ 
leadership, and much of what they uncovered during this process told a compelling story. Articles 
dating back many years through current works, detailed studies and data sets, all documenting and 
demonstrating real value. While the Q-Team’s report highlighted several important variables in ana-
lyzing institutional value, it also set NPS upon a course of compiling the evidence that would answer 
that all-important question. The result is this multi-volume Value Book.
Within these pages lies the beginning of what will be an ever-expanding resource both within and 
beyond the halls of NPS. The documentation contained in these volumes is organized as follows:
VOLUME 1 — PUBLISHED WORKS
This compilation of previously published works provides written testaments to the value of 
NPS. Each work begins with a one-page Executive Summary highlighting key points within 
the article. The full text of each document follows.
VOLUME 2 — ALUMNI and FRIENDS
This volume presents those honored individuals who are current members of the NPS Hall 
of Fame, and our Distinguished Alumni. Each of these leaders is represented by a biography 
and a few select published articles giving context to their contributions to the defense estab-
lishment. This volume also contains several direct quotations from key leaders throughout 
the world, offering their own testament to NPS’ worth.
VOLUME 3 — BENCHMARKING and ANALYSES
In this volume are gathered together all the data collection and analyses in which NPS com-
pares itself against a set of peer institutions. Comprising such topics as faculty salaries, staff-
ing, graduation rates and more, these reports are updated each year.
VOLUME 4 — SURVEYS
NPS regularly conducts surveys of graduating students and alumni. Additionally, ad hoc 
surveys for specific purposes are administered. This volume presents all the reports, with 
annual and historical trends, which have been completed using survey data.
I invite you to explore these resources, and begin to formulate your own answer to the question, “What is 
the value of NPS?” Better yet, please do not hesitate to contribute or suggest content for these resources 
through the NPS Office of Institutional Advancement at pao@nps.edu. While we believe these volumes 
create a truly compelling story, we also hope it represents only the beginning.
Thank you.
Dan Oliver 
President, Naval Postgraduate School
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title  Education and Training Joint Cross Service 
Group Professional Development Education 
Subgroup JPME/PME
source NPS Internal Document, Author Unknown, 2004
abstract  While preparing for BRAC, this table of comparative military value was gener-
ated. This looks at the Naval Postgraduate School compared to 17 other mili-
tary schools.
excerpt  The Naval Postgraduate School received the highest “numerical military val-
ue score of 74.7 in graduate education” — the highest score of all 17 military 
schools studied.
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Education and Training Joint Cross Service Group
Professional Development Education Subgroup
JPME/PME
Installation/Location  Numerical Military Value Score
Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA 65.3
Ft. Leavenworth, KS  59.3
Maxwell AFB, AL  53.8
Carlisle Barracks, PA  53.6
Ft. McNair, DC  52.7 *
Naval Station Newport, RI  52.5
Naval Station Norfolk, VA  47.5
Graduate Education
Monterey, CA (Naval Postgraduate School)  74.7
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (Air Force Institute of Technology) 52.0
Other Full Time Education (Defense Agencies)
Ft. Belvoir, VA (Defense Acquisition University) 58.8
Memphis, TN (Defense Contract Audit Institute) 40.5
Patrick AFB, FL (Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute) 43.7
Other Full Time Education (Chaplains)
Ft. Jackson, SC  51.6
Maxwell AFB, AL  41.3
Naval Station Newport, RI  34.1
Other Full Time Education (JAGs)
Maxwell AFB, AL  45.4
Charlottesville, VA  33.5
Naval Station Newport, RI  33.2
* Fort McNair’s military value score did not include data for Lincoln Hall nor buildable
acres, reference 2 Feb 05 E&T JCSG meeting minutes.
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title What is the Value of NPS
please note  The only name found associated with this document is G. W. Conner who 
made revisions on 7/10/03.
abstract  The outline gives an overview of the objectives and values of the Naval Post-
graduate School curricula. Stressed are NPS’ unique programs as essential to 
the Navy’s and other armed services officers’ combat-effectiveness, as well as 
educating officers from over 50 countries. NPS’ costs are reviewed and com-
pared to costs for graduate degrees at civilian universities.
excerpts  “Cost comparisons are being made erroneously between civilian universities 
market price (tuition) and NPS full costs. Tuition covers 15–25% of public and 
25–30% of private universities’ full cost … Analysis has shown NPS to be aver-
age to below average in total costs.”
  “NPS is in the forefront providing specialized programs that support U.S. na-
tional security priorities, including counterterrorism, homeland security, and 
security cooperation.”
  “Whereas the NPS metric of effectiveness is to take proven warfighters, some-
times with low GPAs, and recast them as strong technical graduate students; 
the same students, however, would not gain entry into Tier One schools whose 
metric of effectiveness is much different and not meant to measure the effec-
tiveness of a proven combat warrior leading people and managing complex 
weapons systems.”
  “Immediate access to cutting-edge IT R&D work will be terminated if NPS 
is closed. More generally, the synergistic combination of graduate education 
in disciplines and curricula critical to the future of our defense establishment 
with high-impact research in crucial technologies directly relevant to DOD’s 
mission is simply not found in either national laboratories with no capacity or 
interest in educating military officers or in civilian universities that engage in 
little or no defense R&D.”
  “Future multinational operations that will be ever more important as we wage 
the GWOT will suffer if the extensive mutual understanding, trust, and good-
will that results from intensive interactions across this ‘global’ population of 
future military leaders are terminated by the closure of NPS.”
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What is the Value of NPS?
It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy 
should be a capable mariner. He must be that, of 
course, but also a great deal more. He should be as 
well a gentleman of much education, refined man-
ners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of 
personal honor.
Charles V said that a man who knew four languages 
was worth four men; and Alexander the Great so 
valued learning, that he used to say he was more in-
debted to Aristotle for giving him knowledge that 
than his father Philip for giving him life.
 THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
IS THE NAVy’S UNIVERSITy
•	 	Essential	to	the	Navy’s	education	continuum	for	




•	 	Inextricably	 linked	 to	 the	 Unified	 Combatant	
Commanders
•	 	A	 key	 element	 in	 the	 nation’s	 national	 security	
strategy
•	 	Vital	 to	DoD’s	 interactions	with	 other	 agencies	
and nations for national security
 ESSENTIAL TO THE NAVy’S EDUCATION 
CONTINUUM fOR ENSURING COMBAT-
EffECTIVENESS Of MILITARy AND 
CIVILIANS
•	 	NPS	 offers	 education	 in	Monterey	 and	 around	
the world with a full array of short courses, cer-
tificates and mobile education.
•	 	NPS	provides	 engineering,	 technical,	 analytical,	
managerial, and national security programs not 
available at civilian institutions to the Depart-
ment of the Navy and most other national secu-
rity organizations. 
•	 	The	Navy	is	provided	robust,	high-quality	resident	
education programs to meet the needs of the naval 
services for operating in a joint environment. The 
Navy is also provided augment residential pro-
grams with distance learning programs. 
 INTEGRAL TO JOINT AND COMBINED 
PROfESSIONAL MILITARy EDUCATION
•	 	The	student	body	reflects	the	operating	environ-
ment. By 2006, 1800 military officers, defense 
civilians, enlisted, defense contractors, and other 
agency representatives from the United States 
and other nations will be studying in resident 
programs at NPS.
•	 	Another	4,000	or	more	students	will	be	enrolled	in	
degree or certificate programs around the world.
•	 	NPS	is	partnered	with	many	defense	and	civilian	
university partnerships that allow NPS to deliver 
defense-related education when and where it is 
needed. A few notable examples of new and ex-
panding partnerships include:
  ~  The Air Force Institute of Technology and 
NPS provide education that allows the 
conceptualization, development and use of 
weapons systems by our military forces.
  ~  Naval War College for Joint Professional 
Military Education.
  ~  Stanford University for Homeland Security.
  ~  University of Maryland, Smith School of 
Business for a defense-related MBA.
•	 	The	“pocket	model”	of	 insurgency	and	counter-
insurgency developed in the Seminar on Guerril-
la Warfare provided the framework that was used 
to successfully prosecute the campaign against 
the Abu Sayyaf Organization in the Philippines 
between 2001–2002. 
  ~  The campaign was developed by SOCPAC 
under the command of General Wooster. 
  ~  Several SOLIC graduates lead the planning 
effort, putting the model they had learned 
into practice. 
  ~  General Wooster uses this as an example 
of the interrelationship between education 
and operational effectiveness. 
 INEXTRICABLy LINKED TO THE UNIfIED 
COMBATANT COMMANDERS
•	 	NPS	works	closely	with	 the	Unified	Combatant	
Commanders to provide the relevant education 
and research critical to the combat mission. NPS 
faculty will work with the UCC’s on real world 
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problems, on-site and with students back on the 
main campus. Recent 2002–2003 examples of 
this include:
  ~  Homeland Defense and Security programs 
for Northern Command and Pacific Com-
mand.
  ~  Counterterrorism programs in support of 
Unified Combatant Commanders initia-
tives.
  ~  NPS faculty and students’ direct support 
to Millenium Challenge 02 for Joint Forces 
Command.
  ~  For Special Operations Command, a Spe-
cial Ops curriculum and related research 
on UAV’s, tactical decision aids, and other 
warfighting advances.
  ~  Information security for Strategic Com-
mand.
  ~  Graduate education for National Guard 
division staffs deploying to Europe Com-
mand countries.
  ~  NPS faculty provide about $75 million of 
research to the Navy, Unified Combatant 
Commanders and the Services. 
VITAL TO DOD’S INTERACTIONS WITH 
OTHER AGENCIES AND NATIONS fOR 
NATIONAL SECURITy
•	 	NPS	 is	 in	 the	 forefront	 providing	 specialized	
programs that support U.S. national security 
priorities, including counterterrorism, home-
land security, and security cooperation. We de-
veloped master’s degree programs and seminars 
on Homeland Defense and Security, as well as 
Counterdrug Strategy and Policy, for the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, Chief of Naval Op-
erations, NORTHCOM, and the National Guard.
•	 	NPS	programs	strengthen	democratic	civil-mil-
itary relationships in countries throughout the 
world. 
  ~  National security decision-making in In-
donesia
  ~  National security strategy development in 
Colombia
  ~  Ministry of Defense reorganization in Tai-
wan




•	 	Homeland	 Defense	 and	 Security	 graduate	 pro-
gram for the Department of Homeland Security, 
NORTHCOM, and the National Guard.
•	 	NPS	has	strong	links	with	NASA	in	focused	areas	
of space research, and offers education and train-
ing for future astronaut candidates. NASA spon-
sors the annual Michael J. Smith NASA Chair at 
NPS.
•	 	NPS	 receives	 sizeable	 annual	 funding	 from	 the	
National Science Foundation for basic research 
in oceanography, meteorology, information sci-
ences, engineering, technology development, 





best to develop a national security strategy, man-
age limited resources, and further civilian-mili-
tary relations.
•	 	Afghanistan,	 Tajikistan,	 and	 Kazakhstan:	 En-
hance U.S. bilateral security cooperation with 
Central Asian countries by assisting these coun-
tries on defense resources and management.
COST
•	 	Items	that	drive	costs	at	NPS:
  ~  Stated requirements called Educational 
Skill Requirements which drive education 
in addition to degree requirements.
   –  Navy’s requirement is for the ESR; de-
grees are issued to individuals.
   –  Credit hours of instruction to meet the 
Navy’s stated requirements are greater 
than the degree requirements.
  ~  Year-round operations: 
   –  Many civilian universities do not have 
a full schedule available in the summer 
term.
	 	 	 –	 	NPS	 accepts	 new	 fleet	 warriors	 each	
quarter into all of its curriculums. 
   –  Most civilian institutions are lock-step 
and if a student does not matriculate in 
the Fall than they must wait until the 
following year to start.
  ~  Cost that NPS endures in converting non-
technical	 warfighters	 from	 the	 fleet	 into	
technical graduate students who earn tech-
nical	degrees	and	return	to	the	fleet.	
  ~  NPS metric of effectiveness is to take prov-
en warfighters, sometimes with low GPAs, 
and recast them as strong technical gradu-
ate students. 
   –  The same students, however, would not 
gain entry into Tier One schools whose 
metric of effectiveness is much different 
and not meant to measure the effective-
ness of a proven combat warrior leading 
people and managing complex weapons 
systems. 
  ~  NPS supports Navy and Marine Corps 
with directly applied research, advice, and 
work.
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COST COMPARISONS 
•	 	Comparisons	 are	 being	 made	 erroneously	 be-
tween civilian universities’ market price (tuition) 
and NPS full costs. 
•	 	Tuition	covers	15–25%	of	public	and	25–30%	of	
private universities’ full cost. 
  ~  One would wonder why a civilian universi-
ty would provide large numbers of degrees 
to Naval officers at the cost of tuition. 
  ~  USAF discovered (during their attempts to 
close AFIT) that in order to meet the stated 
requirements, civilian universities were 
15–90% more expensive in all cases, and 
they wanted guaranteed source of fund-
ing that went beyond tuition; AFIT was the 
best value.
  ~  Analysis has shown NPS to be average to 
below average in total costs. 
  ~  If Navy pays only tuition, then Navy does 
not meet its stated/verified/certified re-
quirements. 
•	 	Navy	believes	 that	 tuition	for	a	graduate	degree	
will be $27,000 at a civilian university.
  ~  This is a academic year charge which is for 
nine months.
  ~  Studies have shown the total cost of an NPS 
degree is $36,000 for twelve months of tai-
lored instruction.
   –  Other costs at NPS are spread to sup-
port tenants, research which is a part 
of the NPS mission, and administrative 
overhead for the civilian university pro-
grams.
•	 	Percent	funded	by	Navy	has	dropped	to	42%	with	




tively to other such emerging crises will be sig-
nificantly reduced if the NPS assets are thrown 
away by an ill-advised decision to close or realign 
the institution.
•	 	Navy	will	 loose	control	 in	dictating	how	robust	
and rigorous each curriculum should be.
•	 	It	is	myopic	to	believe	warfighters	sent	to	civilian	
institutions will receive the same in-depth NPS 
education. 
•	 	Bluntly	put,	they	will	receive	an	inferior	education	
that the Secretary of Navy has no control over. 
•	 	The	perception	that	civilian	universities	can	meet	
Navy’s needs over time is false.
UNIqUENESS
•	 	NPS	 curriculum	 is	 also	 unique	 because	 of	 the	
fluid	exchange	of	intellectual	capital	among	stu-
dents from all four services as well as 300 stu-
dents from over 60 countries that attend NPS.
	 	 ~	 	The	King	 of	 Jordan,	 the	 Turkish	Chief	 of	
Naval Operation, Chief of Staff of the Israel 
Air Force and many others are graduates of 
NPS.
•	 	Unique	 requirements	 are	 levied	by	 Secretary	of	
Navy on naval warfighting graduate education. 
  ~  These requirements are called Educational 
Skill Requirements (ESRs). 
  ~  They require the NPS student to take a 
much more in-depth and rounded educa-
tion than is offered in civilian universities. 
   –  Put simply, once every two years a Navy 
Flag Officer verifies and ensures that ev-
ery NPS curriculum is the most rigor-
ous and relevant curriculum possible.
   –  Consequently, the same civilian degree 
does not equal an NPS degree. 
•	 	Courses	of	study	available	at	US	(civilian)	univer-
sities are poorly matched with Navy needs.
  ~  Faculty and students tend toward the ex-
otic and theoretical at the expense of the 
practical applied sciences needed for naval 
operations.
  ~  There is little indication that the Navy 
COMPARATIVE NPS GRADUATE MIL ITARy  
EDUC ATION COSTS
Annual costs per student,1 with adjustments for students’ salary/benefits,2 program dura-
tion,3 transition and refresher courses,4 course load and contact hours.5
1Student population is defined as full time equivalent students at NPS; fall enrollment elsewhere.
2Military	Salary	and	benefits	is	$63,300/year	at	NPS;	$72,300	elsewhere,	reflecting	higher	off-base	housing	costs.	Program	duration	is	
24 months at civilian universities.
3NPS program duration is 22.8 months, including transition and refresher courses.
4NPS graduate program duration is 18 months, excluding transition and refresher courses.
5Civilian universities include 972 class hours (a 24 month program with 13 class hours/week for 32 weeks during the normal academic 
year, plus 7 class hours/week for 10 weeks during the summer). NPS program includes 1152 class hours (an 18 month program with 
16 class hours/week, 48 weeks/year). The NPS cost per class hour would be the same for the graduate program plus transition and 
refresher courses (class hours and program costs both increase proportionally).
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leadership prizes (graduate) education as a 
necessary component of an officer’s back-
ground.
WHy IN MONTEREy? PROXIMITy TO 
GREAT UNIVERSITIES, SILICON VALLEy, 
MIIS, DLI, qUALITy Of LIfE, OCEAN, 
RANGES, LLNL PARTNERSHIP, AND ???
•	 	Reasons	 for	why	NPS	 is	 and	 should	be	 in	Mon-
terey remain much the same as they were when 
NPS was established. Access to open ocean, access 
to ranges and uncontrolled airspace and a city that 
is not a distraction to the officer students.
•	 	If	we	close	NPS	and	disperse	its	students	to	civil-
ian institutions we will lose these unique capabil-
ities and we will never recover them: the faculty 
who are central to operating this enterprise will 
migrate to other research universities. 
•	 	Moving	selected	components	of	the	NPS	to	col-
locate with other naval facilities will also lead to 
the loss of most of our research faculty and their 
unique skills and knowledge.
  ~  Air, land and ocean facilities that are in use 
today. Finding other airspace, for example 
on the East coast, that will allow the 24/7 
operation of UAVs at altitudes up to and in 




more important as we wage the GWOT will suffer 
if the extensive mutual understanding, trust, and 
goodwill that results from intensive interactions 
across this ‘global’ population of future military 
leaders are terminated by the closure of NPS.
•	 	A	tactical	decision	to	close	the	School	at	this	criti-
cal time in the nation’s efforts to increase the sup-
ply of defense scientists and engineers would be a 




best to develop a national security strategy, man-
age limited resources, and further civilian-mili-
tary relations.
•	 	Afghanistan,	 Tajikistan,	 and	 Kazakhstan:	 En-
hance U.S. bilateral security cooperation with 
Central Asian countries by assisting these coun-
tries on defense resources and management.
•	 	NPS	programs	strengthen	democratic	civil-mil-
itary relationships in countries throughout the 
world. 
  ~  National Security decision-making in In-
donesia
  ~  National Security strategy development in 
Colombia
  ~  Ministry of Defense reorganization in Tai-
wan
  ~  Security Building in Afghanistan
•	 	Homeland	 Defense	 and	 Security	 graduate	 pro-
gram for the Department of Homeland Security, 
NORTHCOM, and the National Guard.
PERCENT NAVy ENROLLMENT 
ENROLLMENT MIX
US Off-CAMPUS PROGRAMS
•	 	NPS	 offers	 degrees,	 certificates,	 short	 courses,	
Directory | Maps | CalendarSearch
Home Design One | Level One-One |  Home D esign Two |  Level One-Two |  Home D esign Thr ee | Level  One- Thr ee
Allied and Coalition
NATO Partnership for Peace Education 
and Training Centre
• Designated by Sec of State in 2004
• Only U.S. institution 
• 2351 resident students 1994-2004
Defense Resource Management Institute
• ~28,000 students from 160 countries and US
• Mobile Education Teams
Center for Civil-Military Relations
• Mobile Education Teams, 427 programs, 21,168 participants 
11,028 US, 10140 International
Directory | Maps | CalendarSearch
Home Design One | Level One-One |  Home D esign Two |  Level One-Two |  Home D esign Thr ee | Level  One- Thr ee



















Student HighlightsResident Degree Program Enrollment 
(Summer 2004) Total Resident: 1,586
U.S. (82%)
•All Military Services
•Other Government                           
Agencies                                                      
International (18%)
•291 Residents                                                   
from 57 countries
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web-based, forward presence, e.g., Regional Se-
curity Education Program, to over 15,000 stu-
dents last year.
NAVy’S NEEDS fOR HIGH-TECH
•	 	The	Navy	has	an	increasing	need	for	officers	who	
can:
 ~  comprehend the potential for warfighting that 
new technologies bring
 ~  understand both the opportunities and limi-
tations of the new technologies
 ~  choose among competing technical avenues
 ~  critically assess and lead technological devel-
opments
 ~  formulate practicable new technological vi-
sions
•	 	Technically	 literate	 personnel	 will	 enable	 the	
navy to field more effective fighting units, but the 
present trend with regard to technical literacy 
among navy personnel is negative, and sounds 
the alarm for the desired impact of technology 
on the Navy in the next 35 years
NEED TO MOVE fROM TRADITIONAL 
WARfARE TO UNCONVENTIONAL 
WARfARE
•	 	NPS	is	leading	the	way	in	developing	unconven-
tional warfare education that will move the na-
tion into the 21 Century.
RESEARCH 
•	 	Immediate	access	to	cutting-edge	IT	R&D	work	
will be terminated if NPS is closed. 
•	 	More	 generally,	 the	 synergistic	 combination	 of	
graduate education in disciplines and curricula 
critical to the future of our defense establishment 
with high-impact research in crucial technolo-
gies directly relevant to DOD’s mission is simply 
not found in either national laboratories with no 
capacity or interest in educating military officers 
or in civilian universities that engage in little or 
no defense R&D. 
ADMISSION Of OffICERS
•	 	Civilian	university	admission	criteria	are	a	major	
caveat that must be considered. 
•	 	Besides	 the	 minimum	 3.0	 undergrad	 GPA	 re-
quired for most Tier One schools, the undergrad 
degree usually is in the same field as the NPS. 
 ~  This is not true of the NPS. For example, 15% 
of NPS’ engineering and science graduates 
had non-technical degrees at the bachelor’s 
level. 
 ~  There are no Tier One graduate schools that 
would take non-technical students and admit 
them into a technical degree programs in the 
numbers required by the Secretary of Navy. 
•	 	NPS	converts	non-technical	warfighters	from	the	
fleet	 into	 technical	 graduate	 students	who	 earn	
technical	degrees	and	return	to	the	fleet.	
•	 	Whereas	the	NPS	metric	of	effectiveness	is	to	take	
proven warfighters, sometimes with low GPAs, 
and recast them as strong technical graduate 
students; the same students, however, would not 
gain entry into Tier One schools whose metric 
of effectiveness is much different and not meant 
to measure the effectiveness of a proven combat 
warrior leading people and managing complex 
weapons systems. 
•	 	NPS	accepts	new	fleet	warriors	each	quarter	into	
all of its curriculua. Most civilian institutions are 
lock-step and if a student does not matriculate in 
the Fall than they must wait until the following 
year to start
THE DEfENSE DEPARTMENT HAS A 
PROBLEM: IT NEEDS TO HIRE MORE 
THAN 14,000 CIVILIAN SCIENTISTS AND 




ates from American universities are foreign na-
tionals, who are mostly off limits to federal agen-
cies. 
•	 	Fewer	 American	 students	 are	 entering	 science	
and tech fields than in previous years. 
•	 	Moreover,	DoD	must	 compete	with	 the	 private	
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sector and other agencies for that talent and 
many engineering students aren’t even aware jobs 
await them at DoD.
•	 	Naval	Postgraduate	School	is	ninth	in	the	nation	
in the production of science and technology mas-
ter degrees.
•	 	NPS	is	currently	producing	18–20	civilian	gradu-
ates a year to serve in the cyber-corps in all agen-
cies of the government. 
The benefits of geographic balance?
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The Naval Postgraduate School — It’s About Value 
By ADMIRAL HENRy H. MAUz JR . , U.S . NAVy (RETIRED) , AND WILLIAM R. GATES  
Naval Institute Proceedings, 126/8/1,170 (August 2000), pp. 60-63 
www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles00/promauz.htm
The Department of the Navy has been under severe 
budget pressure for most of the past decade. Shortag-
es in people, parts, maintenance funding, and train-
ing opportunities have combined with a multitude of 
commitments and a high operating tempo to strain 
our forces. There has been insufficient investment in 
ships and airplanes, and a tremendous bow wave of 
requirements looms on the horizon even to maintain 
the	size	of	today’s	too-small	fleet.	It	is	not	surprising	
that naval leaders are looking for ways to cut costs in 
all “support” areas, including graduate education. 
Graduate education in the Department of the Navy 
is provided mainly by the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS). The cost of sending students to NPS has been 
under close scrutiny for some years, to see if funds 
could be squeezed out for other purposes, and the 
department has commissioned several studies to 
look for alternative ways to provide graduate educa-
tion at less cost. For the most part, however, these 
studies	have	been	flawed	by	imbalanced	analysis,	in-
adequate research, and preordained outcomes. 
In her July Proceedings article, “Rethinking the Na-
val Postgraduate School” (July 2000, pp. 46-49), re-
tired Navy Lieutenant Commander Janice Graham 
offers yet another view. Driven largely by her inter-
pretation of the Department of the Navy’s values 
and objectives for graduate education and a superfi-
cial analysis of relative education costs, Commander 
Graham offers education vouchers, privatization, 
and outsourcing as alternatives to NPS graduate 
education.1	These	recommendations	seem	to	reflect	
the notion that one graduate degree will serve the 
department just about as well as any other. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. 
THE VALUE Of RELEVANT  
GRADUATE EDUCATION 
For the Navy, the longstanding “P-Code” system 
identifies the billets requiring graduate education in 
specific academic areas, but those billets are almost 
entirely ashore and mainly in Washington.2 There is 
a much larger requirement for graduate education 
than that dictated by the narrow confines of the P-
Code system. It seems reasonable, for example, for a 
few officers serving on board, say, an aircraft carrier 
or an Aegis cruiser to have had graduate education 
in	an	area	of	practical	value	to	the	fleet.	Department	
heads certainly would benefit from graduate work 
in virtually any curricula offered by NPS. More im-
portant, their ships or squadrons would benefit, too. 
The Fleets are trying to be more involved in the re-
quirements process, and NPS graduates will be in-
creasingly	important	to	fleet	understanding	of	how	
systems work and how they are integrated into a 
larger whole. Upgrades and new systems are being 
introduced continuously, but few of our end us-
ers have the background to understand them fully 
and use them effectively. We can’t offer everyone a 
graduate	education,	but	our	fleet	officers	ought	to	be	
more than just a cadre of “button pushers.” 
In spite of Commander Graham’s assertion to the 
contrary,3 there is evidence that most senior leaders 
in the Department of the Navy place great value on 
graduate education. Facing rapidly changing tech-
nology, new missions, and evolving military strate-
gy, they recognize that education is a key to preserv-
ing maritime dominance. In fact, the Marine Corps 
has almost doubled the number of Marine students 
at NPS in the past several years. 
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WHAT NPS GRADUATE EDUCATION 
PROVIDES 
The mission and objectives of a Department of the 
Navy-funded graduate school are clearly specified. 
With guidance from Title 10 U.S.C., Section 7041-
7047, and SecNav Instruction 1524.2A (4 April 1989), 
the Chief of Naval Operations’ “Vision Statement for 
Graduate Education” (5 May 1999), and its own vi-
sion statement (www.nps.navy.mil), the Naval Post-
graduate School for more than 90 years has provided 
graduates able to serve well in a wide variety of coded 
billets. These graduates have brought their education 
to	the	fleet	as	well,	which	probably	is	of	even	greater	
value to the services. Besides honing graduates to fill 
specific jobs, there are other critical characteristics 
that distinguish NPS from civilian universities: 
•	 	NPS	 provides	 curricula	 that	 are	 militarily	 rel-
evant, meeting Navy and Marine Corps sub-
specialty and general education requirements. 
Degree programs serendipitously chosen by the 
officer corps would not match service needs. 
•	 	NPS	curricula	are	subject	to	biennial	Navy	flag-
level sponsor review for military relevancy, with 
the ability to implement desired course and pro-
gram changes swiftly. 
•	 	Entrance	 to	 NPS	 is	 controlled	 by	military	 per-
formance and demonstrated aptitude rather than 
undergraduate grade-point average and stan-
dardized testing. 
•	 	NPS	provides	able	and	motivated	officers	the	op-
portunity to transition from one undergraduate 
area to a different graduate major (unlike indus-
try, the military cannot hire mid-career talent 
with the desired skill sets; it must educate from 
within). Astronaut Winston Scott, for example, 
transitioned from an undergraduate music major 
to a master’s in aeronautical engineering at NPS. 
•	 	NPS	provides	refresher	courses	to	allow	students	
to renew academic skills after several years of on-
the-job performance. 
•	 	Faculty	 and	 students	 participate	 in	 more	 than	
500 research projects per year on issues of inter-
est to sponsoring (funding) agencies from the 
Department of the Navy and throughout the U.S. 
government.4 
•	 	The	NPS	student	body	combines	 junior	officers	
from the Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, 
National Guard, defense agencies, and more than 
60 foreign countries to explore technical, opera-
tional and strategic problems. 
This partnership among students, faculty, sponsors, 
and foreign militaries produces an unparalleled 
educational opportunity. There also are important 
linkages between the Naval Postgraduate School, the 
geographic commanders-in-chief, and the Fleets. 
If the Department of the Navy sought to replicate 
these attributes in civilian universities, it would have 
to establish Navy and Marine Corps programs un-
der civilian control (with significant augmentation). 
Naval leaders control these attributes at NPS; they 
would have to be contractually specified in civilian 
universities, with questionable results.5 
Many of the Postgraduate School’s technical and 
nontechnical fields appear to have civilian counter-
parts, but NPS curricula have the advantage of being 
uniquely tailored to satisfy Department of the Navy 
subspecialty requirements as well as civilian-sector 
degree requirements and accreditation standards. 
For example, both NPS and civilian universities of-
fer master’s degrees in management, but the NPS 
programs add defense-specific issues to the general 
material. Contract management at NPS includes 
Defense and Navy Department contracting policies, 
requirements, and case studies. Manpower Systems 
Analysis addresses the software, data bases, and an-
alytical techniques peculiar to military manpower 
analysis. There are other examples of synergy, too, 
such as the National Security Affairs Department 
being able to draw on the presence of 250 foreign 
officer students from 60 countries. 
NPS is responsive to Department of the Navy and 
curriculum sponsor direction in ways that may be 
transparent to the outside observer. For example, at 
the behest of Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski when 
he was Director, Space, Information Warfare, Com-
mand and Control, NPS changed the electronic/
information warfare curricula significantly. The 
school also developed two new 18-month master’s 
programs--Information, Systems, and Operations 
and Systems Engineering and Integration--specif-
ically designed to meet the needs of unrestricted 
line officers. Both include joint professional military 
education. A relatively new 18-month interservice, 
interdisciplinary curriculum for special warfare of-
ficers, sponsored by U.S. Southern Command and 
initiated under the close scrutiny of its Command-
er-in-Chief, is very popular with that community. 
Students also have increasing opportunities to 
complete phase one of professional military educa-
tion during their standard NPS tours, taking classes 
from on-site Naval War College instructors. Finally, 
NPS is working with Navy sponsors and operational 
forces to provide distance learning, including both 
traditional NPS degree courses and graduate-level 
short courses.6
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COST EffECTIVENESS 
Any analysis of cost-effectiveness must first consid-
er educational objectives. If the Department of the 
Navy validates subspecialty-based curricula, which 
it has, then the alternatives include maintaining the 
Naval Postgraduate School, outsourcing, and priva-
tization. If the department were to adopt a general 
education model, the alternatives would include a 
restructured NPS and tuition payment to civilian 
institutions.7
Subspeciality-based Graduate Education. For the 
government to consider outsourcing or privatiza-
tion, private-sector graduate education must offer 
better performance or lower costs, resulting in bet-
ter value. Office of Management and Budget Circu-
lar A-76 emphasizes the need to normalize for dif-
ferences in outputs when comparing costs between 
government and commercial producers. 
If we attempt to analyze the cost to provide subspe-
cialty-based graduate education, comparing NPS’ 
costs to the existing tuition rates at civilian universi-
ties will not provide meaningful data. Endowments 
and state and local taxes subsidize civilian tuition. 
Civilian universities likely would view an outsourc-
ing or privatization proposal as a business opportu-
nity that they would enter if profitable; it is unrea-
sonable to think that they have excess endowment 
funds or tax financing to subsidize Department of 
the Navy graduate education.8 Thus, an appropriate 
comparison involves total education costs, given a 
standardized educational offering. 
Unfortunately for purposes of comparison, there 
are important differences between the Naval Post-
graduate School and civilian universities. Unique 
attributes that increase NPS’ average education cost 
per student per year relative to the standard civilian-
sector model include: 
•	 	Military-relevant	 graduate	 education	 that	 satis-
fies both general education and subspecialty re-
quirements 
•	 	Dedication	to	graduate	education	(instruction	by	
regular faculty; no teaching assistants) 
•	 Academic	scheduling	with	heavy	class	loads	
•	 	Quarterly	admissions	with	demand-driven	course	
scheduling (courses scheduled to guarantee on-
time graduation) 
•	 	Required	theses	in	all	degree	programs
•	 	A	 military	 infrastructure	 superimposed	 on	 a	
traditional academic infrastructure to maintain 
professional and military aspects of officer-stu-
dent careers
•	 	Infrastructure	to	support	classified	courses,	labo-
ratories, and student/faculty research 
In addition, the Department of the Navy also pays 
students’ full salaries and benefits while they attend 
in-residence graduate programs. These costs can be 
significant, and they are important considerations 
if graduate programs differ in duration. The most 
critical adjustments to be made in this area when 
comparing costs include:9 
•	 	Academic	Calendar	and	Course	Scheduling.	The	
Navy and Marine Corps want every day of gradu-
ate education to count because an officer’s time 
away	from	the	fleet	is	precious.	Thus,	the	typical	
NPS student receives 16 hours of instruction per 
week and attends class 48 weeks per year. This to-
tals 768 hours of instruction per year. In contrast, 
civilian-sector graduate students typically receive 
486 hours of instruction per year, including sum-
mer classes, when course selection typically is 
limited.10 
•	 	Dual	General	Academic	and	Subspecialty	Educa-
tional Requirements. The average NPS graduate 
degree program requires 18 months and involves 
1,152 hours of class instruction; civilian universi-
ties would require 28 months to deliver an equiv-
alent course content.11 
•	 	Focus	on	Graduate	Education.	Graduate	educa-
tion is more expensive than undergraduate edu-
cation. Graduate class sizes are smaller, professors 
are not supplemented by teaching assistants, and 
instruction and research require more expensive 
equipment and specialized laboratories, especial-
ly if students must complete master’s theses. This 
is particularly significant for technical graduate 
programs. One analysis found that graduate edu-
cation in Washington, Florida, and Illinois was 
two to three times as expensive as undergraduate 
education.12 
•	 	Student	 Salaries	 and	Benefits.	 If	NPS	 and	 civil-
ian programs are of different duration (e.g., 18 
versus 28 months), any cost comparison must 
include the students’ salaries and benefits. The 
Department of the Navy’s Director, Assessment 
Division, estimated that the annual cost of salary, 
benefits, and housing per NPS-resident officer 
totaled $63,300, compared to $72,300 per officer-
student at civilian institutions.13 The higher ci-
vilian	cost	reflects	the	fact	that	most	NPS	officers	
live in base housing. 
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A 1998 study by Linda Cavalluzzo and Donald Cym-
rot compared cost data for postsecondary education 
in 28 civilian universities and NPS. We normalized 
that data for the effects of NPS’ unique academic 
calendar and course scheduling, dual general educa-
tion and subspecialty academic requirements, focus 
on graduate education, and student salary and ben-
efit considerations.14 With these adjustments, the 
current graduate education costs per master’s degree 
student range from $570,500 (California Institute 
of Technology) to $208,400 (University of Texas at 
Austin). The average for the 28 civilian universities 
considered is $268,300. NPS’ graduate education 
costs are $207,200--lower than all the civilian insti-
tutions considered. Student salaries and benefits are 
included in these figures and account for anywhere 
between 25% and 70% of the totals, with an average 
of 53%. 
As these results show, when data are normalized for 
the school’s unique aspects, the Naval Postgraduate 
School is cost competitive with civilian universities. 
It is unlikely, therefore, that the total costs of in-resi-
dence subspecialty-based graduate education for the 
Department of the Navy would be reduced by out-
sourcing or privatization. In fact, NPS would look 
even more cost-effective after adjusting for other 
cost-related unique attributes.15 
This result is counter to the conventional view that 
annual costs per student are greater at NPS than at 
civilian institutions. The primary explanation for this 
difference is workload. Because annual student work-
loads are approximately 60% higher at NPS than at ci-
vilian graduate programs, and because higher student 
workloads use faculty more intensively, the average 
annual cost per student is increased. But the length--
and thus ultimate cost--of a standardized degree pro-
gram is reduced considerably. 
General Graduate Education. If the Department 
of the Navy were to adopt a general education ob-
jective, comparing current costs at the Naval Post-
graduate School to tuition rates at civilian institu-
tions	still	would	be	meaningless.	NPS’	costs	reflect	
subspecialty-based graduate education; to compare 
NPS costs with civilian institutions would require 
first defining a general education curriculum struc-
ture at NPS. This is beyond this article’s scope, but 
we offer some observations. 
On the surface, cost-effectiveness of general gradu-
ate education at NPS is unlikely to compare favor-
ably with tuition costs at civilian institutions. This is 
because tuition covers only a portion of educational 
costs at civilian universities--endowments and tax 
financing fund the balance.16 The Navy Depart-
ment, on the other hand, must pay all educational 
costs at NPS. This disadvantage would be offset to 
some extent by NPS providing more class hours per 
year	 and	 by	 flexible	 admissions	 timing.	 Returning	
students	to	the	fleet	more	quickly	reduces	the	asso-
ciated student salary and benefit costs by up to 40%. 
In addition, NPS admits students based on militarily 
relevant requirements. Civilian universities consider 
undergraduate academic records, standardized test 
scores, and, in some cases, relevant professional 
experience. Civilian admissions committees also 
balance the demographic characteristics of their 
incoming classes. The prestigious programs often 
suggested as alternatives to NPS are not undersub-
scribed by civilian students. Thus, they likely would 
limit admission to a very few of the most qualified 
Navy and Marine Corps students. This would cre-
ate problems for the Department of the Navy as it 
seeks quality civilian education for large numbers of 
service members. Of course, marginal schools that 
struggle to maintain enrollment would welcome 
large groups of Navy Department students willing 
to pay full tuition, but we should carefully consider 
the resulting tradeoff between cost and educational 
quality. Civilian universities are ranked on excel-
lence of education, not on costs. Why should the 
Navy Department’s university be ranked otherwise? 
A GOOD RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
The Department of the Navy’s objective for the Na-
val Postgraduate School is to provide technical, ana-
lytical graduate education in a variety of subspecial-
ty areas not available in civilian universities. General 
graduate education emphasizing entrepreneurial 
skills, public speaking, debate, and better business 
practices simply does not meet the naval services’ 
need. NPS includes this material in its curricula, but 
it specializes in developing and applying technology, 
knowledge, and intelligence to managing future se-
curity crises and wars, serving all military services 
and more than 60 foreign countries. NPS quickly 
adapts curricula to the sponsor’s changing needs, 
and its programs are well regarded by the nation’s 
higher educational community and highly valued by 
their curriculum sponsors, by commands receiving 
its graduates, and by foreign governments. Although 
many civilian institutions offer graduate education, 
none provide it with the unique naval and defense 
characteristics that the Naval Postgraduate School 
offers. 
Commander Graham’s article does highlight the 
importance of providing more visibility to the great 
national resource that is the Naval Postgraduate 
School. If the school were better understood by 
some of the budget-cutters in Washington, there 
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would be greater recognition that it produces the 
essential seed corn of tomorrow’s educated officer 
corps and is cost-effective in the process. 
To put this debate in perspective, consider that the 
annual budget of the Naval Postgraduate School is 
less than one tenth of one percent of the Department 
of the Navy’s budget. It produces an overwhelmingly 
good return on that investment. Even so, the school 
is not about costs; it is about value. NPS graduates 
will have a significant positive impact on the future 
of the Navy and Marine Corps. In fact, both ser-
vices would be well served to examine more closely 
their	requirements	for	graduates	to	serve	afloat	and	
ashore, and increase the number of students at NPS 
accordingly. All the studies in recent years, and the 
related discussion of realignment, relocation, out-
sourcing, privatization, and so on, have had a cor-
rosive effect on the school, its faculty, and even the 
students. Let’s hope those studies have run their 
course. It’s time to get on with graduate education at 
the Naval Postgraduate School. 
NOTES
1. Commander Graham states, “Initial forays to 
several top-tier private universities for the purpose 
of determining their interest in some type of part-
nership with NPS were most promising.” She does 
not provide any reference for this assertion, list the 
universities contacted, or describe the ground rules 
specified (student/faculty workloads; admissions 
timing, curriculum content and review; etc.). As 
such, it is difficult to determine the actual interest 
level in such partnerships. 
2. Commander Graham reports that only 20-25% 
of NPS graduates filled matching P-coded billets in 
the six years following graduation. The primary ref-
erence is Linda C. Cavalluzzo and Donald J. Cym-
rot, “A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship 
Schools,” CRM 97-24, Center for Naval Analyses, 
January 1998, p. 111. More detailed data in this re-
port (pp. 61-62) indicate that “exact matches” within 
six years equaled 54% and 30% in the restricted line 
and unrestricted line communities, respectively. 
Utilization rates after six years for a qualifying pay-
back tour (exact, closely related, or other qualifying 
match) were 91% and 67%, respectively. 
3. See also Cavalluzzo and Cymrot, “A Bottom-Up 
Assessment.” 
4.	 This	 reflects	 fiscal	 year	 2000	 reimbursable	 re-
search program as of 1 June 2000. 
5. Civilian universities are unlikely to develop/deliv-
er military-unique material, or the other attributes 
NPS offers, if DoN students simply pay civilian tu-
ition rates. 
6. This is consistent with SecNav Instruction 
1524.2A, which states: “The objectives of gradu-
ate education at the NPS are to prepare officers to 
fill subspecialty positions. . . . Graduate degree and 
nondegree (short courses) programs in technical 
and nontechnical fields shall be established by the 
Superintendent of the NPS in response to Navy and 
Marine Corps requirements.” 
7. Restructuring NPS into fewer, broader curricula 
would increase the emphasis on general education 
while retaining some focus on DoN- and DoD-
specific issues. Sending students to existing civil-
ian programs would mean losing all focus on DoN/
DoD issues unless the programs were augmented by 
Navy-funded material. 
8. Civilian universities would share their endow-
ments only if they enter outsourcing or privatization 
agreements out of a sense of public service, not as 
business opportunities. 
9. For a more complete discussion see William R. 
Gates,	Xavier	K.	Maruyama,	John	P.	Powers,	Richard	
E. Rosenthal, and Alfred W. M. Cooper, “A Bottom-
Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools: The NPS 
Faculty Critique of CAN’s Report,” NPS Technical 
Report NPS-FC-98-001, November 1998, pp. 11-22. 
10. NPS’ heavier academic load makes sense because 
the Navy and Marine Corps pay these students full 
salary and benefits; graduate students at civilian uni-
versities may need a lighter load to allow time for 
employment or other pursuits. 
11. Cavalluzzo and Cymrot, “A Bottom-Up Assess-
ment.” Alternatively, NPS and civilian university 
costs could be scaled to a 972-class-hour civilian 
graduate program. Relative costs are the same in 
either case; only the scale differs. Commander Gra-
ham asserts that NPS’ dual educational requirements 
increase degree program length; however, its more 
intensive academic calendar allows NPS to satisfy 
dual education requirements without extending the 
graduate program length. Transitional and refresher 
courses have a greater impact on program length. 
These	classes	reflect	Navy	policy	allowing	students	
to enter NPS in fields outside their undergraduate 
majors.	This	 flexibility	 is	 essential	 considering	 the	
Navy’s closed-pipe personnel system that precludes 
mid-career accessions in areas of Navy need. 
12. Peter D. Syverson and Moira J. Maguire, “Esti-
mating Institutional Costs of Graduate Education: 
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Reports from Three States Demonstrate Prom-
ise, Pitfalls of Cost Studies,” Council of Graduate 
Schools, 1997. 
13. “Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and 
Assessments),” Ser N81/3U639949, 29 March 1993. 
14. Detailed calculations are described in Gates et 
al., “A Bottom-Up Assessment.” 
15. For example, quarterly inputs and class sched-
uling to ensure on-time graduation reduce class 
size; maintaining military infrastructure increases 
administrative costs; and the thesis requirement in-
creases faculty costs. 
16. Tuition covers 13%-73% of educational expen-
ditures in the civilian sample described above (Ca-
valluzzo and Cymrot, “A Bottom-Up Assessment,” p. 
69). 
Admiral Mauz is president of the Naval Postgraduate 
School Foundation. Before retiring from active duty 
in 1994, he was Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic 
Fleet. Dr. Gates is an associate professor at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. He received his Ph.D. in eco-
nomics from Yale University. Prior to joining NPS, he 
worked as an economist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab-
oratory and as a consultant to the Rand Corporation. 
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title Military Value Analysis
source  Technical Joint Cross Service Group Analyses and Recommendations (Vol-
ume XII) 19 May 2005
subtitle  Technical Joint Cross Service Group (JCSG) Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) Report for BRAC 2005 under Ronald M. Sega, Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering
abstract  The Naval Postgraduate School was rated high by the BRAC Technical Joint 
Cross Service Group (TJCSG) when they examined 146 technical facilities re-
garding their value to defense RDT&E. The report identifies the most impor-
tant 13 technical areas in developing military strength, then evaluates each 
technical facility over three functional areas: research, development and acqui-
sition, and test and evaluation.
excerpts  “Each of the DoD technical facilities was awarded a Military Value score for 
each of the resulting 39 categories. While NPS received a score in many of 
these areas, this report concentrates only on our results for the 13 ‘Research’ 
categories. However, it should be noted that NPS was rated the number one 
technical facility in the category: Battlespace Environments D&A.”
  “NPS received its highest rating (top 5%) in Information Systems, while its 
overall ranking was in the top third on average. This result clearly demon-
strates the breadth, importance, and quality of our research program.”
  “The TJCSG identified four major multidisciplinary laboratories as consolidat-
ed Defense Research Laboratories: Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, Naval Re-
search Laboratory, Washington DC, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. NPS clearly 
represents a fourth multi disciplinary research asset that should be recognized 
as a major contributor to developments in defense R&D.”
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Area NPS Mil Value Ranking
Air Platforms Research 14 of 35
Battlespace Environments Develop-
ment & Acquisition 
1 of 21
Battlespace Environments Research 3 of 25 
Biomedical Research 23 of 30
Chemical & Biological Defense De-
velopment & Acquisition
32 of 40
Chemical & Biological Defense 
Research
10 of 42
Ground Vehicles Research 13 of 24
Human Systems Development & 
Acquisition
17 of 87
Human Systems Research 13 of 65
Information Systems Development 
& Acquisition
66 of 105
Information Systems Research 4 of 68
Materials & Processes Research 18 of 46
Nuclear Technology Research 4 of 15 
Sea Vehicles Research 11 of 36
Sensors, Electronics & Electronic 
Warfare Development & Acquisi-
tion
39 of 103
Sensors, Electronics & Electronic 
Warfare Research
20 of 68
Space Platforms Research 10 of 26
Weapons and Armaments Research 24 of 60
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title White Paper: Naval Postgraduate School
author	 CDR	Porter	•	20	Mar	05
abstract  In a memorandum dated 4 Jan 2005 from Acting Under Secretary of Defense 
Michael W. Wynne, he cites cost as the fourth criteria in selecting military 
installations for closure or realignment. This paper proves that the Naval Post-
graduate School is cost-effective and is a valuable asset. Other NPS values in-
clude its unique military curricula, high academic standards, and faculty with 
extensive defense-related experience.
excerpts  “Judging by the priority of the Under Secretary’s criteria cited above, it is rec-
ognized that cost savings is only one consideration of military value in decid-
ing whether to close or realign an installation. In the case of the Naval Post-
graduate School, to make a closure decision primarily on cost considerations is 
to miss the very essence of what the school represents operationally, academi-
cally, and intrinsically to the Navy and to the Department of Defense.” 
  “NPS may be one of our best tools to ensure the alignment of advanced opera-
tional concepts and technologies among the Department of Defense, Home-
land Security, interagency, and international military partnerships. Rather than 
considering closure of NPS, we should be focusing on how to better maximize 
the return on our investment. These rewards could well include our Navy’s 
preeminence in educating and retaining the most technologically advanced 
warfighters in the world, both officer and enlisted, and our military’s assured 
superiority in Joint and coalition warfare for generations to come.”
  “An August 2000 article in “Proceedings” magazine titled, “NPS: A Case for Value,” 
provided a comparison of the costs associated with a degree earned from NPS and 
a similar degree earned from a comparable civilian university … a civilian course 
of study almost certainly does not represent the same tailored, defense-centric, 
militarily	career-enhancing	curriculum	provided	by	NPS.	This	is	a	crucial	flaw	in-
herent in any cost comparison. Because, in fact, curricular requirements at NPS 
include Educational Skill Requirements (ESRs) dictated by the Secretary of the 
Navy that are intended to broaden the military student’s educational experience.”
  “Other studies completed recently estimate the average cost of a graduate degree 
from a civilian university to be approximately $27,000 per academic school year (9 
months) … Hence, based on the 24–28 months required to earn a Master’s degree 
at a civilian university, without meeting Educational Skill Requirements, it is fair 
to	estimate	total	tuition	fees	of	approximately	$72,000	(2.6	x	$27K).	An	academ-
ic school year at NPS (12 months) was recently estimated to cost approximately 
$36,000.”
  “NPS is vital to DoD’s interaction with other agencies and nations for national 
security. As has been shown, NPS programs strengthen democratic civil-mil-
itary relationships in countries throughout the world. The “National Defense 
Strategy” plainly proclaims a goal fully supported by the Naval Postgraduate 
School, ‘We seek to foster a culture of innovation.’”
cd ref no. pw–5
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White Paper: Naval Postgraduate School
THE ABILITy Of OUR OffICER AND ENLISTED LEADERS TO ANTICIPATE AND MANAGE 
THE CHALLENGES Of TOMORROW IS ONLy LIMITED By OUR fORESIGHT TODAy
OVERVIEW
In his Memorandum dated 4 Jan 2005, Subject: 2005 
Base Closure and Realignment Selection Criteria, 
Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics) Michael W.Wynne stated 
the following:
“In selecting military installations for closures or 
realignment, the Department of Defense, giving pri-
ority consideration to military value (the first four 
criteria below), will consider:
MILITARy VALUE
1.  The current and future mission capabilities, and 
the impact on operational readiness of the total 
force of the Department of Defense, including 
the impact on joint warfighting, training, and 
readiness.
2.  The availability and condition of land, facilities, 
and associated airspace…
3.  The ability to accommodate contingency, mobili-
zation, surge, and future total force requirements 
at both existing and potential receiving locations 
to support operations and training.
4.  The cost of operations and the manpower impli-
cations.
Other considerations cited in the Under Secretary’s 
Memorandum included the extent and timing of 
potential costs and savings, the economic impact 
on existing communities in the vicinity, the ability 
of infrastructure of both the existing and potential 
receiving communities to support forces, missions, 
and personnel, and the environmental impact.
Judging by the priority of the Under Secretary’s cri-
teria cited above, it is recognized that cost savings is 
only one consideration of military value in deciding 
whether to close or realign an installation. In the case 
of the Naval Postgraduate School, to make a closure 
decision primarily on cost considerations is to miss 
the very essence of what the school represents oper-
ationally, academically, and intrinsically to the Navy 
and to the Department of Defense. And yet inevita-
bly, this is the first criterion examined and, perhaps, 
the one most heavily weighted in the decision pro-
cess. Despite the fact this does not seem in keeping 
with the Under Secretary’s guidance, and as I hope 
to prove, would lead to the conclusion that closing 
NPS would be a costly mistake, such an approach 
runs the risk of overlooking the TRUE value of the 
institution…one that has been named an Informa-
tion Operations Center of Excellence by the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, the Center of Education Ex-
cellence by the Commander of NETWARCOM, the 
U.S.’s only NATO Partnership for Peace Education 
and Training Center by former Secretary of State 
Colin Powell, and a “national treasure” by GEN John 
Abizaid, COMCENTCOM.
The Naval Postgraduate School represents the center 
of gravity of the US Navy’s education strategy and is 
a critical enabler in DoD’s Transformation, our own 
Human Capital Strategy, Sea Power 21, and the War 
On Terrorism. NPS may be one of our best tools 
to ensure the alignment of advanced operational 
concepts and technologies among the Department 
of Defense, Homeland Security, interagency, and 
international military partnerships. Rather than 
considering closure of NPS, we should be focusing 
on how to better maximize the return on our invest-
ment. These rewards could well include our Navy’s 
preeminence in educating and retaining the most 
technologically advanced warfighters in the world, 
both officer and enlisted, and our military’s assured 
superiority in Joint and coalition warfare for genera-
tions to come. 
We can’t afford to build tomorrow  
what we have today!
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OUR INITIAL INVESTMENT
Originally established as a postgraduate department 
of the US Naval Academy almost 100 years ago, 
the Naval Postgraduate School moved to its cur-
rent location in Monterey, California in 1951. The 
main campus is situated on 135 acres along Pacific 
Coast Highway that were originally purchased for 
$660,372 as part of a 627 acre buy. Today, NPS hold-
ings include 620.5 acres, the original cost of which 
totaled $1.3 million. The scenic location of this 
property and its proximity to other area academic 
institutions (Stanford University, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, University of California, San Jose, 
Defense Language Institute), as well as Silicon Val-
ley’s powerful technological epicenter, make it dif-
ficult to appraise its current monetary value. But the 
intrinsic value of the location cannot be overstated 
in drawing some of the nation’s brightest defense 
research professors, serving as a powerful incentive 
for junior and mid-grade officers (and perhaps one 
day for degreed enlisted leaders as well) to continue 
their service, and providing an a idyllic glimpse of 
America for international students from over 60 
countries. 
Operationally, NPS’ holdings in Monterey provide ac-
cess to open ocean, ranges and uncontrolled airspace 
(as well as to a city that is an inspiration vice a dis-
traction for students). If we close NPS, and disperse 
the students to civilian institutions or other military 
installations, we will lose these unique capabilities 
and we will never recover them. Our research faculty 
will likely migrate to other research universities tak-
ing with them unique skills and knowledge. In fact, 
finding other airspace, at an installation on the East 
coast for example, that will allow the 24/7 operation 
of UAVs at altitudes up to and in excess of 15000 feet 
will, most likely, be impossible. 
OPERATING COSTS
In 2002 total expenditures/operating costs amount-
ed to $314.5 million (37% of which covered stu-
dent salaries, 21% went to research). This was bal-
anced by a budget of $314.5 million which included 
$129.3 million for student salaries, $80.6 million 
for reimbursable academic costs, $48.8 million for 
direct academic costs, $27.4 million for direct base 
operations, $17.7 million for reimbursable base op-
erations, $9.7 million for military staff salaries, and 
$1 million for NAF. In 2003, sponsored program re-
imbursable expenditures (which include Research, 
Education, and Service Programs) exceeded $66 
million, a 15% growth from FY02 (ranked by the 
National Science Foundation among the top 25% 
of institutions in total R&D expenditures). In 2004, 
$184 million of expenses (not including student sal-
aries) were covered by $184 million total funding. 
This included Navy direct funding for $74 million 
(covering 40%) and reimbursable funding for $109 
million (60%). 
In attempting to compare apples to apples we miss 
the core differences!
A COMPARATIVE ANALySIS
An August 2000 article in “Proceedings” magazine 
titled, “NPS: A Case for Value ,” provided a com-
parison of the costs associated with a degree earned 
from the Naval Postgraduate School and a similar 
degree earned from a comparable civilian university. 
I have highlighted the word, here, because “simi-
lar” though the degrees may be when displayed on 
a sheepskin, and surely just as challenging in their 
pursuit, a civilian course of study almost certainly 
does not represent the same tailored, defense-cen-
tric, militarily career-enhancing curriculum provid-
ed	by	NPS.	This	is	a	crucial	flaw	inherent	in	any	cost	
comparison. Because, in fact, curricular require-
ments at NPS include Educational Skill Require-
ments (ESRs) dictated by the Secretary of the Navy 
that are intended to broaden the military student’s 
educational experience. For instance, NPS provides 
JPME coursework on campus from dedicated War 
College faculty, so that officers can satisfy both their 
masters and joint military requirements during a 
single tour. Additional coursework is also required 
to ensure the student appreciates the military rel-
evance of the academic subject material, thereby 
enabling immediate application upon rejoining the 
operational force. Hence, additional credit hours 
of instruction are built into NPS curricula to meet 
ESRs. Similar courses are not available at civilian 
universities and represent a hidden, but necessary, 
cost in NPS’ budget. 
Another “core” difference that must be acknowl-
edged as part of any comparison is that civilian 
university admission criteria can not be trivialized. 
Besides the minimum 3.0 undergrad GPA required 
for most Tier One schools, and a requirement to do 
well on a graduate entrance exam (e.g. GRE), gradu-
ate students are usually accepted for admission in 
the same field of study in which they received their 
undergraduate degree. This is not the case at NPS 
whose mission includes converting non-technical 
warfighters	from	the	fleet	(some	of	whom	had	rela-
tively low undergraduate GPAs or have been away 
from academia for a number of years) into graduate 
students capable of earning technical degrees and 
applying this expertise in a highly complex opera-
tional environment. For example, 15% of NPS’ en-
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gineering and science graduates had non-technical 
degrees at the bachelor’s level. The truth is that 
many NPS students would not gain entry into Tier 
One schools whose entrance criteria are not meant 
to consider the attributes of a combat warrior with 
proven leaderships skills, capable of managing com-
plex weapons systems (a review by civilian univer-
sities of 300 Navy officers enrolled at NPS revealed 
they would admit only 12% directly and 13% with 
additional courses). No Tier One graduate schools 
would take non-technical students and admit them 
into technical degree programs in the numbers re-
quired by the Secretary of Navy. 
Further, each quarter NPS accepts new military stu-
dents into its curricula. Most civilian institutions, on 
the other hand, work on a fixed academic calendar, so 
that if a student does not matriculate in the Fall, they 
cannot be admitted until the following year. Bear-
ing operational demands in mind, particularly dur-
ing	this	time	of	war,	this	loss	of	scheduling	flexibility	
would have a significant impact on the number of 
military students capable of accommodating such a 
restrictive admission policy. But in an attempt to pro-
vide an “apples to apples“comparison, we must focus 
our attention on a more profound difference between 
NPS and civilian universities that has a significant im-
pact on the cost of earning a degree.
The academic ops tempo at NPS is significantly 
greater than that of a traditional civilian university. At 
NPS, the academic school year is based on four,twelve 
week quarters consisting of 16 classroom hours per 
week. Although academic calendars vary at civilian 
universities, typically students attend classes 13 hours 
a week for 32 weeks of the year, and may attend a 
ten week summer term for seven hours a week. This 
amounts to approximately 58% more student-faculty 
contact hours per academic year at NPS than at a typ-
ical civilian university. Carrying this line of reasoning 
out to its logical conclusion, the “Proceedings” article 
demonstrates that a student at NPS would conclude 
his Master’s degree coursework in approximately 18 
months, or 6-10 fewer months than would have been 
required at a civilian university. 
A recently updated version of this original article 
estimates the “cost” per credit hour at NPS by using 
the FY02 Operating Budget and the average number 
of students on board that year. The total instruction-
al cost is calculated by adding the direct academic 
cost ($48.8 million) to the fraction of direct base-
operations costs attributable to non-reimbursed 
academic functions ($27.4 million times 48.8/185.2, 
which is the total expenditures minus $129.3 mil-
lion in student salaries) for a total of $56,019,869. By 
dividing this total instructional cost by the average 
number of students on board in FY02 (1336), and 
by 64 credit hours per year (16 per quarter), the cost 
per credit hour at NPS is calculated to be $655. This 
number compares to an average of $724 at 11 peer 
institutions (including Cal Tech, Carnegie Melon, 
Georgia Tech, Illinois Institute of Technology, MIT, 
NC State-Raleigh, Purdue, Rensselaer Polytechnic, 
Rice, Rochester Institute of Technology, and USC). 
At $655 per credit hour, NPS ranked seventh among 
these universities. However, the point of this exer-
cise was to demonstrate the difference in cost over 
the duration of coursework needed to earn a degree. 
Returning to our initial assertion, we’ll recall that 
based on a more aggressive academic calendar, an 
NPS student could earn a degree (requiring 96 cred-
it hours) in 18 months vice the 24-28 months that 
would likely be required to complete 96 credit hours 
of coursework at a civilian university. Therefore, to 
compare the costs of a degree, six to ten additional 
months of the student’s military salary would have 
to be added to the nominal tuition fee at a civilian 
university. Based on these calculations, a degree at 
NPS would clearly cost the government less than the 
average cost associated with the 11 other peer uni-
versities cited above. 
Other studies completed recently estimate the av-
erage cost of a graduate degree from a civilian uni-
versity to be approximately $27,000 per academic 
school year (9 months). Bearing in mind that tuition 
represents only a fraction of total costs (70-80% of 
the total costs at a civilian university are compen-
sated by state, federal, or private endowments and 
research), we must consider the points made above 
regarding credits contained in one academic year 
at a civilian university. Hence, based on the 24-28 
months required to earn a Master’s degree at a ci-
vilian university, without meeting Educational Skill 
Requirements, it is fair to estimate total tuition fees 
of	approximately	$72,000	(2.6	x	$27K).	An	academic	
school year at NPS (12 months) was recently esti-
mated to cost approximately $36,000. But, again, 
based on the more rigorous academic calendar at 
NPS, a degree would take only 18 months to earn 
(excluding an estimated 4.8 months additional time 
required for transition and refresher courses). Even 
by adding the costs associated with the additional 
4.8 months (which would not include a full aca-
demic load), a student would earn a tailored degree, 
would produce a defense-related thesis, and would 
meet all Educational Skills Requirements in under 
two	years,	for	less	than	$72,	000	(<	2	x	$36K).
It should be noted that this cost comparison did not 
consider varying housing allowances from region to 
region. Therefore, drawing the conclusion from the 
analysis cited above that the cost of a similar degree 
at a comparable civilian university would be signifi-
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cantly higher than at NPS, another cost analysis is 
suggested: how much would be saved by moving 
NPS to an existing military installation in a less ex-
pensive geographic area? It could be argued that the 
same rigorous academic calendar would be in place, 
so that not only would the degree be completed in 
the same amount of time as currently done at NPS, 
the cost of living would be lower for the student and 
his or her dependents. But here, I return to an ear-
lier point: making a closure, or realignment, deci-
sion primarily on cost considerations is to miss the 
essence of what NPS represents operationally, aca-
demically, and intrinsically to the Navy and to the 
Department of Defense. 
Operationally and intrinsically, Naval Postgraduate 
School is a model environment for military academic 
excellence and a showcase of American values for in-
ternational students. It should serve as an incentive 
for our best and brightest officers and enlisted person-
nel who seek graduate degrees to enrich and enhance 
their military careers and improve their post-career 
job prospects as well (in fact, many of these students 
should be encouraged to pursue defense-related em-
ployment upon retirement from the service, thereby 
bringing their extensive military experience and 
graduate education into government or private sec-
tor defense-related fields). NPS also imprints a strong 
positive impression of America and our military on 
international students, many of whom will go on 
to	be	senior	 leaders,	with	considerable	 influence,	 in	
their own militaries. Fond memories of NPS and the 
friends with whom they studied there will pay further 
dividends on our investment through stronger collec-
tive	security	partnerships	in	the	future.	The	King	of	
Jordan, the Turkish Chief of Naval Operations, and 
the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Air Force are among 
the international alumni of NPS.
The location of NPS adds intrinsic value to the 
school and increases the potential return on our 
initial investment. While the cost of operating a 
military postgraduate institution in a less costly 
economic area than Monterey would probably save 
money in housing and some direct operating costs, 
what would be the second and third order effects 
of such a move? Would a school in a less attrac-
tive and academically dynamic environment draw 
research academicians with degrees from the same 
prestigious universities as are represented today by 
the faculty of NPS (among tenured track faculty, 
terminal degrees are held by three or more faculty 
members from Stanford, MIT, Harvard, Yale, Pur-
due, Princeton, Penn State, Cornell, Northwestern, 
Rensselaer, The University of California system, and 
more)? Further, what would be the impression of a 
less attractive and culturally stimulating environ-
ment on our international students? And perhaps 
most importantly, what message would this send 
our Navy family, who so often trades inconvenience 
and quality of life for the opportunity to serve? The 
postgraduate experience should be enriching both 
academically and socially. With the capital invest-
ment we have made in Monterey, California we can 
offer the finest quality of life for our students and 
their families as an indication of our commitment 
to them and to their futures. They will repay us with 
their energy, resourcefulness, and innovation.
And finally, hypothetically, what if we could find a 
civilian university willing to offer a degree in an ac-
celerated timeframe so that we could avoid paying 
the additional costs associated with a “typical” ci-
vilian academic regime? While a civilian university 
might come close to equaling some of the intrinsic 
value associated with NPS, the vital operational as-
pects of the curriculum (including the Educational 
Skills Requirements) would be missing. Professors 
would generally not have the extensive defense-re-
lated experience common among the NPS faculty, 
nor could they be expected to demonstrate military 
applications of their subject matter. Student/fac-
ulty contact hours would be less (NPS was ranked 
near the top of the 11 peer universities mentioned 
in this category) since civilian universities routinely 
use graduate assistants to teach some graduate-level 
courses, and university research would not be 85% 
defense-related as it is at NPS. The academic envi-
ronment, while perhaps representing a refreshing 
change for military students, would tend to take 
minds away from the challenging operational appli-
cations of their course of study. In fact, the opportu-
nity to work with other service members and with 
international military students would be largely lost. 
As would the ability to introduce foreign officers to 
a challenging and enriching glimpse of what their 
military futures could hold. The return on invest-
ment in sending military students to civilian univer-
sities for the United States Navy and program spon-
sors would be far less then it is in the defense-centric 
environment at NPS.
If our task was to design a graduate university to 
prepare America’s young military leaders for the 
dynamic challenges and opportunities of a vastly 
different tomorrow it would be joint and inter-
national, have diverse defense and interagency 
related curricula, be held to the highest academic 
standards, taught by professors experienced in ad-
vanced military research. It would be cost-effective 
and offer the highest level quality of service needed 
to draw and keep our best…
NPS IS THIS AND MORE…
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While	 enrollment	 fluctuates	 somewhat	 through-
out the academic year, in the summer of 2004, the 
NPS student body was comprised of 42% Navy, 14% 
Marine Corps, 13% Air Force, 8% Army, 5% other 
US agencies, and 18% international students (291 
residents from 57 countries). By 2006, 1800 mili-
tary officers, defense civilians, enlisted, defense con-
tractors, and other agency representatives from the 
United States and other nations will be studying in 
resident programs at NPS. Another 4,000 or more 
students will be enrolled in degree or certificate pro-
grams around the world. 
Joint 
NPS works closely with the Unified Combatant 
Commanders to provide relevant education and re-
search critical to the combat mission. NPS faculty 
provides about $75 million of research to the Navy, 
Unified Combatant Commanders and the Services. 
Examples of support to the Combatant Command-
ers in 2002-2003 included:
	 •	 	Homeland	Defense	and	Security	programs	for	
Northern Command and Pacific Command.
	 •	 	Counterterrorism	 programs	 in	 support	 of	
Unified Combatant Commanders’ initiatives.
	 •	 	NPS	 faculty	 and	 students’	 direct	 support	
to Millenium Challenge 02 for Joint Forces 
Command.
	 •	 	A	 Special	 Ops	 curriculum	 and	 related	 re-
search on UAV’s, tactical decision aids, and 
other warfighting advances for SOCOM.
	 •	 	Information	Security	for	Strategic	Command.
	 •	 	Graduate	education	for	National	Guard	divi-
sion staffs deploying to European Command 
(and NATO) op areas.
International
The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at 
NPS is dedicated to strengthening democratic civil-
military relationships and assisting other nations 
in making integrated defense decisions. Courses 
are offered across the country, overseas, and in-res-
idence. Each quarter, CCMR runs 20 to 30 events 
in more than 20 nations, reaching over 8000 civil-
ian and military personnel each year. From Octo-
ber through December 2004, CCMR held 25 events, 
both in residence and non-residence, teaching civil-
ians and military from 28 nations, including Azer-
baijan,	Slovenia,	Latvia,	Bosnia,	Kosovo,	Romania,	
Columbia, Fiji, and others. These events ranged 
from two-day site visits to two-week seminars. Na-
val Postgraduate School professors and instructors 
taught these courses/seminars.
The Leader Development and Education for Sus-
tained Peace (LDESP) program is a component of 
CCMR. This graduate-level education program 
serves the education needs of professionals from 
various disciplines and/or agencies such as ambas-
sadors, former political officials, former military 
commanders, security and international law en-
forcement personnel, community leaders, and Unit-
ed Nations and State Department personnel. LDESP 
prepares units deploying to stability operations in 
Central Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East and 
Africa. Recent activity (late 2004) focused on pre-
paring senior leaders/U.S. units for their deploy-
ments	to	Iraq,	Afghanistan,	and	Kosovo.
The Defense Resources Management Institute 
(DRMI) is an educational institution sponsored by 
the Secretary of Defense and located at NPS. Since 
1965, DRMI has conducted professional educa-
tion programs in analytical decision-making and 
resource management for military officers of all 
services as well as senior civilian officials from the 
United States and 125 other countries. The courses 
can be studied either overseas or in-residence. The 
principal focus of all DRMI programs is to develop 
an understanding and appreciation of the concepts, 
techniques, and decision-making skills related to 
defense resource management. The emphasis is not 
on training in job-specific skills, but rather to un-
derstand the concepts, techniques, and issues that 
pervade defense resources management decision-
making. 
In 2004, DRMI’s Mobile Education Team (MET) 
held courses in: Macedonia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Argentina, Thailand, Tajikistan, Malaysia, Belize, 
Lithuania and Bosnia. In 2005, DRMI’s MET plans 
to hold courses in: Guinea, El Salvador, Columbia, 
Honduras, Bangladesh, the South Pacific, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Estonia, Argentina, Canada, and 
Latvia.
Interagency, National Security
NPS provides specialized programs that support 
U.S. national security priorities, including counter-
terrorism, homeland security, and security coopera-
tion. Master’s degree programs and seminars have 
been developed on Homeland Defense and Secu-
rity, as well as Counter-drug Strategy and Policy, for 
the Department of Homeland Security (and for the 
Chief of Naval Operations, NORTHCOM, and the 
National Guard). NPS teaches a classified graduate 
education program for the National Security Agen-
cy, is a University of choice for the National Recon-
naissance Office, and NASA sponsors the annual 
Michael J. Smith NASA Chair at NPS with focused 
areas of space research, education and training for 
future astronaut candidates. Additionally, NPS re-
ceives sizeable annual funding from the National 
Science Foundation for basic research in oceanog-
raphy, meteorology, information sciences, engineer-
ing, and technology development, often partnering 
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with other universities on interdisciplinary research 
projects.
“Prevail today while bridging to a successful fu-
ture.” CNO Guidance for 2005 
NPS IS THE BRIDGE TO… 
“Refined Operational Concepts to deliver the kind 
of dominant military power from the sea envisioned 
in Sea Power 21.” Operations Logistics faculty and 
students are conducting research on how to use of 
High Speed Vehicles (HSVs) in a logistics role for 
CTF-73 and how to modify contingency support 
plans. Twenty Systems Engineering and Analy-
sis students are leading a campus-wide integrated 
study on defeating maritime terrorism and pirate-
supported terror in the Southeast Asian waterways; 
NPS students from Singapore will be integrated into 
this study. Thirteen Systems Engineering and Anal-
ysis students will lead a campus-wide integrated 
study on the challenges of Undersea Warfare in the 
Littoral. This work will focus on the most relevant 
threats and will involve coordination with COM-
PACFLT, ASW Command, and TF ASW. The esti-
mated completion date is December 2005. 
“Alignment to best organize our personnel and re-
sources across the Navy to support the Fleet, training 
and education of our personnel, and the synergies 
of our various echelon levels.” NPS’ Regional Secu-
rity Education Program (RSEP) raises the strategic 
situational awareness of deploying and forward-
deployed naval forces, thereby enhancing force pro-
tection and mission performance. The RSEP sends 
teams of regional security experts to ships and for-
ward bases where they brief unit personnel on the 
strategic, political, and cultural contexts in which 
they will operate. RSEP teams typically remain on 
site for several days where they conduct briefings as 
well as informal discussion sessions. An RSEP team 
was onboard the Lincoln Strike Group as they de-
ployed to the Persian Gulf, where the team provided 
staff and crew with counter-terrorism and Middle 
Eastern political, military, and regional orientation. 
“Sea Trial to increase levels of operational, organi-
zational and technological agility.” Students in the 
Systems Engineering and Analysis curriculum com-
pleted a nine-month study of Sea Basing and Joint 
Expeditionary Logistics for the 2015 to 2025 time 
frame. The integrated multidisciplinary project was 
completed by a team of 50 students and 20 faculty 
from across campus including the Systems Engi-
neering Analysis and Total Ship Systems Engineer-
ing curricula. One student helped develop a pro-
totype map-based system to automatically display, 
animate, and statistically analyze situation reports 
about insurgent activity (including Improvised Ex-
plosive Device or IED attacks) from Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. The student applied statistical process 
control techniques developed by his thesis advisor 
and XML technology developed by his second read-
er to display and analyze SIGACT data, providing 
early warning of shifting enemy patterns. 
“Sea Enterprise to increase the pace of innovation 
throughout our Navy.” NPS has been a leader and 
an active participant in the Navy’s efforts to develop 
future naval technologies. NPS researchers took part 
in the Silent Hammer exercise that tested submarine 
control of a long-endurance UAV to support forces 
on land, and NPS physicists have conducted pio-
neering research on shipboard free electron lasers 
and electromagnetic rail guns while guiding student 
thesis research on these topics in order to develop 
military leaders familiar with these future technolo-
gies. In another thesis, a student created a theater 
ballistic missile defense (TBMD) operational plan-
ning aid that helps the Area Air Defense commander 
create courses of action to best locate TBMD assets. 
The model, JOINT DEFENDER, which can also be 
used in programmatic development for evaluating 
cost/benefit of new technologies, has been briefed to 
NWDC, CNO N-76 and STRATCOM and is being 
evaluated for inclusion in a standard suite of TBMD 
models. 
“Sea Warrior to empower our people with a lifetime 
of learning, with technology that is integrated with 
the human being, and with more choices and incen-
tives in a competitive career environment.” NPS is 
partnered with many defense and civilian univer-
sities. These partnerships, which allow NPS to de-
liver defense-related education when and where it 
is needed, include the Air Force Institute of Tech-
nology (AFIT), Stanford University (for Homeland 
Security), the University of Maryland and Smith 
School of Business (for defense-related MBAs). NPS 
is currently running 11 non-resident degree pro-
grams, 85 on-line courses, 4 Navy-relevant distance 
learning certificate programs, more than 300 cours-
es using web technology, 5 online distance learning 
courses on board ship, 215 locations for distance 
learning (via video teleconferencing, internet, satel-
lite campuses, etc).
“We will continually adapt how we approach and 
confront challenges, conduct business, and work 
with others.” National Defense Strategy, March 2005 
 NPS: A TOOL fOR TRANSfORMATION
The Office of Force Transformation now sponsors 
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an NPS Chair and course development in one of 
the first programs in Transformation Education and 
Research, through the NPS Cebrowski Institute of 
Information Innovation and Superiority. The new 
“National Defense Strategy’s” section on Defense 
Transformation states that, 




	 •	 	Adapting	 the	 defense	 establishment	 to	 that	
new perspective, and 
	 •	 	Refocusing	 capabilities	 to	 meet	 future	 chal-
lenges, not those we are already most pre-
pared to meet.”
It goes on to say that, “We are working to transform 
our international partnerships, including the capa-
bilities that we and our partners can use collectively.” 
NPS is vital to DoD’s interactions with other agen-
cies and nations for national security. As has been 
shown, NPS programs strengthen democratic civ-
il-military relationships in countries throughout 
the world. The “National Defense Strategy” plainly 
proclaims a goal fully supported by the Naval Post-
graduate School, “We seek to foster a culture of in-
novation.”
NPS: Navy Education Strategy’s Center of Gravity 
As a matter of national security, the Navy needs to 
do a better job of managing the careers of our young 
warfighters. We must develop an education strategy 
that builds postgraduate education into the career 
paths of our officer and enlisted leadership as both a 
reward and an incentive. There is no better military 
environment in which to earn a postgraduate degree 
than the Naval Postgraduate School with students 
representing all services, several US Government 
agencies, and more than 60 countries. This is the 
future operational environment: technology serving 
joint, interagency and combined operations world-
wide. Further, we need to think of all our Navy fam-
ily, uniformed and civilian, and their dependents. 
Through distributed distance learning we can pro-
vide the means to develop draw the best and keep 
the best happy. 
Naval Postgraduate School represents the beating 
heart of the Navy’s future Human Capital Strategy. 
We truly must “Win in the marketplace for talent.” 
We can only do this by investing in and demonstrat-
ing a commitment to the education and training 
of our people. From their recruitment, to their re-
tirements, and beyond into our nation’s workforce, 
we must provide the opportunities for our leaders 
to excel: personally and professionally. Sadly, fewer 
American’s are seeking technical degrees in col-
lege. Many officers with non-technical degrees are 
asked not only to be leaders, but to work in a highly 
technical environment with sophisticated weapons 
systems. Our enlisted sailors who demonstrate a 
technical aptitude are likewise trained to perform 
highly complex tasks in a stressful environment. In 
fact, more and more of our enlisted sailors (and sol-
diers, airman, marines) are entering the service with 
degrees or pursuing degrees via distance learning. 
Having demonstrated the maturity and capability 
of performing the most exacting jobs in the most 
stressful conditions, our warriors have earned the 
right to learn more, to progress educationally. They 
deserve the opportunity to fulfill their career goals 
both in the service and after they leave the service.
In the next year, the Defense Department needs to 
hire more than 14,000 civilian scientists and engi-
neers. But the pool of candidates is shrinking. More 
than half of science and engineering graduates from 
American universities are foreign nationals, who are 
mostly off limits to federal agencies. Moreover, DoD 
must compete with the private sector and other 
agencies for the talent that is available. Naval Post-
graduate School is ninth in the nation in the produc-
tion of science and technology Master degrees. In 
fact, NPS is graduating 18-20 civilians a year to serve 
in all agencies of the government. By developing an 
education strategy built upon continuing education, 
career management and counseling, we can ensure 
our nation has technically qualified and innovative 
sailors, soldiers, airmen and marines who are capa-
ble and willing to carry their experience and educa-
tion into the civilian work force when they retire. 
Naval Postgraduate School is ideally placed to serve 
as the centerpiece of a Navy Education Strategy that 
takes a total force, lifelong approach to serving our 
Navy family and our nation’s defense needs.
[CDR Porter, 20 Mar 05]
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title  Address by Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN, 
Chief of Naval Operations Before the [Naval] 
Postgraduate School
ref no.  620-59 News Release: Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs, Wash-
ington	25,	D.C.	•	May	28,	1959
abstract  On the 50th anniversary of the Naval Postgraduate School and the 5/28/59 
graduation exercises, Admiral Burke commended the officer students for their 
hard work in obtaining their graduate degrees. As leaders he urged them to 
continue gaining knowledge in military as well as political and international 
affairs, to keep their perspective, and to retain their “moral and intellectual 
integrity.” This being 1959 during the cold war, he urged the study of Commu-
nism to understand how it works and not be misled by propaganda.
excerpts  “The Navy has been a leader in this rapid technological advance. But this 
did not come by accident, nor did it come overnight. It has been the result 
of educating carefully selected officers in each succeeding generation of offi-
cers … All with but one purpose, one objective, to improve the Navy’s combat-
effectiveness, and the security of the United States.”
  “Naval postgraduate education is an added asset of the line officer of the Navy. 
It	helps	him	to	do	a	better	job	afloat.	It	allows	him	to	be	in	the	forefront	of	de-
velopment when ashore. Each naval officer who has acquired technical knowl-
edge realizes that this knowledge increases his value to his profession, that 
he knows it as a stepping stone to greater and broader responsibility. He can 
expect and should solicit billets in his career that will involve command, plan-
ning and national strategy and work. He should solicit the war college training 
so helpful to these duties.”
  “We in the Navy today are the inheritors of that legacy of wisdom, and we 
can see clear evidence of their foresight all around us. Operating at sea now 
and ready for combat is a family of guided missiles. The application of nuclear 
power in our submarines and in our surface ships is well known. The Navy has 
been in the forefront of development in radar, radio, the gyro compass, and 
many other complex devices which our predecessors applied in naval weapons 
systems.”
  “Leadership is needed more today than ever before. You are the ones who will 
push the revolution onward, who will produce the new machines, and who will 
lead the men. It is you to whom they will turn for guidance, precept, example, 
inspiration. Your personal philosophy, your inner values, your sense of moral 
responsibility, and your willingness to work hard will be vital to the efforts of 
the men.”
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Address By Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN 
Chief Of Naval Operations 
Naval Postgraduate School, Thursday, May 28, 1959 
It is a pleasure to be in Monterey to participate in the 
graduation exercises of this fine institution. 
It is not only a pleasure but a welcome opportunity 
for me, an opportunity because you are a very im-
portant group, important to your service, important 
for the future of your country. 
You are important because you now combine ser-
vice experience with advanced knowledge. You are 
important because you are good, or you wouldn’t 
have been selected to come here in the first place. 
You have capability for work, and we intend to use it. 
This year we mark the 50th anniversary of the found-
ing of this splendid school. In 1909 ten students in 
Marine Engineering constituted the first class in the 
Navy’s postgraduate school program, a program 
which has grown and expanded over the years. 
The naval leaders of fifty years ago showed great 
perspective and foresight in seeing the need for ad-
vanced technical and scientific knowledge among 
naval officers. They recognized that ships and naval 
weapons were becoming more complex, that their 
proper employment at sea would require officers 
who were familiar not only with the age-old profes-
sion of the sea, but who could also understand and 
could use effectively the complex weapons of the 
years to come. 
We in the Navy today are the inheritors of that lega-
cy of wisdom, and we can see clear evidence of their 
foresight all around us. Operating at sea now and 
ready for combat is a family of guided missiles. The 
application of nuclear power in our submarines and 
in our surface ships is well known. The Navy has 
been in the forefront of development in radar, radio, 
the gyro compass, and many other complex devices 
which our predecessors applied in naval weapons 
systems.
The Navy has been a leader in this rapid techno-
logical advance. But this did not come by accident, 
nor did it come overnight. It has been the result of 
educating carefully selected officers in each suc-
ceeding generation of officers. It has been essential 
to train officers who could assimilate the educa-
tion they would receive, who would continue their 
professional interest, who would be fully qualified 
for command at sea, and who would combine the 
scholar’s interest in science and technology with the 
practical man’s appreciation of how new discoveries 
can be applied. All with but one purpose, one ob-
jective, to improve the Navy’s combat-effectiveness, 
and the security of the United States.
Naval postgraduate education is an added asset of 
the line officer of the Navy. It helps him to do a bet-
ter	job	afloat.	It	allows	him	to	be	in	the	forefront	of	
development when ashore. Each naval officer who 
has acquired technical knowledge realizes that this 
knowledge increases his value to his profession, 
that he knows it as a stepping stone to greater and 
broader responsibility. He can expect and should so-
licit billets in his career that will involve command, 
planning and national strategy and work. He should 
solicit the war college training so helpful to these 
duties.
The start of this school opened a host of opportuni-
ties for the advancement of naval and military sci-
ence previously not available. These opportunities 
are not restricted to the United States Navy alone. 
Here today are officers of all United States military 
forces and from nations who are among our coun-
try’s closest friends. 
It is well that you have studied and learned together. 
There may be times when we of the services repre-
sented here will fight along side of each other in sup-
port of the strong beliefs we share. At such times, 
our common purpose will be supported by the 
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knowledge you hold in common. 
My remarks today are directed toward the naval side 
particularly but I hope you of our sister services with 
bear with me and interpret these remarks as appro-
priate to you. 
Compared to the first class of ten officers there are 
some five hundred of you who now complete your 
studies. It is a wonderful thing that so many of you 
could be given this coveted opportunity. An oppor-
tunity which I am sure was well used or you wouldn’t 
be here on this day. 
Today should be a day of pride for you, filled with 
feelings of accomplishment. You have attained an-
other goal along the route of life. You have succeed-
ed in something worthwhile. So doing, you have 
strengthened one of the best habits of life, the habit 
of finishing a hard task you started. 
Finishing difficult tasks can become a habit, and like 
all habits it gains in strength and adds to what you 
are able to accomplish. It is a habit that thrives on 
enthusiasm and a consuming interest in what you 
are doing. 
You had to work hard here at this school, very hard. 
This is something which you will come to value, for 
not only have you gained an advanced professional 
knowledge, but also you have gained a confidence in 
yourself that you can face and thrive on hard work. 
The ability to stand up under pressures whether they 
are mental or physical is as great an asset as is your 
increased professional knowledge, perhaps even 
greater. This is something you will realize more and 
more as you assume larger and larger responsibili-
ties. 
As you go on in your careers, you will find that both 
your knowledge and your ability to stand up to the 
difficult, will be well used. For the more you do, the 
more you can do. The more you accomplish, the 
more the world, your seniors, messmates and ju-
niors, will look to you to do. This is, and will be your 
responsibility. This has long been the responsibility 
of those with knowledge and stamina. Fortunately 
for the Navy, the responsibility to act and to accom-
plish, has been wel1 carried in the past. 
Doing and accomplishing provide one of life’s great-
est satisfactions, self-satisfaction, a knowledge that 
you have done your best, that you have pulled your 
weight in the boat. This often brings success. But 
whether it is recognized or not, there remains your 
inner satisfaction, your feeling of worth to yourself 
and your fellow man. 
It is pleasant to have the plaudits of the crowd. It 
is pleasant to receive a “Well done” from the Task 
Force Commander. But there is even more satisfac-
tion, when others may not have noticed, if you can 
say to yourself, “I have done my part, and a little 
extra.” To achieve this satisfaction, to gain success, 
the important thing is to do everything to the best 
of your ability, regardless of how large or small you 
think the job is. There is no job in the Navy that is 
beneath you. Your every assignment is worth your 
very best. 
Each time you do something well, you help your 
service, you increase your own satisfaction, you en-
hance your reputation, you strengthen your hold on 
the habit of hard work, and success is more apt to 
come your way. 
As you continue to seek success for this wonderful 
Navy of ours, and your own sake, there are major 
thoughts to be always before you. 
 First you must continue to enlarge your knowledge, 
not only in formal schools, but in your own reading. 
You must continually broaden and exercise what 
knowledge you have. 
Today, man’s horizons of knowledge are widening 
at an ever accelerating rate. Within my lifetime the 
field of what was once a specialty has developed, di-
vided, subdivided and redivided. 
Your quest for knowledge must be broad, it must be 
spurred by intellectual curiosity, a curiosity which 
is its own motivating force, and provides its own 
momentum. 
To meet the responsibilities that will fall your way as 
you advance in seniority, you must know an awful lot. 
It is not sufficient to merely to continue learning in 
the particular field of interest to you. You must know 
that certainly, but more too, what is going on in allied 
fields, what is going on in the service, what new ideas 
are being generated, what is going on in the world, 
what can the United States do about it, what can the 
service do about it, what can you do about it. 
All these bits of knowledge you will need, if you are 
to be prepared for responsibility, for opportunity. Op-
portunity often comes when you least expect it. You 
can take advantage of it, only if you are prepared. 
Knowledge	is	the	basic	element	of	being	prepared.	
In expanding your intellectual horizon, I would 
commend to you readings on the meaning of com-
munism and its nature. This is singled out, because 
this is the greatest threat to the Free World today.
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We are in cold war and sometimes in limited wars. 
In both of these, all of us are participants. Unless you 
know how the communist thinks, what he thinks 
and what he really means, you will be duped. Ev-
ery day the Soviets fight us with ideas, psychology, 
propaganda. A lot of the propaganda is very com-
petent, so competent in fact, some of it is believed 
and spread by strongly patriotic Americans. They 
have been misled because they do not know enough 
about communism. 
If they, and you, understand what the communists 
are working for, how they go about it, and how they 
express it, then you, and they, will know fact from 
communist fiction. You will not be misled. 
This is important, because you are leaders of men. 
You have been chosen for an opportunity not ac-
corded	to	all	men.	Your	word	carries	a	lot	of	influ-
ence. If you know what is true and real, then you can 
lead properly. 
Even though I have singled it out, communism is 
but one of the things about which you should learn, 
if you are to have the knowledge that will be expect-
ed of you. You may never be able to learn all that you 
will need to know, when you move on to positions of 
greater responsibility. But unless you keep working 
at it continually, you will never know a fraction of 
what you should. 
The second point to remember is to keep your per-
spective. Specialize if you will. Understand and be 
rightfully proud of your particular field of interest. 
Know	 the	 importance	 of	 what	 you	 are	 doing.	 But	
remember, always remember, where your interest 
fits into the whole. What you do must advance your 
specialty, but also it must advance your service, your 
country. 
There are well-sought-after jobs in the Navy, and 
then there are those nobody wants. Both should fall 
your way. Take both in stride. 
Many naval officers want to lead destroyers in to 
bombard the enemy shore. Many naval officers want 
to move wave on wave of troop-laden boats to the 
beach. Before either of these things could happen, 
the hard working minesweepers had cleared the way. 
Many officers want to be building the latest mis-
sile, to be building a rocket to challenge outer space. 
But none of these could happen unless other offi-
cers, had not spent a lot of effort and a lot of time, 
convincing the people who husband the taxpayer’s 
money, convincing the Administration, convincing 
the Congress, of the worth of the program. 
All these tasks are important when seen with per-
spective, for they are all things that make your ser-
vice move ahead. If you ever allow yourself to lose 
perspective, you are apt to let your service down. 
You are apt to consider your field the only impor-
tant one, to forget that it is but a part of the whole. 
Perspective will help you remember that you are a 
professional officer first, and a specialist secondarily.
In the Navy, the very uniform you wear should re-
mind you of this. You wear the proud blue and gold 
of the naval profession. On this uniform, the corps 
insignia, the dolphins, or the wings are but a small 
part. Some specialties do not even show on your 
uniform. They are merely numbers behind your 
name. All this is as it should be. For you are a profes-
sional naval officer first and last. 
The third point I would suggest, is to retain your 
moral and intellectual integrity. These essential, 
these vital elements of a successful naval officer are 
always emphasized throughout the Navy, because of 
their undying importance. You have heard, and you 
will hear, much said about moral integrity. 
However not so much is said about intellectual in-
tegrity. Since you are men of intellect, and will soon 
be called upon to use this wonderful faculty under 
many and trying circumstances, it is appropriate to 
consider intellectual integrity. 
By intellectual integrity I mean honesty of mind, 
truthfulness with yourself. It includes mentally call-
ing things as you see them. It means calling red, 
red and not cerise because that is the fashion of 
the moment, it means calling black, black, and not 
dark gray because someone wants you to. It means 
if something is bad, admit it is bad and don’t call it 
good because you wish it to be so. It means forming 
your own opinion. 
Sometimes in forming your own opinion you must 
necessarily be critical of things as they are, or of a 
plan that has been proposed. Criticism is fine, but 
be careful of it. It is very easy, particularly when you 
have no responsibility, to be critical of somebody 
else’s work. Criticism by itself doesn’t help anybody. 
Criticism can be helpful only if the suggested solu-
tion is also put forward. 
Even that is frequently not enough. There will be 
occasions when there are many different views on a 
subject. For an organization to go forward, decisions 
must be made, and those decisions must be support-
ed, or else the organization falls apart. This means 
that you must give weight to other people’s views. If 
your views are not always accepted, you should sup-
port the decision made. 
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Nations have grown weak and ineffective because of 
divisiveness within the nation. As a matter of fact, 
this is the usual reason why nations disappear, the 
many factions which exist within a nation. There 
is truth in the old axiom that “in unity there is 
strength, in common accord there is power.” So it 
is a fine line that you have to follow between being 
critical and being obstructive with your criticism. It 
takes judgment, judgment which you are generating 
as you go through life. 
There will be many times when those who lack in-
tegrity, seem to fare better than those who have it. 
There will be times when such apparent success will 
tempt you to chuck integrity aside, and get on the 
gravy train. Don’t do it, for when you do, you chip 
away at your greatest moral asset, character, you 
lessen your self-respect, and ultimately but certainly, 
the respect others have for you. These are the things 
that make you a man, an officer, and an effective 
leader, precious things to be guarded jealously for 
your country, your service, your men, and yourself.
Since World War II, there have been many spirited 
discussions on issues of national interest, such issues 
as national strategy, defense organization, weapon 
systems concepts. Each service has had very strong-
ly held viewpoints. On these issues the Navy has had 
to stand up for what it believes. Each time we have 
had to stand up for our viewpoint, we rested our 
case on honesty, on integrity. This is as important as 
the issues themselves. For national security, present 
readiness, future capabilities, and even economic 
conditions depended on their outcome. 
Because of this, on Capitol Hill today the Navy has 
a reputation for honesty and integrity. This stands 
us in good stead. When the very importance of the 
issues, the strength of the differing viewpoints, con-
fuse even the most conscientious, our reputation 
provides the much needed support. 
A Service reputation is made by many people, so 
many people in the Navy must have demonstrated 
integrity for the reputation to have been made. As 
long as we continue to keep integrity a hallmark of 
the United States Navy, we shall always have the re-
spect, and support of staunch friends. If you hold 
your personal integrity high, you will have respect 
and support when you need it. 
Enlarge your knowledge, keep your perspective, re-
tain your integrity, and we will weather the storm of 
today’s revolution. History teaches us of the Indus-
trial Revolution and its effects on world civilization, 
effects still felt in many parts of the world. Today, 
the world is in an even more tremendous and faster 
moving revolution. It is a revolution of science and 
technology, and its effects are being felt in every 
nook and cranny of the world. 
Science and technology are no longer simply ad-
vancing. They are exploding. Think of the changes 
during your own lifetime, in our knowledge and use 
of the atom, the electron, automation, outer space, 
medicine and health. These things affect us all, both 
in the deepest and simplest ways. 
The atom and its nuclear energy already has altered 
the lives of peoples and their dealings with one an-
other. By some it is viewed as a sword of Damocles, 
and by others as a potential savior. 
The electron allows us to exchange ideas with the 
remote peoples of the earth. It also distracted you 
from your studies when that good television show 
came on. 
Automation gives the engineers among you a calcu-
lating tool never available to your fathers. It gives in-
dustry a means of quality mass production that can 
have effects both good and evil. 
Outer space comes daily closer and closer to us. 
Once only in the realm of wild-dreaming authors, 
it now belongs to the scientist. Tomorrow it will be-
long to mankind. Today we are probing the depth of 
the sea and the outer reaches of space. 
Medicine advances by leaps and bounds to over-
come the most fatal diseases of yesteryear, and lays 
before us the problem of greatly expanding popula-
tions. 
No matter where we look, we face new boons, and 
new problems. This Revolution has reached the very 
keel of our Navy. It is up to us to master it. 
The Industrial Revolution brought steam to the Navy 
and left sail in its wake. It replaced smooth bore with 
rifles.	 It	 replaced	paddle-wheels	with	propellers.	 It	
changed Naval strategy, tactics and logistics. But it 
took two generations to do all this. 
Today we are moving rapidly ahead in nuclear pow-
er and missiles. We have evolved the ALBACORE 
hull, more effective propellers, weapons of devastat-
ing destruction, missiles of phenomenal accuracy, 
and all at a pace that bewilders the soul. This pace 
causes us to ponder, but does not allow us the time. 
Throughout the industrial revolution there were, and 
throughout this scientific and technological revolu-
tion there will be many changes, yet one element of 
the Navy remains unchanged. It is man, his character 
and his values, that stands as the most essential ele-
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ment. It is man who controls the machines, man who 
maintains the machines, and man who must stand up 
against the new problems created by the machines. 
Men are, and will remain, the soul of the Navy. 
Leadership is needed more today than ever before. 
You are the ones who will push the revolution on-
ward, who will produce the new machines, and 
who will lead the men. It is you to whom they will 
turn for guidance, precept, example, inspiration. 
Your personal philosophy, your inner values, your 
sense of moral responsibility, and your willingness 
to work hard will be vital to the efforts of the men. 
Your opportunities are unlimited. As officers your 
responsibilities are great. Your country, your Navy 
and your shipmates, look to you. With knowledge, 
with perspective, and with integrity, you will suc-
ceed. The opportunity is yours: it’s up to you.
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NPS: The Case for Value 
INTRODUCTION
Officers in the United States armed services have 
unique educational needs. Although civilian and 
military subject-matter fundamentals are generally 
the same, applications of these fundamentals differ 
widely. Just as graduate studies in a civilian univer-
sity prepare students for work in the civilian world, 
so military graduate students require coursework 
suffused with military applications.
The United States Navy particularly requires gradu-
ate education in a military university because of 
the technical complexity of sea and shore naval 
operations around the world. At sea, technical re-
quirements are becoming increasingly demanding. 
Other U.S. armed services also require officers with 
advanced education to manage the complexities of 
21st century warfare. Relevant graduate education 
directly contributes to combat-effectiveness. While 
ashore, working in their subspecialty areas, naval 
officers do staff work in a military setting. In this 
work, in addition to military education and expe-
rience, they require the same level of professional 
expertise as their civilian counterparts. Some of this 
work will be technical, requiring engineering and 
science education, while other will be managerial, 
benefiting from a military MBA program. Some will 
require cultural, linguistic, or policy expertise, par-
ticularly in relation to other nations. Military gradu-
ate education can increase the effectiveness of offi-
cers of all armed services who fill both combatant 
and non-combatant roles.
The Naval Postgraduate School is a military uni-
versity that uniquely meets the graduate education 
needs of both U.S. and allied military officers. World 
War ll hero Admiral Arleigh Burke, NPS 1930 grad-
uate, characterized the school aptly and succinctly 
in these words: “This splendid school opened a host 
of opportunities for the advancement of naval and 
military science not previously available.” The only 
other graduate institution that can compare with 
NPS as a military university is its smaller and more 
narrowly focused sister school, the Air Force Insti-
tute of Technology (AFIT), with which NPS has an 
ongoing active relationship. From the establishment 
of NPS in 1909, the military value of NPS gradu-
ate education has continued to increase until today 
it greatly exceeds anything offered in the civilian 
world.
At NPS, unlike a civilian graduate school, military 
applications pervade school life both inside and out-
side of classes, while every student must do defense-
related research. Educational effectiveness and effi-
ciency measured by graduation rate, cost to obtain 
an equivalent degree, student-faculty contact hours, 
faculty-student ratio, and time to graduation are 
uniformly superior at NPS. All these are facts solidly 
established by the following documentation.
NPS IS THE GRADUATE SCHOOL Of 
CHOICE fOR MILITARy OffICERS
Comparisons of curricula and course offerings be-
tween NPS and civilian universities with similar 
degree programs make clear the superior relevance 
of NPS for the graduate education of military offi-
cers. Few if any civilian universities have defense-
focused curricula such as Homeland Security, Special 
Operations, Systems Engineering and Space Systems, 
Undersea Warfare, Naval Systems Engineering, 
Combat Systems Sciences and Technology, Informa-
tion Warfare, or studies relating to the Middle East, 
Africa, South Asia. Yet these are some of the many 
military-oriented curricula offered at NPS. A like 
case can be made for special course offerings such 
as Aircraft Combat Survivability, The Economics of 
U.S. Defense Policy, Joint Intelligence and Military 
Command, Joint Campaign Analysis, Radar Systems, 
History of Special Operations, Software Development 
for Combat Systems, Underwater Acoustics, Logis-
tics Engineering, and Financial Management in the 
Armed Forces. Even in NPS courses having non-
military names like Statistics, military applications 
predominate, such as the use of multiple regression 
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in manpower-requirements determination. Notably 
different from civilian universities, while offering 
traditional academic degrees, NPS encourages and 
even demands a military framework for its course-
work and related student research.1
Outside the curricula leading to master’s degrees, 
programs in counterterrorism, homeland security, 
post-conflict	 security	 building,	 civil-military	 rela-
tions, and counter-drug strategy and policy place 
NPS in the forefront of educational institutions that 
support national security priorities.2
When students work together on research projects 
at NPS, not only do the project teams usually consist 
only of military officers but also these officers may 
often be members of different military services and 
even from different nations. Opportunities to work 
or study with military colleagues across service and 
national boundaries exist in virtually every unclas-
sified course at NPS. These experiences are rare, if 
non-existent, at civilian universities.
NPS IS SWIfT TO RESPOND TO 
CHANGING fLEET AND NATIONAL 
SECURITy NEEDS
NPS	 teaching	 and	 research	 reflects	 the	 needs	 of	
both	the	fleet	and	the	Navy’s	shore	establishment,	as	
well as other DoD and national security priorities. 
As	seen	in	the	Afghanistan	and	Iraq	conflicts,	NPS	
responds quickly to emergent DOD war-fighting 
requirements and applies science and technology to 
address near term and high profile issues.
The mechanisms for this process, unique to NPS, 
are the Educational Skill Requirements (ESRs) for 
the school’s curricula and the reimbursable research 
program.
Each curriculum at NPS has a Navy, DoD, or other 
national security sponsor, usually a Washington-
based	flag	or	 general	 officer,	 as	well	 as	 its	 own	 set	
of ESRs. The ESRs for a curriculum determine the 
objectives of the required courses. Biennially, NPS 
faculty members work with curriculum sponsors 
to	ensure	that	the	ESRs	reflect	current	Navy,	DoD,	
and national security needs. In addition to the Navy, 
sponsors of NPS curricula include members of the 
Army, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the National 
Security Agency, the Department of Homeland Se-
curity, Special Operations, and the Army National 
Guard.
Since the sources of reimbursable research funds 
are commanders of Navy sea and shore facilities, as 
well as other DoD and national security activities, 
the NPS research program ensures that its work is 
responsive — often vitally responsive — to Navy or, 
more generally, national security research needs. 
Faculty involvement in research on national security 
issues also helps keep classroom instruction abreast 
of latest developments contributing to the enhance-
ment of national security.
NPS RESEARCH IS UNIqUELy USEfUL TO 
NAVy AND DOD ACTIVITIES
NPS research centers and institutes target research 
work on specific Navy, DoD, and other national 
security needs. Examples of projects worked on 
include electric ships, directed-energy weapons, 
and rail guns. As Exhibit 1 shows, fully 85%, of 
NPS reimbursable research by faculty is directed 
at military concerns. No civilian university is likely 
to come close to this percentage. NPS students are 
mature military officers who make their contribu-
tion through the completion of a research thesis as a 
requirement for graduation. There are also 200 or so 
MBA students who must complete group research 
projects each year. Most student theses and projects, 
directed by faculty, address problems relating to 
military issues.
In the short term, NPS research, being directed at 
military problems, is uniquely useful to Navy and 
DoD activities. Like all research products, however, 
the products of this research often find applications 
in the civilian world. Former NPS faculty member 
Gary	Kildall	created	the	“parent”	of	DOS	(disk	op-
erating system), which, prior to Windows, made the 
word- and data-processing capabilities of comput-
ers available to practically anyone who had access 
to a personal computer. Today, computer programs 
that help “smart weapons” see targets also help phy-
sicians pinpoint breast tumors for radiation therapy, 
and self-lubricating ball bearings developed for the 
space shuttle also help reduce the temperature of 
high-speed dentist drills. NPS cutting-edge research 
in areas such as electric ships and directed-energy 
weapons will be important not only to the Navy’s 
future warfare capabilities but also, when applied 
commercially, to the enrichment of civilian life. 
These are just a few of many examples of military-
1  Secret or higher clearances are required for some courses, and the prerequisite for one course, Joint Campaign Analysis, is four or 
more	years	of	experience	in	the	field	or	the	fleet.
2  NPS faculty and students work closely with the Unified Combatant Commanders in education and research critical to the accom-
plishment of their missions. 
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to-civilian technology transfers. The Navy’s China 
Lake facility has a Web site dedicated to technol-
ogy transfer; NASA has a newsletter called God-
dard Tech Transfer News. NPS also plays a key role 
in transforming military technology to benefit the 
U.S. economy. Technology transfer is an important 
military activity, and it occurs at NPS.
NPS COMPARES fAVORABLy WITH 
OTHER UNIVERSITIES ON MEASURES  
Of qUALITy
The National Center for Educational Statistics 
(NCES) through its IPEDS (Integrated Postsecond-
ary Education Data System) Website provides nu-
merical data useful for comparing NPS with other 
universities. Exhibit 2 shows a number of these com-
parisons. Particularly notable: although NPS has the 
lowest ratio of administrative staff in all categories 
to faculty, it has the highest faculty-student ratio 
within a peer group of 12 U.S. universities that share 
its technical and research orientation (see ranks in 
the bottom row).
The	 high	 faculty-student	 ratio	 at	 NPS	 reflects	 the	
absence of teaching assistants in an almost solely 
military student body. As a measure of effectiveness, 
a high faculty-student ratio is an educational plus, 
but does this plus come at the expense of a costly 
minus in the efficient use of financial resources? Not 
at NPS. As shown in Exhibit 4, NPS ranks 7th low-
est — and below average — among 12 institutional 
peers in cost per credit hour.
Graduation rate merits especial attention. Different 
from its peer universities, NPS does not require its 
applicants to take an entrance test like the Gradu-
ate Record Examination (GRE). Institutions such as 
Cal Tech and MIT, cited in Exhibit 2, have among 
the highest entrance-examination mean scores of all 
universities in the nation. A substantial purpose of 
requiring entering students to have high entrance-
examination scores is to assure high student reten-
tion and graduation rates, especially in demanding 
curricula. Though important, academic aptitude 
measured by entrance tests is not the only personal 
attribute contributing to student success. Traits in 
the realm of motivation and character also contrib-
ute to this success, and NPS students, who through-
out their careers are routinely evaluated in fitness 
reports, tend to have such traits in abundance. NPS 
knows its applicants well. This, reinforced by the 
military success ethos pervasive at the school, is 
likely the reason that NPS has a 97°/o graduation 
rate despite the absence of an entrance test.
Still, a reasonable question is how NPS students 
might compare with other graduate students on the 
GRE. NPS has addressed this question by adminis-
tering the GRE on a number of occasions in the past, 
the finding being that NPS students in the samples 
tested scored above average on the GRE. That result 
is not surprising. While not directly testing aca-
demic aptitude, each curriculum at NPS requires it 
applicants to have an educational achievement pro-
file measured by three digits of an Academic Profile 
Code	(APC)	reflecting	undergraduate	grades	over-
all, as well as courses and grades in mathematics and 
science.
Student-faculty contact hours constitute an impor-
tant measure on which to compare NPS with its peer 
universities. At four quarters per year, 12 weeks per 
quarter, and 16 classroom hours per week, NPS av-
erages an annual total of 768 student-faculty contact 
hours, or 1,152 student-faculty contact hours in a 
typical six-quarter NPS master’s degree program. 
These numbers vary at civilian universities. Ac-
cording to an NPS technical report,3 U.S. graduate 
students attending non-military schools typically 
attend classes 13 hours per week for 32 weeks in a 
standard academic year plus, sometimes, 7 hours 
per week in a 10-week summer term. That is an an-
nual maximum of 486 student-faculty contact hours 
at a typical civilian university. The NPS contact-hour 
experience is clearly superior: about 58% greater at 
NPS than at a typical civilian university (100 X (768- 
486)/486).
Since NPS has no graduate assistants, as noted earli-
er, all courses at NPS are taught by faculty. If for this 
reason alone, NPS students are uniquely fortunate. 
Measured by degree source and research activity, 
the NPS faculty is comparable in academic strength 
with any other technical university in the world.
A DEGREE COSTS MUCH LESS AT NPS 
THAN AT A PEER UNIVERSITy
What are the comparable costs of a degree at NPS 
and its peer universities? To complete a master’s de-
gree program having contact hours equal to those 
at NPS, a student would have to attend a civilian 
university for about 28 months (12 X 1,152/486 = 
28.4), as opposed to only 18 months at NPS. This 
difference has tremendous cost implications favor-
3  Gates,	W.	R.,	Maruyama,	X.	K,	Powers,	J.P.,	Rosenthal,	R.	E.,	&	Cooper,	A.	W.	M.	(1998).	A bottom-up assessment of Nayy flagship 
schools: the NPS faculty critique of CNA’s report (Report No. NPS-FC-98-00). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.
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ing NPS. Assuming equal student-faculty contact 
hours and equal faculty pay, it implies that the cost 
for a student to earn a graduate degree is on average 
almost 58% more at a civilian graduate school than 
at NPS (100 X (28.4-18)/18).
Even a cost differential as high as 58o/o underesti-
mates the true difference because it fails to take into 
account student pay over the ten extra months (op-
portunity cost).
Cost per credit hour is a vehicle for getting at the 
true difference. Although NPS does not charge tu-
ition for Navy and Marine Corps students, the NPS 
operating budget shown in Exhibit 3 for FY2002, 
together with the 1,336 students on board that year, 
provides data for estimating NPS cost per credit 
hour comparable with credit-hour costs at peer 
institutions. This estimate depends on the total in-
structional cost, which from Exhibit 3 may be cal-
culated as the direct academic cost ($48.8 million) 
plus the fraction of direct base-operations cost at-
tributable to non-reimbursed academic functions 
($27.4 million times 48.8/185.2, the 185.2 being to-
tal expenditures minus student salary): $56,019,869. 
Dividing this total instructional cost by the 1,336 
students on board in FY2002 and by 64 credit hours 
per year (16 per quarter) results in the estimate of 
$655 per credit hour at NPS. This number compares 
with an average of $724 at NPS’ peer institutions, as 
shown in the first column of Exhibit 4.
What would a master’s degree cost if the Defense 
Department sent students to a civilian university 
rather than to NPS? The entire cost differential be-
tween NPS and other universities must take into 
account 10 months of a student’s salary because a 
student would have to attend a civilian university 
10 months longer than NPS to obtain an equivalent 
degree. The second and third columns of Exhibit 4 
show the results of accounting for student pay, de-
termined from Exhibits 3 and 5 by dividing student 
salary ($129.3 million) by the number of military 
students (943) in 2002 and multiplying the result by 
10/12: $114,263.
Unlike civilian universities, NPS curricula include 
courses that U.S. military students must take for 
credit toward their Joint Professional Military Edu-
cation (JPME) requirements. The expense of provid-
ing these courses would add to the cost of sending 
U.S. military officers to a civilian university instead 
of NPS.
NPS GRADUATES ShOw ThE VALUE 
Of ThEIR EDUCATION IN fUTURE 
ASSIGNMENTS
NPS counts among its graduates at least 34 astro-
nauts, a number of service secretaries, and hundreds 
of officers of flag rank. Among NPS’ distinguished 
military alumni: Admiral Arleigh Burke (World 
War II hero and former Chief of Naval Operations), 
Captain Eugene Cernan (astronaut who last walked 
on the moon), Admiral Moshe Marom (Vice Chief 
of Naval Operations, Israeli Navy), Admiral Henry 
Mauz (former Commander in Chief of the Atlan-
tic Fleet), Admiral Hyman Rickover (“father” of 
the nuclear Navy), Admiral James Watkins (former 
CNO and Secretary of Energy), Admiral James D. 
Watkins (former CNO), Admiral Michael Mullen 
(former Vice Chief of Naval Operations), Vice Ad-
miral Arthur Cebrowski (current Director of the 
Office of Force Transformation for the Secretary of 
Defense), Rear Admiral Wayne E. Meyer (former 
Deputy Commander for Weapons and Combat 
Systems, Naval Sea Systems Command, and “fa-
ther” of the Aegis weapons system), Captain Wil-
liam “Deak” Parsons (former Associate Director 
of Los Alamos Laboratory), Captain James Roche 
(current Secretary of the Air Force), and Brigadier 
General Thomas White (former Secretary of the 
Army). Among notable DRMI short-course gradu-
ates: HRM Abdullah (King of Jordan), HRM Aisha 
(Princess of Jordan), Ricardo Lopez Murphy (Min-
ister of Defense, Argentina), Girts Valdis Kristovskis 
(Minister of Defense, Latvia), Vasile Dudu (Minister 
of Defense, Romania), and Renato de Villa (Minister 
of Defense, Philippines). Some NPS graduates have 
also attained notable achievement in the civilian 
world, one outstanding example being Gordon Eu-
banks (former CEO of Symantec and current CEO 
of OBLIX), another Kevin Sharer (CEO of Amgen). 
The unique combination of military and civilian in-
gredients in NPS graduate education increases the 
value of a military officer in both combat and non-
combat roles. NPS graduates show the value of their 
education in subsequent military assignments and 
in later civilian careers, as well.
NPS PROVIDES DAILy INTERACTIONS 
AMONG MILITARy OffICERS Of 
OThER NATIONS AND U.S. OffICES Of 
DIffERENT SERVICES
NPS provides valuable opportunities for U.S. and 
international military officers to interact in edu-
cational activities focused on military problems. 
International officers sit side-by-side in classes at 
NPS with U.S. officers. During the academic year 
2003–2004, NPS had 356 international degree seek-
ing students out of a student body of 1,491. These in-
ternational students represented 60 different coun-
tries. The School of International Graduate Studies 
(SIGS), one of NPS’ four graduate schools, and the 
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NPS Center for Executive Education provide espe-
cially rich opportunities for such interaction. The 
Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI) 
at NPS has long delivered high-quality short courses 
tailored to the needs of international officers. The lo-
cal community provides civilian support for DRMI 
by “adopting” its students — warmly welcoming and 
familiarizing them with American society and cul-
ture. Monterey — with NPS, the DLI-FLC (Defense 
Language Institute — Foreign Language Center), 
and MIIS (Monterey Institute of International Stud-
ies) at its center — is a highly sought after destina-
tion for international students.
In all four of NPS’ graduate schools, officers of differ-
ent military services study together. Exhibit 5 shows 
this distribution, together with international officers 
and civilians, in average-on-board (AOB) numbers 
for 2003. Though administered by the Department 
of the Navy, NPS is a graduate-education home to 
members of all U.S. armed services.
NPS ExISTS GEOGRAPhICALLy IN A 
SyMBIOTICALLy RICh MILITARy AND 
TEChNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT
The Monterey Bay area is home to a number of mili-
tary institutions in addition to NPS. Notable among 
these are the Defense Language Institute — Foreign 
Language Center (DLI-FLC), the Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL), the Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC), the Army’s Monterey TRADOC 
(Training and Indoctrination) Element, and the 
Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography 
Center (FNMOC). This is the Monterey Model: 
sharing and leveraging resources. All these institu-
tions collaborate on military educational and re-
search programs, as well as efforts to effect civilian 
regional improvement. In libraries, laboratories, and 
other venues, faculty, students, and staff at NPS have 
opportunities to work with their counterparts at 
these other local institutions in constantly emerging 
cooperative endeavors.
The nearby Silicon Valley, with its many cutting-
edge information technology companies such as 
Cisco Systems and Seagate (not to mention Apple 
Computer and Sun Microsystems), provides numer-
ous opportunities for mutually beneficial links be-
tween NPS and industry.
NPS IS DEVELOPING EDUCATION  
AND RESEARCh METhODS fOR ThE 
21ST CENTURy
NPS is well on its way into the 21st century in both 
its teaching and its research programs.
Life -long learning and distance (or distributed) 
learning (DL) are occupying an increasingly large 
portion of the educational activities of universities 
throughout the United States, and NPS is in the 
forefront of this movement. In a military extremely 
busy with operational activities, not all potential 
students have time for residence at a university. 
Many need to pursue their studies while deployed 
elsewhere around the world. NPS meets this current 
challenge. In addition to its roughly 1,600 full-time 
students, NPS currently has more than 600 DL stu-
dents in degree and non-degree programs, and that 
number is increasing. For all its merits, it must be re-
membered that distance learning must be supported 
by a first class teaching institution such as NPS. It 
is noted that another 10,000 students enroll in NPS 
short courses each year.
In addition to planning a program of systematic cur-
riculum-content reviews by faculty members of peer 
institutions, the school is currently engaged in and 
pursuing partnerships with many other universities, 
including Stanford University, the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, the Virginia Polytechnic In-
stitute, Purdue University, the University of Mary-
land, the University of California at Santa Barbara, 
and the University of Southern California. These 
links help to keep NPS curricula abreast of current 
developments in academia. As NPS faculty focuses 
on military problems, its capability to address these 
problems must be constantly nourished by contact 
with civilian developments in teaching and research. 
NPS will maintain its currency in Information Tech-
nology (IT) with continued participation in national 
advanced networking, as well as consortia of univer-
sities and other research centers. These involvements 
will provide NPS faculty and students with tools re-
quired for leading-edge education and research. As 
the new century proceeds, NPS will seek to intensify 
its academic interactions by enhancing its sabbati-
cal program, encouraging exchanges with faculties 
of other universities, and developing an increasingly 
active post-doctoral research program. NPS can be 
extremely attractive to post-doctoral fellows because 
of its unique access to Navy and DoD research fund-
ing. The return to NPS and DoD will be great since 
post-doctoral fellows from universities throughout 
the world can bring with them the latest develop-
ments in theory and methodology that might have 
important applications to military problems.
NPS IS A NATIONAL RESOURCE fOR 
ShAPING ThE fUTURE NATIONAL 
SECURITy ENVIRONMENT
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Like other research universities, NPS develops re-
search methods and creates research products, but, 
unlike others, NPS concentrates its efforts almost 
solely on military problems or concerns. Particular-
ly notable is that the NPS faculty focuses primarily 
on improving the military usefulness of its students 
rather than on replicating itself, e.g., as economists 
or physicists, or on preparing its students for work 
in civilian business administration or professions 
other than the military. The otherwise rare academi-
cian who eschews self-replication is commonplace 
at NPS, and his or her presence here constitutes a 
great measure of what makes NPS unique, as well as 
relevant, to Navy and DoD needs.
At the same time, NPS civilian and military faculty 
are comparable in quality to the faculty at high-
productivity research universities on measures such 
as source of terminal degree and current research 
publication rate, as well as service as consultants to 
military organizations.
NPS accepts students in early-to-mid career and 
through refresher and transition courses, virtually 
unique in graduate-level academia, prepares non-
technical undergraduate majors for graduate study 
in technical curricula. At NPS, undergraduate music 
or history majors have entered the space program as 
engineers. The time spent in the one or two quarters 
of refresher or transition work is made up in NPS’ 
uniquely efficient programming of courses. At NPS, 
the courses that a student needs to take are always 
available when the student needs to take them.4 A 
student at NPS wastes no time waiting for the avail-
ability of a required course.
NPS qualifies nationally as a Carnegie Research 
Intensive University, ranking 81st in 2001 among 
hundreds of comparable institutions in expendi-
tures of federal research dollars, this reported in The 
Top American Research Universities 2003 by John V. 
Lombardi, et al. NPS programs are also accredited 
by the Senior College Commission of the Western 
Association of Schools and Colleges (WASC), the 
Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technol-
ogy (ABET),5 the Association to Advance Collegiate 
Schools of Business (AACSB), and the National As-
sociation of Schools of Public Affairs and Admin-
istration (NASPAA). NPS not only compares well 
with its civilian counterparts; as a military univer-
sity, NPS is unique in its class.
NPS is one of the vitally important contact points 
between the military and civilian worlds, particular-
ly in the realm of education and research. At these 
points, the two worlds help sustain and strengthen 
each other. Amidst the international culture and 
technical vibrancy of the Monterey area, NPS inter-
acts in a richly synergistic intellectual environment. 
The Naval Postgraduate School is a uniquely valu-
able national asset.
4 Although sometimes a potential class size is too small to justify offering a course within a concentration option, this is not the case 
within streams of required courses.
5 The NPS programs accredited by the Engineering Accreditation Commission of ABETS are Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engi-
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title  Naval Postgraduate School  
Frequently Asked Questions
source NPS Internal Document, Author Unknown, 1998
abstract  The specifics regarding the Naval Postgraduate School program are reviewed, 
i.e., academic calendar, admissions criteria, and program length. Special em-
phasis is given the uniqueness of NPS in its ability to meet the Navy’s needs 
for graduate education as reinforced by feedback from civilian professors, and 
graduates, as well as members of a select committee. 
excerpts  “In 1993–94, NPS invited distinguished academics from prestigious universities 
to review NPS programs for uniqueness … The overriding conclusions from this 
group of academics were that NPS programs are unique and that they could not 
be replicated at civilian universities without considerable expense.”
  “[US OPNAV] N81 using actual total costs of Navy graduate programs at civil-
ian universities and at the Naval Postgraduate School, determined that civilian 
universities are 17 percent more expensive per class contact hour than at NPS. 
When other DoD/International/Foreign Military Training students numbers 
and tuition amounts are factored in, the cost per class hour at NPS is further 
reduced.”
  “At NPS, the Navy actually gets more for its dollar. For example, total graduate 
contact hours at civilian schools in a 12 month period equal 384 hours while 
NPS students receive 864 contact hours in that same period. This is due to NPS 
year-round operation and higher daily course loads.”
  “NPS instruction is designed to meet specific military Education Skill Re-
quirements (ESRs) that reflect the academic theory that Naval officers will 
later apply in their careers. In order to do this, hardware, software, documents, 
etc. that are military specific are used … The intent is not to train officers for 
known challenges, but to educate them so they are capable of dealing with the 
unknown and the uncertain.”
  “In April 1991, speaking about NPS, Secretary of Defense Cheney said, ‘The 
School is absolutely vital.’”
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Naval Postgraduate School  
Frequently Asked Questions 
IS ThE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SChOOL 
REALLy UNIqUE?
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is unique in 
several ways. First and foremost, it is unique in its 
mission and in the programs it offers to meet that 
mission. The NPS mission is to enhance the combat-
effectiveness of the United States. Each program, 
and as much as possible, each course is focused on 
meeting that mission.
Other ways that NPS is unique include the following.
Classified Research
NPS has one of the largest classified library collec-
tions in the United States along with the facilities for 
conducting classified teaching and research.
Academic Calendar
NPS operates on a full year schedule with four aca-
demic quarters. Students enter and graduate each 
quarter. This facilitates the Navy’s operating sched-
ule and allows flexibility in officer assignments. 
Most graduate school curricula begin with the Fall 
semester with only a few allowing for January input.
Academic Potential and Officer Performance as 
Admission Criteria
Many graduate institutions only accept students 
with a 3.0 undergraduate grade point average in a 
field of study related to the intended graduate pro-
gram. The average undergraduate GPA for USN of-
ficers is 2.87 and 54% of all USN officers have a GPA 
below 3.0. In addition to academic admission cri-
teria, the Navy also values officer performance and 
potential, therefore NPS will accept officers with less 
than a 3.0 in majors not directly related to the grad-
uate degree program.
Most top performing URL officers do not have an 
undergraduate degree in the correct discipline to 
qualify him/her for admission into civilian gradu-
ate school. Switching programs to CIVINS would 
make fully-funded graduate education unavailable 
to most of these potential leaders.
Transition Programs
The Navy has specific areas of study that it has de-
termined to be critical to the success of the Navy of 
the future. At the same time, there is a closed pool of 
candidates with distinct undergraduate degrees and 
grades that the Navy must choose to educate. These 
two worlds do not always match. NPS has both the 
capability, and an impressive track record, of tran-
sitioning officers with one undergraduate degree to 
an entirely different, and often more technically ori-
ented, graduate degree.
Program Length
Students at NPS generally spend an average of 23 
months obtaining a graduate degree. This compares 
very favorably with programs at civilian universities. 
Navy Supply Corps officers spend an average of 22 
months obtaining MBA’s at civilian universities (com-
pared to an NPS M.S. in Management, which takes 
anywhere from 18-21 months to obtain). Unrestrict-
ed and Restricted Line Officers spend an average of 
33 months obtaining engineering degrees at civilian 
universities (compared to 26 months at NPS).
Interaction with Other Services and Internation-
al Military Officers
For many officers, NPS provides the first oppor-
tunity in their careers for interaction with officers 
from other communities within their own service, 
other U.S. military organizations, and officers from 
other countries. NPS has a diverse student body, not 
only in terms of race, ethnicity and culture, but also 
in terms of different career backgrounds and experi-
ences. The learning experience is further enriched 
as students share these differences both in and out 
of the classroom. The services and the United States 
are also enriched as relationships are formed which 
may serve to provide greater understanding and co-
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operation in times of both peace and crisis through-
out these officers’ careers.
Professors in the Classroom
Civilian professors teach courses at NPS. Civilian 
schools make extensive use of Teaching Assistants 
and other graduate students.
Program Focus
The focus at NPS is on masters’ students and on mas-
ters’ theses. Masters’ students are given the attention 
of the faculty; the emphasis is first on teaching and 
second on research. Top-level civilian institutions tend 
to focus on Ph.D. programs, concentrating on theo-
retical topics and neglecting practical application; the 
first priority of the faculty at these schools is research.
NPS students write theses on military topics 
with oversight from faculty experienced in work-
ing with military applications. NPS theses are 
valuable and timely contributions to operations 
within the DoN. It is unlikely that many students in 
civilian institutions would have the opportunity to 
write military theses, and it would be even less likely 
that they would have access to faculty members ex-
perienced in military applications. DoN has control 
over the quality of instruction and the integrity of 
graduate programs at NPS. Civilian graduate pro-
grams can vary greatly in quality from one school 
to the next.
hOw DO yOU KNOw NPS IS UNIqUE?
Navy Graduate Education Program Select Study 
Committee
In the mid-seventies, the Secretary of the Navy im-
paneled a Select Committee of distinguished civilian 
educators (including Donald Rice, former Secretary 
of the Air Force, William Perry, former Secretary of 
Defense), engineers, and scientists. The committee 
examined the educational goals and academic con-
tent of all Navy graduate education curricula and 
made specific recommendations as to their individual 
placement either at civilian universities or at NPS.
This commission found:
	 •	 	that	 programs	 having	 a	 heavy	 emphasis	 on	
naval systems and those depending for their 
vitality on the unique facilities, services, tal-
ents and circumstances at the Naval Post-
graduate School could not be developed or 
offered at civilian institutions at equal or 
lower costs, and
	 •	 	that	in	the	case	of	those	few	curricula	offered	
at NPS for which counterparts are available at 
some civilian universities virtually all course-
work is required to support other curricula, 
and that the incremental costs of offering 
these curricula is small and well worth the 
value of the benefits received.
The commission report noted that, “a general com-
parison cannot he drawn between NPS programs 
and civilian programs under the same title.” The 
report further states that, “it quickly became obvi-
ous that most of the curricula now conducted at NPS 
contained a high degree of specialization to meet the 
needs of the Navy.”
The Select Committee recommendations were ac-
cepted by SECNAV and CNO and have been im-
plemented. The Committee also directed that NPS 
should not provide programs offered at civilian uni-
versities and the Navy and NPS have complied with 
that direction.
External Review of the NPS by Visiting Civilian 
Professors
In 1993–94, NPS invited distinguished academics 
from prestigious universities to review NPS pro-
grams for uniqueness. The reviewers were also asked 
to evaluate whether NPS students would have been 
accepted into applicable standard programs (i.e. en-
gineering, business, etc.) at their universities.
The overriding conclusions from this group of aca-
demics were that NPS programs are unique and that 
they could not be replicated at civilian universities 
without considerable expense.
“From my perspective, your program is designed with 
different objectives in mind than most civilian pro-
grams and serves an important function that would 
not be easy to replicate. “Steven Long, Professor of 
Electrical Engineering, University of California, Santa 
Barbara: at NPS January 14, 1994.
“NPS offers a unique educational opportunity that 
would not be feasible to establish in a civilian, major 
research university.” John R. Lloyd, University Distin-
guished Professor, Michigan State University: at NPS 
March 21, 1994.
“Without NPS, the Navy would lose control of their 
curricula. The curriculum sponsors would not get 
their requirements met.” Professor Stephen Pollock, 
University of Michigan: at NPS May 23, 1994.
The visiting academics also reviewed the records of 
over 300 NPS students and found that only twelve 
percent would have been unconditionally accepted 
to civilian university programs. About 75% would 
not have been accepted without considerable addi-
tional academic preparation. The table below pro-
vides additional detail. 
62 VALUE BOOK • A STRATEGIC VALUED INVESTMENT  NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Individual Program Reviews
Late in the 1980’s, the Review Committee for the 
Department of Operations Research stated: “Both 
the comprehensiveness of the (OR) program, which 
is based on the assumption that most graduates will 
undertake no further graduate study, and its deeply 
military flavor are unique. We do not believe that 
this military viewpoint could be maintained in any 
civilian academic institution, or that such an insti-
tution could provide its students with anything like 
the thorough survey of tactical, strategic, procure-
ment, and weapon system problems offered in the 
program. We therefore regard the OR curriculum at 
NPS as a major resource of the national military OR 
and defense planning community.”
In 1994, the head of the Air Force Special Opera-
tions School stated, “The (National Security Affairs) 
curriculum at NPS, having been structured specifi-
cally to address the items of most importance to the 
military community, seems ideal for Air Force area 
specialists.”
Student Feedback
NPS graduates who have also taken graduate course 
sat civilian institutions were surveyed about the 
uniqueness, excellence, and relevance to DoD of 
NPS compared to civilian universities. Their over-
whelming response has been that NPS is unique, 
excellent, and relevant.
why DOESN’T ThE NAVy USE CIVILIAN 
UNIVERSITIES fOR GRADUATE 
EDUCATION fOR ITS OffICERS? wON’T 
UNIVERSITIES TAILOR ThEIR PROGRAMS 
TO MEET ThE NEEDS Of ThE NAVy?
Experience at NPS has shown that a powerful factor 
in motivating officers to undergo the intense study 
NPS programs require is the relevance of the course 
material. There is additional value added when 
course material includes applications to one’s own 
environment along with the theory of a discipline.
NPS instruction is designed to meet specific military 
Education Skill Requirements (ESRs) that reflect the 
academic theory that Naval officers will later ap-
ply in their careers. In order to do this, hardware, 
software, documents, etc. that are military specific 
are used. The following are a few examples of topics 
covered and hardware used in courses and laborato-
ries, some of which is classified and all of which are 
relevant to the military.
  Harpoon seeker, Ada as a basic language, SPS-
40C, SPS-67, etc. radars, AGM-78D antiradia-
tion missile, SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare system, 
ALQ-123 IR counter-measure pod, JANUS and 
other war games, BGLCS logistics system, re-
cruiting models, Heavy Attack planning and re-
stocking model, Computer and Information Se-
curity laboratory, Classified reports library, SCI 
facility, ASSET and FAST ship design systems
NPS makes continuous improvements to its cur-
ricula in response to needs of the Navy. NPS also 
develops new curricula (e.g. C4I, ASW, Space Op-
erations, EW, Total Ship Systems Engineering, Op-
erational Logistics, Combat Systems) in timely re-
sponse to emerging Navy requirements.
While other universities are beginning to realize that 
there is a tremendous market in the development of 
tailored, focused curricula for a specific organization, 
corporation, or career field, NPS has been working 
with the Navy for years in this capacity. The term 
“corporate university” is being heard more and more 
often in the academic and corporate world. But, the 
Navy already has in NPS its own corporate univer-
sity. While other civilian universities might be able to 
duplicate individual NPS programs, very few would 
be willing or able to duplicate all programs, or to 
respond as quickly as NPS does in modification of 
existing curricula or development of new programs. 
Evidence of this can be seen in the discussions by 
the visiting academics in the external review of NPS 
programs. Furthermore, the curricula that have been 
developed over the last several years are ones that are 
multidisciplinary in nature. NPS is uniquely quali-
fied to provide these curricula as it can take advan-
tage of existing in-house expertise. As a case in point, 
the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO-
LIC) curriculum combines expertise in the areas of 
National Security, Operations Analysis, Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers and Intelli-
gence (C4I) and Systems Management to create an 
analytically rigorous warfare-oriented program.
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All of the things listed above in the section on NPS 
uniqueness are other reasons that civilian universi-
ties would not be able to meet the Navy’s needs for 
graduate education.
DOES ThE fACT ThAT ThE NAVy TIES 
ThE REqUIREMENT fOR GRADUATE 
EDUCATION TO SPECIfIC BILLETS 
DRIVE GRADUATE EDUCATION MORE 
TOwARD TRAINING ThAN ACADEMIA?
Department of Defense Directive 1322.10 requires 
that the services identify billets that requires educa-
tion and educate officers to fill those specific posi-
tions. Each service developed its own system to en-
sure that they were meeting these requirements. For 
the Navy, this is the subspecialty system. Although 
this system tends to drive the Navy’s management 
of the graduates of its fully-funded graduate educa-
tion programs the same way it manages graduates of 
training programs, the system does not impact the 
education of those graduates in the same way. It sim-
ply cannot for several reasons.
NPS is an academic institution, which prides itself 
on the high-quality Master’s level education that it 
provides. Ninety-nine percent of the permanent fac-
ulty hold doctoral degrees. They are experts in their 
field who work at NPS to provide quality education, 
not train naval officers.
Secondly, each subspecialty has hundreds of billets 
in dozens of commands throughout the Navy and 
DoD with a myriad of duties associated with these 
billets. There is no way to train students in the tasks 
required by each of these billets.
The subspecialty and curriculum review is where 
the transition between the skills required to perform 
in certain billets is translated into academic disci-
plines and learning objectives. The Navy curriculum 
sponsor brings to the review process descriptions of 
the billets and the duties required of those billets. 
Together with the NPS faculty, they develop a com-
mon core of skills required to perform well in those 
billets. The NPS faculty helps to translate those skills 
into knowledge areas and then develop courses to 
meet those objectives. The intent is not to train of-
ficers for known challenges, but to educate them so 
they are capable of dealing with the unknown and 
the uncertain.
ARE ALL COURSES AT NPS UNIqUE?
NPS programs are unique, however, not every in-
dividual course taught at NPS is Navy/military-
unique. Advanced subjects cannot be taught without 
knowledge of science, mathematics, and statistics 
that underlie all science, engineering and technol-
ogy programs. Professors use military examples 
where applicable in all courses.
IS SOME UNIqUENESS “CONTRIVED”? 
COULDN’T PROGRAMS SUCh AS 
MEChANICAL ENGINEERING BE 
TAUGhT ANy UNIVERSITy? DOESN’T 
ThIS UNIqUENESS PERPETUATE ITSELf, 
SIMPLy BECAUSE ThE PROGRAMS ARE 
CURRENTLy TAUGhT AT NPS?
Some curricula taught at NPS, such as Mechanical 
Engineering, have names that are the same as pro-
grams found at civilian universities. Those programs 
are unique because of their direct application to mil-
itary systems and applications. The NPS Mechani-
cal Engineering program includes courses in Naval 
Architecture and Marine Environmental Deteriora-
tion. Curricula with a heavy emphasis on naval sys-
tems and those depending for their vitality on the 
unique facilities, services, talents and circumstances 
available at NPS cannot be found elsewhere.
There is no question that NPS programs become 
more relevant with time. As professors conduct re-
search for the Departments of Defense and Navy, 
and for other military institutions, they gain knowl-
edge in areas directly applicable to defense. They, in 
turn, incorporate this knowledge into the classroom. 
They develop case studies, class projects and as-
signments, and course material based on their own 
knowledge and experience. Students also contribute 
to making the programs more unique through their 
thesis work and the real-world knowledge that they 
bring to the classroom.
The Select Study Committee on Graduate Education 
found that for the few curricula offered at NPS for 
which counterparts are available at some civilian 
universities, virtually all coursework is required to 
support other curricula, and the incremental costs 
of offering these curricula is small and well worth 
the value of the benefits received.
why DOES ThE NAVy NEED ITS OwN 
GRADUATE SChOOL whEN NONE Of 
ThE OThER SERVICES NEEDS ThEIR OwN?
Because of the unique operating environment of the 
Navy, educational opportunities are not as great in the 
Navy. If the Navy wants a mix of technical and non-
technical then opportunities for fully-funded gradu-
ate education must exist. Because of the cost of the 
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officer’s salary, this opportunity must be as compact 
as possible and focused. NPS, with its year-round op-
eration, four times a year graduation and input, and 
its focus on corporate issues meets these needs.
Unlike the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), 
NPS is used extensively by the other U.S. mili-
tary services. NPS is the Department of the Navy’s 
school, so it supports the graduate education needs 
for both the Navy and Marine Corps. The Army and 
Air Force have chosen NPS for all or most of their 
National Security Affairs, Management, Operations 
Research, Computer Science and Aeronautical En-
gineering curricula.
	 •	 	Computer	 Science’s	Computer	Graphics	 and	
Visual Simulation track has attracted Army 
students because of the non-availability at ci-
vilian institutions.
	 •	 	The	Army	and	Air	Force	have	stated	that	they	
believe NPS fulfills their graduate education 
requirements in these areas.
In a letter dated 4 February, 1997, the Secretary ofthe 
Navy and Secretary ofthe Air Force discussed con-
solidation of AFIT and NPS. They recommended 
that NPS consider changing its name, mission and 
organization to emphasize its unique status. There 
was no mention of closing both NPS and AFIT, 
which implies that the services recognize the need 
for one graduate institution, dedicated to providing 
graduate education in areas of importance to the de-
fense establishment.
In April, 1991, speaking about NPS, Secretary of De-
fense Cheney stated: “The School is absolutely vital.”
why DOES IT TAKE ALMOST TwO 
yEARS TO COMPLETE A DEGREE AT 
NPS whILE CIVILIAN UNIVERSITIES 
ADVERTISE ShORTER PROGRAMS?
Graduate students are accepted into programs at 
civilian schools if they are academically qualified 
for immediate entry into the applicable graduate 
program. This generally assumes that the student 
has the requisite undergraduate degree, a sufficient 
GPA, away from an academic environment no more 
than 3–4 years and performs well on graduate en-
trance examinations. If they are not qualified they 
cannot enroll directly in the program and must take 
additional courses to meet the entry requirements. 
Depending on the academic preparation of the stu-
dent, they may be required to take one or two se-
mesters of undergraduate preparatory work.
NPS students, for the most part, would not be quali-
fied for immediate entry into graduate programs 
because of their time out of undergraduate school, 
GPA and/or their undergraduate major. NPS will ac-
cept students into the program and will “transition” 
them to qualified graduate students.
Additionally, NPS programs are designed to meet 
both degree requirements and fulfill educational 
skill requirements (ESRs).
NPS is working with the curriculum sponsors to de-
velop shorter programs for unrestricted line (URL) 
officer students who are the ones who have the 
most difficulty finding time in their career paths for 
graduate education. Of note, URL officers attending 
programs at civilian universities spend an average of 
24 months obtaining as degree, compared with the 
average 23 months spent at NPS.
CAN NAVAL OffICERS, SPECIfICALLy 
URL OffICERS, AffORD ThE TIME IN 
ThEIR CAREER PAThS TO ATTEND 
GRADUATE EDUCATION PROGRAMS?
The answer to this question is yes, however, the 
question really should be, could the Navy afford not 
to invest in its URL officers by providing them the 
opportunity for graduate education? An OPNAV 
study revealed that there is time for graduation edu-
cation early in an officer’s career and recommended 
a continued long-term strategic commitment to 
postgraduate education for URL officers.
Although many officers believe that the time spent 
in a “Not Observed” status while attending gradu-
ate education programs will hurt their chances for 
promotion, statistics show that officers with gradu-
ate education promote at or above the rate of officers 
without graduate education.
ARE NPS PROGRAMS MORE EXPENSIVE 
ThAN PROGRAMS AT CIVILIAN 
UNIVERSITIES? whAT ABOUT OThER 
NAVy EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS?
Using actual total costs of Navy graduate programs 
at civilian universities and at the Naval Postgradu-
ate School, N81 determined that civilian universi-
ties are 17 percent more expensive per class contact 
hour than at NPS. When other DoD/international/
Foreign Military Training students numbers and tu-
ition amounts are factored in, the cost per class hour 
at NPS is further reduced.
A recent draft CNA study shows costs at NPS to be 
$89,000 for a 23 month program, $33,000 to $51,000 
for a 10 month program at the Naval War College, 
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and $218,000 for a 48 month program at the Naval 
Academy. When compared on a monthly basis 
NPS costs are $3870/mo, Naval War College costs 
are $3300 to $5100/mo and the Naval Academy 
costs are $4540/mo. NPS is not out of line when 
compared against other Navy schools.
The cost-effectiveness of NPS is directly attributable 
to the efficient operation of NPS. NPS operational 
costs per student are extremely sensitive to the av-
erage number of Navy students onboard. Program 
costs are relatively the same whether you are educat-
ing five or twenty students. If the Navy sends fewer 
students in a year, the cost per student will go up 
accordingly. While NPS can respond to short notice 
changes, it takes several years to resize the faculty, 
staff and support structures accordingly.
When considering total cost to the Navy, the high-
est cost, approximately two-thirds of the total, is at-
tributed to student salary and benefits, regardless of 
what school the student attends.
At NPS, the Navy actually gets more for its dollar. 
For example, total graduate contact hours at civilian 
schools in a 12 month period equal 384 hours while 
NPS students receive 864 contact hours in that same 
period. This is due to NPS year-round operation and 
higher daily course loads.
ARE NPS PROGRAMS AS GOOD AS 
ThOSE AT CIVILIAN UNIVERSITIES?
Upon receiving the maximum length accreditation 
from the Accrediting Board for Engineering and 
Technology, “NPS was informed by the board presi-
dent that NPS had the strongest review of any of the 
schools they visited that year” (1991).
President Bush’s Science Advisor wrote about NPS: 
“What particularly impressed me, was the … unique 
mixture of outstanding fundamental science coupled 
to very clear, well-developed ideas as to how the sci-
ence in question could be applied to specific Navy 
problems and applications.” 
The Degrees earned here (NPS) are “the equal of any 
being awarded. … anywhere … in the world …” Na-
tional Science Advisor Dr. Allen Bromley: November 
1989, Monterey, California
ShOULD MILITARy OffICERS ATTEND 
CIVILIAN UNIVERSITIES TO INTEGRATE 
wITh SOCIETy?
There is a serious tradeoff between using gradu-
ate educational opportunities for integration of the 
military with society and providing tailored relevant 
curricula that will increase the combat-effectiveness 
of the officer and the Navy. As discussed above, the 
greatest cost to the service for graduate education is 
the student’s time and salary. As civilian universities 
cannot provide the type of education that the Navy 
requires of its officers, it may not be prudent to sac-
rifice the educational needs of the officer corps for 
goodwill purposes.
The importance of the relationships made and the 
knowledge gained about the other U.S. services and 
officers of other countries by NPS students would be 
hampered, if not lost, should graduate education be 
transferred entirely to civilian universities.
DOESN’T ThE fACT ThAT NPS 
DEVELOPS CURRICULA IN RESPONSE TO 
ThE NAVy’S NEEDS jUST ALLOw NPS 
TO PERPETUATE ITS OwN EXISTENCE?
The Navy has very specific procedures for identify-
ing what education that it requires and where that 
education should be obtained. The directives read 
that a curriculum should not be taught at NPS if a 
program of comparable quality, focus and cost is 
available at a civilian university. NPS is not involved 
in the decision process about where a particular cur-
riculum should be obtained.
However, as the experts in graduate education, NPS 
is often consulted on the development of new sub-
specialties and the curricula required to support 
these subspecialties. Moreover, it is often the case 
that Navy sponsors have an idea of what they want 
from a curriculum, and know that they will get the 
best product from NPS so they come to NPS for as-
sistance in developing that product. Again, the Navy 
must ultimately decide where that education should 
be obtained, and NPS does not have the power to 
make that decision.
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title  Uniqueness and Excellence of the Naval  
Postgraduate School
source NPS Internal Document, Author Unknown, 2000
abstract  The benefits of the Naval Postgraduate School are outlined, including its pro-
grams structured to help combat terrorism, its student-faculty research on U.S. 
security requirements, and its outreach support to deployed forces. Also out-
lined are how NPS programs are structured by defense-relevant Educational 
Skill Requirements as specified by DoN and other sponsors.
excerpts  “NPS’ accredited degree programs are structured to help win the War against 
Terrorism from Afghanistan and Iraq to Hometown, USA.”
  “Navy comprises only 45 percent of NPS enrollment; growing flow of students 
from USAF, Army, and USMC. Unparalleled international enrollment: 303 
students from 61 nations, many of them critical defense partners (US and In-
ternational students are co-mingled in the classroom and in student housing).” 
  “UAV and network research (using NPS-controlled runways and airspace) has 
produced systems currently deployed by Special forces in Afghanistan.”
  “Dep Sec Def has designated NPS as the Information Operations Center of 
Excellence.”
  “Leadership Development for Sustained Peace (provides seminars for leader-
ship of all divisions deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan on security-building 
challenges).”
  “NPS costs reflect requirements imposed by Navy and others to meet opera-
tional demands and provide agile, adaptive and relevant programs.”
  “NPS meets military requirements while maintaining national academic repu-
tations.”
  “NPS faculty includes PhD’s from the nation’s best universities including Har-
vard (9), Princeton (6), Yale (5), University of California (69), Stanford (25), 
MIT (14), Cornell (4), Columbia (3).”
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Uniqueness and Excellence of the  
Naval Postgraduate School 
NPS’ accredited degree programs are structured 
to help win the War against Terrorism, from 
Afghanistan and Iraq to Hometown, USA
	 •	 	SOCOM-Sponsored	 curriculum	 in	 Defense	
Analysis (including specialized Counterter-
rorism (CT)-oriented coursework)
	 •	 	Stability	 Operations	 and	 Post-Conflict	 Re-
construction
	 •	 	Homeland	Defense	and	Security	(the	nation’s	
largest and most successful)
	 •	 	Computer	 Security,	 Information	 Assurance,	
and other critical infrastructure protection 
programs
	 •	 	Blend	of	defense-oriented	programs	 in	 tech-
nology, engineering, policy and management 
reflects agility and uniqueness of NPS
NPS student mix builds Joint, Combined, and 
Interagency effectiveness
	 •	 	Navy	 comprises	only	45	percent	of	NPS	en-
rollment; growing flow of students from 
USAF, Army, and USMC
	 •	 	Unparalleled	 international	 enrollment:	 303	
students from 61 nations, many of them criti-
cal defense partners (US and international 
students are co-mingled in the classroom and 
in student housing)
	 •	 	Additional	 160	 senior	 defense	 officials	 from	
around the world attend leadership education 
in defense management
	 •	 	NPS	designated	as	the	US’	only	NATO	Part-
nership for Peace Education Center
	 •	 	Strong	 interagency	 input	 (FBI,	 DHS,	 NSA,	
NSF Cyber corps, NRO and others)
NPS student-faculty research directly focused on 
US security requirements
	 •	 	UAV	and	network	research	(using	NPS-con-
trolled runways and airspace) has produced 
systems currently deployed by Special Forces 
in Afghanistan
	 •	 	Classified	 research	 in	 Maritime	 Domain	
Awareness, Intelligence, many other war-on-
terrorism topics (heavy use of Special Com-
partmented Information Facility)
	 •	 	Work	 in	 TBMD,	Directed	 Energy,	 Counter-
insurgency operations, Undersea Warfare, 
Combat Systems advance combat-effective-
ness now and for the future
	 •	 	Dep	Sec	Def	has	designated	NPS	as	the	Infor-
mation Operations Center of Excellence
Outreach to support deployed forces, US policy-
makers
	 •	 	Regional	 Security	 Education	 Program	 (de-
ploys NPS professors to conduct graduate 
seminars for Carrier Battle Groups sailing to 
operating areas)
	 •	 	Leadership	Development	for	Sustained	Peace	
(provides seminars for leadership of all divi-
sions deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan on 
security-building challenges)
	 •	 	Homeland	Security	 for	Governors	(seminars	
assist Governors in strengthening HS in their 
States — 22 programs already conducted)
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	 •	 	NPS	offers	15	degree	and	certificate	programs	
to over 600 off campus deployed forces, de-
fense civilians and others working full-time 
in areas such as ASW, Information Systems, 
Systems Engineering, and Space Operations
	 •	 	Mobile	Education	Team	programs	 to	over	50	
countries per year to assist them in strengthen-
ing their CT and coalition warfare capabilities
	 •	 	Provide	 operationally-relevant	 cultural	
knowledge and a real-time grasp of the in-
digenous environment to Marine personnel 
deploying for OIF III, including tactical sce-
nario-driven knowledge of the Iraq dialect of 
the Arabic language
NPS costs reflect requirements imposed by Navy 
and others to meet operational demands and 
provide agile, adaptive and relevant programs
	 •	 	Year-round	operations	with	4	inputs	per	year	
(gets officers back to operational positions 
ASAP)
	 •	 	Refresher	 courses,	 other	 special	 support	
programs to enable success by students who 
would not gain admission to equivalent civil-
ian institutions
	 •	 	Program	 content	 and	 length	 driven	 by	 de-
fense-relevant Educational Skill Require-
ments, outcomes, and objectives (as specified 
by DON/other sponsors)
NPS meets military requirements while main-
taining national academic reputation
	 •	 	NPS	 faculty	 includes	 PhD’s	 from	 the	 na-
tion’s best universities including Harvard (9), 
Princeton (6), Yale (5), University of Califor-
nia (69), Stanford (25), MIT (14), Cornell (4), 
Columbia (3)
	 •	 	The	 Dudley	 Knox	 Library	 at	 NPS	 has	 just	
been named by the Librarian of Congress as 
the best large federal library; it also serves 
as the Virtual Library for the Department of 
Homeland Security
	 •	 	NSF-designated	Center	of	Excellence	 for	 In-
formation Assurance
	 •	 	NPS	programs	accredited	by	regional	(WASC)	
and specialized bodies including ABET; NAS-
PAA and AACSB
NPS leverages the unique advantages of the Mon-
terey region
	 •	 	Undersea	Warfare,	Oceanography,	and	other	
education and research programs leverage co-
location with other ocean research facilities 
including Monterey Bay Aquarium Research 
Institute, Stanford’s Hopkins Lab, and the 
Fleet Numerical and Oceanographic Center
	 •	 	NPS	has	priority	claim	(24–7)	on	use	of	100	
square	KM	of	closed	airspace	at	Camp	Rob-




	 •	 	Close	 linkages	 with	 Silicon	 Valley,	 NASA	
AMES, and Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory
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title  Graduate Education in the Department  
of the Navy  
NPS:	Value	and	Relevance	•	June	2000
authors Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr. 
 U.S. Navy (Retired), President, Naval Postgraduate School Foundation 
 William R. Gates, PhD, Associate Professor, NPS
abstract  Due to severe budget pressure during most of the 1990s, many areas were cut 
causing shortages. The Department of the Navy, looking for ways to cut costs 
,further commissioned studies to look for less costly graduate education than 
NPS. Questioning the value of an NPS education, Janice Graham recommends 
alternatives to an NPS graduate education, including vouchers, privatization 
and outsourcing. Mauz and Gates respond to her analysis and illustrate that 
NPS is cost competitive to civilian universities..
excerpts  “Graham uses anecdotal evidence in asserting that the Department of the 
Navy does not value graduate education. In contrast to Graham’s assertion, 
this article is based on the belief that most senior leaders in the Department of 
the Navy do place great value on graduate education.”
  “Graham further suggests that it is more cost-effective to meet these educa-
tional objectives by either privatizing or outsourcing NPS or giving officers 
educational vouchers … This depiction redefines the objectives for Navy-fund-
ed graduate education, confuses the link between delivery modes and educa-
tional outcomes, and bases cost-effectiveness conclusions on cost analysis that 
doesn’t standardize across alternatives and ignores the cost of student salaries 
and benefits.”
  “Despite Graham’s ideas to the contrary, NPS meets its currently defined edu-
cational objectives and is cost-effective after standardizing for program con-
tent … The previously referenced study by Cavalluzzo and Cymrot (1998) de-
veloped cost data (Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). 
We have normalized that data … The average for the 28 civilian universities 
considered is $268,400. NPS’ graduate education costs are $207,200, lower 
than all civilian institutions considered.”
  “One more attempt to put this whole debate in perspective. The annual budget 
of the Naval Postgraduate School is less than one tenth of one percent of the 
Department of the Navy’s budget. It produces an overwhelmingly good return 
on that investment. Even so, the school is not about costs; it is about value.”
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Graduate educ ation in the department of the navy
The Naval Postgraduate School; Value and Relevance
By admiral henry h. mauz, Jr . u.S . navy (ret)
and William r. GateS, phd
ShORTAGE Of fUNDS hAS RAISED 
qUESTIONS ABOUT GRADUATE 
EDUCATION
The Department of the Navy has been under se-
vere budget pressure for most of the 1990s. Reports 
from the fleet tell of shortages in people, spare parts, 
maintenance funding, and training opportunities. 
Today’s much smaller fleet is chasing a multitude of 
commitments and operating tempo is higher than 
during the Cold War. There has been insufficient 
investment in things like ships and airplanes, and 
a tremendous bow wave of requirements looms on 
the horizon even to maintain the size of today’s too 
small fleet. It is not surprising that the leadership in 
the Department of the Navy is looking for ways to 
cut costs in all “support” areas, including graduate 
education.
Graduate education in the Department of the Navy 
is mainly provided by the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) located in Monterey, California. The cost of 
sending students to NPS has been under close scru-
tiny for some years to see if funds could be squeezed 
out of graduate education for other purposes. The 
Department of the Navy has commissioned several 
studies, referenced elsewhere in this article, to look 
for alternative ways to provide graduate education at 
less cost. For the most part, these studies are flawed 
for want of balanced analysis, inadequate research, 
and pre-ordained outcomes.
Janice Graham offers yet another view in her July 
Proceedings article “Rethinking Graduate Education 
in the Navy and the Naval Postgraduate School.” 
Driven largely by her interpretation of the Depart-
ment of the Navy’s values and objectives for gradu-
ate education and her (mis)perception of relative 
education costs at NPS, Graham recommends edu-
cation vouchers (redeemable at the student’s school 
of choice), privatization and outsourcing as alterna-
tives to NPS graduate education.1 These recommen-
dations seem to reflect the notion that one graduate 
degree will serve the department just about as well 
as any other, and from any source.
VALUE Of GRADUATE EDUCATION
What added value do officers with relevant graduate 
education bring to the Service? For the Navy, there 
is a long-standing “P-Code” system in place that 
identifies the billets requiring graduate education in 
specific academic areas. Those billets are almost en-
tirely ashore and mainly in Washington. It is not the 
purpose of this article to take on the P-Code system, 
but doesn’t it seem reasonable for a few officers serv-
ing aboard, say, an aircraft carrier or Aegis cruiser 
to have had graduate education in an area of practi-
cal value to the fleet? Every department head would 
certainly benefit from graduate work in virtually 
ANY curricula offered by NPS. More importantly, 
his or her ship or squadron would benefit as well.
The Fleets are trying to be more involved in the re-
quirements process. NPS graduates will be increas-
ingly important to fleet understanding of how sys-
tems work and are integrated into a larger whole. 
Upgrades and new systems are continuously being 
introduced, but few in the fleet have the background 
1  Graham states that “Initial forays to several top-tier private universities for the purpose of determining their interest in some type of 
partnership with NPS were most promising …” However, Graham does not provide any reference for this assertion, list the universi-
ties individuals contacted, or describe the ground rules specified for this partnership (e.g., student/faculty workloads; admissions 
timing, policies and requirements; curriculum content and review; etc.). As such, it is difficult to determine the actual interest level.
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  VALUE BOOK •  A STRATEGIC VALUED INVESTMENT  73
to fully understand and use them effectively. Even 
existing systems tax the technical competence of 
today’s officer corps. While we can’t educate every-
body, there ought to be more than just a cadre of 
“button pushers” in the fleet. The point here is that, 
while the P-Coded billets ashore should be filled, 
there is a much larger requirement for graduate edu-
cation than that dictated by the narrow confines of 
the P-Code system.
Graham uses anecdotal evidence in asserting that 
the Department of the Navy does not value graduate 
education.2 In contrast to Graham’s assertion, this ar-
ticle is based on the belief that most senior leaders in 
the Department of the Navy do place great value on 
graduate education. The entire Defense Department 
faces rapid changes in technology, new missions and 
evolving military strategy in the 21st Century. Navy 
and Marine Corps leaders recognize that education 
is a key to preserving maritime dominance in this 
environment. In point of fact, the Marine Corps has 
almost doubled the number of Marine students at 
NPS in the past several years.
whAT NPS GRADUATE EDUCATION 
PROVIDES
In contrast to Graham’s description, the mission 
and objectives of a Department of the Navy-funded 
graduate school are well defined. NPS’ objectives 
are described in three sources: Title 10 U.S.C., Sec-
tion 7041–7047 and SECNAV Instruction 1524.2A 
(April 4, 1989), the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) “Vision Statement for Graduate Education” 
(May 5, 1999), and the Naval Postgraduate School 
vision statement (www.nps.navy.mil). Reflecting 
this guidance, NPS has, for over 90 years, provided 
graduates able to serve well in a wide variety of cod-
ed billets. These graduates have brought their edu-
cation to the fleet as well, which is probably of even 
greater value to the Service in the long run. Besides 
honing graduates to fill specific jobs, there are other 
critical characteristics that distinguish NPS from ci-
vilian universities:
	 •	 	NPS	provides	curricula	that	are	militarily	rel-
evant, meeting Navy and Marine Corps sub-
specialty and general education requirements 
(the Navy has rejected the idea that a set of 
degree programs serendipitously chosen by its 
officer corps would meet Navy needs).
	 •	 	NPS	 curricula	 are	 subject	 to	 biennial	 Navy	
flag-level sponsor review for military relevan-
cy with the capability to swiftly implement 
desired course and program changes.
	 •	 	Entrance	to	NPS	is	controlled	by	military	per-
formance and demonstrated aptitude rather 
than undergraduate grade-point average and 
standardized testing (e.g., GRE scores).
	 •	 	NPS	 provides	 opportunity	 for	 able	 and	mo-
tivated officers to transition from one under-
graduate area to a different graduate major 
(unlike industry, the military cannot hire 
mid-career talent with the desired skill sets; it 
must educate them from within the ranks; e.g. 
Astronaut Winston Scott transitioned from 
an undergraduate music major to aeronauti-
cal engineering).
	 •	 	NPS	provides	refresher	courses	to	allow	stu-
dents to renew academic skills after several 
years of on-the-job performance.
	 •	 	Faculty	 and	 students	participate	 in	over	 500	
reimbursably funded research projects per 
year on issues of interest to sponsoring (fund-
ing) agencies from the Department of the 
Navy and throughout the U.S. government.3
	 •	 	The	NPS	student	body	combines	 junior	offi-
cers from the Navy, Marines, Army, Air Force, 
National Guard, civilian defense agencies and 
scores of foreign countries to explore techni-
cal, operational and strategic problems.
This partnership among students, faculty and spon-
sors (curriculum and research) produces an unpar-
alleled educational opportunity that is not available 
in civilian graduate programs. There are also im-
portant linkages between NPS, the CINCs and the 
fleets. If the Department of the Navy would want 
to replicate these attributes in civilian universities, 
it would have to establish Navy and Marine Corps 
programs under civilian control (requiring signifi-
cant augmentation to civilian educational programs 
at universities or at NPS if outsourced or privatized). 
Navy Department leadership directly controls these 
attributes at NPS; they would have to be contractu-
ally specified in civilian universities, with question-
able results.4
NPS’ curricula include both technical and non-
technical fields. While many of these fields appear 
2  This point is also promoted in Linda C. Cavalluzzo and Donald J. Cymrot, “A Bottoms-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools,” 
CRM 97-24, Center for Naval Analyses, January 1998.
3 This reflects the NPS FYOO reimbursable research program as of 1 June 2000.
4  Graham observes that “… there does not seem to be a part of any curricula that could not be taught by a civilian university-if one 
was asked to structure and teach such a course for military students.” While this is true, civilian universities are unlikely to provide 
military unique course material, or the other attributes NPS currently offers, if DoN students simply pay civilian tuition rates.
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to have civilian counterparts, NPS curricula are 
uniquely tailored to Navy Department requirements. 
Each degree program satisfies civilian-sector degree 
requirements (as necessary to maintain accredita-
tion) and Department of the Navy subspecialty 
requirements. For example, both NPS and civilian 
universities offer Masters’ Degrees in Management. 
However, NPS programs in Contract Management 
and Manpower Systems Analysis include both the 
general material covered in civilian universities 
and Defense Department-specific issues. Contract 
Management includes Department of the Navy and 
Defense Department specific contracting policies, 
requirements and case studies. Manpower Systems 
Analysis addresses the software, databases and ana-
lytical techniques peculiar to military manpower 
analysis. Similar examples characterize every tech-
nical and non-technical degree program that NPS 
offers. There are other examples of synergy, such as 
the National Security Affairs Department being able 
to draw heavily on the presence of 250 foreign of-
ficer students from 5 I countries.
NPS curricula are responsive to Department of the 
Navy and curriculum sponsor direction in ways 
likely invisible to Janice Graham. For example, NPS 
significantly changed the electronic/information 
warfare curricula at the behest of VADM Arthur Ce-
browski when he was N-6. NPS has also developed 
two new curricula specifically designed to meet the 
needs of unrestricted line officers. The first is In-
formation, Strategy, and Operations, and the other 
is Systems Engineering and Integration. Both are 
IS-month master’s degree programs which include 
Joint Professional Military Education. NPS offers 
a relatively new 18-month curriculum for Special 
Warfare Officers. It is an inter-service, interdisci-
plinary curriculum, sponsored by USSOCCOM. It 
was initiated under close scrutiny from USCINC-
SOC himself, and is very popular with the special 
welfare community. NPS has recently partnered 
with MIT in developing a breakthrough curriculum 
called Product Development for the 21st Century 
(PD-21). Students also have increasing opportuni-
ties to complete Professional Military Education 
Phase One during their standard NPS tour, from on-
site Naval War College instructors. Finally, NPS is 
working with Navy sponsors and operational forces 
to provide distance learning, including both tradi-
tional NPS degree courses and graduate-level short 
courses.5
GRAhAM’S ALTERNATIVE MODEL
Graham’s model for Navy graduate education em-
phasizes general educational skills, including en-
trepreneurial skills, better business practices and 
the basics of acquisition, the art of diplomacy and 
debate, computer literacy, culture and languages.6 
Graham does not properly analyze either the costs 
or benefits of subspecialty based curricula. She com-
pares NPS’ average annual cost per student to tuition 
costs at civilian institutions. This cost comparison is 
largely irrelevant.
COST EffECTIVENESS Of DEPARTMENT 
Of ThE NAVy fUNDED GRADUATE 
EDUCATION
Cost-effectiveness analysis must first consider edu-
cational objectives. If the Department validates 
subspecialty-based curricula, which it has, then the 
alternatives include NPS, outsourcing and privati-
zation. If the Department were to adopt a general 
education model, the relevant alternatives include 
a restructured NPS and tuition payment to civilian 
institutions.7
Sub-Specialty Based Graduate Education: NPS, 
Outsourcing and Privatization
To consider outsourcing or privatization, private 
sector producers of graduate education must im-
prove performance or reduce costs, resulting in bet-
ter value to the government. OMB Circular A-76 
provides detailed instructions concerning cost 
comparisons between government and commercial 
producers. These instructions emphasize the need to 
normalize for differences in outputs when compar-
ing costs (Executive Office of the President, Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB), Circular A-76).
In comparing NPS’ costs to the price civilian uni-
versities would charge to provide subspecialty-
based graduate education, existing tuition rates do 
5  This is consistent with SECNA V Instruction 1524.2A, which states: “The objectives of graduate education at the NPS are to prepare 
officers to fill subspecialty positions … Graduate degree and non-degree (short courses) programs in technical and nontechnical fields 
shall be established by the Superintendent of the NPS in response to Navy and Marine Corps requirements.”
6  See also Cavalluzzo and Cymrot (1998) pp. 5–6, 63, 72-73.
7  Of course, these alternatives are not equivalent substitutes. Restructuring NPS into fewer, broader curricula would increase the 
emphasis on general education while retaining some focus on DoN and DoD-specific issues. Sending students to existing civilian 
programs would lose all focus on DoN and DoD issues unless civilian programs were augmented by Navy-funded supplementary 
material. This would require considerable funding beyond tuition expenses.
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not provide a meaningful comparison. Endowments 
and state/local tax financing subsidize civilian tu-
ition. Civilian universities would likely view an 
outsourcing or privatization proposal as a business 
opportunity that they would enter if profitable. It 
is unreasonable to believe that civilian universities 
have excess endowment funds or tax financing to 
subsidize Department of the Navy graduate edu-
cation.8 Thus, the appropriate comparison involves 
total education costs at both NPS and civilian uni-
versities, given a standardized educational offering.
Unfortunately for ease of comparing “apples to ap-
ples”, there are important differences between NPS 
and civilian universities. NPS’ unique attributes that 
add to the cost of graduate education include:
	 •	 	Military	relevant	graduate	education	that	sat-
isfies dual general education and subspecialty 
requirements.
	 •	 	Institution	devoted	to	graduate	education	(in-




	 •	 	Quarterly	 admissions	 with	 demand	 driven	
course scheduling (courses scheduled to 
guarantee on-time graduation as opposed to 
minimum class size requirements).
	 •	 	Thesis	required	in	all	degree	programs,	which	
increases relative intensity of faculty use.
	 •	 	A	 military	 infrastructure	 superimposed	 on	
top of traditional academic infrastructure to 
maintain professional and military aspects of 
officer-student careers.
	 •	 	Infrastructure	 to	 support	 classified	 courses,	
laboratories and student/faculty research.
All of these unique attributes increase NPS’ average 
education costs per student per year relative to the 
standard civilian-sector model. Furthermore, edu-
cational costs are only a portion of the Department 
of the Navy’s total graduate education costs; the De-
partment pays the students’ full salary and benefits 
while they attend in-residence graduate programs. 
These costs can be significant relative to educational 
costs. Salary and benefits are important to consider 
if graduate programs differ in duration. As discussed 
below, this represents an important difference be-
tween NPS and civilian universities. The most criti-
cal adjustments include: 9
  Academic Calendar and Course Schedul-
ing The Navy and Marine Corps want every 
day of graduate education to count because an of-
ficer’s time away from the fleet is precious. Thus, 
the typical NPS student receives 16 hours of in-
struction per week and attends class 48 weeks per 
year. This totals 768 hours of instruction per year. 
In contrast, civilian-sector graduate students typ-
ically receive approximately 486 hours of instruc-
tion per year if they attend summer classes (when 
course offerings are typically limited).10
  Dual General Academic and Sub-Specialty 
Educational Requirements This analysis uses 
class hours as a measure of course content. While 
class hours are an input to the education process, 
they can be used as a measure for education as 
long as NPS and civilian faculty and students 
deliver and absorb material at the same rate. The 
average NPS graduate degree program requires 
18 months and involves 1152 hours of class in-
struction;11 civilian universities would require 28 
months to deliver an equivalent course content.12
  Focus on Graduate Education Graduate 
education is more expensive than undergradu-
ate education. Larger undergraduate class size 
and instruction by graduate teaching assistants 
at civilian universities are at least two reasons 
to expect a significant cost difference. Graduate 
instruction and research also require more ex-
8  Graham suggests that civilian universities might be anxious to share their endowments with DoN. She states, “High quality educa-
tional institutions normally have large endowments that could be of great benefit in maintaining and improving the physical and 
educational infrastructure at NPS.” This is only possible if civilian universities enter outsourcing or privatization agreements out of a 
sense of public service, not as business opportunities.
9  For	a	more	complete	discussion	see	William	R.	Gates,	Xavier	K.	Maruyama,	John	P.	Powers,	Richard	E.	Rosenthal,	and	Alfred	W.M.	
Cooper, “A Bottom-up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools: The NPS Faculty Critique of CNA’s Report,” NPS Technical Report NPS-
FC-98-00 1, November 1998, pp. 11-22.
10  NPS’ heavier academic load makes sense because the Navy and Marine Corps pay these students full salary and benefits whereas 
graduate students at civilian universities may need a lighter load to allow time for temporary employment or other pursuits.
11  Cavalluzzo and Cymrot, 1998. Alternatively, NPS and civilian university costs could be scaled to a 972 class hour civilian graduate 
program. Relative NPS and civilian costs are the same in either case; only the scale differs.
12  Graham asserts that NPS’ dual educational requirements increase degree program length at NPS relative to civilian universities. 
However, NPS’ more intensive academic calendar allows NPS to satisfy dual education requirements without extending the graduate 
program length. Transitional and refresher courses have a greater impact on program length. These classes reflect Navy policy allow-
ing students to enter NPS in fields outside their undergraduate major. This flexibility is essential considering the Navy’s closed-pipe 
personnel system that precludes mid-career accessions in areas of Navy need.
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pensive equipment and specialized laboratories, 
especially if students are required to complete a 
Master’s thesis. This is particularly significant for 
technical graduate programs. One analysis found 
that graduate education in Washington, Florida 
and Illinois was two to three times as expensive 
as undergraduate education.13 The analysis sum-
marized in this article adjusts civilian university 
costs and assumes that graduate programs are 
twice as expensive as undergraduate programs.
  Student Salaries and Benefits If NPS and ci-
vilian programs are of different duration (e.g., 18 
versus 28 months as indicated above), any cost 
comparison must include the students’ salaries 
and benefits. This is a significant portion of the 
total cost of graduate education for officers. The 
Department of the Navy Director, Assessment 
Division (N81) estimated that the annual cost of 
salary, benefits, and housing (referred to as MPN 
costs) per NPS-resident officer equaled $63,300, 
compared to $72,300 per officer-student at civil-
ian institutions.14 The higher civilian MPN cost 
reflects that NPS officers predominantly live in 
base housing. 
The previously referenced study by Cavalluzzo and 
Cymrot (1998) developed cost data (Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)). 
We have normalized that data for the effects of NPS’ 
unique academic calendar and course scheduling, 
dual general education and subspecialty academic 
requirements, focus on graduate education and 
student salary and benefit considerations.15 Af-
ter making these adjustments, the present value 
of graduate educational costs per master’s degree 
student range from $570,500 (California Institute 
of Technology) to $208,400 (University of Texas at 
Austin). The average for the 28 civilian universi-
ties considered is $268,300. NPS’ graduate education 
costs are $207,200, lower than all civilian institutions 
considered. Student salaries and benefits are included 
in these figures and account for anywhere between 
25% and 70% of the totals, with an average of 53%.
These results indicate that NPS is cost competitive 
with civilian universities after normalizing for NPS’ 
unique aspects. Therefore, if the Department of the 
Navy retains its subspecialty-based degree program, 
which it believes it needs, it is unlikely that the to-
tal costs of in-residence graduate education would 
be reduced by outsourcing or privatization. In fact, 
NPS would look even more favorable in the cost 
comparison after adjusting for other cost-related 
unique attributes.16
This result is counter to the conventional view that 
average annual costs per student are greater at NPS 
than at a civilian institution. The primary explana-
tion for this difference involves NPS student work-
loads relative to typical civilian graduate programs. 
Because student workloads are higher at NPS than at 
civilian graduate programs, both in terms of hours 
per week and weeks per year, and because higher 
student workloads use faculty more intensively, the 
average annual cost per student is increased. But the 
program’s length for a standardized degree program 
is reduced considerably.
General Graduate Education: The Alternative of 
Restructuring NPS and Paying Tuition at Civil-
ian Institutions
Even if the Department of the Navy were to adopt 
a general education objective, comparing NPS’ cur-
rent costs to tuition costs at civilian institutions is 
still meaningless. NPS’ current costs reflect subspe-
cialty-based graduate education. For comparability 
with civilian institutions, the Department would 
first have to develop a general education curriculum 
structure at NPS. This is beyond this article’s scope, 
but we will offer some observations.
On the surface, cost-effectiveness of general graduate 
education at NPS is unlikely to compare favorably with 
tuition costs at civilian institutions. This is because tu-
ition only covers a portion of educational costs at civil-
ian universities.17 Endowments and tax financing fund 
the balance. The Navy must pay all educational costs 
at NPS. Thus, civilian universities have a seemingly 
overwhelming inherent cost-effectiveness advantage. 
However, this advantage would be offset to some 
extent by NPS providing more class hours per year 
and flexible admissions timing. Returning students 
to the fleet more quickly reduces the associated stu-
13  Peter D. Syverson and Moira J. Maguire, “Estimating Council of Graduate Schools, 1997.
14  “Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments),” Ser N81/3U639949, 
29 March 1993).
15  Detailed calculations are described in Gates, et aL., 1998.
16  For example, quarterly inputs and class scheduling to ensure on-time graduation reduce class size; maintaining military infrastruc-
ture increases administrative costs; and the thesis requirement increases faculty costs.
17  Tuition covers between 13% and 73% of educational expenditures in the civilian university sample described above (Cavalluzzo and 
Cymrot, 1998, p.69).
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dent salary and benefit costs by up to 40%.
Finally, as noted above, NPS admits students based 
on military relevant admissions requirements. Civil-
ian universities consider undergraduate academic 
records, scores on the Graduate Record Exam (GRE) 
and, in some cases, relevant professional experience. 
Furthermore, civilian admissions committees bal-
ance demographic characteristics of their incoming 
classes. The prestigious programs often suggested as 
alternatives to NPS are not under-subscribed by ci-
vilian students. Thus, civilian programs would likely 
limit admissions to a very few of the most qualified 
Navy students. This would create problems for the 
Department of the Navy as it seeks quality civilian 
education for large numbers of service members. Of 
course, marginal schools that struggle to maintain 
enrollment would welcome large groups of Navy 
Department students willing to pay full-tuition. But 
Navy Department leadership should carefully con-
sider the resulting tradeoff between cost and educa-
tional quality. It is noted that civilian universities are 
not ranked on costs, but on excellence of education. 
Why should the Navy Department’s university be 
ranked otherwise?
CONCLUSIONS
Janice Graham provides one perspective on Navy 
Department-funded graduate education. Her sug-
gestion that officers would be better served by a 
general graduate education that emphasizes entre-
preneurial skills, public speaking, debate and better 
business practices simply does not meet the needs 
of the naval services. These may not be bad educa-
tional goals, and they might be included to some 
extent (if curricula sponsors so desire) in existing 
graduate education directed at Department of the 
Navy needs. Graham further suggests that it is more 
cost-effective to meet these educational objectives 
by either privatizing or outsourcing NPS or giving 
officers educational vouchers to attend the civilian 
institutions of their choice. This depiction redefines 
the objectives for Navy-funded graduate educa-
tion, confuses the link between delivery modes and 
educational outcomes, and bases cost-effectiveness 
conclusions on cost analysis that doesn’t standardize 
across alternatives and ignores the cost of student 
salaries and benefits.
The Department of the Navy’s objectives for NPS 
graduate education are well articulated: NPS is to 
provide technical, analytical graduate education in 
a variety of subspecialty areas not available in ci-
vilian universities. NPS quickly adapts curricula to 
the sponsor’s changing needs based on the flow of 
technology and a changing world. NPS’ curricula 
are well regarded by the nation’s higher educational
community and are well-received and highly valued 
by their curriculum sponsors and by commands re-
ceiving NPS graduates. While many civilian institu-
tions offer graduate education, none provide gradu-
ate education with the unique naval and defense 
characteristics that NPS offers.
Graham’s article highlights the importance of pro-
viding more visibility to the great national resource 
that is the Naval Postgraduate School. If the school 
were better understood by some of the cost-cutters 
in Washington, there would be greater recognition 
that NPS produces the essential “seed corn” of to-
morrow’s educated officer corps. Despite Graham’s 
ideas to the contrary, NPS meets its currently de-
fined educational objectives and is cost-effective 
after standardizing for program content. Recent 
curriculum modifications also illustrate the value of 
retaining NPS’ responsiveness and flexibility, attri-
butes civilian universities cannot even contemplate.
One more attempt to put this whole debate in per-
spective. The annual budget of the Naval Postgradu-
ate School is less than one tenth of one percent of 
the Department of the Navy’s budget. It produces 
an overwhelmingly good return on that invest-
ment. Even so, the school is not about costs; it is 
about value. NPS graduates will have a significant 
and positive impact on the future of the Navy and 
Marine Corps. In fact, both services would be well 
served to examine more closely their requirements 
for graduates to serve afloat and ashore, and increase 
the number of students at NPS accordingly. All the 
studies in recent years, and related discussion of 
base closure, realignment, relocation, outsourcing, 
privatization, and so on, have had a corrosive effect 
on NPS, its faculty and even the students. Hopefully, 
those studies have now run their course. Let’s get on 
with graduate education at NPS.
Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr. USN (ret) is the President of the 
Naval Postgraduate School Foundation, Inc. His last assignment 
on active duty was Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. He 
retired on 1 November, 1994.
William R. Gates is an Associate Professor of Economics at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. He received a B.A. in Economics 
from the University of California at San Diego and a Ph.D. in 
Economics from Yale University. Prior to joining the NPS faculty, 
Professor Gates worked as an Economist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory and as a consultant to the Rand Corporation.
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title  Naval Postgraduate School Six Most  
Frequently	Asked	Questions	•	2-23-04
source NPS Internal Document, Author Unknown, 2004
abstract  Answers to why NPS offers the most effective graduate program for officers 
are explored. NPS’ uniqueness and relevance are discussed, as well as its ad-
vantages over civilian universities. NPS’ importance is further reviewed by the 
added value NPS-trained officers bring to their next command.
excerpts  “NPS aligns with rapidly changing needs of military within DoD and Combat-
ant Commands, percolating DoD themes, requirements and priorities down to 
NPS curriculum and research programs.”
  “Joint network-centric operations, joint warfighting and joint peacekeeping 
campaigns demand that officers know and work seamlessly with all branches 
of service and coalition forces. NPS supports rapidly changing military re-
quirements through advanced graduate education for the Navy, Marine Corps, 
Army and Air Force, with jointness as a keystone.”
  “The highest priority at NPS is relevant education to military officers, an edu-
cational focus that cannot be replaced by Stanford or MIT. Combining ba-
sic and applied skills contributes to decision-making about future forces and 
warfighting capabilities. Example: NPS applied research recently supported a 
brief to Congress on Expeditionary Warfare Force Protection, which is now 
used widely in the military.”
  “…it is NPS, along with the Air Force Institute of Technology, that provide ed-
ucation across a broad spectrum of areas that are critical to combat-effective-
ness as they provide officers with education that allows the conceptualization, 
development and use of weapons systems by our military forces. NPS provides 
a process-oriented education, with experience in integrated interdisciplinary 
research. A NPS graduate has a knowledge of diverse and innovative ways to 
attack a problem. Every graduate is required to write a master’s thesis based on 
a real problem, finding real solutions with current and emerging technologies. 
This experience is invested back into the fleets and offices of DoD.” 
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Naval Postgraduate School 
Six Most Frequently Asked Questions 
1.  hOw IS ThE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE 
SChOOL UNIqUE?
Unique Mission
  To provide relevant and unique advanced education 
and research programs that increase the combat-ef-
fectiveness of the United States and Allied Forces …”
Unique Vision




tidisciplinary military ‘change agents”
	 •	 	To	equip	future	leaders	to	transform	the	mili-
tary into a force that capitalizes on the advances 
and advantages of information management, 




    NPS aligns with rapidly-changing needs 
of military within DoD and Combatant 
Commands, percolating DoD themes, re-
quirements and priorities down to NPS 
curriculum and research programs.
    Examples: NPS Center for Homeland De-
fense & Security — post 9/11 requirement 
for fast-track education to federal, state & 
city frrst responders. NPS Maritime Do-
main Protection Task Force quick response 
to DoD needs; C4l, ASW, Space Opera-
tions, Total Ship Systems Engineering, Sea-
basing, Combat Systems, Modeling Virtual 
Environments.
	 •	 	Joint	 Military	 and	 International	 Cross 
Fertilization:
    Fertile intellectual environment for lifelong 
networking/interaction between within 
same service, other U.S. military organiza-
tions, and other countries.
	 •	 Interdisciplinary	Research	and	Education:
    Courses and research are inherently inter-
disciplinary in nature; curricula optimizes 
existing in-house expertise.
    Examples: the Special Operations/Low 
Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) program com-
bines experts in National Security, Opera-
tions Analysis (C41), Systems Management 
to create an analytically rigorous warfare-
oriented program.
	 •	 Classified	Research:
    NPS has large SCIF capabilities for con-
ducting classified teaching and research, 
offers the largest classified library collec-
tions in the United States.
2.  hOw IS ThE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE 
SChOOL RELEVANT?
Transformation
	 •	 	The Secretary of Defense’s highest priority is 
Force Transformation.
	 •	 	Office of Force Transformation (OFT/SECDEF) 
 sponsors a new program at NPS, consisting of 
a Transformation Chair, Transformation Edu-
cation and Transformation Research.
  ~  Goals - to gain insights into current trans-
formation in DoD, foster greater awareness 
of defense transformation internally with 
NPS faculty and students, and to a broad 
external audience of combatant commands 
& military stakeholders, equipping and in-
fluencing a new generation of DoD leaders.
  ~  NPS will be a broker for transformation 
research, whereby faculty and students 
world-wide can seek and share informa-
tion on defense transformation and net-
work-centric operations.
  ~  Offered both on campus and as short 
courses offsite.
Jointness
	 •	 	Joint network-centric operations, joint warf-
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ighting and joint peacekeeping campaigns de-
mand that officers know and work seamlessly 
with all branches of service and coalition 
forces. NPS supports rapidly changing mili-
tary requirements through advanced graduate 
education for the Navy, Marine Corps, Army 
and Air Force, with jointness as a keystone.
	 •	 	The NPS student body is comprised of 42% 
Navy, 13% Marine Corps, 11% Air Force, 7% 
Army, and 24% international students.
3.  why NOT USE CIVILIAN 
UNIVERSITIES fOR GRADUATE 
EDUCATION fOR ITS OffICERS?
	 •	 	Special curricula that combines basic research 
with direct military applications that respond 
directly to current military needs is not found 
in civilian universities.
	 •	 	Defense focus not duplicated by civilian uni-
versities.
	 •	 	The highest priority at NPS is relevant educa-
tion to military officers, an educational focus 
that cannot be replaced by Stanford or MIT. 
Combining basic and applied skills contributes 
to decision-making about future forces and 
warfighting capabilities. Example: NPS applied 
research recently supported a brief to Congress 
on Expeditionary Warfare Force Protection, 
which is now used widely in the military.
4.  why NOT EDUCATE OffICERS 
AT ThE AIR fORCE INSTITUTE Of 
TEChNOLOGy (AfIT)?
	 •	 	Different mission than Air Force Institute of 
Technology (AFIT).
	 •	 	NPS as joint corporate university is used ex-
tensively by the other U.S. military services.
	 •	 	NPS has 1500 student officers in residence 
with a capacity for 2000, while AFIT accom-
modates 400 students with an Air Force focus. 
NPS responds directly to the specific needs of 
the Combatant Commanders and military 
through education, targeted research proj-
ects and theses. Students contribute to efforts 
in three NPS Institutes via multi-year inte-
grated theme projects that generate real-time 
solutions to real-time problems. Examples 
are the Sea Basing study from the Meyer In-
stitute of Systems Engineering and Analysis, 
whose technologies and approach are being 
employed throughout the military. Through 
the Cebrowski Institute the Battlespace Com-
munications project works FORCEnet and 
netcentric issues for the Navy. MOVES Insti-
tute used cutting-edge gaming technologies 
to launch an Internet “America’s Army” game 
that models infantry career paths in the Army, 
saving the Army hundreds of millions of dol-
lars while increasing recruitment.
5.  why NOT USE ThE wAR COLLEGES 
OR NATIONAL DEfENSE UNIVERSITy?
	 •	 	The War Colleges and NDU are not suited 
for the mission of educating junior and mid-
grade officers in the scientific, engineering 
and technical areas essential to maintaining 
the combat-effectiveness of the Navy. The 
military academies focus on the development 
of leaders, the war colleges on the strategy and 
policies of war. But it is NPS, along with the 
Air Force Institute of Technology, that pro-
vide education across a broad spectrum of 
areas that are critical to combat-effectiveness 
as they provide officers with education that al-
lows the conceptualization, development and 
use of weapons systems by our military forces.
	 •	 	NPS provides JPME coursework on campus 
from dedicated War College faculty, so that 
officers can satisfy both their masters and 
military requirements from one location dur-
ing a single tour.
6.  whAT IS ThE ADDED VALUE TO ThE 
fLEET Of AN NPS OffICER whEN 
ThEy RETURN TO ThEIR NEXT 
COMMAND?
Operations experience combined with  
and education
  Officers apply their operational experiences gained 
in previous commands with applied military 
coursework and basic research on a master’s thesis. 
A NPS graduate returns to duty with the “Why” 
(theory, computer modeling and simulation, prob-
lem solving, etc) in addition to the “How.”
Broader world view
	 •	 	Greater perspective than 4-year degree pro-
vides, gains the value of education
	 •	 	Perspective on how the military works, the 
“business” of national security and defense
	 •	 	Equipped with understanding of the new face 
of war and peace in the net-centric age
	 •	 	Relationships/networks within 60 other coun-
tries and coalition forces
  Approach to problem solving
  NPS provides a process-oriented education, with 
experience in integrated interdisciplinary research. 
A NPS graduate has a knowledge of diverse and 
innovative ways to attack a problem. Every gradu-
ate is required to write a master’s thesis based on 
a real problem, finding real solutions with current 
and emerging technologies. This experience is in-
vested back into the fleets and offices of DoD. 
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title Rationale for Navy-Sponsored Education 
 Prepared by N09BC 
ref no. N09BC, OPNAV Document, October 1995
abstract  Recognizing the importance of specially educated Naval officers to combat-ef-
fectiveness, this document builds a strong case for Navy-sponsored education. 
It reviews the five premises on which such an education is based, and stresses 
the Navy’s commitment to professional military education, such as offered by 
NPS as a strategic, cost-effective investment in the future.
excerpts  “Naval officers with the competencies (of) graduate education and profession-
al military education meet the intellectual demands and challenges of their 
future careers. They can meet Navy unique goals that require intellectual flex-
ibility; an understanding of the principles that govern in peace and war; and 
an ability to employ the analytical skills and perspective required for allocating 
and wisely using available resources.”
  “The Navy is in the higher education business because of the required focus on 
naval professional development, meeting the requirements of technological in-
novation, ability to exercise quality control, as well as optimizing Navy colleges 
capabilities for excellent teaching, professional competence, and professional 
interaction between students and teachers from a teaching/research perspec-
tive and cost-effectiveness.”
  “For the Navy, undergraduate, graduate and professional military education is 
an investment. Maritime supremacy requires a Navy-oriented perspective to 
meet the technical and professional challenges of the 21st century.”
  “To paraphrase the CNO, the intention of Navy undergraduates, graduates and 
professional military education is to prepare officers for a long career of con-
tributions. This goal fosters the Navy ability to capitalize on new technology, 
management, and leadership linked to its level of officer competence. The flag-
ship institutions combine excellence in the quality of their academic programs 
with responsiveness to change and innovation in the technology and manage-
ment in the Navy.”
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Rationale For Navy-Sponsored Education
prepared By n09Bc . octoBer 1995 
Navy-sponsored education is a cost-effective strate-
gic investment in the future. Some may argue that 
if the Navy needs education why not rely on an ex-
panded NROTC as feeder for officers with under-
graduate degrees; executive professional develop-
ment from any number of colleges and universities 
who sponsor these types of programs; and meeting 
graduate school requirements from the plethora of 
graduate sdlools in America. If the only goal were 
to provide education just for the sake of education, 
then an argument could be advanced for sending 
naval officers and Midshipmen to the many diver-
sified colleges 300 universities in the United States. 
Under this arrangement, a further argument could 
be advanced that it might be more cost-effective to 
do so. But, the rationale for Navy-sponsored educa-
tion is sound. particularly in this current era of cost-
constrained resources and reduced budgets.
For the Navy, undergraduate, graduate and profes-
sional military education is an investment. Maritime 
supremacy requires a Navy-oriented perspective to 
meet the technical and professional challenges of 
the 21st century. The Navy’s interest in this type of 
education is based on five premises: (1) enhanced 
and more effective accomplishment of its mission; 
(2) enlightened decision-making; (3) developed in-
sights and broad perspectives for unique Navy tasks; 
(4) preparation for effective performance in high-
level national security positions; and (5) quality 
control of the education process.
Enhanced mission effectiveness is developed and 
maintained with an educated officer corps who have 
experienced technical and subspecialty education 
and professional development not available through 
other educational institutions. Further, the research 
and study at the Navy’s five flagship institutions sup-
port increased combat-effectiveness of the Navy and 
Marine Corps.
Enlightened decision-making is required to “man-
age the increased complexities in the technological, 
managerial and political-economic fields that affect 
the Navy. These factors require officers with a solid 
intellectual capability and the vision to capitalize on 
evolving technology and developments” (quoted 
from the CNO’s Policy on Graduate Education. 1988).
Developed insights and broad perspectives for 
Navy unique tasks are components derived again 
from the CNO’s Policy on Graduate Education, 
which makes explicit the requirement for “officers 
capable of original thought and the capacity to syn-
thesize broad areas of knowledge, analyze complex 
issues, and appreciate the distinction between what 
is theoretically possible and actually achievable.”
Preparation for effective performance in high-
level national security positions is a requirement 
that Navy and Marine Corps officers face to become 
effective executives who can synthesize many disci-
plines relevant to different situations. This require-
ment seeks a balanced use of reasoning based on 
both academic and professional foundation.
Quality control of the education process is ab-
solutely essential. The Navy Flagship institutions 
focus as academic institutions with an emphasis on 
programs relevant to Navy interests with an accom-
modation to the unique requirements of scheduling 
and sequencing officers into programs while main-
taining academic excellence.
ThE NAVy’S EDUCATION POLICy
Naval officers’ careers consist of two distinct phas-
es. The first phase (Ensign through Lieutenant) re-
quires the mastery of a specific warfare specialty. 
Competency in this phase is developed from a 
combination of undergraduate education, technical 
service schools and significant on-the-job training 
and experience. The technical/scientific complexi-
ties of warfare systems and their support mandates 
that some officers pursue specialized technical and 
other postgraduate education that is related directly 
to identified requirements.
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The second career phase (Lieutenant Commander 
onward) requires a knowledge of multidimensional 
naval and joint warfare, knowledge of the process 
for obtaining, allocating, and wisely using national 
resources, and a broad intellectual development to 
think better conceptually, especially with regard to 
strategy. Service college education (at Naval War 
College) prepares officers in this phase for the rest 
of their careers, whether in command, on the staff of 
large warfighting units, or participation in the pro-
cesses of choosing and supporting future military 
forces. For officers who have not had the opportu-
nity to pursue a postgraduate education, the Naval 
War College provides a capability to obtain a mas-
ter’s degree in National Security Affairs if the stu-
dent is willing to expend an extra measure of effort 
while attending that insitution.
To paraphrase the CNO. the intention of Navy un-
dergraduate, graduate, and professional military 
education is to prepare officers for a long career of 
contributions. This goal fosters the Navy ability to 
capitalize on new technology, management, and 
leadership linked to its level of officer competence. 
The flagship institutions combine excellence in the 
quality of their academic programs with responsive-
ness to change and innovation in the technology 
and management in the Navy.
The contributions of degree-granting flagship insti-
tutions to the combat-effectiveness of the Navy and 
Marine Corps reflect:
	 •	 	An	ability	to	develop	and	offer	unique	curri-
cula while simultaneously meeting accredita-
tion criteria.
	 •	 	An	 ability	 to	 handle	 technical	 and	 strategic	
classified instruction and research.
	 •	 	Flexibility	in	tailoring	general	educational	sub-
jects to the particular interest of the military.
	 •	 	A	 capability	 to	 structure	 curriculmn	 and	
course sequences to meet professional needs 
and maintain officer warfare specialty with 
minimum time away from professional duties.
	 •	 	The	ability	 to	meet	DoN	 requirements	 rap-
idly and effectively by creating and adapting 
relevent programs and terminating obsolete 
programs.
	 •	 	The	benefit	of	bringing	together	officers	from	
all the services and international military 
communities that increases the professional 
dialogue among officers in related efforts to 
solve significant military problems.
	 •	 	The	cultivation	of	a	unique	pool	of	specialized	
faculty whose teaching and research expertise 
is particularly relevant to the military.
NAVAL EDUCATION RESULTS
The increased effectiveness of naval officers is dem-
onstrated by the high professional quality of its 







	 •	 	Abilities	 to	 extend	 themselves	 beyond	 the	
typical capabilities of undergraduate students 
through analysis and writing
	 •	 	Demonstrated	 senior-level	 decision-making	
abilities
	 •	 	Confidence	 in	 their	 own	 high-level	 profes-
sional abilities
Naval officers with the competencies graduate educa-
tion and professional military education meet the in-
tellectual demands and challenges of their future ca-
reers. They can meet Navy unique goals that require 
intellectual flexibility; an understanding of the prin-
ciples that govern in peace and war; and an ability to 
employ the analytical skills and perspectives required 
for allocating and wisely using available resources.
SUMMARy
The Navy is committed to undergraduate, graduate 
and professional military education as a strategic in-
vestment in the future. Officer graduates are able to 
make the right decisions on national security equa-
tions. These officers must have the thoughtfulness, 
judgement, insight and abilities to adapt the past to 
the future.
Their education. unique to the technologies and 
professional requirements of the Navy, involves the 
process of clear, objective observation, persistent 
analyses, and tbe ability to deal with uncertainties, 
assessment of risk, postulating solutions, and mea-
suring responses to them. These qualities and ex-
periences are the essence of good higher education. 
The Navy, through its higher education institutions, 
has found this is the optimal way to provide insights 
for development and tasking for its future.
The Navy is in the higher education business because 
of the required focus on naval professional develop-
ment, meeting the requirements of technological in-
novation, ability to exercise quality control, as well 
as optimizing Navy colleges capabilities for excellent 
teaching, professional competence, and professional 
interaction between students and teachers from a 
teaching-research perspective and cost-effectiveness.
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title  NPS: The Nexus of Advanced DoD  
and DoN Concepts
author CDR Porter, NPS Internal Document, March 2005
abstract  Reviewing a memorandum by Acting Under Secretary of Defense Michael W. 
Wynne, in which he explores criteria for closing or realigning military instal-
lations, the author cites the value of the militarily tailored curricula the Naval 
Postgraduate School offers versus civilian universities. Factors reviewed include 
NPS’ programs developed to increase the combat-effectiveness of U.S. and allied 
armed forces and enhance national security, as well as the specialized institutions 
and programs NPS offers in, for example, civic-military relations, education for 
sustained peace, and counter-terrorism. Also cited are findings from “NPS: A 
Case for Value” (Proceedings 8/2000 issue) by Adm. Henry Mauz, Jr. (ret) which 
stresses NPS’ superiority and cost-effectiveness versus civilian universities in of-
fering responsive and effective military curricula.
excerpts  “In the case of the Naval Postgraduate School, to make a closure decision pri-
marily on cost considerations is to miss the very essence of what the school 
represents operationally, academically, and intrinsically to the Navy and to the 
Department of Defense.”
  “…a civilian course of study almost certainly does not represent the same 
tailored, defense-centric, militarily career-enhancing curriculum provided 
by NPS. This is a crucial flaw inherent in any cost comparison. Because, in 
fact, curricular requirements at NPS include Educational Skill Requirements 
(ESRs) dictated by the Secretary of the Navy that are intended to broaden the 
military student’s educational experience … Based on these calculations, a de-
gree at NPS would clearly cost the government less than the average cost as-
sociated with the 11 other peer universities cited above.”
  “In a recently updated version of his original article, ADM Mauz estimates 
the “cost” per credit hour at NPS by using the FY02 Operating Budget and the 
average number of students on board that year … the cost per credit hour at 
NPS is calculated to be $655. This number compares to an average of $724 at 
11 peer institutions.”
  “NPS is the bridge to … Refined operational concepts to deliver the kind of 
dominant military power from the sea envisioned in Sea Power 21 … Sea Trial 
to increase levels of operational, organizational and technological agility…Sea 
Enterprise to increase the pace of innovation throughout our Navy … NPS is 
vital to DoD’s interactions with other agencies and nations for national secu-
rity. As has been shown, NPS’ programs strengthen democratic civil-military 
relationships in countries throughout the world.” 
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NPS: The Nexus of Advanced DoD and DoN Concepts
the aBil ity of our officer and enliSted leaderS to anticipate and manaGe the 
challenGeS of tomorroW iS only l imited By our foreSiGht today
OVERVIEw
In his Memorandum dated 4 Jan 2005, Subject: 2005 
Base Closure and Realignment Selection Criteria, 
Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics) Michael W.Wynne stated 
the following:
 “In selecting military installations for closures or 
realignment, the Department of Defense, giving pri-
ority consideration to military value (the first four 
criteria below), will consider:
Military Value
1.  The current and future mission capabilities, and 
the impact on operational readiness of the total 
force of the Department of Defense, including 
the impact on joint warfighting, training, and 
readiness.
2.  The availability and condition of land, facilities, 
and associated airspace .
3.  The ability to accommodate contingency, mobili-
zation, surge, and future total force requirements 
at both existing and potential receiving locations 
to support operations and training.
4.  The cost of operations and the manpower impli-
cations.
Other considerations cited in the Under Secretary’s 
Memorandum included the extent and timing of 
potential costs and savings, the economic impact 
on existing communities in the vicinity, the ability 
of infrastructure of both the existing and potential 
receiving communities to support forces, missions, 
and personnel, and the environmental impact.
Judging by the priority of the Under Secretary’s cri-
teria cited above, it is recognized that cost savings is 
only one consideration of military value in decid-
ing whether to close or realign an installation. In 
the case of the Naval Postgraduate School, to make 
a closure decision primarily on cost considerations 
is to miss the very essence of what the school rep-
resents operationally, academically, and intrinsically 
to the Navy and to the Department of Defense. And 
yet inevitably, this is the first criterion examined 
and, perhaps, the one most heavily weighted in the 
decision process. Despite the fact this does not seem 
in keeping with the Under Secretary’s guidance, 
and as I hope to prove, would lead to the conclu-
sion that closing NPS would be a costly mistake. 
Such an approach runs the risk of overlooking the 
TRUE value of the institution … one that has been 
named an Information Operations Center of Excel-
lence by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Cen-
ter of Education Excellence by the Commander of 
NETWARCOM, the U.S.’s only NATO Partnership 
for Peace Education and Training Center by former 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, and a “national trea-
sure” by GEN John Abizaid, COMCENTCOM.
The Naval Postgraduate School represents the center 
of gravity of the US Navy’s education strategy and is 
a critical enabler in DoD’s Transformation, our own 
Human Capital Strategy, Sea Power 21, and the War 
On Terrorism. NPS may be one of our best tools 
to ensure the alignment of advanced operational 
concepts and technologies among the Department 
of Defense, Homeland Security, interagency, and 
international military partnerships. Rather than 
considering closure of NPS, we should be focusing 
on how to better maximize the return on our invest-
ment. These rewards could well include our Navy’s 
preeminence in educating and retaining the most 
technologically advanced warfighters in the world, 
both officer and enlisted, and our military’s assured 
superiority in Joint and coalition warfare for genera-
tions to come.
We can’t afford to build tomorrow what we have 
today!
OUR INITIAL INVESTMENT
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Originally established as a postgraduate department 
of the US Naval Academy almost 100 years ago, 
the Naval Postgraduate School moved to its cur-
rent location in Monterey, California in 1951. The 
main campus is situated on 135 acres along Pacific 
Coast Highway that were originally purchased for 
$660,372 as part of a 627 acre buy. Today, NPS hold-
ings include 620.5 acres, the original cost ofwhich 
totaled $1.3 million. The scenic location of this 
property and its proximity to other area academic 
institutions (Stanford University, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, University of California, Defense 
Language Institute), as well as Silicon Valley’s pow-
erful technological epicenter, make it difficult to ap-
praise its current monetary value. But the intrinsic 
value of the location cannot be overstated in draw-
ing some of the nation’s brightest defense research 
professors, serving as a powerful incentive for junior 
and mid-grade officers (and perhaps one day for de 
greed enlisted leaders as well) to continue their ser-
vice, and providing an a idyllic glimpse of America 
for international students from over 60 countries.
Operationally, NPS ‘s holdings in Monterey pro-
vide access to open ocean, ranges and uncontrolled 
airspace (as well as to a city that is an inspiration 
vice a distraction for students). If we close NPS, and 
disperse the students to civilian institutions or other 
military installations, we will lose these unique capa-
bilities and we will never recover them. Our research 
faculty will likely migrate to other research universi-
ties taking with them unique skills and knowledge. 
In fact, finding other airspace, at an installation on 
the East coast for example, that will allow the 24/7 
operation of UAVs at altitudes up to and in excess of 
15000 feet will, most likely, be impossible.
OPERATING COSTS
In 2002 total expenditures/operating costs amount-
ed to $314.5 million (37% of which covered student 
salaries, 21% went to research). This was balanced 
by a budget of $314.5 million which included $129.3 
million for student salaries, $80.6 million for reim-
bursable academic costs, $48.8 million for direct ac-
ademic costs, $27.4 million direct base operations, 
$17.7 million for reimbursable base operations, $9.7 
million for military staff salaries, and $1 million for 
NAF. In 2003, sponsored program reimbursable 
expenditures (which include Research, Education, 
and Service Programs) exceeded $66 million, a 15% 
growth from FY02 (ranked by the National Science 
Foundation among the top 25% of institutions in to-
tal R&D expenditures). In 2004, $184 million of ex-
penses (not including student salaries) were covered 
by $184 million total funding. This included Navy 
direct funding for $74 million (covering 40%) and 
reimbursable funding for $109 million (60%).
In attempting to compare apples to apples we miss 
the core differences!
A COMPARATIVE ANALySIS
In an August 2000 article in Proceedings magazine 
entitled, “NPS: A Case for Value,” ADM Hemy 
Mauz, Jr (ret) provided a comparison of the costs as-
sociated with a degree earned from the Naval Post-
graduate School and a similar degree earned from 
a comparable civilian university. I have highlighted 
the word, here, because “similar” though the degrees 
may be when displayed on a sheepskin, and surely 
just as challenging in their pursuit, a civilian course 
of study almost certainly does not represent the 
same tailored, defense-centric, militarily career-en-
hancing curriculum provided by NPS. This is a cru-
cial flaw inherent in any cost comparison. Because, 
in fact, curricular requirements at NPS include Edu-
cational Skill Requirements (ESRs) dictated by the 
Secretary of the Navy that are intended to broaden 
the military student’s educational experience. For in-
stance, NPS provides JPME coursework on campus 
from dedicated Naval War College faculty, so that 
officers can satisfy both their masters and joint mili-
tary requirements during a single tour. Additional 
coursework is also required to ensure the student 
appreciates the military relevance of the academic 
subject material, thereby enabling immediate appli-
cation upon rejoining the operational force. Hence, 
additional credit hours of instruction are built into 
NPS curricula to meet ESRs. Similar courses are not 
available at civilian universities and represent a hid-
den, but necessary, cost in NPS’ budget. 
Another “core” difference that must be acknowl-
edged as part of any comparison is that civilian 
university admission criteria can not be trivialized. 
Besides the minimum 3.0 undergrad GPA required 
for most Tier One schools, and a requirement to do 
well on a graduate entrance exam (e.g GRE), gradu-
ate students are usually accepted for admission in 
the same field of study in which they received their 
undergraduate degree. This is not the case at NPS 
whose mission includes converting non-technical 
warfighters from the fleet (some of whom had rela-
tively low undergraduate GPAs or have been away 
from3 academia for a number of years) into gradu-
ate students capable of earning technical degrees 
and applying this expertise in a highly complex op-
erational environment. For example, 15% of NPS’ 
engineering and science graduates had non-techni-
cal degrees at the bachelor’s level. The truth is that 
many NPS students would not gain entry into Tier 
One schools whose entrance criteria are not meant 
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to consider the attributes of a combat warrior with 
proven leaderships skills, capable of managing com-
plex weapons systems (a review by civilian univer-
sities of 300 Navy officers enrolled at NPS revealed 
they would admit only 12% directly and 13% with 
additional courses). No Tier One graduate schools 
would take non-technical students and admit them 
into technical degree program in the numbers re-
quired by the Secretary of Navy.
Further, each quarter NPS accepts new military stu-
dents into its curricula. Most civilian institutions, on 
the other hand, work on a fixed academic calendar, 
so that if a student does not matriculate in the Fall, 
they cannot be admitted until the following year. 
Bearing operational demands in mind, particularly 
during this time of war, this loss of scheduling flex-
ibility would have a significant impact on the num-
ber of military students capable of accommodating 
such a restrictive admission policy. But in his at-
tempt to provide an “apples to apples” comparison, 
ADM Mauz focuses our attention on a more pro-
found difference between NPS and civilian universi-
ties that has a significant impact on the cost of earn-
ing a degree.
In his article, ADM Mauz explains that the aca-
demic ops tempo at NPS is significantly greater than 
that of a traditional civilian university. At NPS, the 
academic school year is based on four, twelve week 
quarters consisting of 16 classroom hours per week.
Although academic calendars vary at civilian uni-
versities, typically students attend classes 13 hours a 
week for 32 weeks of the year, and may attend a ten 
week summer term for seven hours a week. This 
amounts to approximately 58% more student-faculty 
contact hours per academic year at NPS than at a 
typical civilian university. Carrying this line of rea-
soning out to its logical conclusion, ADM Mauz dem-
onstrates in his article that a student at NPS would 
conclude his Master’s degree coursework in approxi-
mately 18 months, or 6–10 fewer months than would 
have been required at a civilian university.
In a recently updated version of his original article, 
ADM Mauz estimates the “cost” per credit hour at 
NPS by using the FY02 Operating Budget and the 
average number of students on board that year. He 
calculates the total instructional cost by adding the 
direct academic cost ($48.8 million) to the frac-
tion of direct base-operations costs attributable to 
non-reimbursed academic functions ($27.4 million 
times 48.8/185.2, which is the total expenditures 
minus $129.3 million in student salaries) for a total 
of $56,019,869. By dividing this total instructional 
cost by the average number of students on board in 
FY02 (1336), and by 64 credit hours per year (16 per 
quarter), the cost per credit hour at NPS is calcu-
lated to be $655. This number compares to an av-
erage of $724 at 11 peer institutions (including Cal 
Tech, Carnegie Melon, Georgia Tech, Illinois Insti-
tute of Technology, MIT, NC State-Raleigh, Purdue, 
Rensselaer Polytechnic, Rice, Rochester Institute of 
Technology, and USC). At $655 per credit hour, NPS 
ranked seventh among these universities. However, 
the point of this exercise was to demonstrate the 
difference in cost over the duration of coursework 
needed to earn a degree.
Returning to ADM Mauz initial assertion, we’ll re-
call that based on a more aggressive academic cal-
endar, an NPS student could earn a degree (requir-
ing 96 credit hours) in 18 months vice the 24–28 
months that would likely be required to complete 96 
credit hours of coursework at a civilian university. 
Therefore, to compare the costs of a degree, six to 
ten additional months of the student’s military sal-
ary would have to be added to the nominal tuition 
fee at a civilian university. Based on these calcula-
tions, a degree at NPS would clearly cost the govern-
ment less than the average cost associated with the 
11 other peer universities cited above.
Other studies completed recently estimate the av-
erage cost of a graduate degree from a civilian uni-
versity to be approximately $27,000 per academic 
school year (9 months). Bearing in mind that tuition 
represents only a fraction of total costs (70–80% of 
the total costs at a civilian university are compen-
sated by state, federal, or private endowments and 
research), we must consider the points made above 
regarding credits contained in one academic year 
at a civilian university. Hence, based on the 24–28 
months required to earn a Masters degree at a ci-
vilian university, without meeting Educational Skill 
Requirements, it is fair to estimate total tuition fees 
of	approximately	$72,000	(2.6	x	$27K).	An	academic	
school year at NPS (12 months) was recently esti-
mated to cost approximately $36,000. But, again, 
based on the more rigorous academic calendar at 
NPS, a degree would take only 18 months to earn 
(excluding an estimated 4.8 months additional time 
required for transition and refresher courses). Even 
by adding the costs associated with the additional 
4.8 months (which would not include a full aca-
demic load), a student would earn a tailored degree, 
would produce a defense-related thesis, and would 
meet all Educational Skills Requirements in under 
two	years,	for	less	than	$72,	000	(	<	2	x	$36K).
It should be noted that this cost comparison did not 
consider varying housing allowances from region to 
region. Therefore, drawing the conclusion from the 
analysis cited above that the cost of a similar degree 
at a comparable civilian university would be signifi-
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cantly higher than at NPS, another cost analysis is 
suggested: how much would be saved by moving 
NPS to an existing military installation in a less ex-
pensive geographic area? It could be argued that the 
same rigorous academic calendar would be in place, 
so that not only would the degree be completed in 
the same amount of time as currently done at NPS, 
the cost of living would be lower for the student and 
his or her dependents. But here, I return to an ear-
lier point: making a closure, or realignment, deci-
sion primarily on cost considerations is to miss the 
essence of what NPS represents operationally, aca-
demically, and intrinsically to the Navy and to the 
Department of Defense.
Operationally and intrinsically, Naval Postgraduate 
School is a model environment for military academic 
excellence and a showcase of American values for in-
ternational students. It should serve as an incentive 
for our best and brightest officers and enlisted person-
nel who seek graduate degrees to enrich and enhance 
their military careers and improve their post-career 
job prospects as well (in fact, many of these students 
should be encouraged to pursue defense-related em-
ployment upon retirement from the service, thereby 
bringing their extensive military experience and 
graduate education into government or private sec-
tor defense-related fields). NPS also imprints a strong 
positive impression of America and our military on 
international students, many of whom will go on 
to be senior leaders, with considerable influence, in 
their own militaries. Fond memories of NPS and the 
friends with whom they studied there will pay further 
dividends on our investment through stronger collec-
tive	security	partnerships	in	the	future.	The	King	of	
Jordan, the Turkish Chief of Naval Operations, and 
the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Air Force are among 
the international alumni of NPS.
The location of NPS adds intrinsic value to the 
school and increases the potential return on our 
initial investment. While the cost of operating a 
military postgraduate institution in a less costly 
economic area than Monterey would probably save 
money in housing and some direct operating costs, 
what would be the second and third order effects 
of such a move? Would a school in a less attrac-
tive and academically dynamic environment draw 
research academicians with degrees from the same 
prestigious universities as are represented today by 
the faculty of NPS (among tenured-track faculty, 
terminal degrees are held by three or more faculty 
members from Stanford, MIT, Harvard, Yale, Pur-
due, Princeton, Penn State, Cornell, Northwestern, 
Rensselaer, The University of California system, and 
more)? Further, what would be the impression of a 
less attractive and culturally stimulating environ-
ment on our international students? And perhaps 
most importantly, what message would this send 
our Navy family, who so often trades inconvenience 
and quality of life for the opportunity to serve? The 
postgraduate experience should be enriching both 
academically and socially. With the capital invest-
ment we have made in Monterey, California, we can 
offer the finest quality of life for our students and 
their families as an indication of our commitment 
to them and to their futures. They will repay us with 
their energy, resourcefulness, and innovation.
And finally, hypothetically, what if we could find a 
civilian university willing to offer a degree in an ac-
celerated timeframe so that we could avoid paying 
the additional costs associated with a “typical” ci-
vilian academic regime? While a civilian university 
might come close to equaling some of the intrinsic 
value associated with NPS, the vital operational as-
pects of the curriculum (including the Educational 
Skills Requirements) would be missing. Professors 
would generally not have the extensive defense-re-
lated experience common among the NPS faculty, 
nor could they be expected to demonstrate military 
applications of their subject matter. Student/fac-
ulty contact hours would be less (NPS was ranked 
near the top of the 11 peer universities mentioned 
in this category) since civilian universities routinely 
use graduate assistants to teach some graduate-level 
courses, and university research would not be 85% 
defense-related as it is at NPS. The academic envi-
ronment, while perhaps representing a refreshing 
change for military students, would tend to take 
minds away from the challenging operational appli-
cations of their course of study. In fact, the opportu-
nity to work with other service members and with 
international military students would be largely lost. 
As would the ability to introduce foreign officers to 
a challenging and enriching glimpse of what their 
military futures could hold. The return on invest-
ment in sending military students to civilian univer-
sities for the United States Navy and program spon-
sors would be far less then it is in the defense-centric 
environment at NPS.
If our task was to design a graduate university to 
prepare America’s young military leaders for the 
dynamic challenges and opportunities of a vastly 
different tomorrow it would be joint and inter-
national, have diverse defense and interagency 
related curricula, be held to the highest academic 
standards, taught by professors experienced in ad-
vanced military research. It would be cost-effective 
and offer the highest level quality of service needed 
to draw and keep our best …
NPS IS ThIS AND MORE …
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While enrollment fluctuates somewhat through-
out the academic year, in the summer of 2004, the 
NPS student body was comprised of 42% Navy, 14% 
Marine Corps, 13% Air Force, 8% Army, 5% other 
US agencies, and 18% international students (291 
residents from 57 countries). By 2006, 1800 mili-
tary officers, defense civilians, enlisted, defense con-
tractors, and other agency representatives from the 
United States and other nations will be studying in 
resident programs at NPS. Another 4,000 or more 
students will be enrolled in degree or certificate pro-
grams around the world.
Joint
NPS works closely with the Unified Combatant 
Commanders to provide relevant education and re-
search critical to the combat mission. NPS faculty 
provides about $75 million of research to the Navy, 
Unified Combatant Commanders and the Services. 
Examples of support to the Combatant Command-
ers in 2002-2003 included:
	 •	 	Homeland	Defense	and	Security	programs	for	
Northern Command and Pacific Command.
	 •	 	Counterterrorism	 programs	 in	 support	 of	
Unified Combatant Commanders’ initiatives.
	 •	 	NPS	 faculty	 and	 students’	 direct	 support	
to Millenium Challenge 02 for Joint Forces 
Command.
	 •	 	A	 Special	 Ops	 curriculum	 and	 related	 re-
search on UAV’s, tactical decision aids, and 
other warfighting advances for SOCOM.
	 •	 	Information	Security	for	Strategic	Command.
	 •	 	Graduate	education	for	National	Guard	divi-
sion staffs deploying to European Command 
(and NATO) op areas.
International
The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at 
NPS is dedicated to strengthening democratic civil-
military relationships and assisting other nations 
in making integrated defense decisions. Courses 
are offered across the country, overseas, and in-res-
idence. Each quarter, CCMR runs 20 to 30 events 
in more than 20 nations, reaching over 8000 civil-
ian and military personnel each year. From Octo-
ber through December 2004, CCMR held 25 events, 
both in residence and non-residence, teaching civil-
ians and military from 28 nations, including Azer-
baijan,	Slovenia,	Latvia,	Bosnia,	Kosovo,	Romania,	
Columbia, Fiji, and others. These events ranged 
from two-day site visits to two-week seminars. Na-
val Postgraduate School professors and instructors 
taught these courses/seminars.
The Leader Development and Education for Sus-
tained Peace (LDESP) program is a component of 
CCMR. This graduate-level education program 
serves the education needs of professionals from 
various disciplines and/or agencies such as am-
bassadors, former political officials, former mili-
tary commanders, security and international law 
enforcement personnel, community leaders, and 
United Nations and State Department personnel. 
LDESP prepares units deploying to stability opera-
tions in Central Europe, Central Asia, the Middle 
East and Africa. Recent activity (late 2004) focused 
on prepanng senior leaders/U.S. units for their de-
ployments	to	Iraq,	Afghanistan,	and	Kosovo.
The Defense Resources Management Institute 
(DRMI) is an educational institution sponsored by 
the Secretary of Defense and located at NPS. Since 
1965, DRMI has conducted professional educa-
tion programs in analytical decision-making and 
resource management for military officers of all 
services as well as senior civilian officials from the 
United States and 125 other countries. The courses 
can be studied either overseas or in-residence. The 
principal focus of all DRMI programs is to develop 
an understanding and appreciation of the concepts, 
techniques, and decision-making skills related to 
defense resource management. The emphasis is not 
on training in job-specific skills, but rather to un-
derstand the concepts, techniques, and issues that 
pervade defense resources management decision-
making.
In 2004, DRMI’s Mobile Education Team (MET) 
held courses in: Macedonia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Argentina, Thailand, Tajikistan, Malaysia, Belize, 
Lithuania and Bosnia. In 2005, DRMI’s MET plans 
to hold courses in: Guinea, El Salvador, Columbia, 
Honduras, Bangladesh, the South Pacific, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Estonia, Argentina, Canada, and 
Latvia.
Interagency, National Security
NPS provides specialized programs that support 
U.S. national security priorities, including counter-
terrorism, homeland security, and security coopera-
tion. Master’s degree programs and seminars have 
been developed on Homeland Defense and Secu-
rity, as well as Counter-drug Strategy and Policy, for 
the Department of Homeland Security (and for the 
Chief ofNaval Operations, NORTHCOM, and the 
National Guard). NPS teaches a classified graduate 
education program for the National Security Agen-
cy, is a University of choice for the National Recon-
naissance Office, and NASA sponsors the annual 
Michael J. Smith NASA Chair at NPS with focused 
areas of space research, education and training for 
future astronaut candidates. Additionally, NPS re-
ceives sizeable annual funding from the National 
Science Foundation for basic research in oceanog-
raphy, meteorology, information sciences, engineer-
ing, and technology development, often partnering 
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with other universities on interdisciplinary research 
projects.
“Prevail today while bridging to a successful fu-
ture.” CNO Guidance for 2005
NPS IS ThE BRIDGE TO …
“Refined operational concepts to deliver the kind 
of dominant military power from the sea envisioned 
in “Sea Power 21”.” Operations Logistics faculty and 
students are conducting research on how to use of 
High Speed Vehicles (HSVs) in a logistics role for 
CTF–73 and how to modify contingency support 
plans. Twenty Systems Engineering and Analy-
sis students are leading a campus-wide integrated 
study on defeating maritime terrorism and pirate-
supported terror in the Southeast Asian waterways; 
NPS students from Singapore will be integrated into 
this study. Thirteen Systems Engineering and Anal-
ysis students will lead a campus-wide integrated 
study on the challenges of Undersea Warfare in the 
Littoral. This work will focus on the most relevant 
threats and will involve coordination with COM-
PACFLT, ASW Command, and TF ASW. The esti-
mated completion date is December 2005.
“Alignment to best organize our personnel and re-
sources across the Navy to support the Fleet, training 
and education of our personnel, and the synergies 
of our various echelon levels.” NPS’ Regional Secu-
rity Education Program (RSEP) raises the strategic 
situational awareness of deploying and forward-
deployed naval forces, thereby enhancing force pro-
tection and mission performance. The RSEP sends 
teams of regional security experts to ships and for-
ward bases where they brief unit personnel on the 
strategic, political, and cultural contexts in which 
they will operate. RSEP teams typically remain on 
site for several days where they conduct briefings as 
well as informal discussion sessions. An RSEP team 
was onboard the Lincoln Strike Group as they de-
ployed to the Persian Gulf, where the team provided 
staff and crew with counter-terrorism and Middle 
Eastern political, military, and regional orientation.
“Sea Trial to increase levels of operational, organi-
zational and technological agility.” Students in the 
Systems Engineering and Analysis curriculum com-
pleted a nine-month study of Sea Basing and Joint 
Expeditionary Logistics for the 2015 to 2025 time 
frame. The integrated multidisciplinary project was 
completed by a team of 50 students and 20 faculty 
from across campus including the Systems Engi-
neering Analysis and Total Ship Systems Engineer-
ing curricula. One student helped develop a pro-
totype map-based system to automatically display, 
animate, and statistically analyze situation reports 
about insurgent activity (including Improvised Ex-
plosive Device or IED attacks) from Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. The student applied statistical process 
control techniques developed by his thesis advisor 
and XML technology developed by his second read-
er to display and analyze SIGACT data, providing 
early warning of shifting enemy patterns.
“Sea Enterprise to increase the pace of innovation 
throughout our Navy.” NPS has been a leader and 
an active participant in the Navy’s efforts to develop 
future naval technologies. NPS researchers took part 
in the Silent Hammer exercise that tested submarine 
control of a long-endurance UAV to support forces 
on land, and NPS physicists have conducted pio-
neering research on shipboard free electron lasers 
and electromagnetic rail guns while guiding student 
thesis research on these topics in order to develop 
military leaders familiar with these future technolo-
gies. In another thesis, a student created a theater 
ballistic missile defense (TBMD) operational plan-
ning aid that helps the Area Air Defense commander 
create courses of action to best locate TBMD assets. 
The model, JOINT DEFENDER, which can also be 
used in programmatic development for evaluating 
cost/benefit of new technologies, has been briefed to 
NWDC, CNO N-76 and STRATCOM and is being 
evaluated for inclusion in a standard suite of TBMD 
models.
“Sea Warrior to empower our people with a lifetime 
of learning, with technology that is integrated with 
the human being, and with more choices and incen-
tives in a competitive career environment.” NPS is 
partnered with many defense and civilian univer-
sities. These partnerships, which allow NPS to de-
liver defense-related education when and where it 
is needed, include the Air Force Institute of Tech-
nology (AFIT), Stanford University (for Homeland 
Security). NPS is currently running 11 non-resident 
degree programs, 85 on-line courses, 4 Navy-rele-
vant distance learning certificate programs, more 
than 300 courses using web technology, 5 online 
distance learning courses on board ship, 215 loca-
tions for distance learning (via video teleconferenc-
ing, internet, satellite campuses, etc).
“We will continually adapt how we approach and 
confront challenges, conduct business, and work 
with others.” National Defense Strategy, March 2005
NPS: A TOOL fOR TRANSfORMATION
The Office of Force Transformation now sponsors 
an NPS Chair and course development in one of 
the first programs in Transformation Education and 
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Research, through the NPS Cebrowski Institute of 
Information Innovation and Superiority. The new 
“National Defense Strategy’s” section on Defense 
Transformation states that,
  “ Transformation is not only about technology.  
It is also about: 
	 •	 	Changing	the	way	we	think	about	chal-
lenges and opportunities
	 	 •	 	Adapting	the	defense	establishment	to	that	
new perspective, and
	 	 •	 	Refocusing	capabilities	to	meet	future	
challenges, not those we are already most 
prepared to meet.”
It goes on to say that, “We are working to transform 
our international partnerships, including the capa-
bilities that we and our partners can use collectively.”
NPS is vital to DoD’s interactions with other agencies 
and nations for national security. As has been shown, 
NPS programs strengthen democratic civil-military 
relationships in countries throughout the world. The 
“National Defense Strategy” plainly proclaims a goal 
fully supported by the Naval Postgraduate School, 
“We seek to foster a culture of innovation.”
NPS: NAVy EDUCATION STRATEGy’S 
CENTER Of GRAVITy
As a matter of national security, the Navy needs to 
do a better job of managing the careers of our young 
warfighters. We must develop an education strategy 
that builds postgraduate education into the career 
paths of our officer and enlisted leadership as both a 
reward and an incentive. There is no better military 
environment in which to earn a postgraduate degree 
than the Naval Postgraduate School with students 
representing all services, several US Government 
agencies, and more than 60 countries. This is the 
future operational environment: technology serving 
joint, interagency and combined operations world-
wide. Further, we need to think of all our Navy fam-
ily, uniformed and civilian, and their dependents. 
Through distributed distance learning we can pro-
vide the means to develop draw the best and keep 
the best happy.
Naval Postgraduate School represents the beating 
heart of the Navy’s future Human Capital Strategy. 
We truly must “Win in the marketplace for talent.” 
We can only do this by investing in and demonstrat-
ing a commitment to the education and training 
of our people. From their recruitment, to their re-
tirements, and beyond into our nation’s workforce, 
we must provide the opportunities for our leaders 
to excel: personally and professionally. Sadly, fewer 
American’s are seeking technical degrees in col-
lege. Many officers with non-technical degrees are 
asked not only to be leaders, but to work in a highly 
technical environment with sophisticated weapons 
systems. Our enlisted sailors who demonstrate a 
technical aptitude are likewise trained to perform 
highly complex tasks in a stressful environment. In 
fact, more and more of our enlisted sailors (and sol-
diers, airman, marines) are entering the service with 
degrees or pursuing degrees via distance learning. 
Having demonstrated the maturity and capability 
of performing the most exacting jobs in the most 
stressful conditions, our warriors have earned the 
right to learn more, to progress educationally. They 
deserve the opportunity to fulfill their career goals 
both in the service and after they leave the service.
In the next year, the Defense Department needs to 
hire more than 14,000 civilian scientists and engi-
neers. But the pool of candidates is shrinking. More 
than half of science and engineering graduates from 
American universities are foreign nationals, who are 
mostly offlimits to federal agencies. Moreover, DoD 
must compete with the private sector and other agen-
cies for the talent that is available. Naval Postgradu-
ate School is ninth in the nation in the production of 
science and technology Master degrees. In fact, NPS 
is graduating 18–20 civilians a year to serve in all 
agencies of the government. By developing an educa-
tion strategy built upon continuing education, career 
management and counseling, we can ensure our na-
tion has technically qualified and innovative sailors, 
soldiers, airmen and marines who are capable and 
willing to carry their experience and education into 
the civilian work force when they retire.
Naval Postgraduate School is ideally placed to serve 
as the centerpiece of a Navy Education Strategy that 
takes a total force, lifelong approach to serving our 
Navy family and our nation’s defense needs.
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title NPS Strategic Communications Plan
source NPS Internal Document, 3 October 2006
abstract  The plan details the Naval Postgraduate School’s key messages to be promoted, 
including how NPS differs from civilian universities and reinforces NPS’ mis-
sion. The plan’s audiences are outlined, as well as how NPS community mem-
bers need to be involved in carrying out the plan. Communication methods 
and implementation are also defined.
excerpts  “NPS education and research programs are of the highest quality. Our faculty 
are recruited from, and sought after by, the best universities in our nation and 
abroad. Our students are accomplished professionals with tremendous career 
potential who take with them both academic as well as joint and combined 
military professional education credentials.”
  “Accomplished NPS faculty, both civilian and military, integrate graduate edu-
cation objectives of the Armed Services with relevant research at the applied 
and theoretical levels into degree programs and student theses and disserta-
tions of great value to our nation and international partners.”
  “To advance the vision and capabilities that NPS brings to the Department of 
the Navy, Department of Defense, interagency and the nation, each contribu-
tor to implementation of this Strategic Communications Plan will understand 
its objectives and assist the Institutional Advancement Department with co-
ordinating and orchestrating their individual and combined efforts to achieve 
NPS, DoN and DoD objectives for the 21st century.” 
  “When properly orchestrated, individual, School, Institute, CEE and combined 
efforts can ensure DoD-wide coverage for NPS on an annual (or semi-annual) 
basis as well as synchronize efforts to meet with and brief critical interagency 
and foreign partners.”
  “As the central focus of this Strategic Communications Plan, enthusiastic mar-
keting of NPS and the potential of our faculty, students and graduates is every-
one’s responsibility.” 
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NPS Strategic Communications Plan
3 oct 2006 
“A View to the Future” calls for a coordinated strate-
gic communication plan for synchronized and effec-
tive outreach to potential students, alumni, research 
partners and Armed Services who are the consum-
ers of our products, both nationally and internation-
ally. Effective and orchestrated communications at 
all levels: leadership, faculty, students and graduates 
are essential for us to accomplish this mission. The 
purpose of this plan is to ensure that everyone un-
derstands the messages to be communicated, the 
audiences, the methods and the responsibilities for 
coordinating communications.
NPS MISSION
Provide relevant and unique advanced education 
and research programs in order to increase the 
combat-effectiveness of US and Allied armed forces 




1.  EXCELLENT NPS education and research 
programs are of the highest quality. Our faculty 
are recruited from, and sought after by, the best 
universities in our nation and abroad. Our stu-
dents are accomplished professionals with tre-
mendous career potential who take with them 
both academic as well as joint and combined 
military professional education credentials.
2.  RELEVANT Accomplished NPS faculty, both 
civilian and military, integrate graduate educa-
tion objectives of the Armed Services with rele-
vant research at the applied and theoretical levels 
into degree programs and student theses and dis-
sertations of great value to our nation and inter-
national partners.
3.  JOINT, COMBINED AND SERVING THE TO-
TAL FORCE All branches of the U.S. Armed 
Services, and Armed Forces personnel from all 
over the world, come together with Department 
of Defense, Department of Homeland Security 
and civilians from other interagency depart-
ments and activities for a tactically and strategi-
cally joint and combined experience.
4.  MISSION CRITICAL NPS develops our na-
tion’s foremost Department of Defense analysts, 
strategic thinkers and leaders — those who will 
lead the U.S. Armed Forces, our Allied and Com-
bined Forces and our nation in the 21st Century.
5.  SERVING ORNATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITY NPS educational, re-
search and outreach programs enhance our na-
tional and international security while building 
camaraderie and international relationships be-
tween students, faculty and institutions that will 
last lifetimes.
POINTS Of DIffERENCE wITh CIVILIAN 
INSTITUTIONS Of hIGhER EDUCATION:
•	 	Naval	and	defense	focused	curricula
•	 	Wide-range	of	offerings	in	sciences,	engineering,	
policy, security, management, and technology
•	 	Ability	 to	 quickly	 develop	 and	 offer	 interdisci-





agement including DoD Civilians
•	 	Many	 international	 students	 from	about	 60	na-
tions attend resident programs




•	 	Graduate	 degrees,	 military	 specific	 educational	
competencies and Joint Professional Military 
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Education are combined to meet Congressional 
direction
•	 	Robust	 short	course	offerings	 for	US	and	 inter-
national student, in US and abroad, through a 
broad spectrum of web-based and distributed 
learning methods
DESCRIPTORS:
•	 	Agile		 	 	 •	 	Defense-Focused
•	 	Adaptive	 	 •	 	Innovative
•	 	Relevant		 	 •	 	Responsive
•	 	Excellence	 	 •	 	Internationally	Focused











 ~  Navy Secretariat, CNO, CMC, VCNO, ACMC 
and OPNA V and HQMC Staffs
 ~  Fleet and Fleet Marine Force leadership
 ~  SYSCOMS/ONR
 ~  Curriculum sponsors



























tions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum
NPS STAKEhOLDER RESPONSIBILITIES
In order to achieve the NPS objectives, all elements 
of the NPS community must be involved in the fol-
lowing ways.
•	 	Secretary	 of	 the	 Navy,	 CNO,	 Commandant,	
VCNO and ACMC, along with other Naval lead-
ership, need to clearly understand and concisely 
communicate how they value higher education 
and NPS’ contributions to higher education. An-
nual guidance to their forces should also reflect 
their commitments to educating their forces to 
achieve US Strategic Objectives in the 21st Cen-
tury and beyond.
•	 	NPS	President	and	Provost	must	provide	the	vi-
sion and strategy for NPS. They set the priorities 
for NPS and are the key communicators within 
NPS and about NPS.
•	 	NPS	Chief	 of	 Staff,	Deans,	Department	Chairs,	
Institute Directors, Executive Directors, Associ-
ate Provosts, and other key leaders must embrace 
the NPS strategy and vision and ensure that their 
organizational goals and plans are aligned ac-
cordingly. They must then communicate both 
within NPS and to their primary external cus-
tomers and stakeholders about the NPS vision 
and how their initiatives support it.
98 VALUE BOOK • A STRATEGIC VALUED INVESTMENT  NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
•	 	Faculty	and	staff	need	to	understand	and	embrace	
the NPS vision and strategy and understand how 
it applies to them and how they are integral to the 
accomplishment of that vision.
•	 	Students	should	understand	the	NPS	vision	and	
strategy and understand how they are integral to 
the accomplishment of that vision.
•	 	Alumni	should	understand	and	embrace	the	NPS	
vision, strategy and long-term plans. They should 
understand how they are integral to the accom-




 ~  Newsletters
 ~  Web: Sites and Stories, Photo Gallery
 ~  Brochures and Curricula Pamphlets
 ~  Annual Catalog
 ~  Staff and Faculty Visits
 ~  Annual Report
 ~  Media Visits
 ~  Community Impact Study (Local)
 ~  Press Releases
 ~  Community Impact Study (Defense)
 ~  Outreach Programs
 ~  NPS Branding
 ~  Student Briefings
 ~  Give-Aways for Conferences and Outreach 
events
 ~  Alumni Events and Judicious use of Distin-
guished Alumni
•	 	Correspondence
 ~  E-mail
 ~  Written





 ~  National
 ~  Local
 ~  Defense-related
 ~  Navy-related
•	 	All	collateral	materials	will	carry	the	authorized	
NPS branding and follow the NPS Style Guide 
specification.
•	 	‘’NPS	Tag-Line”	 is	 under	development	 and	will	
be reflected on all marketing materials.
IMPLEMENTATION
•	  Responsibility: The President of NPS has overall 
responsibility for the formulation and implemen-
tation of this Strategic Communications Plan.
 ~  The Associate Provost for Institutional Ad-
vancement is the President’s lead agent under 
this responsibility and is accountable for de-
veloping an implementation plan, milestones, 
and the means to measure progress toward 
achieving objectives and goals.
•	  Overview: To advance the vision and capabilities 
that NPS brings to the Department of the Navy, 
Department of Defense, interagency and the na-
tion, each contributor to implementation of this 
Strategic Communications Plan will understand 
its objectives and assist the Institutional Advance-
ment Department with coordinating and orches-
trating their individual and combined efforts to 
achieve NPS, DON and DoD objectives for the 
21st Century. For example, our outreach to US 
Armed Forces can and will play a significant part 
in recognition of NPS as the premier institution 
of higher learning available for studies in the cur-
ricula for which we grant degrees. Research by fac-
ulty and students in areas of significant national 
and international interest can be highlighted by 
deans visiting Service Headquarters and interna-
tional staffs, and when combined with briefings 
and demonstrations by students and faculty, who 
have completed that research, demonstrate the 
tremendous potential and critical acclaim of NPS’ 
programs, faculty and graduates.
•	 	When	properly	orchestrated,	individual,	School,	
Institute, CEE and combined efforts can ensure 
DOD-wide coverage for NPS on an annual (or 
semi-annual) basis as well as synchronize efforts 
to meet with and brief critical Inter-Agency and 
foreign partners. For example, if the MOVES In-
stitute meets with key members of the OPNAV 
and Joint Staffs, they can carry the message of 
recent successes in modeling and simulation, 
and offer to have faculty and students brief those 
models and their potential. In another example, 
when deans and faculty are in Fleet Concentra-
tion Areas, they should coordinate with the OCL 
offices in those FCA’s to influence regional com-
manders and generate interest in NPS programs 
and research.
•	 	As	the	central	focus	of	this	Strategic	Communi-
cations Plan, enthusiastic marketing of NPS and 
the potential of our faculty, students and gradu-
ates is everyone’s responsibility. 
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title  Issue Brief: Why Do We Need a Naval  
Postgraduate School (NPS)? 
ref no.	 N09BC	•	1	May	1996
abstract  This brief answers why the Naval Postgraduate School is needed. Factors sup-
porting its effectiveness and importance include NPS’ primary mission — to 
prepare Naval officers with a DoD and DoN-specific graduate education not 
available at civilian universities — as well as the fact that NPS’ program is cost-
effective and offers an excellent research program.
excerpts  “The primary goal of NPS is subspecialty education, not a master’s degree. 
However, given the extent of the education required to meet educational skill 
requirements, it is practical, desirable and cost-effective for NPS students to 
obtain a master’s degree while attending NPS.”
  “Officers are sent to NPS when the educational skills involve DoD-specific 
knowledge that is not readily available at civilian universities.”
  “N81-led study group in 1992 concluded that NPS was $22m cheaper than 
CIVINS would be for providing a fully comparable education. A 1993 analysis 
by NPS using N81 study data showed that NPS had a cost per class hour of 
$135 vice (versus) $176 for CIVINS.”
  “The NPS course of study is extremely rigorous. Students average 64 quarter 
credit hours of work per year compared with the normal 30 to 48 credit hours 
at average civilian universities for a longer period of time.”
  “NPS has an excellent research program. All students participate in research 
projects through required theses, often not a requirement for CIVINS master’s 
degrees.” 
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Why Do We Need A Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)? 
PURPOSE
To respond to queries as to why NPS is needed.
DISCUSSION
The NPS primary mission is to prepare naval officers 
with education skill requirements needed to qualify 
them to serve in positions subspecialty requiring 
graduate education.
	 •	 	Officers	are	sent	to	NPS	when	the	educational	
skills involve DoD-specific knowledge that is 
not readily available at civilian universities.
	 •	 	When	 educational	 skills	 may	 not	 require	
DoD-specific knowledge or relevancy, officers 
are sent to civilian universities (CIVINS).
	 •	 	The	primary	goal	of	NPS	is	subspecialty	edu-
cation. not a master’s degree. However. given 
the extent of the education required to meet 
educational skill requirements, it is both prac-
tical, desirable and cost-effective for NPS stu-
dents to obtain a master’s degree while attend-
ing NPS.
About half of NPS students change major fields be-
tween their undergraduate and graduate degrees. 
NPS is unique in its ability to accommodate these 
students, whereas civilian universities will not.
	 •	 	NPS	offers	one	or	two	quarter	transition	pro-
grams in which entering students can take 
courses needed to change academic majors.
	 •	 	Accomplishing	this	at	civilian	universities	re-
quires either substantial accredited off-duty 
study prior to entering full-time graduate 
study, or a prohibitively long full-time gradu-
ate study status at higher costs to naval ser-
vice.
NPS makes far more efficient use of officers’ time.
	 •	 	The	NPS	course	of	 study	 is	 extremely	 rigor-
ous. Students average 64 quarter credit hours 
of work per year compared with the normal 
30 to 48 credit hours at average civilian uni-
versities for a longer period of time.
	 •	 	NPS	operates	a	full	class	schedule	throughout	
the year. There is no limited summer session 
with limited course offerings. This provides 
admittance at the beginning of each quarter, 
and education of summer-time “dead-time” 
prevalent at most universities.
	 •	 	NPS	curricula	are	designed	 to	ensure	steady	
progression with required course in sequence. 
Civilian universities often do not offer re-
quired courses when needed which delay 
graduation and increases costs.
NPS is cost-effective in light of the extent of the edu-
cation provided.
	 •	 	N81-led	study	group	in	1992	concluded	that	
NPS was $22M cheaper than CIVINS would 
be for providing a fully comparable educa-
tion.
	 •	 	A	1993	analysis	by	NPS	using	N81	study	data	
showed that NPS had a cost per class hour of 
$135 vice $176 for CIVINS.
	 •	 	CIVINS	may	 be	 cheaper	 if	 Navy	 sends	 stu-
dents to shorter, generic master’s degree pro-
grams. However, this would require overhaul-
ing and altering the subspecialty system to 
make the requirement simply a master’s de-
gree rather than specific educational skills re-
quirements. If Navy is willing to settle for this 
lower standard, the CIVINS option would be 
$20M cheaper. But a significant change in the 
law would be required to eliminate the re-
quirement for officer subspecialties.
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Other considerations which, while not as critical to 
educational skill requirements, but nevertheless im-
portant are:
	 •	 	One	third	of	the	student	body	consists	of	of-
ficers from other services and countries. We 
consider this interaction for a two-year pro-
gram to be much more valuable that interface 
with the general civilian public at CIVINS.
	 •	 	NPS	 has	 an	 excellent	 research	 program.	 All	
students participate in research projects 
through required theses, often not a require-
ment for CIVINS master’s degrees. NPS is 
one of the few places still involved in small 
scale, small group basic research. R&D has 
become so highly structured with such a vol-
ume of justification materials and reviews that 
multi-million dollar projects which cannot be 
allowed to fail (even if they produce a poor, 
unnecessary or inadequate project) have be-
come the “norm” in DoD and private indus-
try. Other value-added benefits include NPS 
using “backyard garage” (hands-on experi-
mental) technology, has produced scientific 
achievements, such as an acoustic refrigerator 
that has been successfully tested on the space 
shuttle and a circuit board for satellites that 
is a major advance over other systems for re-
ceiving and relaying short-wave signals. The 
Japanese, recognizing what is happening, have 
set up basic research institutes in the United 
States to use our scientists to do precisely this 
type of research. General Electric is using this 
technology to develop CFC-free, non-electric, 
acoustic generator type refrigerators and air 
conditioners which are scheduled to market 
approximately three years from now.
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title  Graduate Education in the Department of 
the Navy: Objectives, Cost-Effectiveness and 
Analysis of the Alternatives
source NPS Document, Author Unknown, Date Unknown
abstract  Janice Graham’s assertion that “subspecialty-based graduate education is out-
moded and not valued by Navy leadership” and that such an education can 
be more cost-effective by the use of educational vouchers, privatizing or out-
sourcing NPS are disproved in this article. Contesting Graham’s “flawed analy-
sis,” the article reviews the value of NPS’ graduate education curricula in meet-
ing the Department of the Navy’s objectives, the program’s cost-effectiveness, 
and asserts that the militarily-focused NPS program cannot be duplicated by 
civilian universities.
excerpts  “Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) cost data, reported 
by Cavalluzzo and Cymrot (1998), were modified to normalize for the effects 
of NPS’ unique academic calendar and course scheduling, dual general educa-
tion and subspecialty academic requirements, focus on graduate education and 
student salary and benefit considerations. After making these adjustments, the 
present value of civilian graduate educational costs per degree student range 
from $570,500 … to $208,400. The average for the 28 civilian universities con-
sidered is $268,300. NPS’ graduate education costs are $207,200, lower than 
all civilian institutions considered. Student salaries and benefits account for 
anywhere between 25% and 70% of the totals, and average 53%.”
  “However, a dedicated Navy graduate institution offers several advantages, 
which help offset the cost subsidization, including operations tempo, admis-
sions timing and admissions policies. Most importantly, NPS students receive 
more instruction per year than their civilian university counterparts. As ex-
plained above, NPS can deliver comparable material in a shorter period. This 
returns students to the fleet more quickly and reduces the associated student 
salary and benefit costs by up to 40%.” 
  “Janice Graham … maintains that subspecialty-based graduate education is 
outmoded and not valued by Navy leadership. She suggests that DoN officers 
are better served by a general graduate education … Graham further suggests 
that it is more cost-effective to meet these educational objectives by either 
privatizing or outsourcing NPS or giving officers educational vouchers to at-
tend the civilian institutions of their choice. This depiction redefines the objec-
tives for Navy-funded graduate education, confuses the link between delivery 
modes and educational outcomes, and bases cost-effectiveness conclusions on 
cost analysis that doesn’t standardize across alternatives and ignores the cost 
of student salaries and benefits. Graham’s solutions redefine educational objec-
tives on the basis of flawed analysis.”
  “Graham’s article highlights the importance of clearly defining DoN’s educa-
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tives and comparing the cost-effectiveness of alternative means to provide a 
standardized degree program. Unfortunately, Graham’s analysis fails to satisfy 
these requirements. In actuality, NPS meets its currently defined educational 
objectives and is cost-effective after standardizing for program content. This 
cost-effectiveness reflects NPS’ more intensive student and faculty workloads, 
factors ignored in most existing cost analyses. Recent curriculum modifica-
tions also illustrate the value of retaining NPS’ responsiveness and flexibility, 
an attribute civilian universities cannot even contemplate.”
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Graduate Education in the Department of the Navy: 
Objectives, Cost-Effectiveness and Analysis  
of the Alternatives 
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) provides 
in-residence graduate education tailored, by law 
and directive, to meet the needs of Department of 
Navy (DoN) students (Navy and Marine Corps) as 
well as students from other services, civilian DoD 
employees and international officers. NPS’ subspe-
cialty based graduate curricula are developed in 
close coordination with Navy curricula sponsors to 
fulfill the technical and analytical educational skills 
required in specifically identified and coded bil-
lets. NPS’ evolving curricula reflect guidance and 
instructions articulated in U.S. law, Secretary of the 
Navy instructions and Chief of Naval Operations’ 
vision statements. As demonstrated elsewhere, NPS 
is also more cost-effective in providing this educa-
tion that than an independently selected compari-
son group of 28 top ranked schools offering gradu-
ate engineering degrees.1
Janet Graham offers an alternative view in “Rethink-
ing Graduate Education in the Navy and the Naval 
Postgraduate School.” Driven largely by her inter-
pretation of DoN’s values and objectives for gradu-
ate education and her (mis)perception of relative 
education costs at NPS, Graham recommends edu-
cation vouchers (redeemable at the student’s school 
of choice), privatization and outsourcing as alterna-
tives to NPS graduate education.2 This recommen-
dation reflects Graham’s view that the Navy places 
the least value on graduate education of any service, 
and that Naval officers are best served by general 
educational objectives that emphasize” … the pro-
cess and practice of innovation and the skills of an 
entrepreneur.” Graham’s proposal represents a radi-
cal departure from current educational objectives. 
Therefore, its underlying assumptions and recom-
mendations deserve close scrutiny. 
DON’S VALUE Of GRADUATE 
EDUCATION 
Graham asserts that DoN does not value gradu-
ate education using primarily anecdotal evidence.3 
In contrast to Graham’s assertion, this discussion 
assumes that DoN values graduate education. The 
Navy faces rapid changes in technology, social in-
teractions and military strategy in the 21st century. 
Presumably, Navy leaders recognize that educa-
tion is a key to preserving maritime dominance in 
this environment. If graduate education becomes 
a hurdle to jump for promotion, DoN should stop 
funding in-residence graduate education and find 
the cheapest means possible to jump this hurdle. If 
current or future Navy culture views graduate edu-
cation as critical, then DON must define the appro-
priate educational objectives and identify the most 
cost-effective means to achieve those objectives.
DON’S VISION fOR NPS GRADUATE 
EDUCATION
In contrast to Graham’s description, the mission 
1  Gates, et al., “A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools: The NPS Faculty Critique ofCNA’s Report,” NPS-FC-98-001, Naval 
Postgraduate School, November, 1998.
2  Graham states that “Initial forays to several top-tier private universities for the purpose of determining their interest in some type of 
partnership with NPS were most promising … “ However, Graham does not provide any reference for this assertion, list the universi-
ties individuals contacted, or describe the ground rules specified for this partnership (e.g., student/faculty workloads; admissions 
timing, policies and requirements; curriculum content and review; etc.). As such, it is difficult to determine the actual interest level.
3  This point is also promoted in Linda C. Cavalluzzo and Donald J. Cymrot, “A Bottoms-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools,” 
CRM 97-24, Center for Naval Analyses, January 1998.
106 VALUE BOOK • A STRATEGIC VALUED INVESTMENT  NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
and objectives of a Navy-funded graduate school 
are well defined, including the role NPS plays rela-
tive to other Navy-funded graduate education. NPS’ 
objectives are described in three sources: Title 10 
U.S.C., Section 7041-7047 and SECNAV Instruction 
1524.2A (April 4, 1989), the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (CNO) “Vision Statement for Graduate Edu-
cation” (May 5, 1999), and the Naval Postgraduate 
School vision statement (www.nps.navy.mil).
Title 10 U.S.C. established NPS and SECNA V In-
struction 1524.2A defined NPS’ academic purpose. 
Instruction 1524.2A describes NPS’ mission and ob-
jectives as follows:
  Background To perform effectively in peace 
and war, Navy and Marine Corps officers must 
understand the technologies inherent to the capa-
bilities of their weapons systems and ships … The 
professional development and education of Navy 
and Marine Corp officers must, therefore, give 
them … the knowledge to operate in an increas-
ingly sophisticated technological environment … 
  Rationale For NPS The NPS exists for the sole 
purpose of increasing the combat-effectiveness of 
the Navy and Marine Corps. It accomplishes this 
by providing post-baccalaureate degree and non-
degree programs in a variety of subspecialty areas 
not available through other educational institu-
tions.
  General Program Guidance NPS programs 
must provide officers the latest technological 
knowledge relevant to their future duty assign-
ments as well as an appreciation of the funda-
mentals of maritime strategy and concepts of 
naval warfare.
The CNO’s “Vision Statement for Navy Officer Edu-
cation” reaffirms this focus by stating:
  … flexibility and creativity are more important 
than ever as today’s fast pace and rapid increase 
in technological sophistication defme our times.
This guidance is embodied in NPS’ vision statement:
  Increase the combat-effectiveness of U.S. and 
Allied armed forces and enhance the security 
of the U.S. through advanced education and re-
search programs focused on the technical, ana-
lytical, and managerial tools needed to confront 
defense-related challenges.
Reflecting these instructions and vision statements, 
NPS subspecialty-based graduate curricula provide 
students with the technical and analytical skills re-
quired in certain specifically identified and coded bil-
lets. However, this is only one of the unique attributes 
NPS provides. Other critical characteristics that dis-
tinguish NPS from civilian universities include:
	 •	 	Military	relevant	curricula	offerings	that	meet	
Navy subspecialty and general education re-
quirements and projected billet requirements 
(the Navy has rejected the idea that a set of 
degree programs serendipitously chosen by its 
officer corps would meet Navy needs)
	 •	 	Programs	 subject	 to	biennial	Navy	flag-level	
curriculum sponsor review for military rele-
vancy with the capability to swiftly implement 
desired course and program changes
	 •	 	Entrance	controlled	by	military	performance	
instead of undergraduate grade-point average 
and standardized testing (e.g., GRE scores)
	 •	 	Opportunity	 for	high-ability,	high-motivation	
officers to transition from one undergraduate 
area to a different graduate major (unlike in-
dustry, the Navy cannot hire mid-career talent 
with the desired skill sets; it must educate them 
from within the ranks; e.g., Astronaut Winston 
Scott transitioned from an undergraduate mu-
sic major to aeronautical engineering)
	 •	 	Opportunity	 for	 refresher	 courses	 to	 allow	
students to renew academic skills after several 
years of on-the-job performance
	 •	 	Faculty	and	students	participating	in	over	500	
reimbursably funded research projects per 
year on issues of interest to sponsoring (fund-
ing) agencies from the DoN and throughout 
the U.S. government4
	 •	 	A	 student	 body	 combining	 junior	 officers	
from the Navy, Marines, Army, Air Force, 
National Guard, civilian defense agencies and 
scores of foreign countries to explore techni-
cal, operational and strategic problems.
This partnership among students, faculty and spon-
sors (curriculum and research) produces an unparal-
leled mix of attributes that are not available in civilian 
graduate programs. If DoN wants to replicate these 
attributes in civilian universities, it will have to es-
tablish Navy unique programs under civilian control 
(i.e., outsource or privatize NPS). Navy leadership di-
4  This reflects the NPS FYOO reimbursable research program as of 1 June 2000.
5  Graham observes that” … there does not seem to be a part of any curricula that could not be taught by a civilian university-if one 
was asked to structure and teach such a course for military students.” While this is true, civilian universities are unlikely to provide 
military unique course material, or the other attributes NPS currently offers, if DoN students simply pay civilian tuition rates.
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rectly controls these attributes at NPS; they would be 
contractually specified in civilian universities.5
NPS’ subspecialty curricula include both technical 
and non-technical fields. While many of these fields 
appear to have civilian counterparts, NPS curricula 
are uniquely tailored to Navy-specific requirements. 
Each degree program satisfies civilian-sector degree 
requirements (as necessary to maintain accredi-
tation) and DoN subspecialty requirements. For 
example, both NPS and civilian universities offer 
programs in Contract Management and Manpower 
Systems Analysis. However, the NPS curricula in-
clude both the general material covered in civilian 
universities and DoN and DoD-specific issues. For 
instance, Contract Management includes DoN and 
DoD specific contracting policies, requirements and 
case studies; Manpower Systems Analysis addresses 
the software, databases and analytical techniques 
peculiar to military manpower analysis. Similar ex-
amples characterize every technical and non-techni-
cal degree program that NPS offers.
Most importantly, NPS curricula are responsive 
to DoN and curriculum sponsor direction in ways 
likely invisible to Graham. NPS cut the number of 
different curricula in electronic/information war-
fare at the behest of VADM Arthur Cebrowski 
when he was N-6. NPS also offers a relatively new 
18-month curriculum for Special Warfare Officers. 
It is an inter-service, interdisciplinary curriculum, 
sponsored by USSOCCOM. It was initiated under 
close scrutiny from USCINCSOC himself, and is 
very popular with student sponsors. A similar pro-
gram is under development for Navy combat offi-
cers and international students. Students also have 
increasing opportunities to complete Professional 
Military education Phase One during their standard 
NPS tour, from on-site Naval War College instruc-
tors. Finally, NPS is working with Navy sponsors 
and operational forces to provide distance learning, 
including both traditional NPS degree courses and 
graduate-level short courses.6
Graham’s model for Navy graduate education em-
phasizes general educational skills, including in-
stitutional cultural innovation (“better business 
practices” and the basics of acquisition), the art of 
diplomacy and debate, computer literacy, culture 
and languages.7 This model represents a deviation 
from SECNAV Instruction 1524.2A. Distinguish-
ing between these two educational models raises 
two questions: which is the appropriate objective 
for Navy-funded graduate education and what is the 
most cost-effective way to provide that education? 
The first question should be answered by comparing 
the costs and benefits of the alternative educational 
objectives; the second question should be answered 
by comparing the cost-effectiveness of alternative 
delivery modes. The answers to these questions are 
interrelated. The delivery mode depends on the edu-
cational objectives.
COMPARING ThE COSTS AND BENEfITS 
Of SUB-SPECIALTy DRIVEN VERSUS 
GENERAL GRADUATE EDUCATION
NPS, like Graham, believes that benefits of subspe-
cialty-based curricula are not measured by utiliza-
tion rates in appropriately coded billets. Education 
benefits are recouped throughout the service mem-
ber’s career. Furthermore, P-code designated billets 
are primarily shore-duty billets. However, opera-
tional tours benefit from subspecialty-based educa-
tion. Ships benefit from officers educated in elec-
tronics, combat systems, information technology, 
financial management, etc.; airwings or squadrons 
benefit from officers educated in aeronautics and 
astronautics, mechanical engineering, etc. Thus, P-
code utilization rates only capture a portion of the 
relevant jobs that officers fill.
If utilization rates in appropriately coded pay-back 
billets do not measure the benefits of subspecialty 
based graduate education, how can we measure 
these benefits? These benefits are reflected by the 
added value subspecialty trained students bring to 
their future DoN assignments, compared to their 
more generally educated colleagues. In some cases, 
added value is reflected in lower on-the-job-training 
requirements, better familiarity with required DoN/
DoD policies and procedures, or knowledge about 
unique military software or databases. In other 
cases, added value may be reflected in specialized 
technical knowledge essential for DoN or DoD but 
not available through civilian-sector universities. 
Examples include underwater acoustics and infor-
mation warfare, as well as military specific topics in 
meteorology, oceanography, aeronautical engineer-
ing, mechanical engineering, etc.
Cost-benefit analysis of subspecialty-based curricula 
should measure the costs and benefits of increasing-
6  This is consistent with SECNAV Instruction l2524.2A, which states: “The objectives of graduate education at the NPS are to prepare 
officers to fill subspecialty positions … Graduate degree and non-degree (short courses) programs in technical and nontechnical fields 
shall be established by the Superintendent of the NPS in response to Navy and Marine Corps requirements.”
7  See also Cavalluzzo and Cymrot (1998) pp. 5-6,63,72-73.
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ly specialized curricula. DoN may fmd that certain 
subject areas or communities (e.g., Restricted Line 
versus Unrestricted Line) are better served by sub-
specialty education, while others are better served 
by general education. Considering DoN’s size and 
diversity, one set of educational objectives is unlike-
ly to satisfy all service members in all communities 
for both shore and sea assignments. Graham con-
cludes that NPS’ specialized curricula unacceptably 
increase NPS’ education costs. However, she never 
analyzed either the costs or benefits of subspecialty 
based curricula.8 Such an analysis would be an ap-
propriate starting point.
COST EffECTIVENESS IN DoN fUNDED 
GRADUATE EDUCATION
In her cost analysis, Graham compares NPS’ average 
annual cost per student to tuition costs at civilian 
institutions. However, this cost comparison is large-
ly irrelevant. Cost-effectiveness analysis must first 
consider educational objectives. If DoN validates 
subspecialty-based curricula, the relevant alterna-
tives include NPS, outsourcing and privatization. If 
DoN adopts a general education model, the relevant 
alternatives include a restructured NPS and tuition 
payment to civilian institutions.9
Sub-Specialty Based Graduate Education: NPS, 
Outsourcing and Privatization
To consider outsourcing or privatization, private 
sector producers must improve performance or 
reduce costs, resulting in better value to the gov-
ernment. OMB Circular A-76 provides detailed 
instructions concerning cost comparisons between 
government and commercial producers. These in-
structions emphasize the need to normalize for dif-
ferences in outputs when comparing costs (Execu-
tive Office of the President, Office ofManagement 
and Budget (OMB), Circular A-76).
In comparing NPS’ costs to the price civilian uni-
versities would charge for outsourcing or privatizing 
subspecialty-based graduate education, tuition rates 
are largely irrelevant. Endowments and state/local tax 
financing subsidize civilian tuition. Civilian universi-
ties would likely view an outsourcing or privatization 
proposal as a business opportunity that they would 
enter if profitable. It is unreasonable to believe that 
civilian universities have excess endowment funds or 
tax financing to subsidize DoN graduate education.10 
Thus, the appropriate comparison involves total edu-
cation costs at both NPS and civilian universities, 
given a standardized educational offering.
Unfortunately, there are critical differences between 
NPS and civilian universities. NPS’ unique benefits 
have been described in detail elsewhere (Gates, et 
al., 1998). These benefits include:
	 •	 	Military	relevant	graduate	education	that	sat-
isfies dual general education and subspecialty 
requirements
	 •	 	Institution	devoted	to	graduate	education	(in-
struction by regular faculty; no teaching as-
sistants)
	 •	 	Atypical	calendar	and	scheduling	with	heavi-
er than normal class loads and full throttle 
operations 48 weeks per year
	 •	 	Quarterly	 admissions	 with	 demand	 driven	
course scheduling (courses scheduled to 
guarantee on-time graduation as opposed to 
minimum class size requirements)
	 •	 	Admissions	policy	 emphasizing	military	po-
tential rather than academic achievement
	 •	 	Refresher	 and	 transitional	 courses	 to	 trans-
form mid-career adult learners to new aca-
demic fields, as required by the military’s pol-
icy against mid-career accessions in needed 
skill areas
	 •	 	Thesis	required	in	all	degree	programs,	which	
increases relative intensity of faculty use
	 •	 	Military	 infrastructure	 superimposed	 on	
top of traditional academic infrastructure to 
maintain professional and military aspects of 
officer-student careers
	 •	 	Infrastructure	 to	 support	 classified	 courses,	
laboratories and student/faculty research
All of these unique attributes increase NPS’ average 
annual education costs per student relative to the 
standard civilian-sector model. Furthermore, edu-
cational costs are only a portion of DoN’s total grad-
8  Graham reports average annual cost per NPS student, not the cost impact of increasing sub-specialization. The same criticism applies 
to Cavalluzzo and Cymrot (1998).
9  Of course, these alternatives are not equivalent substitutes. Restructuring NPS into fewer, broader curricula would increase the 
emphasis on general education while retaining some focus on DoN and DoD-specific issues. Sending students to existing civilian 
programs would lose all focus on DoN and DoD issues unless civilian programs were augmented by Navy-funded supplementary 
material. This would require funding beyond tuition expenses.
10  Graham suggests that civilian universities might be anxious to share their endowments with DoN. She states, “High quality educa-
tional institutions normally have large endowments that could be of great benefit in maintaining and improving the physical and 
educational infrastructure at NPS.” This is only possible if civilian universities enter outsourcing or privatization agreements out of a 
sense of public service, not as business opportunities.
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uate education costs; DoN pays the students’ full 
salary and benefits while they attend in-residence 
graduate programs. These costs can be significant 
relative to educational costs. Salary and benefits are 
important to consider if graduate programs differ in 
duration. As discussed below, this represents an im-
portant difference between NPS and civilian univer-
sities. The most critical adjustments include:11
  Academic Calendar and Course Schedul-
ing The Navy wants every day of graduate ed-
ucation to count because an officer’s time away 
from the fleet is precious. Thus, the typical NPS 
student receives 16 hours of instruction per week 
and attends class 48 weeks per year. This totals 
768 hours of instruction per year. In contrast, 
civilian-sector graduate students typically receive 
approximately 486 hours of instruction per year 
if they attend summer classes (when course offer-
ings are typically limited).12
  Dual General Academic and Sub-Specialty 
Educational Requirements This analysis uses 
class hours as a proxy for course content. While 
class hours are an input to the education pro-
cess, they can be used as a proxy for education 
as long as NPS and civilian faculty and students 
deliver and absorb material at the same rate. The 
average NPS graduate degree program requires 
18 months and involves 1152 hours of class in-
struction;13 civilian universities would require 28 
months to deliver an equivalent course content.14
  Focus on Graduate Education Graduate edu-
cation is more expensive than undergraduate 
education. Larger undergraduate class size and 
instruction by graduate teaching assistants are at 
least two reasons to expect this cost difference. 
Graduate instruction and research also require 
more expensive equipment and specialized lab-
oratories, especially if students are required to 
complete a Master’s thesis. This is particularly 
significant for technical graduate programs. One 
analysis found that graduate education in Wash-
ington, Florida and Illinois was two to three 
times as expensive as undergraduate education.15 
This analysis adjusts civilian university costs, as-
suming that graduate programs are twice as ex-
pensive as undergraduate programs.
  Student Salaries and Benefits If NPS and ci-
vilian programs are of different duration (e.g., 18 
versus 28 months as indicated above), any cost 
comparison must include the students’ salaries 
and benefits. This is a significant portion of the 
total cost of graduate education for DoN officers. 
The DoN Director, Assessment Division (N81) 
estimated that the annual cost of salary, ben-
efits, and housing (referred to as MPN costs) per 
NPS-resident officer equaled $63,300, compared 
to $72,300 per officer-student at civilian institu-
tions.16 The higher civilian MPN cost reflects that 
NPS officers predominantly live in base housing.
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
(IPEDS) cost data, reported by Cavalluzzo and 
Cymrot (1998), were modified to normalize for the 
effects of NPS’ unique academic calendar and course 
scheduling, dual general education and subspecialty 
academic requirements, focus on graduate educa-
tion and student salary and benefit considerations. 
After making these adjustments, the present value 
of civilian graduate educational costs per degree 
student range from $570,500 (California Institute 
of Technology) to $208,400 (University of Texas at 
Austin). The average for the 28 civilian universities 
considered is $268,300. NPS’ graduate education 
costs are $207,200, lower than all civilian institu-
tions considered. Student salaries and benefits ac-
count for anywhere between 25% and 70% of the 
totals, and average 53%.
These results indicate that NPS is cost competitive 
with civilian universities after normalizing for NPS’ 
11  For a more complete discussion see Gates, et al. (1998), pp. 11-22.
12  NPS’ heavier class load makes sense because the Navy pays these students full salary and benefits. They do not need outside jobs to 
feed their families.
13  Cavalluzzo and Cymrot, 1998. Alternatively, NPS and civilian university costs could be scaled to a 972 class hour civilian graduate 
program. Relative NPS and civilian costs are the same in either case; only the scale differs.
14  Graham incorrectly asserts that NPS’ dual educational requirements increase degree program length at NPS relative to civilian uni-
versities. In actuality, NPS’ more intensive academic calendar allows NPS to satisfy dual education requirements without extending 
the graduate program length. Transitional and refresher courses have a greater impact on program length. These classes reflect Navy 
policy allowing students to enter NPS in fields outside their undergraduate major. This flexibility is essential considering the Navy’s 
closed-pipe personnel system that precludes mid-career accessions in areas of Navy need.
15  Peter D. Syverson and Moira J. Maguire, “Estimating Institutional Costs of Graduate Education: Reports from Three States Demon-
strate Promise, Pitfalls of Cost Studies,” Council of Graduate Schools, 1997.
16  “Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments),” Ser N8 I/3U639949, 
29 March 1993).
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unique academic calendar and course scheduling, 
dual general education and subspecialty academic 
requirements, focus on graduate education, and stu-
dent salary and benefit considerations. If the Navy 
retains its subspecialty-based degree program, it 
is unlikely to reduce the total costs of in-residence 
graduate education by outsourcing or privatization. 
NPS would look even more favorable in the cost 
comparison after adjusting for other cost-related 
unique attributes.17
This result is counter to the prior implications com-
paring average annual costs per student. The pri-
mary explanation for this seeming contradiction 
involves NPS student workloads relative to typical 
civilian graduate programs. As explained above, stu-
dent workloads are higher at NPS than at civilian 
graduate programs, both in terms of hours per week 
and weeks per year. Higher student workloads use 
faculty more intensively. This increases the average 
annual cost per student, but reduces the program’s 
length for a standardized degree program. Compar-
ing graduate education costs for a standardized 
graduate program (e.g., 1152 course hours) normal-
izes across program content. Incorporating student 
salary and benefits captures the most significant im-
pact of higher student workloads; students return 
to the fleet more quickly. This reduces DoN’s total 
degree program costs. Average annual costs per stu-
dent don’t capture the benefits of shorter program 
duration; they only capture the adverse cost implica-
tions of using faculty more intensively.
General Graduate Education: Restructuring NPS 
and Paying Tuition at Civilian Institutions
Graham compares NPS’ current costs to tuition 
costs at civilian institutions.18 However, this com-
parison is meaningless, even if DoN adopts a gen-
eral education objective. NPS’ current costs reflect 
subspecialty-based graduate education. For compa-
rability with civilian institutions, DoN would first 
have to redefme a general NPS curriculum struc-
ture. This is beyond this paper’s scope, but we will 
offer some observations.
On the surface, cost-effectiveness at NPS is unlikely 
to compare favorably with tuition costs at civilian 
institutions. Tuition only covers a portion of edu-
cational costs at civilian universities.19 Endowments 
and tax financing fund the balance. The Navy must 
pay all educational costs at NPS. Thus, civilian uni-
versities have a seemingly overwhelming inherent 
cost-effectiveness advantage.
However, a dedicated Navy graduate institution of-
fers several advantages, which help offset the cost 
subsidization, including operations tempo, admis-
sions timing and admissions policies. Most impor-
tantly, NPS students receive more instruction per 
year than their civilian university counterparts. As 
explained above, NPS can deliver comparable mate-
rial in a shorter period. This returns students to the 
fleet more quickly and reduces the associated stu-
dent salary and benefit costs by up to 40%. The ben-
efits of a higher operations tempo can swamp edu-
cation cost differences. Furthermore, NPS admits 
students quarterly. This minimizes the time students 
may be stashed while waiting to begin school and 
decreases the number of students precluded from 
attending in-residence graduate programs because 
of timing.
Finally, NPS admits students based on military rel-
evant admissions requirements; civilian universities 
consider undergraduate academic records, scores 
on the Graduate Record Exam (GRE) and, in some 
cases, relevant professional experience. Further-
more, civilian admissions committees balance de-
mographic characteristics of their incoming classes, 
and the prestigious programs often suggested as 
alternatives to NPS are not currently under-sub-
scribed by civilian students. Thus, civilian programs 
would likely limit admissions to one or two of the 
most qualified Navy students. This creates problems 
if the Navy seeks quality civilian education for large 
numbers of service members. Of course, marginal 
schools that struggle to maintain enrollment would 
welcome large groups of Navy students willing to 
pay full tuition, but Navy leadership should careful-
ly consider the resulting tradeoff between cost and 
educational quality.
CONCLUSIONS
Janet Graham provides one perspective on Navy-
funded graduate education. She maintains that 
subspecialty-based graduate education is outmoded 
and not valued by Navy leadership. She suggests that 
DoN officers are better served by a general gradu-
ate education that emphasizes entrepreneurial skills, 
17  For example, quarterly inputs and class scheduling to ensure on-time graduation reduce class size; maintaining a military infrastruc-
ture increases administrative costs and the thesis requirement increases faculty costs.
18  Cavalluzzo and Cymrot (1999) also made this comparison.
19  Tuition covers between 13% and 73% of educational expenditures in the civilian university sample described above. Cavalluzzo and 
Cymrot (1998), p. 69.
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public speaking, debate and better business practic-
es. Graham further suggests that it is more cost-ef-
fective to meet these educational objectives by either 
privatizing or outsourcing NPS or giving officers ed-
ucational vouchers to attend the civilian institutions 
of their choice. This depiction redefines the objec-
tives for Navy-funded graduate education, confuses 
the link between delivery modes and educational 
outcomes, and bases cost-effectiveness conclusions 
on cost analysis that doesn’t standardize across alter-
natives and ignores the cost of student salaries and 
benefits. Graham’s solutions redefine educational 
objectives on the basis of flawed analysis.
DoN’s objectives for NPS graduate education are 
well articulated in U.S. law, SECNAV Instruction, 
and the CNO’s and NPS’ vision statements: provide 
technical, analytical graduate education in a variety 
of subspecialty areas not available in civilian univer-
sities. NPS provides this education using DoN rel-
evant operations tempo, admissions criteria, course 
scheduling and course content. As appropriate, NPS 
quickly adapts curricula to the sponsor’s changing 
preferences. NPS’ curricula are well-received and 
highly valued by their Navy curriculum sponsors. 
While many civilian institutions offer graduate edu-
cation, none provide graduate education with the 
Navy-unique characteristics that NPS offers.
Graham’s article highlights the importance of clearly 
defming DoN’s educational objectives, identifying 
the feasible delivery modes to meet those objectives 
and comparing the cost-effectiveness of alternative 
means to provide a standardized degree program. 
Unfortunately, Graham’s analysis fails to satisfy 
these requirements. In actuality, NPS meets its cur-
rently defined educational objectives and is cost-ef-
fective after standardizing for program content. This 
cost-effectiveness reflects NPS’ more intensive stu-
dent and faculty workloads, factors ignored in most 
existing cost analyses. Recent curriculum modi-
fications also illustrate the value of retaining NPS’ 
responsiveness and flexibility, an attribute civilian 
universities cannot even contemplate.
As technology becomes increasingly important to 
maintaining military superiority, it is increasingly 
important for officers to receive tailored technical 
graduate education such as that provided by NPS. It 
is inappropriate to redefine DoN’s graduate educa-
tion objectives based on Graham’s flawed analysis. 
Considering DoN’s and DoD’s increasing techno-
logical sophistication, more students should benefit 
from military-focused technical graduate education, 
not fewer. Graham’s analysis does not objectively 
and rigorously demonstrate that DoN should close, 
privatize or outsource NPS.
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Commercialization in the Department of the  
Navy — Panacea or Hyperbole
The Case Against Commercializing the Naval Postgraduate School
William r. GateS and John e. mutty 
Resources have become increasingly constrained 
within the Department of Defense (DoD) and the 
Department of the Navy (DoN), but worldwide na-
tional security commitments and operating tempo 
have not decreased accordingly. Under the inevi-
table budgetary pressure, it is natural to search for 
ways to reduce defense costs and improve efficiency. 
As in the private sector, DoD and DoN have re-
cently re-emphasized outsourcing and privatization 
to both reduce costs and focus attention on core 
business functions. Competition for government 
business encourages effective operations and cost 
efficiencies, whether the function is contracted out 
to a commercial provider or retained in-house. This 
article illustrates some of the factors that should be 
considered when identifying potential candidates 
for commercialization. We will discuss DoD’s and 
DoN’s commercial activities initiative, using sugges-
tions to outsource or privatize the Naval Postgradu-
ate School (NPS) as an illustration. In particular, 
we will describe the commercialization process and 
identify the types of activities most likely to gener-
ate significant cost savings. Drawing on this back-
ground, we will provide a preliminary NPS com-
mercialization study and cost analysis.
NPS primarily provides in-residence graduate edu-
cation for Department of Navy students (Navy and 
Marine Corps) as well as for students from other 
services, civilian government employees and inter-
national officers from over 60 foreign countries. Sug-
gestions for improving efficiency in DoN- funded 
graduate education include privatizing or outsourc-
ing NPS, providing education vouchers redeemable 
at the student’s choice of school, and sending stu-
dents to existing programs in civilian universities.
This article concludes that DoN is not likely to cap-
ture any cost savings by outsourcing or privatizing 
NPS’ graduate education mission.1 The character-
istics of graduate education, as currently defined at 
NPS, are not conducive to outsourcing or privatiza-
tion, and cost comparisons indicate that NPS is cost 
competitive with its private sector counterparts. The 
analysis also indicates that NPS is cost competitive 
with tuition costs at civilian universities, after con-
sidering all relevant costs of in-residence graduate 
education. Because cost growth in higher educa-
tion has far outstripped the Consumer Price Index 
for the last two decades,2 it is logical to assume that 
NPS’ current cost competitiveness will become even 
more favorable in the future. As with any govern-
ment activity, budgetary constraints at NPS such as 
Congressionally imposed caps on pay raises, restrict 
the growth of expenditures. To remain competitive, 
the private sector often is required to offer salaries 
and benefit increases that exceed government levels. 
The effect can make privatization and outsourcing 
decisions much less attractive for the long-term.
ThE CASE fOR CONTRACTING OUT 
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES3
Commercialization has the potential to reduce gov-
ernment costs and improve efficiency by exploit-
1  This conclusion is consistent with the results of an independent study by Booze, Allen and Hamilton: “NPS Outsourcing In-Place,” 
unpublished presentation, March 2000.
2  Digest of Educational Statistics, 1999, Table 38; National Center for Educational Statistics, September 1999
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ing private-sector advantages. These advantages 
include labor market efficiencies and scale econo-
mies.4 Compared to the public sector, private sector 
managers have greater flexibility in designing labor 
policies, including compensation and incentives, ac-
countability and capital-labor tradeoffs. Private sec-
tor firms can also capture scale economies unavail-
able to public sector producers when a large supplier 
provides a service to multiple customers. Labor 
market efficiencies and scale economies give private 
sector providers an inherent advantage in activities 
where these factors are significant cost drivers. 
While labor efficiencies and scale economies explain 
private sector advantages, competition is considered 
the key for the government to capture these benefits. 
Competition forces both public and private sector 
providers to identify sources of efficiency and share 
the benefits with the government. In fact, experi-
ence indicates that government costs decrease after 
conducting a competitive commercialization study, 
whether the activity is contracted out or retained 
in-house. Estimates vary, but several studies report 
costs reductions of up to 35% for private-sector 
“wins” and 20% for in-house “wins.” The private sec-
tor wins 55-60% of the competitions; in-house gov-
ernment providers win the remainder.5
Unfortunately, these promising potential results 
have at least two counter arguments: commercial-
ization studies involve significant costs and there is 
debate concerning the validity of DoD’s cost savings 
estimates. First and foremost, the commercialization 
process, described in greater detail below, can be 
costly and lengthy (one to two years or more). Dur-
ing and after this process, morale can suffer among 
employees facing impending job risks; low morale 
can also spread from at-risk employees to their co-
workers. Finally, efficiency may suffer if managers 
take short run actions that might help ease potential 
future transition problems (e.g., billet stockpiling).6
In addition, The U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) concludes that DoD’s cost savings estimates 
are based on cost studies, not actual savings com-
paring pre- and post-competition operating costs. 
These estimates use cost models rather than the 
detailed estimates prepared by the installations con-
sidering commercialization. Furthermore, DoD’s 
cost estimates do not include the inevitable con-
tract modifications or cost increases occurring after 
implementing the commercialization plan. Finally, 
GAO cautions that DoD’s estimates may not reflect 
all the costs associated with the commercialization 
process, including the costs of completing the com-
mercialization studies themselves. Others suggest 
that DoD may underestimate the labor-related costs 
of switching from in-house to private sector produc-
ers. As such, there is reason to question the accuracy 
of DoD’s savings estimates.7
Thus, commercialization studies can generate sig-
nificant benefits, but they are costly and disrup-
tive. As a result, commercialization studies should 
be directed at activities with the greatest potential 
for significant net savings. This includes activities 
where labor efficiencies and scale economies of-
fer the greatest potential to reduce costs. Equally as 
important, these activities should be provided by a 
competitive private sector market to ensure that cost 
reductions translate into government cost savings. 
Finally, there should be evidence that in-house gov-
ernment costs exceed private sector costs for similar 
products or services. As the President’s Commission 
on Privatization observes:
  Contracting is likely to be most successful where 
the terms and measurements of service delivery are 
clear and easily defined, where at least several firms 
have the capacity to perform the contract, where 
the contractor does not have to make large new 
capital expenditures, and where the contract can 
be subject to renewal and renegotiation regularly.8
3  In this discussion, commercialization includes both outsourcing and privatization. The primary distinction between outsourcing and 
privatization involves ownership of the relevant capital assets. With outsourcing, the government shifts responsibility for a commer-
cial activity from in-house to private-sector providers, but retains ownership over the associated capital assets. With privatization, 
the government also divests itself of the capital assets. (See Defense Acquisition Deskbook, Version 3.2, Department of Defense, Joint 
Program Office, January 2000.) This distinction, important in practice, is largely irrelevant to this discussion. 
4  Robbert, Albert A., Susan M. Gates and Marc N. Elliot, “Outsourcing of DoD Commercial Activities: Impacts on Civil Service Em-
ployees,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997, pp. 11-12.
5  Office of Management and Budget, “Enhancing Governmental Productivity Through Competition” August 1988 and March 1984; 
Marcus, Alan, “Analysis of the Navy’s Commercial Activities Program,” Research Memorandum 92-226, Alexandria, VA: Center for 
Naval Analysis, July 1993.
6  U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), “OMB Circular A-76: DoD’s Reported Savings Figures Are Incomplete and Inaccurate,” GAO/
GGD-90-58, March 1990; Robbert, et al., 1997; Tighe, Carla E., et al., “Case Studies in DoD Outsourcing,” CAB 96-62, Alexandria, VA: 
Center for Naval Analyses, January 1997,
7  GAO, 1990; Robbert, et al., 1997.
8  Linowes, David F., Chairman, Privatization: Toward More effective government, Report of the President’s Commission on Privatiza-
tion, March 1988.
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COMMERCIALIzATION GUIDELINES
General guidance for government commercializa-
tion studies is codified in U.S. law (Title 10 U.S.C., 
sections 2461-2471). OMB Circular A-76 provides 
detailed instructions for comparing in-house gov-
ernment and commercial producers (Executive 
Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), Circular A-76, Revised Supplemen-
tal Handbook, March 1996). Dating back to 1955, 
OMB A-76 is designed to: “(I) balance the interests 
of the parties to a make or buy decision, (2) provide 
a level playing field between public and private offer-
ors to a competition, and (3) encourage competition 
and choice in the management and performance of 
commercial activities.” (OMB Circular A-76, p. iii)8
The specific steps in the OMB A-76 commercializa-
tion study process include:
	 •	 	Develop	 a	 performance	 work	 statement	
(PWS) that clearly defines the product or ser-
vice required without specifying the way in 
which the product or service is produced
	 •	 	Develop	 an	 in-house	 government	most	 effi-
cient organization (MEO) to satisfy the PWS
	 •	 	Estimate	the	in-house	government	cost	to	sat-
isfy the PWS using the MEO
	 •	 	Solicit	cost	estimates	to	satisfy	the	PWS	from	
potential private sector contractors
	 •	 	Estimate	 the	 costs	 of	 contract	 performance,	
including the contract price, contract admin-
istration costs, adjustments for federal income 
tax benefits of the contract and one-time con-
version costs (e.g., labor transition assistance 
costs and severance pay)
	 •	 	Contract	 with	 the	 private	 sector	 contractor	
if the total costs of contract performance, 
including all one-time costs, are more than 
10-percent less than the in-house cost10
Following this guidance, we must begin assessing 
the prospects for commercializing NPS by identi-
fying the mission and objectives (PWS) of a Navy-
funded graduate school, and the particular role 
played by NPS relative to other Navy-funded gradu-
ate education. After establishing the PWS, we will 
then conduct a preliminary cost analysis that com-
pares in-house NPS and private sector university 
costs to satisfy NPS’ PWS. In this analysis, we will 
assume that NPS has already adopted its MEO. Sim-
ilarly, we will assume that competition has forced 
private sector universities to evolve to their MEO. 
This preliminary analysis will not consider contract 
administration costs, tax implications or one-time 
conversion costs.
PERfORMANCE wORK STATEMENT
There are at least two competing notions of the ap-
propriate NPS graduate education model and PWS. 
The PWS could either emphasize subspecialty-based 
technical curricula or general graduate education, 
with some technical content.11 NPS currently gro-
vides subspecialty-based curricula; some authors 
have proposed a more general graduate curriculum.12
NPS currently offers curricula satisfying 45 sub-
specialty requirements. The sub-specialties include 
both technical and non-technical fields. While many 
of these fields appear to have civilian counterparts, 
NPS curricula are uniquely tailored to Navy-specific 
requirements. Each degree program satisfies general 
civilian degree requirements and DoN subspecialty 
requirements. The general education component 
ensures that NPS remains accredited by the appro-
priate civilian accreditation committees. Subspecial-
ty courses ensure that graduates are fully qualified 
for the relevant DoN and DoD subspecialty jobs. 
Biennial curriculum reviews by Navy flag-level cur-
riculum sponsors ensure NPS programs remain re-
sponsive to DoN and DoD requirements.13
For example, both NPS and civilian universities of-
fer programs in Contract Management and Man-
power Systems Analysis. However, the NPS cur-
ricula include both the general material covered in 
civilian universities and DoN and DoD-specific is-
9  See also OMB, 1988 and OMB, 1984.
10  OMB A-76; see also Robber!, et al., 1997, pp. 15-17.
11  Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr. (Retired) and William R. Gates, “The Naval Postgraduate School: It’s About Value,” Naval Institute 
Proceedings, August 2000.
12  Linda C. Cavalluzzo and Donald J. Cymrot, “A Bottoms-Up Assessment ofNavy Flagship Schools,” CRM 97-24, Center for Naval 
Analyses, January 1998; Janice M. Graham, “Rethinking Graduate Education in the Navy and the Naval Postgraduate School,” Naval 
Institute Proceedings, July 2000.
13  In response to evolving Navy needs, NPS has recently initiated new graduate programs in Information, Systems and Operations; 
Systems Engineering and Integration; an interservice, interdisciplinary curriculum for special warfare officers; and a cooperative 
program with MIT focusing on product development. Students are also increasingly completing phase one of professional military 
education during their standard NPS tour through on-site classes from Naval War College instructors. Finally, NPS is working to 
increase its distance learning offerings.
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sues. Contract Management includes DoN and DoD 
specific contracting policies, requirements and case 
studies; Manpower Systems Analysis addresses the 
software, databases and analytical techniques pecu-
liar to military manpower analysis. Similar examples 
characterize every technical and non-technical de-
gree program that NPS offers. This DoN and DoD-
specific material allows graduates to integrate more 
quickly into follow-on job assignments.
An alternative model for Navy graduate education 
emphasizes general educational skills. Proponents 
of this model emphasize that general graduate edu-
cation prepares students to address a range of issues 
and problems in various career stages.14 One sugges-
tion would consolidate curricula into five general 
fields that provide some specialty area knowledge, 
but also emphasize institutional cultural innovation 
(“better business practices” and the basics of acqui-
sition), the art of diplomacy and debate, computer 
literacy, culture and languages. More extreme sug-
gestions would pay tuition to send NPS students to 
civilian universities or provide students with educa-
tion vouchers to attend the school of their choice.15 
The PWS depends critically on the educational ob-
jectives specified for NPS.
In actuality, NPS’ subspecialty based educational 
objectives are specified in U.S. law (Title 10 U.S.C., 
Section 7041-7047) and Secretary ofthe Navy In-
struction (SECNAV Instruction 1524.2A, April 4, 
1989). Specifically, Title 10 U.S.C. establishes NPS 
and the SECNAV Instruction defines NPS’ academ-
ic purpose. SECNAV Instruction 1524.2A describes 
NPS’ mission and objectives as follows:
  Rationale for NPS The NPS exists for the sole 
purpose of increasing the combat-effectiveness of 
the Navy and Marine Corps. It accomplishes this 
by providing post-baccalaureate degree and non-
degree programs in a variety of subspecialty areas 
not available through other educational institu-
tions.
  General Program Guidance The NPS shall 
strive to benefit the Naval Services through the 
education of Navy and Marine Corps officers. 
NPS programs must provide officers the latest 
technological knowledge relevant to their future 
duty assignments as well as an appreciation of the 
fundamentals of maritime strategy and concepts 
of naval warfare.
  Academic Curricula The objectives of gradu-
ate education at the NPS are to prepare officers to 
fill subspecialty positions.
This analysis initially assumes that the relevant law 
and instruction remain in force. The PWS developed 
here will reflect subspecialty-based graduate educa-
tion. With this PWS, the relevant alternatives to 
NPS include outsourcing and privatization. Enroll-
ing students in existing civilian graduate programs 
will not satisfy a subspecialty based PWS. As a re-
sult, educational vouchers and tuition costs to send 
students to civilian universities are irrelevant for this 
discussion. These alternatives will be addressed in 
the context of a general education PWS and educa-
tional objectives.
DoN Subspecialty Graduate Education Perfor-
mance Work Statement
A subspecialty-based graduate education program 
provides students with the technical and analytical 
skills required in certain specifically identified and 
coded billets. A PWS that reflects NPS’ current op-
erations would include the following activities:16
	 •	 	Military	relevant	graduate	education	that	satis-
fies dual general education and subspecialty re-
quirements and projected billet requirements
	 •	 	Programs	 subject	 to	biennial	Navy	flag-level	
curriculum sponsor review for military rele-
vancy with the capability to swiftly implement 
desired course and program changes
	 •	 	Institution	 devoted	 to	 graduate	 education	
(instruction by regular faculty; no teaching 
assistants)
	 •	 	Atypical	calendar	and	scheduling	with	heavi-
er than normal class loads and full throttle 
operations 48 weeks per year
	 •	 	Quarterly	 admissions	 with	 demand-driven	
course scheduling (courses scheduled to 
guarantee on-time graduation as opposed to 
minimum class size requirements)
	 •	 	Admissions	policy	controlled	by	military	per-
formance instead of undergraduate grade-
point average and standardized testing (e.g., 
GRE scores)
	 •	 	Refresher	courses	to	allow	students	to	renew	
academic skills after several years of on-the-
job performance
14  Cavalluzzo and Cymrot (1998), pp. 63, 72-73.
15  Graham (2000). See also Cavalluzzo and Cymrot (1998) pp. 5-6.
16  These	attributes	are	discussed	in	detail	in	Gates,	W.R.,	X.K.	Maruyama,	J.P.	Powers,	R.E.	Rosenthal,	and	A.W.M.	Cooper,	“A	Bottom-
Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools: The NPS Faculty Critique ofCNA’s Report,” NPSFC- 98-001, Monterey, CA: Naval Post-
graduate School, November, 1998; and Mauz and Gates, 2000.
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	 •	 	Transitional	courses	to	transform	mid-career	
adult learners to new academic fields, as re-
quired by the military’s policy against mid-
career accessions in needed skill areas (e.g., 
Astronaut Winston Scott transitioned from 
an undergraduate music major to a MS in 
aeronautical engineering)
	 •	 	Thesis	 required	 in	 all	 degree	 programs	 (in-
creases relative intensity of faculty use)
	 •	 	Military	 infrastructure	 superimposed	 on	
top of traditional academic infrastructure to 
maintain professional and military aspects of 
officer-student careers
	 •	 	Infrastructure	 to	 support	 classified	 courses,	
laboratories and student/faculty research
	 •	 	Faculty	 and	 students	 participating	 in	 reim-
bursable research projects on issues of inter-
est to sponsoring (funding) agencies from the 
DoN and throughout the U.S. govemment17
	 •	 	A	 student	 body	 combining	 junior	 officers	
from the Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air 
Force, National Guard, civilian defense agen-
cies and over 60 foreign countries (45 coun-
tries onboard in August 2000) to explore tech-
nical, operational and strategic problems.
This PWS integrates students, faculty and sponsors 
(curriculum and research) to produce an unparal-
leled mix of attributes that is not available in civilian 
graduate programs. If DoN wants to commercialize 
these attributes using civilian universities, it would 
have to establish Navy unique programs under civil-
ian control. The winning contractor would need to 
make a significant investment in developing the re-
quired curricula, courses and faculty expertise.18 This 
has two implications. The initial investment limits the 
scope for competition after awarding the initial con-
tract. Furthermore, Navy leadership directly controls 
these performance attributes within NPS; they would 
be contractually controlled in civilian universities.
COST-EffECTIVENESS IN DoN-fUNDED 
SUBSPECIALTy GRADUATE EDUCATION
Cavalluzzo and Cymrot (1998, pp. 64-71) provide 
data on annual educational costs for NPS and 28 
civilian universities offering graduate engineering 
degrees.19 These costs can be used to conduct a pre-
liminary cost comparison between private sector 
and in-house government (NPS) production. This 
analysis assumes that NPS and civilian universities 
have adopted their MOE, as required by OMB-A 
76. This analysis also ignores contract administra-
tion costs, tax implications and one-time conversion 
costs (including labor transition costs, and the civil-
ian university’s investment to develop Navy unique 
curriculum, courses and faculty expertise).
In comparing NPS’ s costs to the price civilian uni-
versities would charge for outsourcing or privatiz-
ing subspecialty-based graduate education, civilian 
tuition rates are largely irrelevant. Endowments and 
state/local tax financing subsidize civilian tuition. 
In fact, 76.1% of all postbaccalaureate full-time stu-
dents received financial aid in the 1995-96 academic 
year.20 Civilian universities would likely view an 
outsourcing or privatization proposal as a business 
opportunity; they would enter such an agreement 
if profitable. Civilian universities don’t likely have 
excess endowment funds or tax financing to subsi-
dize DoN graduate education. Thus, the appropriate 
comparison involves the total cost to meet the PWS 
at both NPS and civilian universities. Later in this 
analysis, we will address the option of saving money 
by pursuing general education and simply paying 
tuition at civilian universities.
The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Sys-
tem (IPEDS) cost data for NPS reported by Caval-
luzzo and Cymrot reflects the PWS defined above. 
However, civilian university costs must be modified 
to account for differences between the PWS and 
standard civilian university programs.21 Three PWS 
requirements will be considered in this cost analy-
sis: academic calendar and course scheduling, dual 
general academic and subspecialty educational re-
quirements, and sole focus on graduate education.22 
Normalizing for the remaining PWS requirements 
would further increase costs at civilian universities, 
but estimating their impacts is beyond the scope of 
this preliminary analysis.
17  The NPS FYOO reimbursable research program included over 500 funded projects as of I June 2000.
18  Graham (2000) observes that “… there does not seem to be a part of any curricula that could not be taught by a civilian university 
if anyone were asked to structure and teach such a course for military students.” While this is true, it ignores the initial investment 
civilian universities would require to provide military unique course material and the other attributes NPS currently offers.
19  The costs reported here reflect data collected by the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). Research costs are 
reported as part of total educational costs in this database. This biases the cost analysis against schools with relatively high research 
budgets, but it does not significantly affect the conclusions drawn below.
20  Digest of Educational Statistics, 1999, Table 327; National Center for Educational Statistics, September 1999
21  Most past analyses comparing NPS and civilian universities, including both total educational and tuition costs, do not normalize 
NPS and civilian university costs to a common PWS. (Cavalluzzo and Cymrot, 1998; Graham, 2000)
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Furthermore, educational costs are only a portion 
of DoN’s total graduate education costs; DoN also 
pays the students’ full salary and benefits while they 
attend in-residence graduate programs. Salary and 
benefit costs can be significant relative to educa-
tional costs and are important to consider if gradu-
ate programs differ in duration. As discussed below, 
this represents an important difference between 
NPS and civilian universities.
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
(IPEDS) cost data were modified to normalize for 
the effects of NPS’ unique academic calendar and 
course scheduling, dual general education and sub-
specialty academic requirements, focus on graduate 
education and student salary and benefit consider-
ations.23 The most critical adjustments include:
  Academic Calendar and Course Schedul-
ing The typical NPS student attends class 16 
hours per week, 48 weeks per year (four 12-week 
quarters). This totals 768 hours of class instruc-
tion per year. In contrast, civilian-sector graduate 
students typically attend classes 13 hours per week 
for 32 weeks during the standard academic year 
(semester system), which equates to 416 hours. 
Some students attend classes seven hours per week 
for ten weeks during the summer. This totals 486 
hours of instruction per year for the typical civil-
ian-sector student attending summer classes.
  Dual General Academic and Sub-Specialty 
Educational Requirements This analysis uses 
class hours as a proxy for course content. While 
class hours are an input to the education process, 
they can be used as a proxy for education as long 
as the rate at which faculty deliver and students 
absorb material is consistent across institutions. 
There is no reason to believe that NPS faculty and 
students are less able to deliver and absorb mate-
rial than their civilian counterparts.
  Cavalluzzo and Cymrot (1998) found that the 
average NPS curriculum is 22.8 months: 4.8 
months for transitional and refresher courses 
and 18 months for graduate education. Only the 
18 months of graduate education are relevant to 
a comparative cost analysis. Transitional and re-
fresher courses reflect the Navy’s policy of pro-
viding graduate education to mid-career adult 
learners and allowing students to switch to new 
academic areas to fill Navy needs (as required be-
cause Navy practice prohibits mid-career acces-
sions to fill shortfalls). If the Navy adopted tra-
ditional civilian-sector admissions requirements, 
and only accepted qualified students, these 
courses could be eliminated from NPS’ curricu-
lum. If current NPS students were transferred to 
equivalent civilian-sector programs, these costs 
would be incurred at civilian universities.
  The average NPS graduate program involves 1152 
hours of class instruction; civilian universities 
would require 28 months to deliver an equivalent 
course content. If the typical civilian graduate 
programs covers two academic years, plus two 
summer terms (i.e., 24 months), they would in-
clude 972 hours of class instruction; NPS would 
require 15 months to deliver an equivalent course 
content. It is essential to normalize for program 
content before comparing NPS and civilian uni-
versity graduate degree costs. This analysis will 
estimate comparative costs for both the 1152 
class hour average NPS program and a hypotheti-
cal 972 class hour civilian graduate program.
  Class hour differences between NPS and civilian 
university curricula largely reflect NPS’ dual gen-
eral academic and subspecialty-based require-
ments. Both NPS and civilian program lengths 
differ across curricula. For example, the standard 
NPS MS in Management graduate curriculum 
includes 960 graduate class hours (15 months); 
the standard civilian two academic year MBA 
program (no summer session) involves 832 grad-
uate class hours. The 128 class hour difference 
between these two programs (representing two 
4-unit NPS courses) reflects the additional cost 
of NPS’ s dual degree requirements. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to analyze the costs and 
benefits of subspecialty versus general graduate 
education; this analysis simply normalizes across 
programs for cost comparison purposes, using 
both the average NPS curriculum and a hypo-
thetical two year civilian program.24
  Focus on Graduate Education It is gener-
ally acknowledged that graduate education is 
22  For more detail see Gates, et al., 1998.
23  For a more complete discussion see Gates, et al. ( 1998), pp. 11-22.
24  However, it is informative to recall that current NPS curricula complete two separate reviews. They are reviewed for military rel-
evancy during biannual flag-level curriculum reviews, where curriculum sponsors share DoN’s desire to quickly return officers to 
the fleet. They are also reviewed for academic competency by the relevant academic accreditation board(s) following the accredita-
tion cycle. These reviews help ensure that NPS curricula are academically rigorous, comprehensive and militarily relevant, but not 
wastefully expansive.
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more expensive than undergraduate education. 
Larger undergraduate class size and instruction 
by graduate teaching assistants are at least two 
reasons to expect this cost difference. Graduate 
instruction and research also require more ex-
pensive equipment and specialized laboratories, 
especially if students are required to complete a 
Master’s thesis. This is particularly significant for 
technical graduate programs. One analysis found 
that graduate education was two to three times as 
expensive as undergraduate education in studies 
conducted by Washington, Florida and Illinois.25
  The IPEDS data reported by Cavalluzzo and 
Cymrot (1998) combine undergraduate and 
graduate costs. The civilian universities include 
graduate populations that range from 15% to 66% 
of the total student body; the weighted-average 
graduate population is 35%. Only some of these 
civilian graduate students are in engineering and 
other equipment and laboratory-intensive pro-
grams. NPS is 100% graduate students, with a 
relatively high percentage of students in technical 
and engineering graduate programs. This analy-
sis adjusts civilian university costs, conservative-
ly assuming that graduate programs are twice as 
expensive as undergraduate programs.
  Student Salaries and Benefits As discussed 
above, the average NPS graduate program lasts 
18 months (excluding transitional and refresher 
courses). This translates into a 28 month civilian 
graduate program. If tenures differ at NPS and ci-
vilian programs, cost comparisons must include 
the students’ salaries and benefits. This is a sig-
nificant portion of the total cost of graduate edu-
cation for DoN officers. Using the Military Com-
posite Standard Pay Rates,26 the greater course 
length at a civilian university would equate to 
$75,840 more per degree for pay and allowances 
than at NPS (ten additional months at a $91,013 
annual military composite standard pay rate for 
salary and benefits, using the current NPS stu-
dents’ rank structure).27 Furthermore, approxi-
mately 58% of NPS students live in base housing, 
and support costs for Family Housing 
25  Peter D. Syverson and Moira J. Maguire, “Estimating Institutional Costs of Graduate Education: Reports from Three States Demon-
strate Promise, Pitfalls of Cost Studies,” Council of Graduate Schools, 1997.
26  Memorandum of June 30, 2000, OSD FY 2002/2003 Defense Budget Review Guidance, Attachment 6.
27  This student salary and benefit penalty falls to $68,260 per degree for a hypothetical 972 class hour civilian university graduate 
program.
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title  Talking Paper: Value of NPS
author CAPT Paul Shemella (Ret.) 
	 NPS	Internal	Document	•	March	2011
abstract  This paper focuses on the most important factors of the Naval Postgraduate 
School that distinguish it from other educational institutions and that justify 
keeping it functioning despite a “declining budget climate.” NPS’ quality edu-
cation, valuable research, and its unique curricula in training military officers 
are stressed.
excerpts  “No institution can do what NPS does as well as NPS does. The National De-
fense University comes closest, but it has limited capacity and shorter courses. 
Like the other war colleges, NDU’s role is teaching military officers how to 
develop joint strategy and operations; NPS’ role is to teach military officers 
how to think critically and holistically, producing an officer who can quickly 
understand a complex situation and collaborate with anyone to achieve a suc-
cessful outcome.”
  “NPS has human resources unmatched in the US government for teaching, 
targeted research, and constantly emerging specialized courses. The school is 
a large network, connected to many other networks. We are a ‘hot spot’ for 
creativity in defense and security issues, collaborating with smart people with 
the best ideas from our network of networks.”
  “NPS responds quickly to the needs of the Combatant Commands, Service 
headquarters, and other sponsors from across government. New courses and 
programs are created from nothing faster than anywhere else.”
  “NPS draws resources from myriad institutions, both public and private. For 
a relatively low fixed cost, this ‘intellectual gravitation’ brings in enormous 
amounts of money to produce officers with critical thinking and technical 
skills, as well as deliverable products for decision-makers.”
  “Measurable and anecdotal evidence indicates that NPS provides high-quality 
education, valuable research, responsive special programs, and very important 
capacity building in most of the world’s countries.”
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Talking Paper 
Value of NPS 
PURPOSE
To summarize the most important arguments for al-
lowing NPS to continue thriving in a declining bud-
get climate.
MAIN qUESTIONS AND ANSwERS.
*What do we do?
	 •	 	Teach	graduate	education	to	military	officers	
from around the world; conduct cutting·edge 
research in policy and technical areas; provide 
quick response to fleet and CO COM require-
ments; and conduct capacity-building pro-
grams in partner nations.
*How well do we do it?
	 •	 	Measurable	and	anecdotal	evidence	indicates	
that NPS provides highquality education, 
valuable research, responsive special pro-
grams, and very important capacity building 
in most of the world’s countries.
*Why is what we do important?
	 •	 	Education	 is	one	 leg	of	 the	professional	suc-
cess triad. Military officers must succeed in 
each of three spheres of endeavor: the opera-
tional, the managerial, and the educational. 
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind 
down, the educational sphere will become 
even more critical... who thinks, wins.
	 •	 	Research	helps	government	institutions	antic-
ipate future defense and security challenges. 
Without it, resources cannot be invested wise-
ly and military officers face the future unpre-
pared to fight.
*Who else can do what we do?
	 •	 	No	institution	can	do	what	NPS	does	as	well	
as NPS does. The National Defense University 
comes closest, but it has limited capacity and 
shorter courses. Like the other war colleges, 
NDU’s role is teaching military officers how 
to develop joint strategy and operations; NPS’ 
role is to teach military officers how to think 
critically and holistically, producing an officer 
who can quickly understand a complex situa-
tion and collaborate with anyone to achieve a 
successful outcome.
*NPS has anticipated all the major trends in se-
curity over the last twenty years. What is next for 
NPS to anticipate?
	 •	 	Capacity	building	for	security	 institutions	 in	
North Africa and the wider Middle East (after 
the region’s new and more democratic gov-
ernments settle down).
*What distinguishes NPS from other educational 
institutions the Navy could use?
	 •	  Context. NPS classroom are populated with 
all US military services and international of-
ficers from all regions — and a growing num-
ber of other government institutions. NPS is 
a defense and security institution that places 
all education into this context. Students 
create lifelong bonds of trust and friend-
ship — across Services and across borders.
	 •	  Content. NPS has accumulated (and continues 
to grow) an astonishing body of knowledge, 
available to all US Government officials and 
most US citizens. This content is continually 
updated and enriched by officers with field 
experience across the spectrum of security 
operations.
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	 •	 	Critical Mass of Scholarship. NPS has human 
resources unmatched in the US government 
for teaching, targeted research, and constantly 
emerging specialized courses. The school is a 
large network, connected to many other net-
works. We are a ‘hot spot’ for creativity in de-
fense and security issues, collaborating with 
smart people with the best ideas from our 
network of networks.
	 •	 	Institutional Agility. NPS responds quickly to 
the needs of the Combatant Commands, Ser-
vice headquarters, and other sponsors from 
across government. New courses and pro-
grams are created from nothing faster than 
anywhere else.
	 •	  Leverage. NPS draws resources from myriad 
institutions, both public and private. For a rel-
atively low fixed cost, this ‘intellectual gravita-
tion’ brings in enormous amounts of money 
to produce officers with critical thinking and 
technical skills, as well as deliverable products 
for decision-makers.
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title  Seven Reasons to Preserve and Exploit the 
Naval Postgraduate School 
author	 CAPT	Wayne	P.	Hughes,	Jr.	(Ret.)	•	16	July	2003
abstract  Hughes outlines why he believes the Naval Postgraduate School is the “best 
source and has no rival” in training military officers seeking a graduate educa-
tion. He states that the value of NPS is supported by the following seven fac-
tors.
 1.  “NPS education cannot be duplicated. There is no alternative to NPS edu-
cation anywhere, including AFIT and the War Colleges, not even close.”
 2.  “The basis of NPS research is unique because it is oriented to fleet opera-
tions that no other university can match.”
 3.  “The interdisciplinary characteristics of both education and research are 
tailored to the needs of the Navy. In these NPS has no peer. We know 
where and how our graduates will serve; therefore the education is tai-
lored for military service and leadership.”
 4.  “Setting aside the unmatched content of NPS education, an NPS master’s 
degree is also cost competitive when measured in student-faculty contact.”
 5.  “No civilian university is as adaptive in making abrupt changes of sub-
ject matter or even entire curricula to match changing defense missions, 
new technologies, and career demands … Curricula tailored to the needs 
of Navy combat officers and homeland security civilians have introduced 
radically new delivery methods matched by only a handful of other for-
ward-leaning institutions.”
 6.  “The quality of our education is unmatched by foremost civilian universi-
ties because at NPS no courses are taught by teaching assistants or Ph.D. 
students. Military faculty from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, all with 
advanced degrees, integrate defense-relevant subject matter in a way that 
has no counterpart at civilian institutions.”
 7.  “As defense emphasis shifts from NATO and Europe to Asia, NPS has 
added relevance and proximity to the new centers of interest.”
  “To sum up, there is no alternative to the Naval Postgraduate School. If the 
Navy has a need for graduate education in its officer corps, whether degree 
programs or short courses, the Naval Postgraduate School is the best source 
and has no rival.”
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16 July 2003
Seven Reasons to Preserve and Exploit the  
Naval Postgraduate School 
Wayne p. huGheS, Jr .  
1.  Education NPS education cannot be duplicated. 
There is no alternative to NPS education any-
where, including AFIT and the War Colleges, not 
even close.
	 •	 	We	 design	 our	 courses	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	
our homogenous student body. They are ma-
ture officers with four to eight years of experi-
ence in their profession, devoted to national 
service, and appreciative of the opportunity 
for a paid education.
	 •	 	Every	graduate	writes	a	master’s	thesis	tutored	
by an individual faculty member, or partici-
pates in a major study accomplished in col-
laboration with a faculty team.
2.  Research The basis of NPS research is unique 
because it is oriented to fleet operations that no 
other university can match. Our research has 
three distinctions.
	 •	 	Nearly	all	of	it	is	DoD	sponsored	and	funded,	
in competition with foremost research uni-
versities.
	 •	 	The	collaborative	research	across	campus	that	
is the hallmark of the three institutes is un-
matched not only because they sponsor inter-
disciplinary studies but also because the work 
is in military “disciplines” such as undersea 
warfare, expeditionary warfare, information 
operations, and command and control.
	 •	 	The	student	thesis	work	(performed	by	near-
ly every graduate — around 600 per year) is 
low-cost, with high payoff to the sponsors 
because it is done by officers who know their 
profession.
3.  Customer The interdisciplinary characteristics of 
both education and research are tailored to the 
needs of the Navy. In these NPS has no peer.
	 •	 	We	know	where	and	how	our	graduates	will	
serve; therefore the education is tailored for 
military service and leadership. Another 
graduate school, even a law, medical, or busi-
ness school, must dilute its curriculum con-
tent to cover the profession’s many variations. 
Nor would a civilian school adapt or intensify 
its curricula to meet Navy needs.
	 •	 	In	both	 technology	and	policy	 sciences,	 fac-
ulty research is slanted toward defense needs 
because that is the only way to keep courses 
up to date.
4.  Cost Setting aside the unmatched content of a 
NPS education, an NPS master’s degree is also 
cost competitive when measured in student-fac-
ulty contact.
	 •	 	How	could	it	be	otherwise?	We	teach	with	un-
matched intensity: 48 weeks a year, delivering 
an average of four courses totaling an average 
of 16 contact hours during those 48 weeks.
	 •	 	We	commence	curricula	and	short	courses	to	
meet Navy and DoD needs at odd times of the 
year that a civilian university would reject as 
unorthodox.
	 •	 	In	 a	 typical	 NPS	 curriculum	 half	 or	 less	 of	
the courses fulfill the degree requirements 
for a university master’s degree program. The 
other half is devoted to preparing the student 
for graduate study and to enrichment courses 
beyond the master’s level. The latter courses 
respond to Navy sponsor requirements, often 
including Professional Military Education.
5.  Response No civilian university is as adaptive in 
making abrupt changes of subject matter or even 
entire curricula to match changing defense mis-
sions, new technologies, and career demands.
	 •	 	Short	 courses	 deliver	 certificates	 and	 diplo-
mas each year, either in residence or by Dis-
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tance Learning, often in partnership with 
leading universities. Short course emphasis is 
on currency with the latest information in the 
field.
	 •	 	Resident	 programs	 are	 kept	 up-to-date	 in	
computer and information technology, ship 
design, cryptology and information assur-
ance, and space engineering and operations, 
among others.
	 •	 	Curricula	tailored	to	the	needs	of	Navy	com-
bat officers and homeland security civilians 
have introduced radically new delivery meth-
ods matched by only a handful of other for-
ward-leaning institutions.
6.  Faculty The quality of the NPS faculty corre-
sponds to that of upper-tier universities. The 
quality of our education is unmatched by fore-
most civilian universities because at NPS no 
courses are taught by teaching assistants or PhD 
students. Military faculty from the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force, all with advanced degrees, inte-
grate defense-relevant subject matter in a way 
that has no counterpart at civilian institutions.
7.  Location For many years NPS has looked west 
into the Pacific and Indian Oceans and has more 
ties to Pacific Commands than in the European 
theater.
	 •	 	As	defense	 emphasis	 shifts	 from	NATO	and	
Europe to Asia, NPS has added relevance and 
proximity to the new centers of interest.
  The reason the cost of living is high in Monterey 
is because it is a very attractive location once 
housing costs are contained.
	 •	 	Housing	 and	 BAQ	 costs	 for	 students	 are	
avoided because student housing is already in 
place.
	 •	 	Housing	 costs	 for	 faculty	 have	 emerged	 in	
the last decade as a serious handicap in hir-
ing promising young faculty. A program of 
affordable faculty housing has been initiated 
at no cost to the government similar to what 
other universities have had to undertake and 
pay for in high-cost areas.
To sum up, there is no alternative to the Naval Post-
graduate School. If the Navy has a need for gradu-
ate education in its officer corps, whether degree 
programs or short courses, the Naval Postgraduate 
School is the best source and has no rival.
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title  Closure or Realignment of the Naval  
Postgraduate School
source Impact Study, NPS Internal Document, Author Unknown, Date Unknown
abstract  The significant costs of either closing the Naval Postgraduate School or relo-
cating its programs to other Naval facilities are reviewed. Also discussed are 
attributes that make NPS successful and argue against closing the institution. 
These include NPS’ high academic standards, its top-notch research faculty 
conversant with the unique needs of the military service, its unique facilities, 
and its student body comprised of U.S. and international officers. Also stressed 
is NPS’ role in developing the first graduate program in Homeland Security 
after 9/11. 
excerpts  “There are no other institutions in the US, or anywhere else in the world, with 
a similar synergistic system of faculty, students and R&D programs focused on 
the unique needs of national defense and homeland security.”
  “More generally, the synergistic combination of graduate education in disci-
plines and curricula critical to the future of our defense establishment with 
high-impact research in crucial technologies directly relevant to DOD’s mis-
sion is simply not found in either national laboratories with no capacity or 
interest in educating military officers or in civilian universities that engage in 
little or no defense R&D.”
  “If we close NPS and disperse its students to civilian institutions we will lose 
these unique capabilities and we will never recover them … Moving selected 
components of the NPS to collocate with other Naval facilities will also lead to 
the loss of most of our research faculty and their unique skills and knowledge.” 
  “NPS is an ideal institution to provide crucial intellectual leadership, stud-
ies, and research in our pursuit of the Global War on Terrorism … The agil-
ity, responsiveness, and relevance of NPS intellectual capital was most recently 
demonstrated when we conceived, developed, and delivered the country’s first 
graduate program in Homeland Security within fifteen months of 9/11.”
  “The nation’s ability to respond swiftly and effectively to other homeland secu-
rity emerging crises will be significantly reduced if the NPS assets are thrown 
away by an ill-advised decision to close or realign the institution.”
  “Future multinational operations that will be ever more important as we wage 
the GWOT will suffer if the extensive mutual understanding, trust, and good-
will that results from intensive interactions across this ‘global’ population of 
future military leaders are terminated by the closure of NPS.”
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Closure or Realignment of the  
Naval Postgraduate School 
-  impact Study – 
ISSUE
Through	two	world	wars,	Korea,	Vietnam,	and	the	
Cold War strategic thinking and forward-looking 
military officers, government officials and mem-
bers of congress have built and supported a major 
research university dedicated to the nation’s military 
needs: the Naval Postgraduate School. Today, this 
sustained investment is in danger of being aban-
doned either by the closure of NPS or an attempt to 
relocate selected programs to other Naval facilities. 
There are significant costs associated with either of 
these actions. We will examine some of the more 
significant outcomes here.
BACKGROUND
The Navy and our sister service need a high percent-
age of officers with a graduate-level understanding 
of science, technology and management, along with 
a good understanding of systems engineering and 
integration, all developed within the context of mili-
tary systems. In the NPS, the nation has a research 
university uniquely positioned to fill these needs. 
NPS has assembled a top-quality research faculty 
that is successful in the highly competitive world of 
research funding and that has established partner-
ships with peers at other major research universities 
and with the industrial base of the nearby Silicon 
Valley. We have created a student body representing 
the full spectrum of the total US force along with the 
best of our allies. There are no other institutions in 
the US, or anywhere else in the world, with a simi-
lar synergistic system of faculty, students and R&D 
programs focused on the unique needs of national 
defense and homeland security.
ANALySIS
Research is a fundamental part of the NPS mission. 
Research creates and disperses new knowledge to 
the USN and the DOD. The NPS R&D program 
provides a major source of analytical capability for 
the Navy and the rest of DOD, leads to innovative 
and relevant solutions to warfare problems, and pro-
vides graduates who bring the new knowledge back 
to the Fleet. In FY03 NPS carried out over $60M of 
defense-related R&D; almost $25M was in direct 
support of Navy problems. Various program man-
agers and other senior DOD/DON managers who 
are interested in getting the best return possible on 
their R&D investments provide this R&D support. 
There are three components that make this possible. 
We have recruited and developed a top-rated re-
search faculty who have invested the time and effort 
needed to become conversant with the unique needs 
of the military services — this represents a unique 
capability not found in any other educational estab-
lishment. We have built a number of unique facilities 
that allow us to carry out very relevant R&D proj-
ects — for example, we have invested over $5M in 
developing airfield and hanger facilities to enable 
us to operate a fleet of fixed wing and UAV aircraft 
in airspace that is restricted for our use only and 
in which we can fly UAVs. In fact, we fly the only 
UAV’s that can be reconfigured for experimentation 
purposes. As another example of a unique facility, 
we have adapted the old SOSUS Station at Pt. Sur 
as an Ocean Acoustics Lab that can be operated ei-
ther at a classified or unclassified level. We are also 
one of a very few facilities to operate our own Linear 
Accelerator. The third component of our success is 
our student body — we involve our officer-students 
in cutting-edge research that uses their up-to-date 
knowledge of current military operations to keep the 
research firmly focused on the needs of the military 
services. If	we	close	NPS	and	disperse	its	students	
to	 civilian	 institutions	 we	 will	 lose	 these	 unique	
capabilities	 and	 we	 will	 never	 recover	 them:	 the	
faculty	who	are	central	to	operating	this	enterprise	
will	migrate	 to	 other	 research	 universities.	Mov-
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ing	 selected	 components	 of	 the	NPS	 to	 collocate	
with	other	Naval	facilities	will	also	lead	to	the	loss	
of	most	 of	 our	 research	 faculty	 and	 their	 unique	






The events of September 11, 2001 created an un-
precedented focus on homeland security & home-
land defense for the United States, and have neces-
sitated significant changes to the way our nation 
plans and executes our security and defense strategy. 
The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is the most 
important national security challenge we face as a 
nation. With more than four hundred faculty and 
nearly fifteen hundred military and operationally 
experienced international, national, state and lo-
cal government level graduate students, engaged in 
national security programs and projects, NPS is an 
ideal institution to provide critical intellectual lead-
ership, studies, and research in our pursuit of the 
Global War on Terrorism. The agility, responsive-
ness, and relevance of NPS intellectual capital was 
most recently demonstrated when we conceived, 
developed, and delivered the country’s first gradu-
ate program in Homeland Security within fifteen 
months of 9/11. Integrating our expertise in nation-
al security, information warfare, cybersecurity, mar-
itime domain awareness and related subjects, NPS 
was able to respond to the Department of Home-
land Security’s immediate need to provide advanced 
education to federal, state and local officials in areas 
that simply did not exist before September 2001. The	
nation’s	ability	to	respond	swiftly	and	effectively	to	




Another major NPS contribution, largely unher-
alded, is the enormous impact of having over three 
hundred allied and international officers spending 
18–24 months living, learning and discovering side 
by side with Navy, Marine, Army and Air Force of-
ficers how to conceptualize, analyze, and solve the 
global challenges that we all face in the 21st century. 
While difficult to measure, the extensive mutual un-
derstanding, trust, and goodwill that results from 
intensive interactions across this ‘global’ population 
of future military leaders may, in fact, contribute as 
much to international peace and harmony as does 
their formal education itself. As future military op-
erations become both more joint and international, 
it is imperative that our officers understand, appre-
ciate, and interact with their foreign counterparts 
with sensitivity, intelligence, and grace that can only 
come from sustained experience with our interna-
tional allies and partners across the globe. NPS pro-




and	 goodwill	 that	 results	 from	 intensive	 interac-
tions	across	this	‘global’	population	of	future	mili-
tary	leaders	are	terminated	by	the	closure	of	NPS.
There is a compelling need for innovative solutions 
to the well-documented critical shortage of science 
and technology workers in the DOD, other branch-
es of government, and the civilian national security 
workforce. As an example, the Office of Naval Re-
search has estimated that Navy labs alone will need 
to hire up to 400 people (with graduate degrees in 
science and engineering) a year over the next ten 
years to replace its existing US citizen workforce. 
As one solution, OSD is currently examining cre-
ation of a new National Defense Education Act of 
2006 to fund the S&T education of US citizens in 
scholarship-for-service programs. Graduates would 
have a specific federal employment payback period 
dependent on the duration of their federal support. 
Given the magnitude of the workforce shortage, it is 
likely that a transformational change is required to 
address this problem. Just as the nation found it nec-
essary to create the USMA, USNA, and the USAF 
to provide a rigorous military education for future 
military officers, it may be time for a federally-fund-
ed university system to lead the education of the 
future US civilian S&T national security workforce. 
The Naval Postgraduate School is well suited to lead 
in the development of a federal university system. A	
tactical	decision	to	close	the	School	at	this	critical	
time	 in	 the	nation’s	 efforts	 to	 increase	 the	 supply	
of	defense	scientists	and	engineers	would	be	a	fail-
ure	to	recognize	the	strategic	 issues	 involved	and	




The environment in which our forces will operate 
in the future will be dominated by speed: the speed 
with which we can understand our environment; 
the speed with which we share that understanding; 
the speed with which we make decisions; and the 
speed with which our desired effects are achieved. 
The great advances that have taken place and are still 
taking place in the worlds of information technol-
ogy and networking drive are making this possible. 
Many of the research developments in the IT world 
are happening close to NPS in the Silicon Valley. 
Being a research university with a very active IT 
research program located next door to this R&D 
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activity, the NPS is in an ideal position to form part-
nerships and participate in ongoing research efforts 
with universities such as Stanford and UCB, and 




NPS is ideally located to serve as a linchpin in bring-
ing together researchers at California’s outstanding 
universities, researchers from national labs such as 
LLNL, and NPS faculty and students to work on 
problems of national defense and homeland secu-
rity, such as problems involving the security of the 
shipping container system. The Navy also benefits in 
many ways from the partnerships that NPS has es-
tablished with the other oceanographic laboratories 
that are collocated on Monterey Bay. But, neither 
LLNL nor the civilian universities can provide the 
integrated military-academic environment needed 





DOD’s	mission	 is	 simply	not	 found	 in	 either	na-
tional	 laboratories	with	no	capacity	or	 interest	 in	
educating	military	officers	or	in	civilian	universi-
ties	that	engage	in	little	or	no	defense	R&D.
Finally, the reasons why NPS is and should be in 
Monterey remain much the same as they were when 
NPS was established: access to open ocean, access to 
ranges and uncontrolled airspace, and a city that is 
not a distraction to the officer students.
RECOMMENDATION
It is in the nation’s best interests that you make every 
effort possible to make OSD/DON understand the 
enormous cost of closing or realigning the NPS.
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EDUCATION AND TRAINING jOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP 
PROfESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION SUBGROUP
JPME/PME
Installation/Location  Numerical Military Value Score
Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA 65.3
Ft.	Leavenworth,	KS		 59.3
Maxwell AFB, AL  53.8
Carlisle Barracks, PA  53.6
Ft. McNair, DC  52.7 *
Naval Station Newport, RI  52.5
Naval Station Norfolk, VA  47.5
Graduate Education
Monterey, CA (Naval Postgraduate School)  74.7
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (Air Force Institute of Technology) 52.0
Other Full Time Education (Defense Agencies)
Ft. Belvoir, VA (Defense Acquisition University) 58.8
Memphis, TN (Defense Contract Audit Institute) 40.5
Patrick AFB, FL (Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute) 43.7
Other Full Time Education (Chaplains)
Ft. Jackson, SC  51.6
Maxwell AFB, AL  41.3
Naval Station Newport, RI  34.1
Other Full Time Education (JAGs)
Maxwell AFB, AL  45.4
Charlottesville, VA  33.5
Naval Station Newport, RI  33.2
*  Fort McNair’s military value score did not include data for Lincoln Hall nor buildable acres, reference 2 Feb 05 E&T JCSG meeting minutes.
Area  NPS Mil Value Ranking
Air Platforms Research 14 of 35
Battlespace Environments Development & Acquisition  1 of 21
Battlespace Environments Research 3 of 25 
Biomedical Research 23 of 30
Chemical & Biological Defense Development & Acquisition 32 of 40
Chemical & Biological Defense Research 10 of 42
Ground Vehicles Research 13 of 24
Human Systems Development & Acquisition 17 of 87
Human Systems Research 13 of 65
Information Systems Development & Acquisition 66 of 105
Information Systems Research 4 of 68
Materials & Processes Research 18 of 46
Nuclear Technology Research 4 of 15 
Sea Vehicles Research 11 of 36
Sensors, Electronics & Electronic Warfare Development & Acquisition 39 of 103
Sensors, Electronics & Electronic Warfare Research 20 of 68
Space Platforms Research 10 of 26
Weapons and Armaments Research 24 of 60
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title  Naval Postgraduate School Talking Points
source NPS Internal Document, Author Unknown, Date Unknown
abstract  Fourteen talking points make a strong case for the value and necessity of the 
Naval Postgraduate School. One of the most important points is that NPS is 
the only institution in the world with similar faculty, students and R&D pro-
grams focused on national defense and homeland security. 
excerpts  “To be effective in the 21st century the Navy and our sister services need a high 
percentage of officers with a graduate-level understanding of science, technol-
ogy and management, along with a good understanding of systems engineer-
ing and integration: NPS fills this need.”
  “The nation’s ability to respond swiftly and effectively to homeland security 
and other emerging crises would be significantly reduced without NPS assets.”
  “The recent stand up of Cyber Command shows that cybersecurity is a ma-
jor warfare area in today’s world. NPS has extensive programs and is doing 
cutting-edge research in support of cybersecurity including, but not limited to, 
network security, identity management and media exploitation.”
  “We involve our officer-students in cutting-edge research that uses their up-
to-date knowledge of current military operations to keep the research firmly 
focused on the needs of the military services.”
  “We have a top-rated research faculty who have invested the time and effort 
needed to become conversant with the unique needs of the military services. 
We have an international student body.”
  “Future multinational operations are supported by the extensive mutual un-
derstanding, trust, and goodwill that results from intensive interactions across 
our ‘global’ population of future military leaders.”
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Naval Postgraduate School 
Talking Points 
1.    To be effective in the 21st century the Navy 
and our sister services need a high percentage 
of officers with a graduate-level understanding 
of science, technology and management, along 
with a good understanding of systems engi-
neering and integration: NPS fills this need.
2.   According to James Colvard: “The Navy has 
lowered its level of intellectual involvement 
in research and development and weakened 
its entire infrastructure, which at the end of 
WWII was the strongest in the world. For a 
service that sleeps on its weapons, this weak-
ened institutional position in the world of sci-
ence and engineering is dangerous.” NPS can 
be a major player in helping the Navy over-
come this weakness by extending programs 
of study and research to an expanded student 
base that includes more civilians.
3.    There are no other institutions in the US, or 
anywhere else in the world, with a similar 
synergistic system of faculty, students and 
R&D programs focused on the unique needs 
of national defense and homeland security.
4.    Research is a fundamental part of the NPS 
mission.
5.    We have a top-rated research faculty who 
have invested the time and effort needed to 
become conversant with the unique needs of 
the military services. We have an internation-
al student body.
6.    We have built a number of unique facilities 
for highly military relevant experimentation 
and own access to unlimited airspace at Camp 
Roberts.
7.    We involve our officer-students in cutting-edge 
research that uses their up-to-date knowledge of 
current military operations to keep the research 
firmly focused on the needs of the military ser-
vices.
8.    The nation’s ability to respond swiftly and 
effectively to homeland security and other 
emerging crises would be significantly re-
duced without NPS assets.
9.    Future multinational operations are support-
ed by the extensive mutual understanding, 
trust, and goodwill that results from intensive 
interactions across our ‘global’ population of 
future military leaders.
10.   As the nation’s ninth largest annual producer 
of S& T master’s degrees, NPS plays a strate-
gic role in the nation’s efforts to increase the 
supply of defense scientists and engineers.
11.   Being a research university with a very active 
IT research program located next door to the 
R&D activities of the Silicon Valley and the 
heart of the UC system, the NPS is in an ideal 
position to form partnerships and participate 
in ongoing research efforts with universities 
such as Stanford, UCB, UCSC, UCSB, and 
with the many corporations and small com-
panies in the area.
12.   The recent stand up of Cyber Command 
shows that cybersecurity is a major warfare 
area in today’s world. NPS has extensive pro-
grams and is doing cutting-edge research in 
support of cybersecurity including, but not 
limited to, network security, identity manage-
ment and media exploitation.
13.   This immediate access to cutting-edge IT 
R&D activity enhances NPS’ value to the 
Navy.
14.   The NPS was created and nurtured by the 
Navy to develop the technical, management 
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and policy skills of operationally success-
ful Naval officers, and to enhance the overall 
combat-effectiveness of our armed forces by 
carefully crafted post-baccalaureate profes-
sional programs of study built on basic and 
applied research carried out by teams of of-
ficer-students working in conjunction with 
high-quality faculty.
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title Naval Postgraduate School Curricula
source NPS Internal Document, Author Unknown, Date Unknown
abstract  The reasons why the Naval Postgraduate School was developed and the pur-
pose behind its curricula are reviewed. Details discussed include NPS’ cur-
ricula and how it is structured to offer a year-round program of courses that 
most effectively meet the Navy’s needs while making the best use of officers’ 
time.
excerpts  “The key phrase is ‘operationally successful.’ It is and has always been Navy 
policy to select officers for professional development based on their operation-
al experience and the needs of the service, regardless of their undergraduate 
experience.”
  “Curricula at NPS have been carefully designed to meet these Navy require-
ments, and to make the most effective use of the most precious Navy asset, the 
officer’s time.” 
  “The challenge that NPS has faced successfully was to create a learning envi-
ronment that meets all of the Navy’s requirements. … Each curriculum is a 
highly connected network of graduate and professional course and research 
projects designed to provide the level, breadth, and depth of academic and 
professional knowledge essential to the professional and technical develop-
ment of the officer and the Navy. This is considerably above the level of com-
mitment required to obtain a master’s degree: more than 100 hours of credit 
compared to the 40 or so hours typical of a master’s degree program.”
  “When alternate approaches to meeting the Navy’s (and other services and 
our international allies) needs are under discussion it is vital that the mistake 
of assuming that NPS merely awards degrees is avoided. To repeat: The NPS 
was created and nurtured by the Navy to carry out one critical task: to develop 
the technical, management and policy skills of operationally successful Naval 
officers, and to enhance the overall combat-effectiveness of our armed forces 
by carefully crafted post-baccalaureate professional programs of study built on 
basic and applied research carried out by teams of officer-students working in 
conjunction with high-quality faculty. Simply sending officers to civilian uni-
versities to obtain a master’s degree will not suffice!”
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Naval Postgraduate School 
Curricula 
The NPS was created and nurtured by the Navy to 
carry out one critical task: to develop the techni-
cal, management and policy skills of operationally 
successful Naval officers, and to enhance the overall 
combat-effectiveness of our armed forces by careful-
ly crafted post-baccalaureate professional programs 
of study built on basic and applied research carried 
out by teams of officer-students working in conjunc-
tion with high-quality faculty.
The key phrase is “operationally successful”. It is and 
has always been Navy policy to select officers for 
professional development based on their operation-
al experience and the needs of the service, regard-
less of their undergraduate experience. This require-
ment implies a need to update and to enhance the 
undergraduate educational experience of those offi-
cers who have been selected for further professional 
study, particularly since in most cases the time gap 
between completion of undergraduate work and se-
lection is measured in years. 
Curricula at NPS have been fully designed to meet 
these Navy requirements, and to make the most ef-
fective use of he most precious Navy asset, the of-
ficer’s time. Curricula can be divided into four 
interlocking phases: skill reconstruction and prepa-
ratory study; a wide ranking series of graduate-level 
courses that are the equivalent of a master’s degree 
program at most good, tier 1 universities; a care-
fully selected research topic along with professional 
enhancement courses created in consultation with 
senior Navy leaders; and Joint Professional Military 
Education courses. All together these four phases 
form an essential unity in the professional and tech-
nical development of our officer corps. The degree 
is a by-product, but a very importance one, of this 
development process.
The challenge that NPS has faced successfully was to 
create a learning environment that meets all of the 
Navy’s requirements. This was done by establishing 
a year-round program of courses that permit students 
to take a full load in each quarter. In addition, a series 
of carefully designed up date-of-skills and prepara-
tory courses was introduced to bring the incoming 
students’ academic knowledge base up-to-date. Each 
curriculum is a highly connected network of gradu-
ate and professional course and research projects 
designed to provide the level, breadth, and depth of 
academic and professional knowledge essential to the 
professional and technical development of the officer 
and the Navy. This is considerably above the level of 
commitment required to obtain a master’s degree: 
more than 100 hours of credit compared to the 40 or 
so hours typical of a master’s degree program.
When alternate approaches to meeting the Navy’s 
(and other services and our international allies) 
needs are under discussion it is vital that the mis-
take of assuming that NPS merely awards degrees 
is voided. To repeat: The NPS was created and nur-
tured by the Navy to carry out one critical task: 
to develop the technical, management and policy 
skills of operationally successful Naval officers, and 
to enhance the overall combat-effectiveness of our 
armed forces by carefully crafted post-baccalaureate 
professional programs of study built on basic and 
applied research carried out by teams of officer-stu-
dents working in conjunction with high-quality fac-
ulty. Simply sending officers to civilian universities 
to obtain a master’s degree will not suffice!
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abstract  Although the CNA report found that NPS’ master’s level quality to be high, 
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top-level schools offering a graduate-level technical education. However, in re-
sponding to the report, NPS’ main criticism of the CNA report is that it did 
not consider NPS’ unique benefits and differences between NPS’ militarily-di-
rected graduate program and civilian graduate programs that make it difficult 
to compare these institutions regarding true costs. 
excerpts  “CNA found the program costs at NPS to be much higher than the tuition costs 
at 28 other universities referenced in the study. However, we feel that the CNA 
study contains two crucial flaws that bias the comparison against NPS. First, in 
comparing costs between NPS and civilian alternatives, CNA fails to hold the 
desired outputs constant. Second, for both NPS and civilian institutions, CNA 
gives an incomplete measure of costs. Our analysis shows that the major fac-
tors of cost are the officer salaries and housing costs and, hence, the program 
duration. Additional significant cost factors are the year-round operation of 
NPS and the higher student contact-hour loads at NPS … Computing the cost 
per class hour … NPS is the least expensive of the alternatives.”
  “In particular, NPS’ graduate education cost is $159 per class hour, as found 
above; civilian-sector costs with graduate premiums range from $525 per class 
hour at Cal Tech to $282 per class hour at the University of Texas-Austin. The 
weighted civilian-sector average costs with the graduate premium is $318 per 
class hour.”
  “The IPEDS data reported by CNA indicate that NPS has higher annual costs 
per FTE than comparable civilian-sector schools. However, this comparison 
does not indicate that civilian universities could more cost-effectively provide 
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pared on the basis on the IPEDS data; NPS’ unique mission and officer body is 
not comparable to civilian universities without further adjustments.”
  “The Committee believes that the primary question that should have been ad-
dressed in any outside study of NPS is whether NPS has accomplished its mis-
sion. Does NPS contribute to the combat-effectiveness of the Navy? While we 
answer this question strongly affirmative, the CNA study would have been an 
opportune time for an independent answer. We believe the issues raised in our 
report are relevant if this inquiry is made.”
  Vice Admiral John Scott Redd, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy of the 
Joint Staff, earned an M.S. in operations research with distinction from NPS in 
1978: “The purpose of this letter is to put in writing my feelings on the value 
of the education I received at the Naval Postgraduate School and its impact on 
my career … the education I acquired there has proven priceless. I have experi-
enced first-hand the critical importance of higher education in a naval officer’s 
career.”
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARy
The Navy has established a program of mid-career, 
professional, graduate education at the Naval Post-
graduate School to meet its needs for a technically 
qualified, intellectually equipped officer corps. In 
addition, the graduate education program provides 
an opportunity for the Navy to transition officers 
from one set of skills developed in their under-
graduate education to another that meets the Navy’s 
current needs. Another benefit is the expertise in 
military-relevant topics that has developed in the 
faculty and students, leading to a vigorous graduate-
education research program in support of the Navy 
and the Department of Defense.
The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) recently pub-
lished its assessment of the Navy’s flagship educa-
tional institutions, including the Naval Postgradu-
ate School (NPS). The report found the quality of 
the NPS program to be high. In assessing the level 
of funding required to maintain the excellence of 
the Navy’s flagship institutions, CNA explored the 
costs of using civilian-sector universities to obtain 
the same product. Two such approaches would be to 
send officers to civilian universities to obtain gradu-
ate education or to contract with a civilian univer-
sity to operate NPS.
CNA found the program costs at NPS to be much 
higher than the tuition costs at 28 other universities 
referenced in the study. However, we feel that the 
CNA study contains two crucial flaws that
bias the comparison against NPS. First, in compar-
ing costs between NPS and civilian alternatives, 
CNA fails to hold the desired outputs constant. Sec-
ond, for both NPS and civilian institutions, CNA 
gives an incomplete measure of costs. Our analysis 
shows that the major factors of cost are the officer 
salaries and housing costs and the program dura-
tion. Additional significant cost factors are the year-
round operation of NPS and the higher student 
contact-hour loads at NPS.
Incorporating the salary and housing costs in this 
study, we find that NPS is the 8th least expensive of 
the 29 universities considered by CNA. Computing 
the cost per class hour (including the officers’ sala-
ries and housing), NPS is the least expensive of the 
alternatives.
The existence of NPS is due to the benefits that NPS 
offers to the professional and technical development 
of the officer corps. Among these benefits are:
 1.  Military, technical relevance of courses, the-
ses, and curriculum content
 2.  Specialized educational laboratory facilities 
devoted to military hardware and computer 
systems
 3.  Officers and faculty with military expertise 
who produce analyses and research products 
that benefit the Navy and DoD
 4.  An admissions system with primary emphasis 
on military performance and secondary em-
phasis on academic performance
 5.  Refresher and transition mechanisms that ef-
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ficiently and effectively meet the need to al-
low for a time delay between undergraduate 
and graduate studies and for the assignment 
of officers to curricula that meet current Navy 
personnel requirements
 6.  An instructional tempo that operates year-
round and allows higher-than-average 
course loads
 7.  Military infrastructure that allows the officers 
to remain in a professional military environ-
ment while at school, including opportunities 
for interaction with officers from other ser-
vices and countries.
Comparing tuition at civilian universities to the NPS 
program cost (per year per student), NPS is most 
expensive of the 29 universities included in CNA’s 
study. However, such a comparison is flawed since 
tuition costs alone do not measure the complete 
costs of providing graduate education to a military 
officer in the civilian-sector. The following factors 
are necessary components of a complete cost-effec-
tiveness analysis:
 1.  The officer-student’s salary, benefits, and hous-
ing allowance should be considered. These 
costs exceed any tuition payments and are very 
sensitive to the cost of housing and the length 
of programs. NPS has existing base housing, 
which is less expensive than housing in the 
civilian-sector. In addition, the average NPS 
masters program is 1.2 months shorter than 
the average masters program taken by Navy 
URL officers enrolled in civilian universities.
 2.  The role and cost of transition and refresher 
courses also must be incorporated into the 
analysis. These courses support the Navy’s 
policy decisions to provide mid-career edu-
cation to its officers and to transition officers 
into areas of expertise to meet Navy needs.
 3.  The higher contact-hour load carried by the 
officers receiving graduate education at NPS 
should also be added to the analysis. NPS of-
ficers attend approximately 768 hours of in-
struction annually, compared with approxi-
mately 486 hours per year at a civilian school.
 4.  Graduate courses are more expensive to offer 
than undergraduate courses, especially in the 
technical areas favored by the Navy. While it 
is difficult to separate graduate costs in the 
overall cost data from most civilian univer-
sities, a trend-line analysis indicates that the 
cost per graduate-course hour at NPS is much 
lower than the same cost for any civilian uni-
versity. If a civilian school were to take over 
the management of NPS, therefore, there is no 
basis for believing that it could manage NPS 
more cost-effectively than the Navy is doing 
now.
Including these factors in the cost analysis enables 
a more accurate comparison of NPS against civilian 
alternatives. Our cost comparison shows that the 
special benefits of NPS education come at little extra 
cost. Specifically,	we	conclude	that












ing	 costs,	 our	 analysis	 shows	 that	 the	 total	
costs	 are	 about	 the	 same,	 regardless	 of	 the	
provider.	Hence,	any	policy	decisions	made	
on	 graduate	 education	 should	 be	made	 on	
the	basis	of	benefits	to	the	Navy,	in	addition	
to	costs.
The CNA report also criticizes the relatively low rate 
of using NPS graduates in subsequent assignments 
in corresponding P-coded subspecialty billets. But 
CNA’s solution, consolidation of subspecialties and 
curricula, is not based on any cost-benefit analysis, 
as CNA admits in its report. For some restricted-
line and other Navy communities, NPS programs 
are highly successful in providing officers with the 
desired skills and utilization rates are high. In these 
communities, the subspecialty system is working 
properly and is efficiently coupled to the NPS gradu-
ate education system. For some other communities 
(notably the URL warfare communities at sea) the P-
code system is not applicable and does not measure 
the contributions of graduate education to the per-
formance of the officers. Even without a complete 
assessment of the value of graduate education, those 
communities with nominally low P-code utilization 
are benefiting from the analytic reasoning skills, 
military-technical familiarization, and other prod-
ucts of NPS graduate education. The P-code utiliza-
tion rate does not measure these benefits and was 
never expected to do so. At-sea billets, for example, 
are rarely P-coded and, yet, officers in these billets 
do use their graduate education skills. In summary, 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  VALUE BOOK •  A STRATEGIC VALUED INVESTMENT  145
the benefits of NPS graduate education extend be-
yond the subspecialty system. The challenge for the 
Navy and for NPS is to identify these benefits and 
incorporate an assessment system that will feed the 
emerging culture of Navy graduate education.
ThE NPS fACULTy CRITIqUE Of CNA’S  
A BOTTOM-UP ASSESSMENT Of NAVy 
fLAGShIP SChOOLS
This is a response prepared by a committee of the 
NPS faculty to the report A Bottom-Up Assessment 
of Navy Flagship Schools by Linda C. Cavalluzzo and 
Donald J. Cymrot, Center for Naval Analyses Re-
port CRM 97-24, January 1998. This response was 
endorsed by the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate 
School on 2 June 1998.
REVIEw Of CNA REPORT fINDINGS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The CNA report documented the quality of edu-
cation at the Navy’s flagship schools including the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Using a variety of 
criteria, the report made the following findings in 
regard to NPS:
	 •	 The	masters-level	program	quality	is	high,
	 •	 	The	 labs	 are	 excellent	 (although	 a	 mainte-
nance funding 1ssue was identified as a po-
tential problem)
	 •	 	The	 programs	 are	 approximately	 23	months	
long with refresher and transition activities 
accounting for 21% of that total,
	 •	 	The	 curricula	 have	 a	 highly	 specific	 content	
as a result of meeting the needs of the P-code 
subspecialty system
	 •	 	There	is	a	low	utilization	rate	(approximately	
37%) of graduates in P-coded billets. There is 
liberal substitution of related P-codes in fill-
ing billets.
	 •	 	NPS	has	the	highest	per-student	expenditure	
relative to other “top-level” schools offering 
graduate-level technical education.
CNA then went on to make the following recommen-
dations1 relative to NPS and graduate education:
	 •	 	Navy	 leadership	 should	 reassess	 its	 system	
of graduate and professional military educa-
tion and “…in particular the missions of the 
schools and curricula that fulfill those mis-
sions should be reevaluated and better tai-
lored to meet Navy needs…”2 rather than rely-
ing on a subspecialty system focused on shore 
billets that has poor utilization.
	 •	 	Navy	 leadership	 should	 consider	 a	 curricu-
lum that “…might substitute some techni-
cal education with military education. This 
could take the form of a ‘Masters of Science 
in Military Management and Technology.’ 
Such a degree could include a military core 
that might cover strategy and operations, 
and one of several technical tracks that 
would correspond with the broad technical 
areas of study that currently form the basis 
of the subspecialty education.”3
	 •	 	Since	 current	 utilization	 rates	 and	 substitu-
tion patterns suggest that the curricula are 
overspecified, reduce the level of detail in cur-
ricula to allow combination of curricula and 
to allow competition with civilian schools to 
offer the resulting streamlined curricula.
	 •	 	Reduce	the	time	on	campus	by
  ~  reducing program lengths through prun-
ing of material,
  ~  offering refresher courses via distance 
learning methods,
  ~  offering provisional acceptances to offi-
cers requiring transition to new disciplines 
(i.e., require officers to complete transition 
courses before arriving at NPS), and
  ~  when possible, assigning graduates of 
USNA directly to NPS.
	 •	 	Explore	the	possibility	of	“…combining	NPS	
and AFIT into a single school at NPS, with the 
Navy as executive agent.”4
	 •	 	Consider	 “fencing”	 funding	 within	 a	 fiscal	
year to avoid funding instabilities.
	 •	 	Explore	the	concept	of	asking	for	legislative	re-
lief to allow the establishment of endowments.
In our continuing self-evaluation process, NPS had 
already identified some of these issues and had be-
gun working on them. Initiatives were underway in 
such areas as
	 •	 	Reducing	program	length	by	paring	material,
	 •	 	Combining	six	curricula	 into	a	common	In-
formation Sciences, Systems, and Operations 
curriculum,
	 •	 	Preparing	 a	 curriculum	 focused	 on	 warfare	
for the warrior (designed to be of special in-
1  CNA, “A Bottom-Up Assessment ofNavy Flagship Schools,” pp. 2-10 and 73-75
2  CNA, “A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools,” p. 5
3  CNA, “A Bottom-Up Assessment ofNavy Flagship Schools,” p. 5
4  CNA, “A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools,” p. 9
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terest to URL officers),
	 •	 	Developing	 asynchronous	 and	 synchronous	
distance learning courses, and
	 •	 	Incorporating	Joint	Professional	Military	Edu-
cation (JPME) and Defense Acquisition Work-
force Improvement Act (DA WIA) acquisition 
course material into appropriate programs.
Our main criticism of the report is the lack of con-
sideration given to the unique benefits of NPS, which 
make this institution difficult to compare to a civilian 
university. In addition, we feel that the cost analysis 
did not incorporate the full spectrum of factors. The 
following is our assessment of the CNA report.
While NPS may (or may not) appear to be more 
expensive than civilian alternatives (and our cost 
analysis shows that NPS is not more expensive), the 
fundamental question in assessing NPS is whether 
the costs are justified by the benefits that NPS pro-
vides. The following are relevant special features of 
NPS, which the CNA report ignored in its analysis 
of NPS and civilian alternatives.
EDUCATIONAL ISSUES
There are several features of NPS that make it differ-
ent from any other civilian graduate school. These 
differences are in direct response to Navy needs. The 
following is a listing of the most important of these 
benefits.
1.   Military Relevance of Education: NPS courses 
and theses are designed to be militarily relevant. 
The military relevance of an NPS education is the 
primary reason for the existence of NPS. Many 
courses are devoted entirely to specialized mili-
tary topics not available at civilian universities. 
Some courses at NPS are classified, an option that 
is not allowed on most civilian-school campuses. 
Even courses that appear to have counterparts at 
other universities are taught at NPS with military 
relevance through the examples and applications.
  NPS curricula are designed to meet the needs of 
the military communities who sponsor the cur-
ricula. NPS is capable of responding rapidly to 
changing sponsor needs, such as increased tech-
nical content in the Special Operations/Low In-
tensity Conflict (SO/LIC) curricula or the devel-
oping curriculum in information technology for 
the warrior. Civilian universities would not give 
the Navy the same degree of influence over cur-
riculum design and content.
2.  Special Laboratories and Officer Experience 
Tours: NPS’ specialized laboratories and facili-
ties provide educational benefits to our officers 
that would not be available at civilian universi-
ties without recreating the facilities there. These 
include:
 1.  Radar/Electronic Warfare Laboratory (con-
taining classified, military systems)
 2.  FLTSATCOM satellite telemetry, command 
system and spacecraft simulator
 3.  Point Sur SO SUS underwater acoustic array
 4.  Secure Systems Technology Laboratory with 
CINC-level Global Command and Control 
System (GCCS) suite and Global Broadcast 
System (GBS) Receiver
 5. Shipboard Power Systems Laboratory
 6.  SCI-classified Signals Processing and Space 
Systems Laboratory
 7.  Fleet Numerical Meteorological and Oce-
anic Center, the Navy’s center for worldwide 
weather prediction (a tenant activity of NPS)
 8.  CIRPAS, an interdisciplinary facility for test-
ing unmanned airborne vehicle (UAV) flight 
parameters, atmospheric soundings from 
UAVs and electromagnetic sensors on UAVs
 9. Aircraft Combat Survivability Laboratory
 10. Space Structures Dynamics Laboratory
 11. Turbo-Propulsion Laboratory
 12. Marine Propulsion Laboratory
 13. Secure Wargaming Laboratory
  In some curricula, the faculty and curriculum 
sponsors take the view that “the real world is 
the laboratory.” For the officers to understand 
and perform thesis research on real operations, 
they take extended field trips, called “experience 
tours,” to other military commands and indus-
trial centers. This enriching opportunity would 
not be available at a civilian university without 
disruption of the normal academic schedule.
3.   Required Masters Thesis: The thesis (required at 
NPS) provides the officers a chance to practice 
their newly developed skills on a problem of mil-
itary interest and relevance (including classified 
theses up to the SI level). It allows the officers to
	 •	 	Define	a	problem	to	be	studied	and	resolved	
in a limited amount of time, under a firm 
deadline;
	 •	 	Integrate	 the	 materials	 studied	 during	 their	
time at NPS in order to bring their new aca-
demic knowledge to bear on a practical prob-
lem, and;
	 •	 	Organize,	 prepare	 and	 deliver	 written	 and	
oral versions of their thesis work.
  Most theses represent a high-quality contribu-
tion to the DoD. Faculty members are experts in 
military-related research and incorporate their 
thesis students in their research teams. Some 
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theses have resulted in large savings for the 
Navy. Others have introduced important new 
ideas that have had immediate effect on combat-
effectiveness. For example, Challenge Athena, 
which demonstrated a dramatic improvement in 
the ability of commercial satellites to provide es-
sential, high bandwidth communication to Navy 
ships, was developed in a (classified) NPS the-
sis. When assessing NPS’ value to the Navy, one 
should consider the body of valuable research 
produced by students and faculty.
  The thesis is required at NPS because it is con-
sidered the keystone of the master’s degree pro-
gram. Thesis students work closely with faculty 
mentors, focusing on DoD problems, often pro-
ducing solutions that make substantive contri-
butions to the Navy and other services. NPS 
tightly integrates the thesis into the educational 
program. Research-oriented civilian schools fo-
cus on doctoral-level work, giving little regard 
(and sometimes no opportunity) for the master’s 
thesis. At the typical PhD-producing university, 
advising of masters theses is not considered a 
significant accomplishment, whereas, at NPS, we 
consider the quality of MS thesis advising to be 
one of the most important dimensions of faculty 
instructional performance.
4.   Dealing with Needs of the Adult, Mid-Career 
Learners After Selection Based on Navy Re-
quirements: Many officers do not have the nec-
essary undergraduate preparation for graduate 
study in their assigned field. Due to the selection 
emphasis on military performance and the skills 
needed by the Navy, in addition to academic per-
formance, the admissions requirements are sig-
nificantly different at NPS than at civilian univer-
sities. Before entry, NPS officers are not required 
to be exactly matched into their graduate fields 
or to provide evidence of high-level academic 
achievement (e.g., high undergraduate grades, 
recommendations of instructors, and scores on 
the Graduate Record Exams). NPS is extremely 
adept at efficiently transitioning these officers to 
new fields if it is in the interest of the Navy. (This 
is particularly important to the military since its 
closed-pipe personnel system precludes mid-ca-
reer accessions in areas of Navy need). No civil-
ian university routinely faces this requirement to 
transition its students to new fields or can deal 
with it as efficiently and effectively as NPS.
  Similarly, NPS does an efficient and effective job 
of refreshing officers who have been away from 
the academic world for a while. Mid-career, adult 
learners, no matter how bright, need some assis-
tance in getting back into the academic mode.
  Meeting NPS officers’ transition and refresher 
needs adds time that civilian masters programs 
do not need to spend. The CNA report recom-
mends the use of distance learning (DL) and 
computer-based instruction to reduce the length 
of NPS programs. NPS already delivers some 
graduate instruction by video-teleconferencing 
DL and is actively pursuing asynchronous net-
work-based learning. As educational innovators, 
the NPS faculty welcomes the opportunity to 
develop these courses in support of the officers’ 
needs. However, past experience with corre-
spondence courses and anecdotal evidence from 
our students suggest that little time is available 
to study during duty assignments. We propose 
that pilot studies be undertaken to develop some 
courses in order to prove the concept before any 
large-scale implementation.
  Similarly, CNA recommends that officers be 
given provisional acceptance to NPS, subject to 
their acquiring the undergraduate background 
needed for their program before arriving at NPS. 
This suggestion is a great disincentive for officers 
to transition into programs of Navy needs. Few 
would transition into the engineering and sci-
ence fields and, for those few, the time required 
for the preparation would be prohibitive. For 
example, about eight undergraduate engineering 
courses and an engineering design project would 
be required for a non-engineering major to be 
prepared for admission into a graduate engineer-
ing program. The result of this recommendation 
would be for officers to seek admission only to 
programs with minimal entrance requirements, 
i.e., programs outside of the science, engineering, 
and technical areas of critical Navy need.
5.   Calendar and OPTEMPO: NPS operates 48 
weeks a year, compared with civilian universi-
ties which offer full programs for only 32 weeks 
per year (semester system) or 33 weeks per year 
(quarter system). Courses at NPS are scheduled 
in response to curricular requirements, not de-
partment preferences, improving curricula effi-
ciency.
  In addition, while at NPS, officers take around 16 
credit-hours per quarter or 64 credit-hours per 
year, an aggressive academic load that necessi-
tates having more faculty than a civilian school 
(where most faculty are off during the summer).
  NPS respects the officer’s scheduled completion 
date. Programs at civilian universities with the-
sis options have unpredictable duration. Students 
take as long as they need to finish and are not 
hastened by the faculty, in contrast to NPS, where 
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the faculty understand the career consequences 
of a student not finishing on time.
6.   Military Infrastructure: NPS provides a com-
plete military infrastructure that supports the 
military and professional aspects of the officer’s 
career while at NPS. The officers are still im-
mersed in a military environment and are not 
“away” from their parent service. The presence 
of fellow officers from other services enriches the 
experience and makes possible joint military ed-
ucation. International officer-students also add a 
unique professional dimension, especially since a 
large percentage of them will ultimately become 
high-level leaders of their nations’ militaries. The 
experience with officers from other nations en-
hances future performance in combined opera-
tions and exercises. In addition, the presence of 
military instructors at NPS provides an additional 
dimension of military presence. It is noted that 
this benefit of maintaining military connectivity 
does not come without costs, however. NPS main-
tains a military line of command involving a Dean 
of Students/Director of Programs office, headed 
by an 06, and a set of Curriculum Officers with as-
sociated support personnel. This line of command 
would not exist at civilian universities.
Each of these educational benefits has evolved over 
time at NPS in response to Navy needs. They col-
lectively establish NPS as a unique educational 
institution that is closely coupled to the Navy’s re-
quirements. Establishment of graduate education 
programs at civilian institutions will require study of 
whether these attributes should be retained or not, 
since civilian programs will have to be reorganized 
to provide them. Any efforts to compete NPS against 
civilian institutions will have to clearly specify the 
features desired.
UTILIzATION ISSUES
The CNA report finds that the P-code subspecialty 
system results in increased curriculum specificity.5 
In tum, this specificity is assumed to contribute to 
the “high” cost of an NPS education. The report 
concludes that, with low P-code utilization rates, the 
“high” education costs due to this perceived speci-
ficity are not justified. Thus, the CNA report rec-
ommends that the Navy move toward less specific 
curriculum requirements to allow streamlining of 
curricula; the elimination of small, inefficient cur-
ricula; competition with civilian universities to offer 
the resulting, general programs; and the develop-
ment of a more generic program leading to a degree 
such as a “Master of Science in Military Manage-
ment and Technology.”6
In contrast, the analysis provided in the remain-
der of this report indicates that NPS provides cost-
effective graduate education including curriculum 
specificity. The extent to which curriculum specific-
ity increases program duration is unclear; thus, the 
additional costs of maintaining specificity are not 
quantified in the CNA report.
Furthermore, the benefits of a P-code driven educa-
tional program have not been assessed in the CNA 
report. The P-code-driven curriculum model cur-
rently serves a number of shore-based (and some 
fleet-based) communities exceedingly well; these 
communities value graduate education and have 
high fill and utilization rates. Loss of these curri-
cula would severely impact the effectiveness of these 
communities.
Since the P-code system was devised to support 
only the shore-based activities of the Navy, it is not 
clear that the utilization rates and other such mea-
sures capture the true impact of graduate education. 
In the absence of any assessment instruments, it is 
particularly difficult to capture the impact of gradu-
ate education on the URL officers who have attend-
ed NPS. Numerous flag visitors have attested that, 
while they have not recently used the specific disci-
plinary information received at NPS, they have defi-
nitely benefited from the resultant critical thinking 
skills and problem-analysis capabilities throughout 
their career.
We caution against substituting a generic program 
leading to a degree such as a “Master of Science in 
Military Management and Technology” for the tra-
ditional technical curricula. Such a generic program, 
while perhaps appropriate for some warfighters, 
runs counter to the trend of increasing sophistica-
tion of systems and the skills needed to utilize them 
fully. The Navy would be best served by having a sig-
nificant fraction of officers familiar with the details 
of the technology. Navy leaders should consider the 
advantages of having a “dual-track” graduate educa-
tion system for both those who use technology and 
those who foster its development and insertion in 
support of warfighting needs.
5  CNA, “A Bottom-Up Assessment ofNavy Flagship Schools,” pp. 60–63.
6  CNA, “A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools,” p. 5.
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COST COMPETITION
The CNA report recommended that graduate degree 
programs for Naval officers be competed from mul-
tiple providers including NPS to establish a market 
mechanism for achieving cost-effective delivery.7 
However, such a market mechanism requires that 
the requirements of program offerings are clearly 
stated and held constant. The requirements to be 
included in a request for proposals should include:





for classified thesis research
	 •	 	Providing	 specialized	 educational	 laborato-






hours per week, including in the summer
	 •	 	Letting	 admissions	 be	 determined	 predomi-
nately on military performance, in addition 
to academic performance, and letting admis-
sions functions be shared with the Navy
	 •	 	Providing	 refresher	 and	 transition	 courses	
and any other requirements, as necessary.
COST-EffECTIVENESS Of NPS IN 
DELIVERING GRADUATE EDUCATION
The CNA report uses data from the Integrated Post-
secondary Education Data System (IPEDS) to com-
pare the costs of NPS graduate education and the 
cost of education at 28 top ranked civilian univer-
sities offering engineering Ph.D. programs. In their 
comparative cost analysis, CNA concludes “… that 
in 1993-1994 NPS’ expenditures were in the top-
quartile for total and educational expenditures per 
student.”8 They found that NPS is the most expen-
sive school when the comparison considered only 
tuition costs for the civilian schools. This leads CNA 
to recommend strategies to reduce the “high” costs 
of an NPS education and later to suggest that the 
Navy consider greater use of civilian schools. In par-
ticular, CNA recommended that:
  “… Navy schools be invited to compete along with 
civilian schools for contracts to furnish educa-
tional services that meet Navy needs. Educational 
contracts need not go to the lowest bidder, but 
would presumably go to the most cost-effective 
provider. Faced with competition, Navy schools 
would be encouraged to seek out their own oppor-
tunities for efficiency gains, eliminating the need 
to benchmark spending. Even if the Navy makes 
no changes in its choice of providers, we would ex-
pect competition to improve efficiency.”9
Competition and expanded use of civilian schools 
can take on three forms: transferring control (and, 
perhaps, ownership) of NPS to a civilian institution, 
transferring all officers in particular curricula to an-
other specific civilian-sector curricula, and transfer-
ring individual or small groups of officers to any of 
several approved civilian programs.
The cost-effectiveness analysis in the remainder 
of this report considers the first and third of these 
options. The cost of the second option should be 
between the two considered. More specifically, the 
analysis is designed to answer two questions:
	 •	 	Can	DoN	expect	to	reduce	its	graduate	education	
costs by transferring NPS ownership and opera-
tional control to a civilian-sector university?
 •	 	Can	DoN	 reduce	 its	 graduate	 education	 costs	
by sending officers to civilian institutions rather 
than NPS?
To answer the first question, this analysis com-
pares the cost of operating NPS to the total cost of 
graduate education at civilian institutions, after nor-
malizing for several factors. These factors are: stu-
dent salaries and benefits, transition and refresher 
courses, course loads and contact hours, and lower 
undergraduate costs (the results are summarized in 
Figures 1 and 2 below). The second question is ad-
dressed by comparing the cost of operating NPS to 
the cost of tuition at civilian institutions. Costs in 
this comparison are normalized for student salaries 
and benefits, transition and refresher courses, and 
course loads and contact hours (these results are 
summarized in Figure 3 below).
The	analysis	to	follow	shows	that,	after	normaliz-
ing	costs	across	institutions,	the	Navy	is	unlikely	to	
7  CNA, “A Bottom-Up Assessment ofNavy Flagship Schools,” pp. 71.
8  CNA, “A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools,” page 70.
9  CNA, “A Bottom-Up Assessment ofNavy Flagship Schools,” pp. 7.




subsidize	 DoN	 students	 through	 its	 endowment	
or	 state	 tax	 funding.	 Similarly,	 cost	 savings	 from	




to	 find	 a	more	 cost-effective	 provider	 than	NPS. 
The detailed analysis supporting these conclusions 
follows.
An appropriate comparison between NPS and ci-
vilian-sector alternatives should be structured as a 
“cost-effectiveness” analysis. A cost-effectiveness 
analysis is appropriate when it is impractical to con-
sider the dollar value of the benefits provided by al-
ternatives under consideration. Given the difficulty 
in identifying the dollar value of an NPS or civilian-
sector education, a cost-effectiveness analysis is ap-
propriate. This approach is the standard for policy 
and program analysis; it is also mandated by OMB 
Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Federal Programs. This Cir-
cular applies to all agencies of the Executive Branch 
of the federal government, including analyses con-
ducted within or for the Department of the Navy 
(DoN) or the Department of Defense (DoD).
More detailed guidance for cost-effectiveness analy-
ses is found in many references.10 The cost analysis 
portion of CNA’s report is most appropriately inter-
preted as a “fixed effectiveness” cost-effectiveness 
analysis.11 This approach compares the costs of al-
ternitive means to provide a fixed benefit; the least 
expensive approach is the most cost-effective. The 
key to using this approach is to ensure that the as-
sumed benefits are as consistent as possible across 
the alternatives.
While the CNA analysis provides a useful first step, 
it currently falls short of a comprehensive cost-effec-
tiveness analysis. As outlined earlier in this critique, 
there are significant educational differences between 
NPS and civilian graduate programs that are not ac-
counted for in CNA’s analysis. Many of these have 
cost impacts that are easily estimated, particularly 
the refresher and transition courses and the extra 
academic loads taken by NPS students. The cost im-
pacts of these factors will be incorporated here, us-
ing data from CNA and N81.12
There are several differences between NPS and civil-
ian-sector graduate programs that bias any compari-
sons based on IPEDS data, including CNA’s analysis. 
These differences include:
1.   Student Salaries and Benefits The IPEDS data 
and the CNA analysis consider only the cost of 
education. Full-time military graduate students 
receive full salary and benefits while attending 
school. The total cost of a Master’s degree in-
cludes both salary and benefits payments and 
educational expenses. Salary and housing costs 
can create significant cost differences across in-
stitutions if graduate programs differ in duration.
2.   Transition and Refresher Courses NPS of-
fers transition and refresher courses for officers 
entering graduate programs that differ from 
their undergraduate degrees and to compensate 
for any lags between undergraduate and gradu-
ate enrollment; civilian programs include only 
degree-related graduate education, SO students 
must be fully prepared before entering the pro-
gram.
3.   Course Loads and Contact Hours (Calendar 
and OPTEMPO) NPS requires officers both 
to carry a heavier class load each quarter and 
to attend classes more weeks per year than do 
civilian-sector universities. Officers are exposed 
to more material per time period at NPS than at 
civilian-sector universities.
4.   Lower Undergraduate Education Costs (Cross-
Subsidies) NPS has no undergraduate pro-
gram, while all civilian universities included in 
CNA’s comparison offer both undergraduate and 
graduate degrees. Graduate education is widely 
acknowledged to be more expensive than under-
graduate education, artificially lowering the cited 
civilian-sector costs relative to NPS.
5.   Endowments and State Funding Civilian-sec-
tor universities have endowments or state fund-
ing that cover a significant portion of graduate 
school costs; tuition covers a relatively small por-
tion of total costs.
We now consider a detailed discussion of each of the 
10  For example, Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice, by David L. Weimer and Aidan R. Vining, Prentice Hall, 1989.
11  Weimer and Vining, page 221.
12  “Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments),” Ser N8113U639949, 
29 March 1993.
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five cost factors.
1.  Student Salaries and Benefits
CNA reports that the average NPS student spends 
22.8 months in residence at NPS. This compares to 
an average program of 24 months for Navy URL of-
ficers enrolled in graduate programs at civilian in-
stitutions (called “civins”) in 1994.13 If NPS resident 
and civins programs are of different durations, any 
cost comparison must include the opportunity cost 
of the officers’ time. This is a significant portion of 
the total cost of graduate education for Navy and 
Marine Corps officers. N81 estimated the cost of sal-
ary, benefits, and housing (referred to as MPN costs) 
for both NPS-resident and civins students.14 In par-
ticular, N81 estimated that in FY1994 the annual 
MPN cost per NPS-resident officer was $63,300, 
compared with the annual MPN cost of $72,300 per 
officer-student at civilian institutions. The higher 
MPN cost for the civins officer-students reflects dif-
ferences in housing costs. NPS-resident officers pre-
dominantly live in base housing; DoN civins officer-
students live in more expensive off-base housing. 
(Note that NPS MPN costs include base-housing 
maintenance.)
Using N81’s estimated MPN costs, CNA’s IPEDS ed-
ucational cost data, and the average program length 
for NPS and civins students, we can calculate the 
present value of the total cost of a master’s degree. In 
this calculation, second year costs are discounted to 
reflect the time value of money. (Present value cal-
culations reflect the direction in OMB circular A-94 
for analyses involving multi-period decisions.) The 
calculations here use a 2.1% real discount rate; this 
was the short-term real discount rate mandated in 
1994 by Appendix C to OMB Circular A-94. (Ap-
pendix C is updated annually, but the 1994 discount 
rate was used in this analysis for consistency with 
the 1994 IPEDS cost data.15) In these calculations, 
the total educational expenditures in dollars per 
FTE are assumed to remain constant in real terms 
(increase in nominal terms at the rate of inflation) 
during the officer’s graduate program.
Incorporating program duration and MPN costs re-
duces the total cost of an NPS graduate degree rela-
tive to civilian-sector universities. In particular, NPS’ 
cost of a graduate degree is $231,024; the mos expen-
sive master’s degree from the schools on CNA’s list is 
$387,947 for the California Institute of Technology 
(Cal Tech), the cheapest degree is $175,091 for the 
University of Maryland-College Park. The weighted 
average cost of a master’s degree is $210,112. This ad-
justment moves NPS from the fifth to the ninth most 
expensive school on CNA’s list. This reflects both the 
civins program’s longer duration and the higher hous-
ing costs. The cumulative effect of this and later ad-
justments is shown in Figure 1.
2.  Transition and Refresher Courses
NPS provides officers transition and refresher 
courses before they begin their graduate education 
at NPS. CNA estimates that this accounts for 21% 
of the time the average officer spends at NPS. Ac-
cording to CNA, the average NPS residency is 22.8 
months; by inference from CNA’s data, 18 months 
(79%) is spent in graduate courses and 4.8 months 
(21%) is spent in transition (20%) and refresher 
(1%) courses.16
Transition and refresher courses are not graduate 
requirements at NPS. In contrast, these courses re-
flect Navy policy that selects officers for graduate 
work based on criteria beyond their undergraduate 
background and academic performance. If the Navy 
chose to adopt traditional civilian-sector admissions 
standards, these courses could be eliminated from 
NPS’ curriculum. On the other hand, if NPS officers 
were transferred to equivalent civilian-sector pro-
grams, these costs would be incurred at the civilian 
universities.
Transition and refresher course costs are not in-
cluded in the civilian graduate program costs as 
measured in the IPEDS database. To include these 
costs as part of NPS’ graduate degree program in-
appropriately biases the analysis against NPS. To 
compare NPS and civilian graduate program costs 
more accurately, transition and refresher course 
costs should be eliminated from NPS’ cost base, just 
as they are from the civilian alternative.
To make this adjustment, the average residency at 
NPS can be reduced by 21%, to reflect CNA’ s es-
timate of the purely graduate coursework at NPS. 
As stated, this reduces NPS average residency to 
18 months and NPS’ graduate program costs to 
13  Data are from the Manager of Navy CIVINS programs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA.
14  “Memorandum for the Deputy Chief ofNaval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments),” SerN81/3U639949, 
29 March 1993).
15  OMB Circular A-94, “Guidelines and Discount Rates for Cost-Benefit Analysis of Federal Programs: Appendix C,” revised January 1998.
16  CNA, “A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools,” page 66.
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$182,919. No adjustment is required for the civilian-
sector IPEDS cost data. Eliminating transition and 
refresher course costs from NPS’ cost base lowers 
NPS from the ninth most expensive program to the 
22nd most expensive program. NPS now becomes 
the eighth least expensive program.
3.   Course Loads and Contact Hours (Calendar 
and OPTEMPO)
In addition to the preceding differences, a compre-
hensive cost-effectiveness analysis should correct 
for differences in program content across alternative 
institutions. NPS programs satisfy both traditional 
academic degree and Navy P-code subspecialty re-
quirements. With these dual requirements, NPS 
programs are likely to include program content 
beyond that found in civilian institutions. Ideally, 
a cost-effectiveness analysis would compare NPS 
program content to the content of corresponding 
civilian programs. However, detailed program con-
tent data is not readily available. In fact, CNA states 
that they did not consider specific degree programs 
in their analysis.
There are two possible measures to capture differ-
ences in program content, program credit hours and 
program class hours. Credit hours and class hours 
are inputs to the education process. However, each 
can serve as a proxy for program content if this in-
put is similar across institutions. In other words, this 
comparison is appropriate if there is consistency 
across the programs in the rate at which faculty can 
deliver and students can absorb class material. There 
is no reason to believe that NPS faculty and students 
are less able to deliver and absorb material than their 
civilian counterparts.
NPS officers carry a heavier class load per quarter 
and attend classes more weeks per year than civil-
ian-sector universities. In particular, NPS officers 
typically have 16 contact hours per week and attend 
classes 48 weeks per year. As a result, the typical NPS 
officer receives credit for 64 contact hours per year 
and attends 768 hours of instruction per year. In 
contrast, civilian-sector graduate students typically 
attend classes 13 hours per week for 32 weeks dur-
ing the standard academic year. During the summer, 
some students attend classes seven hours per week 
for ten weeks. Thus, the typical civilian-sector stu-
dent is unlikely to receive more than approximately 
486 hours of instruction per year, including summer 
classes.
This analysis uses class hours as a proxy for program 
content. Credit hours have different implications for 
quarter and semester system programs and cost per 
credit hour comparisons would not correct for the 
extra weeks of instruction in the typical NPS aca-
demic year. In particular, NPS officers receive 1,152 
hours of graduate instruction in the 18 months after 
they complete their refresher and transition courses. 
In contrast, civilian institutions provide 972 hours 
of graduate instruction in their typical 24-month 
graduate programs. These values are used to convert 
total graduate program costs to graduate program 
costs per hour of instruction.
Figure 1 shows the results of combining the adjust-
ments for officer salaries and housing, the need for 
transition and refresher courses, the forty-eight week 
NPS school year, and the increased academic load 
at NPS. (The “expected graduate class premium” as-
sumes that graduate education is twice as expensive 
as undergraduate education as explained in section 
4 that follows.) Even without this graduate premi-
um, NPS has the lowest graduate program costs per 
hour of instruction among the universities in CNA’S 
list. NPS’ graduate education costs are $159 per class 
hour; civilian-sector costs range from $399 per class 
hour (Cal Tech) to $180 per class hour (University 
of Maryland-College Park). The weighted civilian-
sector average is $215 per class hour.
It is interesting to note that the same result pertains 
if this adjustment is applied to the NPS program 
including transition and refresher courses. Includ-
ing transition and refresher courses would increase 
both class hours and total program costs by the same 
percentage. Cost per class hour would be unaffected. 
Nevertheless, both this and the previous adjustment 
portray important considerations. This adjustment 
indicates that NPS offers a more intensive instruc-
tional program than typical civilian universities. The 
prior adjustment indicates that NPS officers typical-
ly graduate more quickly than students in equivalent 
civilian graduate programs.
These two adjustments help explain the seeming 
contradiction between CNA’s results and the results 
reported here. NPS’ intensive academic program re-
quires a similarly intensive use of faculty, staff, facili-
ties and equipment. This will increase NPS’ annual 
costs per officer, as reported by CNA. A higher an-
nual cost per officer is the disadvantage of intensive 
education. However, a more intensive educational 
program also exposes officers to more material per 
unit time, allows them to graduate more quickly, 
and reduces the associated officer salary and ben-
efit costs. These are benefits of the more intensive 
education. CNA’s analysis only measures the disad-
vantages of NPS’ relatively intensive education; this 
analysis incorporates the advantages. The results re-
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Preliminary adjustments were described and incor-
porated m this analysis. In particular, the IPEDS and 
NPS education costs were modified to:
	 •	 	Reflect	the	total	cost	of	producing	a	graduate,	
including	MPN;
	 •	 	Separate	 the	 cost	 of	 NPS’	 graduate	 courses	
from	transition	and	refresher	courses;
	 •	 	Account	 for	NPS’	heavier	class	 load	and	ad-
ditional	weeks	of	instruction;
	 •	 	Highlight	the	fact	that	NPS	offers	only	gradu-
ate	 education	while	 civilian	 universities	 also	
provide	 undergraduate	 education,	 which	 is	
less	expensive.
After	making	these	adjustments,	it	appears	that	NPS	
provides	 cost-effective	 graduate	 education	 com-
pared	to	the	civilian	universities	included	in	CNA’s	
report.	 Figure	 1	 demonstrates	 that	 NPS’	 costs	 are	
lower	than	comparable	costs	at	civilian	universities.	
This	 comparison	 is	 based	 on	 total	 graduate	 pro-
gram	costs	per	class	hour.	Per	OMB	circular	A-94,	
this	 comparison	measures	 the	 real	 cost	of	military	
graduate	education,	as	 is	 appropriate	 in	evaluating	
public	 sector	programs.	This	 comparison	 indicates	
that	 DoN	 should	 not	 expect	 significant	 education	
cost	 savings	 by	 transferring	 NPS	 ownership	 and	




uated	on	 tuition	costs.	This	 reflects	NPS’	 intensive	
academic	program	and	 lower	MPN	costs.	This	 in-










student	 and	 faculty	 workloads.	This	 reflects	 NPS’	
intensive	academic	program.	The	cost-effectiveness	
implications	of	heavy	student	and	faculty	workloads	
and	 the	 resulting	 intensive	 academic	 program	 are	
not captured by the IPEDS annual education cost 





program	 duration	 and	 specificity	 of	 the	 curricu-




ate	 degrees	 and	 requiring	 some	 officers	 to	 change	
their	 course	 of	 study	 from	 their	 undergraduate	
degrees	 to	meet	Navy	 needs.	This	 policy	 has	 both	
costs	 and	benefits.	This	policy	 is	 vital	 to	 allow	 the	
Navy	 to	meet	 its	 specialty	 requirements	despite	 its	
closed-pipe personnel system that precludes mid-
career	 accessions	 in	 areas	 of	Navy	need.	However,	
it	 increases	 education	 costs	 and	 program	 length,	
whether	officers	attend	NPS	or	civilian	universities.	
If	 Navy	 policy	 requires	 that	 officers	 attend	 transi-
tion	 and	 refresher	 courses,	 the	 analysis	 provided	
here	indicates	that	NPS	delivers	these	courses	more	
cost-effectively	 than	 the	 civilian	 universities	 high-
lighted	 by	 CNA.	 Transferring	 officers	 to	 resident	






















with	 option	 tracks	 that	 allow	 some	 specialization,	
might	be	appropriate	for	the	URL	officer;	however,	
this	approach	would	not	meet	the	Navy’s	needs	for	
technical subspecialists in the restricted line or spe-
cialty communities.
In	 contrast,	 the	 analysis	 provided	 here	 indicates	
that	NPS	provides	cost-effective	graduate	education	
despite curriculum specificity. The extent to which 
curriculum	 specificity	 increases	 program	 duration	
through	 transition	 and	 refresher	 course	 require-
ments	 is	 unclear	 and	has	not	 been	 analyzed;	 thus,	
18		CNA,	“A	Bottom-Up	Assessment	of	Navy	Flagship	Schools,”	page	72.
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the	 costs	 of	 maintaining	 specificity	 are	 unknown.	
Furthermore,	 the	 benefits	 of	 NPS’	 P-code	 driven	






of	 specificity	 low,	 NPS’	 current	 curriculum	 struc-






or they may be limited. These issues should be as-
sessed	in	a	comprehensive	cost-benefit	analysis	be-
fore	 concluding	 that	 the	 Navy	 should	 restructure	
NPS’	curricula	because	of	the	current	P-code	utili-
zation	rates.	There	may	well	be	a	convincing	argu-
ment	 that	 the	21st	 century	Navy	needs	 technically	
educated	officers.	One	should	think	carefully	before	





an	 enlightened	 program	 that	 allowed	 its	 brightest	
officers,	 with	 proven	 military	 leadership	 skills,	 to	
recapitalize	their	intellectual	skills	at	a	critical	point	
in their career paths. The leadership decided at that 
time	that	civilian	universities	could	not	provide	ex-
actly	 the	 desired	 program,	 so	 they	 established	 the	
predecessor	of	NPS	to	provide	the	environment	and	
the	programs	that	would	produce	the	desired	goals.	
The	 resulting	program	 can	be	 considered	 a	model	
for	 providing	 mid-career,	 professional,	 technical	
education.
The	 present	 curricula	 and	 operation	 of	 NPS	 have	
evolved	over	time	in	response	to	Navy	needs.	Spe-
cifically,	NPS	programs	provide	specific	benefits	to	
the	Navy	 beyond	 traditional	 graduate-degree	 pro-
grams.	These	benefits	include	the	military	relevance	
of	the	programs,	the	specialized	facilities	that	extend	
this	military	 relevance,	 the	 theses	 and	 studies	 that	
support	DoD	and	the	Navy,	an	admissions	process	
















an	assessment	 system	 that	measures	 the	 impact	of	
these skills in order to make critical decisions about 
benefits	and	costs	of	graduate	education.	The	Navy’s	





Contrary	 to	 the	CNA’s	 analysis,	 our	 cost	 study	 in-
dicates	 that	 NPS	 is	 highly	 cost	 efficient	 when	 the	
following	 factors	are	 included:	 (1)	 the	officers’	 sal-
ary	 and	benefits	 (including	housing),	 (2)	 the	 costs	
of	 transition	 and	 refresher	 courses	 that	 have	 been	
established	 to	meet	 the	Navy’s	policies	of	delaying	
graduate	 study	 until	 some	 on-the-job	 experience	




technical	 graduate	 education	 compared	 to	 schools	
that	 can	 subsidize	 their	 graduate	 programs	 with	
their	undergraduate	enrollments.
The	Committee	 cautions	 that	 any	 attempt	 to	 have	
NPS	 compete	 for	 programs	 against	 civilian	 insti-
tutions	 must	 decide	 in	 advance	 what	 non-degree	
benefits	 will	 be	 provided.	 Must	 the	 institutions	
provide	refresher	and	transition	support?	Must	the	
institutions	 accept	 all	 officers	 that	 the	Navy	 sends	
or	will	 they	 apply	 their	 existing	 graduate-program	






explore	 legislative	 relief	 to	 allow	 the	establishment	
of	 endowments.	These	 policy	 revision	 are	 outside	
of	 the	purview	of	 the	NPS	faculty.	The	Committee	






that	 should	 have	 been	 addressed	 in	 any	 outside	
study	of	NPS	is	whether	NPS	has	accomplished	its	
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mission.	Does	NPS	contribute	to	the	combat-effec-
tiveness	 of	 the	Navy?	While	we	 answer	 this	 ques-
tion	strongly	affirmative,	the	CNA	study	would	have	
been	an	opportune	time	for	an	independent	answer.	









tions	 analyst.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 following	 remarks	





















tainment	 of	 an	 operations	 research	 degree	 has	






often,	 senior	 leaders	 do	 not	 have	 time	 to	 build	
new intellectual capital — they just consume it.
	 	“The	years	I	spent	in	Monterey	were	important	in	
other	ways	as	well.	They	allowed	me	to	develop	
lasting	bonds	of	 friendship	with	my	 fellow	 stu-
dents.”19
19		VADM	John	Scott	Redd,	letter	to	Prof.	Rosenthal	dated	March	9,	1998.













intensive	work,	 and	 seminar	 courses	 all	 differ	 significantly	 in	 the	 resources	
required.	NPS	is	working	to	identify	and	reduce	these	costs	to	be	more	efficient	
while	achieving	even	greater	effectiveness.”
	 	“Two	 key	 differences	make	 comparisons	 between	NPS	 and	 civilian	 schools	
incomplete	 or	 even	misleading.	NPS	 is	 a	 year-round	 school	…	Students	 are	

















been able to hold costs to 50 percent lower than what would be expected.”
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based	 on	 cost	 alone,	 however	 if	 comparisons	
must	 be	 made,	 they	 should	 accurately	 reflect	
these	differences.
   CNA	 used	 data	 from	 the	 Integrated	 Post-Secondary	
Education	Data	System	(IPEDS).	IPEDS	states	that	“The	
definitions	and	instructions	for	compiling	data	have	been	








ences	 in	 the	 types	 of	 courses	 offered,	 students	
who	take	those	courses,	or	enrollment	levels	for	
the summer term. Students are required to attend 
classes,	professors	are	required	to	teach	courses,	
and the administration continues to operate at 
full	capacity.	Other	universities	do	not	operate	in	
this way.




•	 	The	 CNA	 report	 used	 cost	 per	 FULL-TIME	
EQUIVALENT	(FTE)	 to	compare	NPS	with	ci-
vilian	universities.	FTE	is	defined	as	the	number	
of	 students	 that	 a	 university	 has	 onboard	 at	 its	
peak	enrollment	(midway	into	the	fall	term).
	 ~	 	For	 civilian	 universities,	 FTE	 is	 a	 high	 esti-






students	 the	 university	 will	 support	 over	 12	












   FTE	 is	 further	 defmed	 as	 the	 number	 of	 full-time	 (IT)	
students	 plus	 one-third	 the	 number	 of	 part-time	 (PT)	
(ITE	=	IT+	113	PT).




FTE is derived from Fall Enrollment Figures
 Fall  Winter  Spring  Summer  FTE  AOB  FTE/AOB
University	A:	 2881	 2651	 2514		 1266		 2785		 328		 1.20
University	B:		 3563		 3402		 3199		 2189		 3325		 3088		 1.08
University	C:		 4592		 4268		 4184		 2591		 4439		 3908		 1.14
NPS:		 1505		 1403		 1314		 1494		 1505		 1429		 1.05
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those	paying	full	tuition	and	fees	for	institutions	that	
charge	a	flat	rate.	At	NPS,	full-time	students	take	16	
credit hours per quarter.
	 	 •	 	PART-TIME	STUDENTS	(PT)	are	those	enrolled	in	
fewer	 than	 12	 credit	 hours	 of	 instruction.	Many	 of	
these	students	are	not	taking	classes	but	are	working	
on their dissertations. 
Graduate Versus Undergraduate Programs








	 ~	 	The	 University	 of	 California	 system	 devel-
oped	 a	weighting	 system	 based	 on	 the	 level	
of	course	offered.	Graduate	level	courses	were	
weighted	more	 than	undergraduate	 (2.5	 to	 I	
.0).	The	UC	system	now	accounts	for	the	per-







than expected when compared to other schools. 
In	fact,	NPS	has	been	able	to	hold	costs to 50 per-
cent lower than what would be expected.
NPS	 does	 not	 support	 the	 comparison	 of	 schools	
based	 on	 cost	 alone.	There	 are	many	 less	 tangible	
issues that impact both the comparisons and the 
definition	 of	 costs.	 Technical	 versus	 management	
courses,	 laboratory	 and	 computer	 intensive	 work,	
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ration	with	 institutions	 to	 strengthen	 its	 programs	 in	 national	 security	 and	
defense.
excerpts	 	“NPS	is	a	professionally	oriented,	graduate	research	university	that,	like	other	
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tution	 that	 supports	 current	 and	 future	 readiness,	
advances	 in	 technology,	 and	 the	 educational	 pro-









almost	 a	 century	 with	 clearly	 defined	 visions	 and	
missions.	NPS	has	an	excellent	and	diverse	student	
body;	 a	first	 rate	 faculty,	many	members	of	which	
are	 nationally	 and	 internationally	 recognized	 as	
leaders	 in	 their	academic	fields	and	 in	defense	ap-
plications;	secure	facilities	and	an	ability	to	conduct	
classified	 research;	 educational,	 research,	 and	 ser-
vice	 missions	 that	 are	 tightly	 focused	 on	 military	
and	national	security	issues;	and	the	ability	to	pro-
vide	graduates,	expertise,	and	knowledge	that	make	
fundamental	 contributions	 to	 solving	 our	 nation’s	




NPS	 is	 rated	 as	 the	 DoD’s	 highest	 military	 value	
educational	 institution.	The	 Technical	 Joint	 Cross	
Service	 Group	 (TJCSG)	 computed	 Military	 Value	





















ternational	 officer	 spending	 18–24	 months	 living,	
learning	 and	 discovering	 side	 by	 side	 with	 Navy,	
Marine,	Army	and	Air	Force	officers	how	to	concep-
tualize,	analyze,	and	solve	the	global	challenges	that	
we	all	 face	 in	 the	21st	century.	The	mutual	under-
standing,	trust,	and	goodwill	that	result	from	inten-
sive	interactions	across	this	‘global	village’	of	future	
military	 leaders	may	 in	 fact	contribute	as	much	to	
international	peace	and	harmony	as	does	their	for-
mal	 education.	 As	 future	 military	 operations	 be-
come	increasingly	more	joint	and	international,	it	is	
imperative	that	our	officers	understand,	appreciate,	
and	 interact	 with	 their	 foreign	 counterparts	 with	
the	sensitivity,	intelligence,	and	grace	that	can	only	
come	 from	sustained	experience	with	our	 interna-
tional	 allies	 and	 partners.	 NPS	 provides	 an	 ideal	
environment	 for	 those	 relationships	 to	flourish;	 its	
close	 proximity	 to	 the	Defense	 Language	 Institute	
and	other	partners	in	Northern	California	enriches	
the	learning	experiences	for	all	its	students.
The NPS has reached out to partner with many in-
stitutions	 to	 strengthen	 its	 programs	 and	 improve	
its	 support	 for	 national	 security	 and	 defense.	 An	
NPS,	UCSB	collaboration	greatly	enhances	the	sup-
port	 and	capabilities	of	 all	US	military	 commands	
and	warfighters:	UCSB	world-class	 semiconductor	
and	nano-fabrication	 facilities	 and	 the	 operational	
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experience	of	NPS	faculty	and	students	are	coming	
together	 to	develop	new	sensors,	 secure	 integrated	
circuits, electro-optical components, and materials 




years,	 individual	 faculty	members	 and	 researchers	
have	 been	 collaborating	 on	 research	 projects,	 sen-
sitive	 and	 classified	 workshops	 and	 the	 graduate	
education	of	NPS	and	UC	students.	These	projects	
span	many	areas	of	science,	 technology	and	policy	
that are critical to National Security. The current list 
includes,	 Homeland	 Security,	 Energetic	 Materials,	
Space	 Operations	 and	 Systems,	 Information	 Op-
erations,	 National	 Security/Counter-Proliferation	








There	 is	 a	 perception	 that	 the	 NPS	 simply	 offers	
master’s	 degrees	 in	 engineering,	 science,	 business,	
public	policy	 and	 security	 studies	 that	 are	 also	of-
fered	at	many	of	our	best	civilian	universities.	This	
is	simply	not	the	case.	The	NPS	programs	are	highly	

















ates	 new	 knowledge,	 synthesizes	 new	 and	 existing	




search	 university	 with	 this	 clear	 focus	 on	 defense	
and	national	security.	The	unique	synergy	provided	
by	 bringing	 operationally	 experienced	 officer-stu-
dents	 together	 with	 nationally	 ranked,	 seasoned,	
defense-oriented	faculty	is	an	essential	step	in	form-
ing	the	military	forces	of	the	21st	century.
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Post	Graduate	Education	In	Naval	Engineering. 
By l ieutenant coMMander John halligan, Jr . , u. s . n. , 
The	midshipman	enters	the	U.S.	Naval	Academy	at	
an	 average	 age	of	 about	 18	 years.	He	has	had	 as	 a	
rule	the	equivalent	of	a	high-school	education.	Dur-
ing	 his	 four	 years	 at	Annapolis	 he	 is	 prepared	 for	
the	manifold	 duties	 of	 a	 naval	 officer,	 there	 being	
no	attempt	at	specialization.	The	ground	covered	in	
the	 undergraduate	 course	 is	 necessarily	 extensive.	
In	addition	to	this	engineering	training	the	gradu-




Engineering	 training	 is	 emphasized;	 by	 means	 of	
textbooks,	 revised	 from	 year	 to	 year,	 and	 well-
equipped shops and laboratories, supplemented by 
practical	 work	 onboard	 ship	 during	 the	 summer	















The	young	officer	 leaving	Annapolis	 finds	 that	 his	
work	 lies	 largely	 with	 one	 or	more	 of	 the	 various	
phases	of	naval	engineering	for	20	to	25	years	until	
he	obtains	command	rank.	When	as	head	of	a	de-
partment onboard ship, as an inspector at a ship-
yard,	as	repair	officer	at	a	navy	yard,	or	as	a	member	
of	 a	 technical	 bureau,	 he	 reaches	 a	 position	 of	 re-
sponsibility in connection with the operation, con-
struction,	repair	or	design	of	engineering	material,	









Hull Engineering	 (naval	 construction)	 The	 de-
signing,	 building,	 fit-











machinery,	 electric	 turret-turning	 machinery,	 boat	
cranes,	deck	winches;	the	docking	of	ships.
Ordnance Engineering	 The	 designing,	 manufac-
ture,	 purchasing	 and	 inspecting	 of	 guns	 and	 gun	
mounts,	 ammunition	 hoists,	 rammers,	 gun	 sights	
and telescopes, periscopes and other optical instru-
ments,	smokless	powder,	gun	cotton	and	other	high	
explosives,	torpedoes	and	mines,	torpedo	tubes,	air	
    Rec  Prep  Shop and Laboratory
Marine	engineering	and	naval	construction	 442	 589	 138
Mathematics	and	mechanics	 	 459	 612	 –
Electrical	engineering,	physics	and	chemistry	 340		 453		 16
Ordnance	 	 	 	 153		 204		 81
Total for four years   1,394  1,858  235
Average per week   10.25  17.19  1.75
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compressors, armor, projectiles, small arms and in 
fan	try	equipments,	fire-control	apparatus.
The	management	of	the	Naval	Gun	Factory,	the	Na-
val	 Proving	Ground,	 the	Naval	 Smokeless-Powder	
Factory,	and	various	naval	magazines.
Electrical Engineering At sea	—	As	electrical	offi-
cers on shipboard, the operation and maintenance 
of	all	electric	machinery,	from	the	switchboard.	On 
Shore	—	The	 designing,	 purchasing	 and	 inspecting	
of	all	electric	machinery	and	appliances	except	tur-
ret-turning	motors,	ammunition-hoist	motors,	boat	
cranes and deck winches.
Radio Engineering At sea	—	As	 radio	 officers	 on	






Marine Engineering At sea	—	As	 chief	 engineers	
or	 assistant	 engineers,	 the	 operating,	maintenance	
and	 repair	 of	motive	 and	 auxiliary	machinery.	On 
shore —	The	designing,	building,	purchase,	inspect-
ing	and	repairing	of	propelling	machinery,	boilers,	




Civil Engineering	 The	 designing	 and	 construct-
ing	of	buildings	and	their	permanent	fixtures	at	navy	
yards	 and	 naval	 stations;	 harbor	 works;	 waterfront	








at	 technical	 schools	 in	 England,	 France	 and	 Scot-
land,	and	more	recently	at	the	Massachusetts	Insti-

































there	 is	 now	 required	 a	 thorough	 training	 in	 the	
fundamental	 theory	 of	 thermodynamics,	 machine	
design,	strength	of	materials,	metallurgy,	electricity,	
applied	mechanics	and	engineering	mathematics.
It	 is	 important	 that	 in	 the	postgraduate	work	 fun-
damental	theory	be	emphasized,	because	this	is	the	
naval	 officer’s	 only	 opportunity	 to	 acquire	 theory.	
During	the	greater	part	of	his	active	career	he	will	be	
associated	with	engineering	practice.
ORIGIN OF PRESENT POST GRADUATE 
DEPARTMENT
About	 12	 years	 ago,	 a	 class	 in	marine	 engineering	
consisting	 of	 about	 six	 students,	 was	 organized	 in	
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The	 students	 found	 that	 they	 were	 hampered	 in	
their	reading	by	 the	 inadequacy	of	 their	education	




service	 of	 this	 and	 succeeding	 classes	 has	 been	 so	
conspicuously	valuable	as	definitely	to	establish	the	
importance	of	postgraduate	education.









students to the end that they would prepare them-
















In	 the	 course	 of	 development	 of	 the	 Post	 Gradu-
ate Department there has been much discussion 
and	diversity	 of	 opinion	 as	 to	where	 it	might	 best	
be	 located	and	as	to	the	extent	to	which	the	facili-
ties	of	colleges	and	universities	should	be	used.	The	
predominant	 service	opinion	at	present	 is	 that	 the	







with	a	view	 to	determining	 their	fitness	 for	 subse-
quent	 postgraduate	 training,	 and	 because	 in	 the	
beginning	 it	 is	 important	 to	 indoctrinate	 them	 as	









are: mathematics, mechanics, and applied mechan-
ics;	 electricity;	 heat	 engineering;	 machine	 design;	





















	 	 (d)		High-speed	 internal-combustion	 motors	
for	aeroplanes






a	 council	 consisting	 of	 the	 Superintendent	 of	 the	
Naval	 Academy,	 the	 head	 of	 the	 Engineering	 Ex-
periment	Station,	the	heads	of	the	academic	depart-
ments	 of	marine	 engineering	 and	 naval	 construc-
tion,	ordnance	and	gunnery,	electrical	engineering	
and	 physics,	 mathematics	 and	mechanics,	 a	 naval	
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The	 courses	 in	 chemistry	 are	 conducted	 by	 Prof.	
of	Mathematics	Paul	 J.	Dashiell,	U.	S.	N.,	who	has	
charge	of	the	undergraduate	work	in	chemistry.





Detailed	 descriptions	 of	 the	 courses	 at	 Annapolis	
and	 elsewhere	 are	 contained	 in	 the	 Catalogue	 of	
Curricula	and	Courses	of	Study,	of	which	a	limited	




NATURE OF THE WORK
Someone	 has	 said	 that	 engineering	 is	 one	 part	
















ternoons	 to	drafting	room	or	 laboratory	work,	 the	
division	of	time	between	theory	and	practical	work	
being	about	even.
There	 is	 scheduled	 about	 55	hours	work	per	week	
(lecture,	 laboratory	 and	 preparation).	 The	 home-
work	 required	 is	 about	 15	 hours	 per	 week	—	the	
men	average	20	hours.
It	 has	 been	 found	 necessary	 to	 establish	 a	 control	
of	the	amount	of	preparation	work	assigned	by	the	
professors.	This	 is	 secured	by	means	of	weekly	 re-




work,	 to	which	 there	 are	 assigned	 three	 periods	 a	




uled	 games	 for	 teams	 comprising	 all	 the.	 students	
and	instructors.	Twenty-four	players	are	accommo-
dated	at	one	time	in	the	courts	available.	When	the	
weather	 permits,	 tennis	 will	 replace	 handball;	 for	
this	there	are	24	courts	available.	The	purpose	of	this	
scheduled exercise is to maintain the physical health 
of	the	students	and	to	teach	them	forms	of	exercise	
which they may take to sea.
CHARACTER OF STUDENTS
Selection	of	officers	for	postgraduate	 instruction	is	
made	by	 the	Navy	Department	 from	applicants	 of	
best	service	record,	on	recommendation	of	the	tech-
Courses At Annapolis Subsequent Training.
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nical bureaus concerned. The present requirements 
of	sea	service	since	graduation	from	the	Naval	Acad-
emy	are,	 for	 the	naval	 constructors	 and	civil	 engi-
neers,	two	years;	for	all	other	groups,	five	years.
The	Naval	Post	Graduate	student	 is	unusual	 in	 the	
following	respects:
	 1st.		 	He	 has,	 in	 many	 cases,	 been	 chosen	 for	
postgraduate	 instruction	 because	 of	 ap-
titude	 in	 the	 practical	 application	 of	 the	
theory which he is subsequently to study.
	 2d		 	He	 is	 ambitious	 and	 zealous.	 With	 very	
few	exceptions	he	is	disposed	to	work	too	
much rather than too little.
	 3d.		 	His	time	as	a	student	is	more	valuable	than	




cancy which cannot be filled. While a stu-
dent	he	receives	the	pay	of	his	rank,	which	
is	about	$2,400	per	annum.







tors are selected with care and they are employed in 
















At Massachusetts Institute of Technology:
	 13	Naval	constructors.
At Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute:
	 3		 Civil-engineers.














ary	1,	 1916,	 required	 for	 efficient	operation	 the	
following	number	of	Post	Graduate	Engineer	Of-
ficers	below	the	grade	of	Commander:
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ing	officer	during	World	War	 II.	He	praises	 the	Naval	War	College	 and	 the	
Naval	Post	Graduate	School.







	 	“To	my	horror	—	I	 learned	 that	on	“D”	day	—	it	was	planned	to	close	down	
the	Naval	War	College	and	the	Naval	Post	Graduate	School	in	order	to	provide	









And	I	hope	 that	your	enjoyment	of	your	duties	 is	commensurate	with	 their	
importance.”
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of	1923	after	 a	 course	of	 eleven	months.	Admiral	
Sims	was	President	and	the	Depts.	of	Strategy	and	
Tactics	 were	 headed	 by	 Captin	 Reginale	 Belknat	
and	J.	M.	Reeves,	respectively,	both	splendid	lead-





tic	 support	 for	 an	 advance	 across	 the	Pacific	—	and	
we	were	well	prepared	for	the	fantastic	logistic	efforts	
required	to	support	the	operations	of	the	war.

















I	 credit	 the	 Naval	War	 College	 for	 such	 success	 I	
achieved	 in	 strategy	and	 tactics	both	 in	peace	and	
war.	When	I	became	Chief	of	Bureau	of	Navigation	
in	June	1939,	my	first	act	was	to	send	for	the	NaBav	








order	 that	more	 officers	 could	 be	 rotated	 through	
your fine institution.









and	 I	 congratulate	 you	 on	 having	 that	 fine	 billet.	
And	 I	 hope	 that	 your	 enjoyment	 of	 your	 duties	 is	
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abstract	 	Daniels	 stresses	 the	 importance	 of	 engineering	 not	 only	 as	 the	 “creator	 of	
wealth”	but	cites	educating	Naval	officers	as	engineers	as	having	greatly	helped	
to	improve	the	Navy	and	a	valuable	skill	helping	officers	in	commanding	ships.




















the	Mt.	Vernon	when	 she	was	 torpedoed.	This	characterized	all	 the	men	of	
every	rating	from	Capt.	Dismukes,	a	skilled	engineer	officer,	to	the	youngest	
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much	 at	 home	 in	 overalls	 as	 in	 dinner	 coats,	who	
love	to	make	the	wheels	go	round,	and	who	under-
stand	that	motive	power	is	the	centre	of	world	prog-
ress and world prosperity.
There	 are	 four	 callings	 that	 add	most	 to	 the	 sum	
of	human	wealth—the	 farmer,	 the	miner,	 the	 arti-
san	and	 the	engineer.	The	 last	 is	 an	old	profession	
as	the	water	system	and	baths	and	roads	of	ancient	
Rome	testify,	but	its	expansion	to	cover	all	fields	has	
been	 the	 outstanding	 creator	 of	wealth	 of	 our	 day	
along	with	new	lines.	It	makes	land,	the	one	thing	it	
was said could not create. It carries the water power 
of	Niagaras,	 great	 and	 small,	 to	 distant	 centres.	 It	
increases	 the	 fruit	and	grain	of	 the	 toil	and	multi-
plies	the	product	of	the	artisan	and	gives	new	value	
to	mineral	deposits.	 It	makes	possible	 girdling	 the	
globe	on	the	sea,	under	the	sea	and	in	the	air.	And	
yet,	because	it	works	in	the	bowels	of	the	earth	and	
in	 the	 lowest	decks	of	 the	 ship	and	 in	places	away	
from	the	crowd,	the	recognition	it	deserves	has	not	
hitherto	been	given	to	these	creators	of	wealth.	





compels	 return	 to	 Adam’s	 style	 of	 garment,	 make	
possible	safe	transportation	in	comfort.	A	visit	from	
the	bridge	 to	 the	 engine-rooms	 is	 an	 education	 in	
the	achievement	of	the	engineer,	for	in	our	modern	















where	 the	 torpedo	 struck	and	where	37	men	were	
killed	at	the	post	of	duty	in	the	darkness	without	a	
moments	 warning.	 Immediately	 after	 the	 torpedo	
struck	there	was	not	only	a	maelstrom	of	inrushing	











under	 its	own	power	witnessed	 to	 the	glory	of	 the	
American	Navy.	
Before	 this	 opportunity	 to	 display	 heroism,	 engi-
neering	 skill	 had	 made	 possible	 in	 an	 incredibly	
short	time	the	repair	of	the	destruction	the	Germans	
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We	 have	made	 progress	 in	 naval	 engineering,	 but	
what	has	been	done	 is	but	 the	earnest	of	what	 the	
younger	men	in	their	day	will	achieve	unless	we	are	
to mark time and surrender leadership to others. In 
the	 immediate	 expansion	 of	 the	merchant	marine	
and	 in	 the	 larger	 ships	 the	Navy	 is	building,	 there	








must	 be	more	 general	 study	 of	 engineering	 prob-
lems	by	all	 the	officers	 in	 the	Navy.	 It	ought	 to	be	












This	 is	due	to	the	fact	 that	such	a	 large	part	of	ev-
ery	 officer’s	 duties	 involves	 handling	 or	 operating	
some	kind	of	and	engine	or	machine	which	is	used	
for	a	fighting	purpose	in	ships	of	the	Navy	and	it	is	
of	 course	 evident	 that	 the	best	 results	 can	only	be	
obtained	when	the	officers	handling	these	machines	




and	 in	 addition	be	 a	master	of	 the	other	branches	
of	 the	Naval	 profession.	 It	 is	 true	 that	 the	 filed	 of	
engineers	is	a	vast	one	because	in	our	ships	of	war	
we	 utilize	 machines	 for	 military	 purposes	 which	











the	engine,	and	 it	 is	due	to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	dem-





A	 knowledge	 of	 one	 kind	 of	machine	 also	 greatly	




to operate the ship as a whole, which is really one 
large	 machine.	 The	 operation	 of	 the	 engineering	
departments	of	our	ship	also	involves	large	amount	
of	executive	work,	due	to	the	large	number	of	men	
required	 in	 the	 engineering	 departments	 and	 the	
experience	 which	 officers	 doing	 engineering	 duty	








ments	 of	 a	 ship’s	 organization,	 particularly	 in	 the	
engineering	department,	he	 is	 thereby	much	more	
capable	to	exercise	the	high	office	of	command	and	
is thereby better fitted to train and prepare his ship 
as	a	whole	to	meet	the	acid	test	of	the	day	of	battle.
Recognizing,	 however,	 that	 there	 is	 a	 particular	
need	 for	 a	 number	 of	 officers	 who	 have	 a	 more	
expert	 knowledge	 than	 can	be	 required	of	 all	 offi-
cers	regarding	the	various	types	of	the	engines	and	
machines,	 including	 the	guns,	which	are	placed	 in	
our	fighting	ships,	we	have	established	 this	 special	







sary	now	 to	have	 a	 large	 and	 separately	 organized	
corps	to	perform	these	duties,	although	there	must	
be	a	 few	officers	who	will	be	especially	designated	
for	 the	 service	 as	 expert	 engineers	 throughout	 the	
entire	length	of	their	service	in	the	Navy.
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The	time	spent	in	gaining	this	expert	knowledge	is	
not	lost	but	is	of	the	greatest	value,	even	though	an	
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title  EMBA	Convocation,	First	Civilian	Cohort


























NPS  VALUE BOOK •  EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES
190 VALUE BOOK • A STRATEGIC VALUED INVESTMENT  NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL













to	 your	 professional	 development.	 You	 have	 com-
pleted	 54	 credit	 hours;	 that	 translates	 to	 540	 class	






ment on your part.
	 	The	tangible	reward	you	gained	from	this	invest-
ment,	besides	being	sleep	deprived	for	two	years,	
is	 an	 internationally	 respected	 professional	 de-




	 	We	 hope	 you	 have	 also	 developed	 friendships	
and	connections	with	your	classmates	and	faculty	
members	that	span	the	FM	community	and	help	
broaden	 your	 perspective.	 Your	 classmates	 and	
faculty	members	create	support	networks	you	can	
draw	on	throughout	the	rest	of	your	careers.
	 	More	 importantly,	 we	 hope	 you	 have	 gained	
the	knowledge	and	skills	 to	improve	the	quality	
of	your	work.	In	a	few	conversations	I	had	with	
graduating	 students,	 I	heard	 that	 class	 concepts	
could be applied, in real-time, to your current 
work	repeatedly	throughout	your	program.	This	
is	a	unique	attribute	of	a	part-time	DL	program	
such as this, where students complete their 





program;	 one	 our	 resident	 students	 miss	 (resi-
dent	students	are	fully	immersed	in	education	in	
our	resident	programs	and	only	apply	their	new	







cording	 to	 one	 of	 our	 current	 graduates,	 who	
reports	weekly	on	this	information	to	the	CNO,	
there	 are	 currently	 183,972	Navy	 civilians.	 De-
fense	 Department	 civilians	 require	 the	 same	
knowledge	 and	 skills	 as	 the	 officer	 corps.,	 and	





ficers	 to	 the	 defense-sector	 civilian	 population	
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our	expertise	to	the	Navy	civilian	FM	workforce.	
I	 hope	 we	 can	 find	 similar	 avenues	 to	 include	





increased their human capital in their jobs, and, 
as	 indicated	by	our	 at	 least	 some	of	 your	 class-
mates,	those	benefits	have	already	been	realized	
in	the	work	you	are	doing.	Your	new	knowledge	
and	 skills	 will	 also	 likely	 affect	 those	 working	
with	 you,	 as	 they	 recognize	 and	 replicate	 your	
new	perspectives	(something	we	economists	re-
fer	to	as	educational	externalities).
	 	While	 the	ROI	on	 improved	work	performance	
is	difficult	to	measure,	much	to	our	dismay,	there	









cost-effective	 retention	mechanism,	 if	 the	Navy	




	 	While	 improving	 the	 quality	 of	 your	work	 and	
the	value	of	a	cost-effective	non-monetary	reten-
















ates’	 spouses,	 family,	 friends,	 and	 co-workers.	You	
no	longer	have	to	suffer	the	late	nights,	lonely	week-
ends, sleepy and distracted co-workers associated 
with	 the	 extra	 half-time	 job	 your	 graduates	 have	
borne. 
	 	I	know	I	spent	four	years	writing	my	dissertation	
after	 beginning	 a	 job	 at	 the	 JPL.	When	 friends	
asked	my	wife	and	me	what	I	would	do	with	all	
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Remarks	by	Secretary	Panetta	at	the	Naval	Post	 
Graduate	School,	Monterey,	Calif. 





first one and he will introduce our — the second and 
our	guest	speaker	for	this	morning.
The	Honorable	Sam	Farr	 is	our	congressman	from	
the	 17th	district	 of	California.	He	has	been	 in	 the	












us today. Thank you so much.
Please	 join	me	in	a	warm	welcome	for	the	Honor-
able	Sam	Farr.	(Applause.)






a	 congressman	 and	 then	 left	Congress	 to	 go	work	





pleasure	 for	 me	 to	 welcome	 back	 our	 native	 son,	
Leon	Edward	Panetta.










public	 service,	 as	 well	 as	 his	 wife.	 Before	 joining	















represented	 the	 16th	 congressional	 district,	 which	
became	 the	17th	 congressional	district,	which	will	
next	 year	 become	 the	 20th	 congressional	 district,	




Early	 in	his	 career,	Leon	 served	as	a	 legislative	as-
sistant	to	Senator	Thomas	Kuchel	of	California,	and	




















SECRETARY	 OF	 DEFENSE	 LEON	 PANETTA:	
Thank	you.	Thank	you.	Thank	you	very	much.	Thank	
you,	Sam.	Sam	Farr	has	been	a	dear	friend	and	some-
one	 that	 I’ve	worked	with	a	 long	 time	 in	a	number	
of	positions	and	was	first	on	the	board	of	supervisors	
and	 served	 in	 the	 assembly.	 Obviously	 now	 serves	
in	the	Congress.	And	he	has	been	someone	who	has	
been	incredibly	 important	to	this	area	 in	protecting	
the military establishments that are here.
And	I	thank	him	for	the	support	that	he	has	provid-




Dan	Oliver,	 great	 to	 be	 able	 to	 see	 you	 again	 and	
have	a	chance	to	visit	here.
This	 is	a	special	place	 for	me	and	 in	many	ways	 it’s	










very	 supportive	 of	 the	 school,	 its	mission	 and	 the	
work	 that	 is	 so	 important	 to	 keeping	 this	 country	
on	 the	 cutting-edge	of	 the	 future.	 In	 addition,	not	
only	 as	 congressman,	 but	 as	 OMB	 Director	 and	
then	 Chief	 of	 Staff	 to	 the	 President	 worked	 very	
hard	when	threats	came	to	 the	school	 through	the	
BRAC	 process	—	not	 just	 once	 but	 a	 number	 of	
times	—	and	had	 the	 support	 of	 the	 local	 commu-
nity,	Mayor	Della	Sala	and	Mayor	Dan	Albert	and	a	
number	of	others	who	worked	very	hard	to	put	to-




this	 country.	 We	 were	 successful	 in	 making	 clear	




bases here in this state.





military	 leaders,	 to	our	 civilian	 leaders	 so	 that	 they	
are better able to lead this country as we would con-
front	those	that	threaten	our	peace	and	our	security.
As	Secretary	of	Defense,	obviously	every	day	I	look	
at	 a	myriad	 of	 challenges	 that	 face	 this	 country,	 a	
range	 of	 security	 challenges	 that	 come	 from	 a	 lot	
of	 different	 directions,	 and	 as	 a	 result	 require	 the	
kind	of	leaders	who	are	knowledgeable,	who	are	cre-
ative,	who	 are	 strategic,	who	understand	 the	 steps	
that	have	to	be	taken	if	we’re	to	protect	this	country.	
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am	 the	 son	 of	 Italian	 immigrants	who	made	 their	




















the	next	 step,	which	was	 to	go	 to	war,	either	 in	 the	
Pacific	or	Europe.	And	so	Monterey	was	kind	of	a	last	
piece	of	civilization.	So	it	was	—	Monterey	was	kind	





and	 bought	 a	 place	 out	 in	 Carmel	 Valley,	 where	
we	now	 live,	 planted	 a	walnut	 orchard	 and,	 again,	
worked	hard	out	there	in	the	orchard	moving	irriga-
tion	pipes	and	doing	hoeing.
There’s	 a	 great	 story	 that	 I	 tell	 because	 it	makes	 a	
point. When I was a boy — and in those days my dad 
went around with a pole and hook and shook each 
of	the	branches	in	the	walnut	trees.	And	my	brother	
and	 I	 used	 be	 underneath	 collecting	 the	 walnuts.	
When	I	got	elected	to	Congress,	my	father	said,	you	





would	 you	 come	 all	 of	 that	 distance	 to	 this	 coun-










been	 at	 the	 heart	 and	 soul	 of	what	America	 is	 all	










We	 are	 today	 engaged	 in	 two	 wars,	 in	 Iraq	 and	
Afghanistan.	Obviously,	 our	hope	 is	 that	 for	 all	 of	







tries but more importantly attack our country.
So	our	hope	is	that	as	we	begin	draw	downs	in	Iraq	
and	draw	downs	 in	Afghanistan	we	do	 it	 in	a	way	
that ensures that these countries are stable, that they 
are secure, and that they build on the sacrifices that 
have	 been	made,	 both	 by	 their	 people	 and	 by	 our	

















































We	 continue	 to	 have	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 threats	 that	
emerge	from	what	I	would	call	rogue	nations,	places	
like	 Iran	 and	North	Korea	 that	 continue	 to	 try	 to	
develop	a	nuclear	capability	and	to	undermine	and	
threaten	 stability	 in	 those	 areas	 of	 the	 world.	We	
must	 continue	 to	 do	 everything	we	 can	 to	 ensure	
that	those	threats	do	not	challenge	stability	in	those	
very	important	parts	of	the	world.





tacks	 is	 growing	 throughout	 the	 world.	 Countries	
like	China,	Iran,	Russia,	others	are	developing	that	
capability.	And	I	truly	believe	that	as	that	technology	
increases, as that capability increases, the ability to 
paralyze	this	country	is	very	real	—	to	take	down	our	
power	grid,	to	take	down	our	financial	systems,	take	
down	 our	 government	 systems,	 to	 create	 the	 kind	
of	paralysis	 that	would	 indeed	be	 comparable	 to	 a	
Pearl	Harbor-type	attack.	We	have	got	 to	be	 ready	
not	only	 to	defend	ourselves	but	 to	be	offensive	 in	
being	able	to	go	after	those	that	would	threaten	our	
country in the cyber arena.
All	of	that	combines	with	the	situation	in	which	we	
face	 rising	 powers	 throughout	 the	world	—	China,	
India,	Brazil,	 not	 to	mention	 the	 continuing	 focus	
on	Russia.	Ensuring	that	we	try	everything	we	can	
to	cooperate	with	these	rising	powers	and	to	work	
with them, but to make sure at the same time that 
they do not threaten stability in the world, to be able 
to project our power, to be able to say to the world 
that	we	continue	to	be	a	force	to	be	reckoned	with.
Now,	 all	 of	 this,	 all	 of	 the	 challenges	 I’ve	 just	 de-
scribed	 come	 at	 a	 time	when	 there	 are	 increasing	
budget	 constrictions	here	 at	home.	 It’s	pretty	 clear	
that	we	 are	 going	 to	 face	 resource	 limitations	 that	
we’re	going	to	have	to	deal	with.	We’re	a	country	that	
now	has	 the	 largest	deficit	 in	our	history,	 running	
about	$1.4	trillion	annual	deficits,	almost	a	$14	tril-
lion	national	 debt.	There	 is	 no	 question	 that	we’re	
going	 to	 have	 take	 steps	 to	 discipline	 that	 budget	
and	to	put	it	on	a	glide	path	that	restores	discipline	
through	to	our	fiscal	arena.
I	 am	 not	 one	—	having	 worked	 on	 budgets	 for	 a	
good	part	of	my	career	—	I	am	not	one	who	believes	
you	have	to	choose	between	fiscal	responsibility	and	
national security. I think we can implement fiscal 




on	 defense	 roughly	 in	 the	 ballpark	 that	 Secretary	
Gates	and	President	Obama	had	looked	at	as	a	pos-
sible	target	for	savings	in	the	defense	arena.	So	while	
the	 decisions	 will	 be	 tough	—	these	 are	 not	 easy	
decisions	to	make	—	I	really	do	think	that	we	have	






In	 addition	 to	 that,	we	have	 to	make	 sure	 that	we	
always	protect	our	troops	and	their	families	and	that	







a way that will protect our core security interests in 
the	future,	and	in	a	way	that	will	protect	faith	with	
those	that	serve.	All	of	that	I	believe	is	doable	if	we’re	
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smart	about	it	and	we	do	it	making	the	right	deci-
sions	for	the	future.
But	 there	 is	 a	 greater	 danger	 out	 there.	There	 is	 a	
greater	 danger.	 And	 the	 greater	 danger	 is	 that	 for	
some	reason	because	of	Congress’	inability	to	be	able	
to	 develop	 the	 kind	 of	 deficit	 reduction	 proposals	
that	they’re	being	asked	to	do,	that	they	have	fash-
ioned	what	I’ve	termed	this	doomsday	mechanism	



















cusing	 on	 discretionary	 spending.	 You	 can’t.	 Dis-
cretionary	spending	makes	up	about	a	third	of	the	
federal	budget.	Two-thirds	of	 the	 federal	budget	 is	
in	mandatory	programs.	So	 if	you’re	serious	about	















It will undermine our ability to maintain our alliances 
throughout	the	world.	And,	most	importantly,	it	will	
break	faith	with	the	troops	and	their	families.
And	 so	 this	 is	 a	 time	 not	 only	when	we	 confront	
the	 challenges	 that	 I	 described,	 not	 only	when	we	
confront	the	challenge	of	having	to	deal	with	small-
er	 budgets,	 but	 we	 also	 confront	 the	 challenge	 of	
making	sure	that	the	American	people	understand	








tected	 so	 that	 you	have	 the	 resources	 you	need	 in	





job	 as	 Secretary	of	Defense	—	the	 toughest	part	 of	
this	job	is	that	I	have	to	do	condolence	letters	to	the	
families	of	those	who	have	been	killed	in	action.
































My	 friends,	 we	 bless	 ourselves	with	 the	 hope	 that	
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everything	 is	 going	 to	 be	 fine	 in	 this	 country,	 but	
very	 frankly	 it	doesn’t	mean	a	damn	 thing	 if	we’re	
not	willing	to	fight	for	it.	You	by	your	presence	here	
make	very	clear	that	you	are	willing	to	fight	for	that	
American	 dream	 that	 brought	 my	 parents	 to	 this	
country,	for	the	dream	of	making	sure	that	our	chil-






MR.:	Mr.	Secretary,	on	behalf	of	 the	 students,	 fac-
ulty	and	staff	here	at	the	Naval	Postgraduate	School,	
I	want	to	thank	you,	sir,	for	taking	the	time	to	come	











Q:	 Sir,	 my	 name	 is	 Lieutenant	 Cirillo	 (ph)	 in	 the	
Business	School.	 If	 the	$600	billion	 in	cuts	are	en-
acted,	and	many	of	us	have	seen	the	Defense	Busi-
ness	Board’s	recommendation	for	retirement,	what	
is	 your	 stance	 on	 the	 military’s	 retirement,	 sir?	
(Laughter,	applause.)
SEC.	PANETTA:	Why	the	hell	did	I	know	I	was	go-
ing	 to	get	 that	question?	 (Laughter.)	As	you	know,	
Secretary	Gates	asked	the	board	to	take	a	look	at	the	
retirement	system.	And	they’ve	done	that	and	they	
have	 some	 recommendations	 that	 they’ve	 made.	
They	 actually	 haven’t	 completed	 the	 report,	 so	 I	
haven’t	really	looked	at	their	final	report.	And	obvi-
ously	no	decisions	have	been	made.
But	 let	me	 just	make	 clear	 to	 you	 that	 one	 of	 the	
commitments	I’ve	made	is	not	to	break	faith	with	the	
troops	or	 their	 families.	And	 those	 that	have	been	
deployed	a	number	of	times	have	been	deployed	on	
the basis that ultimately they knew that they had a 
commitment	with	regards	to	their	retirement.	So	if	
anything	 like	 that	were	ever	 to	be	 thought	of	 seri-
ously,	I	wouldn’t	do	it	without	grandfathering	those	
that	 are	 presently	 in	 the	 service	 and	making	 sure	
that	they	get	the	benefits	that	they’re	entitled	to	un-
der the present time.













But	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 question	 that	 I	 was	 asked,	
my	view	is	we	ought	not	to	break	faith	with	those	
that	 serve,	 that	 serve	 now	 and	 that	 if	 there	 were	






icy.	 Ohio	 State	 University	 Professor	 John	Mueller	
stated	 in	 a	 recent	 article	 in	Foreign	Affairs,	 quote,	
“An	 al	 Qaeda	 computer	 seized	 in	 Afghanistan	 in	
2001	indicated	that	the	group’s	budget	for	research	














we’re	 here	 to	 do.	That’s	 what	 we’re	 all	 about	 is	 to	
make	sure	that	al	Qaeda	and	their	militant	affiliates	
never	again	attack	this	country.
And	 let	 me	 make	 clear	 that	 while	 we	 have	 made	
progress	 against	 al	 Qaeda	 and	 we	 have	 weakened	
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And	I	 think	we	have	 to	make	sure	 that	 they	never	
have	 that	opportunity	 to	again	attack	 this	country.	
And	 that	 means	 we	 continue	 to	 put	 pressure	 on	









attending	 the	 cost	management	 course	here.	Right	









tion	 forces	and,	hopefully,	 the	 transitional	govern-
ment	there	so	that	they	will	have	the	funds	in	order	
to	do	 the	 rebuilding,	 in	order	 to	 establish	 the	 sys-















Q:	 Sir,	 Lieutenant	 Colonel	 Glenn	 Hodges	 (sp)	 in	
the	modeling	virtual	environments	and	simulations	
curriculum	here	at	NPS.	On	the	8th	of	March,	the	




ing	 programs	 that	 are	 enabled	 by	 modeling	 and	
simulation.	 Sir,	what	 is	 your	position	on	 the	value	













So	 without	 going	 into	 particulars,	 I’m	 still	 await-
ing	 actually	 their	 recommendations	 with	 regards	
to	some	of	the	areas	that	they	want	to	focus	on.	As	

















regards	 to	 training,	 that	 undermines	 the	 ability	 to	
have	the	best-trained,	best-equipped	force	that	this	
country	needs	to	have	if	we’re	going	to	confront	the	














tions	 because,	 obviously,	 the	 Navy	 needs	 to	make	
modifications	on	that	plane	for	purposes	of	 taking	
it	off	a	carrier.	The	Marines	need	 to	make	modifi-
cations	 on	 that	 plane	 in	 order	 for	 them	 to	 have	 a	
STOVAL	capability.	And	so	there	have	been	modi-
fications.	We’re	beginning	to	test	the	plane	now.	It’s	
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in the test phase.
I think that plane will give us an important capa-
bility for the future. You know, from everyone I’ve 
talked to, they seem very pleased that it does in fact 
provide the capabilities that we need. But it’s going 
to take a lot of work. It’s still going through the test 
phase. We’ll learn a lot from the test phase. But I 
think it’s an investment that we ought to maintain 
for the future.
One more question.
Q: Hello, sir. My name is Rachel Goshorn. I’m a pro-
fessor in the Engineering School and our C4I chair. 
My question revolves around the concern for not 
having enough intelligence analysts or experts in the 
future to predict and prevent terror threats, particu-
larly when sensor systems are becoming so cheap 
and deployed everywhere and we won’t have enough 
bandwidth to communicate this and our small satel-
lites, unmanned systems won’t have enough power.
So my question is, from your intelligence expertise, 
what is your view on automation in the future and 
automating intelligence analysts at our DoD sys-
tems? (Laughter.)
SEC. PANETTA: I’m still a believer that you still 
need to have two feet and a brain to be able to do the 
kind of intelligence that we need. I mean, there are 
areas, obviously, where we can make use of automa-
tion, where we can make use of new technologies. 
But very frankly, I have seen no substitute for having 
an asset on the ground being able to give you the 
intelligence that you need.
And, you know, now we have a myriad — obviously, 
we’ve got a myriad of intelligence capabilities, both 
in terms of technology, SIGINT, imagery, various 
satellites that provide additional elements to our in-
telligence. But when I have to know what’s taking 
place with regards to a specific target or a specific 
area, the ability to have assets that are trained to go 
into that area and be able to see it, be able to report 
on it, is extremely important to our ability to have 
good intelligence.
So if you’re going to put together the best intelli-
gence — and that was my responsibility as Director of 
the CIA was to give the President the very best intelli-
gence we could, to give him that intelligence depends 
on a lot of contributing factors that help you again be 
able to affirm the intelligence that you’re getting.
Look, when we first got the track to bin Laden’s com-
pound, the key on that was the ability to track these 
couriers that at one time worked for Osama bin Lad-
en, to track those couriers to the compound. We were 
able to do that using, obviously, a lot of new technol-
ogy to be able to get that done. But, in addition, we 
used a lot of other intelligence to be able to continue 
to look at that compound, to continue to determine 
whether or not in fact bin Laden was there.
Let me tell you something. You know, we were never 
able to confirm the fact that bin Laden was there. 
And there were a lot of different opinions as to 
whether or not the intelligence showed bin Laden 
being there that ranged a great deal depending on 
one’s background. But, in the end, as Director of the 
CIA I looked at that and I said, we have the best in-
telligence we’ve had since Tora Bora on where this 
guy may be. And the result of that intelligence came 
from a number of different areas that helped to build 
that case.
But in the end, I’ve got to tell you something and I 
think it’s something you all know. In this business, in 
your business, ultimately you have to take risks. You 
have to take risks based on the best information you 
have, but you have to take risks if you want to get any 
damn thing done. And so based on that the Presi-
dent of the United States made a very courageous 
decision to proceed with that effort, and it paid off. 
But there are times when it doesn’t pay off. There are 
times when you make mistakes.
But the important thing is to use every asset you 
have, every capability you have to build that intel-
ligence. That is what the President needs. That’s 
what policymakers need in order to make the deci-
sion. And, very frankly, my rule was as Director of 
the CIA, whether you like to hear it or not, you’re 
going to hear what I know and you’re going to hear 
the truth. And it’s based on that and ultimately the 
decisions have to be made.
But I do think that with regard specifically to your 
question, I think we need to develop a lot of different 
approaches to intelligence. We’ve got to be willing 
to invest in new capabilities. But in the end, what 
you need are well trained, language-capable analysts 
who know what the hell they’re looking at.
Okay. Thank you.
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It’s More Than a Job or an Adventure
An inside look at the Naval Postgraduate School, where teaching, learning 
and applying operations research is serious business for all concerned 
By RichaRd E . RosEnthal 
Some people think of the Naval Postgraduate School 
as one of the nation’s best-kept secrets. In the Opera-
tions Research World, NPS has a fairly large foot-
print, but still there are members of INFORMS who 
might not know much about NPS-OR.
I was introduced to operations research as a 19-year-
old undergraduate by Professor Jon Liebman. My 
schooling until then was in math, which at Johns 
Hopkins meant theoretical math. I already had ad-
vanced calculus and linear algebra, and was learn-
ing about group theory and rings. To give you an 
idea of how theoretical it was, the linear algebra class 
was completely devoid of numerics, and it dismissed 
matrices as an insignificant special case of linear 
transformations. I knew I did not want to be so 
far removed from real-world problems but did not 
know where to turn. One of the luckiest days of my 
life was when I asked Dr. Liebman for advice. He lit 
my enthusiasm for OR and it has never diminished. 
It is very hard to imagine a better place than NPS to 
fulfill the career ambitions that Jon kindled in me.
The U.S. Navy created NPS in 1909, when Navy 
leadership realized that ships and weapons were get-
ting so technically complex that the officers at sea 
would need more than undergraduate knowledge 
of engineering to keep these systems running. The 
school began as a postgraduate department at An-
napolis and moved to its current breathtaking loca-
tion in Monterey, Calif., in 1952.
The OR program at NPS was established in 1951, 
prior to its civilian counterparts, because of the 
importance of OR in WWII. Fleet Admiral Ernest 
J. King, in his official report on the Navy’s perfor-
mance in WWII, wrote that operations research 
“made it possible to work out improvements in tac-
tics which sometimes increased the effectiveness of
weapons by factors of three or five …” [1]. (For more 
NPS-OR history, see Schrady [2] and Washburn [3]. 
Washburn’s piece points out that the PNS-OR cur-
riculum bears strong resemblance to the ideal OR 
curricula put forth by Dyer et al. [4] and Larson [5].)
HIGHLy-MOTIVATED STUDENTS
The worst thing about NPS education is that it is 
not open to the public. Yet, some of the best things 
about NPS education derive from this fact. We 
know where our students are coming from — they 
are mid-career officers of the U.S. and allied mili-
tary services — and we know what kind of work they 
will be doing when they graduate. Their employers 
maintain close contact with us, providing regular 
feedback on the effectiveness of our graduates.
The services pay our students full salaries, house 
them and their families, and provide complete med-
ical care. Thus, we can work them at full throttle 48 
weeks a year, with two weeks off at Christmas and 
the 4th of July.
The NPS students take their studies quite seriously. 
They are evaluated as military officers in part by how 
effectively they perform as students. So as profes-
sors, we generally have their complete attention.
People in the civilian world may not realize how 
important evaluation is to an officer. The military 
will only promote those whose careers have had ex-
perience and demonstrated mastery of subordinate 
roles, and in addition shown merit and achievement 
to deserve the next promotion. It is an “up or out” 
system, and there is no such thing as a sideways 
move. The U.S. Army does not poach talent from the 
U.S. Navy or from another country’s services. Con-
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trast this to the civilian world, where a freshly mint-
ed MBA might end up in an executive position, and 
a senior executive or even the CEO may be hired 
away from another company. Understanding the 
dynamics of military officers’ careers is important 
for us in dealing with our students on an individual 
level and, incidentally, it creates opportunities for 
some interesting OR problems.
While we faculty are evaluating the students, so are 
they evaluating us. We pay close attention to our 
students, particularly their opinions of our instruc-
tion. These are professional military officers and 
keen judges of professional performance.
Every NPS-OR student writes a thesis. This is a huge 
commitment of faculty and student time, but an im-
portant one. Our graduates immediately assume po-
sitions of responsibility requiring constant reviews 
of technical work, reports, white papers, presenta-
tions and the like. We use the thesis exercise as a 
summary personal study course to hone OR analyti-
cal and expository skills.
Faculty do not use teaching assistants. We grade and 
advise personally. It helps that NPS has a remark-
able 4:1 student-to-faculty ratio, and no class has 
more than 30 students. The flip side of having 45 OR 
faculty to share the thesis load is that we don’t have 
enough courses to keep everyone teaching full-time. 
Consequently, faculty bring in about half their sal-
ary from research sponsors.
Distinguished Professor Jerry Brown advises new 
faculty: “Take good care of your students, they de-
serve it, and eventually you’ll be working for one of 
them.”
Brown should know: His thesis student U.S. Army 
then-Capt. Tom White went on to become a gen-
eral and, later, Secretary of the Army. His linear pro-
gramming student U.S. Navy then-Lt. Mike Mullen 
is now the Chief of Naval Operations, our nation’s 
top naval officer. Mullen has been nominated to 
serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Amer-
ica’s top military officer.
Brown continues: “That Admiral Mullen is best 
known as a problemsolver is no surprise, that’s the 
core focus of our MS-OR program.”
Indeed, many research sponsors are former students.
NPS-OR faculty frequently receive calls from for-
mer students, asking us to participate in solving 
exigent problems. In 2005, Professor Rob Dell got a 
call from Iraq from a graduate who needed help in 
planning airlifts. Within weeks, he and Brown were 
in country, and — while Professor Matt Carlyle was 
generating columns around the clock back home for 
their optimization model — they had a fleet- and 
cargo-scheduling solver up and running.
Professor Bob Koyak and his student, Marine Maj. 
Matt Reuter, are working a murky, but vitally impor-
tant data analysis problem based on vehicle main-
tenance records from Iraq. In the accompanying 
sidebar, Koyak conveys the sense of urgency and ex-
citement NPS students and faculty have about work-
ing on real problems.
Professor Moshe Kress and frequent visitor Profes-
sor Ed Kaplan of Yale have earned a great deal of 
attention with their models of suicide bombing [6]. 
The New York Times called this work one of the 50 
most important ideas of 2005 and described its sur-
prising findings to a wide audience [7].
Homeland security is a key theme in NPS-OR edu-
cation and research. Professor Kevin Wood initiated 
the use of attacker-defender games, solved in the 
form of multi-level optimization models, to assess 
the vulnerability and plan the protection of critical 
infrastructure [8]. This modeling approach is taught 
to every OR graduate.
COMPARE, CONTRAST WITH  
CIVILIAN OR
Most courses in the OR curriculum cover topics 
similar to courses in civilian OR programs — com-
putational methods, statistics, data analysis, sto-
chastic models, linear and nonlinear optimization, 
network flows, simulation, decision analysis and 
game theory — but all of these are enriched with 
examples that relate to the students’ experience and 
the professors’ (and former students’) research.
We also have courses and topics that are not com-
monly found in other programs. In direct response 
to the needs of the services that employ our gradu-
ates, these include campaign analysis, combat mod-
eling, cost analysis, firing theory, human factors in 
system design, test and evaluation, search and de-
tection theory and war-gaming. We even have an 
“OR by Excel” capstone course, very popular with 
students and our sponsors. (We think it is important 
to teach the more in-depth treatment of OR topics, 
before the student sees the spreadsheet versions.)
There is a great deal of emphasis in our courses on 
projects and presentations, because we know our 
students will need to be skilled in these activities on 
their jobs. For example, in our networks class, fol-
lowing the guidance of Professor Carlyle, students 
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form “Red Teams” that plan the optimal attack and 
defense of infrastructure systems (transportation 
networks, data communications, pipelines, power 
distribution networks, nuclear weapons develop-
ment programs, etc.). Some of these projects have 
received attention at high levels in the government.
Many student and faculty projects have led to wide-
ly used products in the services. Professor Wayne 
Hughes’ book Fleet Tactics [9] has been translated 
into numerous languages and is said to be in ev-
ery wardroom afloat. Distinguished Professor Alan 
Washburn’s collection of teaching materials on 
search and detection, Kalman filters, Lanchester 
equations and firing theory are widely used in the 
military OR world, as is his software for anti-sub-
marine warfare.
The Marine Corps used an NPS network model for 
mobilizing officers [10]. A paper published in Opera-
tions Research in 2005 was recently developed into 
a system used for theater missile defense [11]. Capt. 
Jeff Kline, a former student and current faculty mem-
ber, applied a simple linear program for conserving 
fuel when he was in command of a ship [12]. His 
ship’s fuel usage was so much lower than her sister 
ships that Kline was inspected for safety violations. 
His performance was vindicated and the LP method 
was promulgated throughout the fleet. A total of eight 
master’s of science theses have addressed various as-
pects of planning Tomahawk missile strikes from 
ships and submarines — this has culminated in the 
system the Navy now uses for this purpose.
New problems arrive almost every day. For example, 
Professor Gordon Bradley is in frequent contact 
with former students stationed in Iraq. They are try-
ing ideas Bradley and his current students send back 
for dealing with improvised explosive devices. These 
officers are using generator power from forward bas-
es, but they still respond moments after being con-
tacted. We can exchange email and video with them 
at any level of classification. Thus, NPS-OR is part of 
a real-time, networked-OR military campaign. Ty-
ing this sort of experience into the OR education is a 
priceless opportunity for our students.
THE EXPERIENCE TOUR
A vital piece of the NPS-OR approach to education 
is what we call the experience tour. This is a six-week 
period at roughly the midpoint of the curriculum in 
which students go off campus to an organization 
where they can gain practical analytical experience. 
In most cases, the tour is tied to the student’s even-
tual thesis topic, and is related to the faculty advi-
sor’s sponsored research. We fought over the years 
to retain the experience tour when various bean-
counters have tried to find ways to cut the cost of the 
NPS-OR master’s degree. As Distinguished Profes-
sor and Provost Emeritus David Schrady says, “The 
experience tour is essential because the laboratory 
of OR is the real world.”
Our master’s program lasts at least two years, and it 
is a terminal degree for more than 90 percent of our 
students. Depending on the student’s background, a 
one-quarter engineering science and mathematics 
brushup can be added.
Current OR students at NPS include 21 interna-
tional officers from 10 countries (Bahrain, Germa-
ny, Greece, Israel, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Spain, 
Taiwan and Turkey) and 144 U.S. officers from the 
Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. Our stu-
dents learn much from their classmates’ about their 
services, combat specialties and countries. Each year 
we start one cohort in the fall and another in the 
spring. The cohorts stay largely together, so strong 
friendships develop during classes, study sessions 
and after-hours socializing which bridge the mili-
tary service and country differences. Each cohort 
has a section leader, so communication with the fac-
ulty is quick and effective.
NPS is very proud of a story that has been passed 
down like family lore for at least as long as I have 
been on the faculty (23 years). There was a skirmish 
in Cypress, which prompted Greece and Turkey to 
send warships to the area. The tension was rising. It 
looked like serious conflict could break out at any 
moment. A last-ditch effort at diplomacy was called 
for and representatives of both navies were gathered. 
Suddenly, two officers on opposite sides of the table 
recognized each other as fellow NPS students and 
began to reminisce. There was a dramatic change in 
the mood at that moment, and an international cri-
sis was averted.
Several allied student-officers have gone on to great 
success in their services. The Chief Defense Scientist 
of Singapore, Pao Cheun Lui, is an NPS OR gradu-
ate, as is the recent Chief of Naval Operations for the 
Turkish Navy.
Admiral Mullen says this about his NPS-OR degree: 
“I think the OR curriculum I went through is very 
relevant to what we do in the Navy. I’ve used it in 
the Pentagon, at sea and in warfighting. What the 
curriculum taught me to do was properly frame a 
problem, ask the right questions, assess the risks and 
move on from there.”
We are proud of our graduates!
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Clarity in the Fog of War 
By RoBERt KoyaK 
Operations research as a whole benefits from hav-
ing hard problems in data analysis and statistical 
inference engaged by those with expertise in these 
areas. Statistical analysis also benefits from treating 
problems as having more than a quantitative aspect. 
Data are more than a collection of numbers. Our 
students learn to view real-world problems as multi-
disciplinary, and to use all the skills at their disposal 
to handle them with integrity.
Because our master’s students must complete a the-
sis in order to graduate, they quickly see the contrast 
between problems as presented in their textbooks 
(polished diamonds) and the subjects of their the-
sis research (diamonds-in-the-rough). The contrast 
can be disillusioning. I will use a current advisee as 
a case in point.
Maj. Matt Reuter, USMC, has assembled, with 
painstaking care a dataset consisting of the main-
tenance activity of 456 land vehicles (MTVRs) that 
have been fielded in Iraq. The maintenance records 
chronicle both scheduled and unscheduled mainte-
nance events, and the dates upon which the vehicles 
were outfitted with armoring (which adds approxi-
mately five tons of weight to each vehicle). The spon-
sor wants to be informed about the operational re-
liability of these vehicles under field conditions in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
On the face of it, this project is a feast for a reli-
ability modeler: it has a great story, real-world 
data, multiple failure modes (we are studying 11 of 
them), preventative maintenance events and inter-
esting explanatory variables. Time to dig in, right? 
It would be, were it not for a few pesky details. For 
example, each data record is supposed to contain an 
odometer reading for the vehicle at the time of the 
maintenance event. Usage time is much better than 
chronological time for quantifying reliability, so we 
clearly want to have credible odometer readings.
Unfortunately, most of the odometer readings are 
either missing, given phony values such as “9999” or 
“12345,” or constitute a schizophrenic profile when 
a vehicle is considered across time. Other serious 
data-quality problems exist as well. A RAND study 
noted that a 20 percent error rate is fairly typical for 
records in defense-related maintenance data bases, 
and what we have found suggests that this may be 
an understatement.
Many statistical modelers would choose to defer 
their feast for another day, but for my student the 
questions that must be answered would still remain. 
His thesis will describe data-quality shortfalls and 
how they impact his analysis, because these are 
things that his sponsor should know. He will tell 
them, for example, that the maintainers may be 
confusing the odometer with the tachometer, which 
are located side-by-side on the interior panel, and 
which may be causing the wild variations in re-
corded odometer readings that he observed. He will 
answer the important questions to the best of his 
ability, but with honesty about the uncertainty in his 
results due both to stochastic variability and to data-
quality shortfalls.
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ABSTRACT
Few studies have examined the relationship between 
on-the-job productivity and graduate education us-
ing single-firm data. This paper studies the effect 
of graduate education on job performance using a 
unique micro-database consisting of military offi-
cers. Supervisor ratings and promotion probabilities 
are examined for professional and technical officers 
in the US Navy, a hierarchical organization with 
an internal labor market and up-or-out promotion 
policies. Single-stage estimates indicate that, among 
those eligible to be considered for promotion to 
grade 4, the up-or-out point, those with any gradu-
ate degree are more likely to be promoted. The ef-
fect is especially pronounced for those who receive a 
degree via the Navy’s sponsored, full-time program. 
However, when instruments that are uncorrelated 
with promotion are used to predict graduate degree 
status, the results suggest that a sizeable portion of 
the relationship between graduate education and 
promotion is due to unobserved attributes that lead 
some people to attend (or to be selected for) gradu-
ate school and to be more promotable. The selec-
tion-corrected estimates of the promotion effect of 
graduate education are reduced by between 40 and 
50%. [JEL I21, J24] Ó 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All 
rights reserved.
Keywords: Graduate education; Internal labor mar-
kets; Bivariate probit model; Promotion probabilities
1. INTRODUCTION
The earnings premium associated with postsecond-
ary degrees (Grogger & Eide, 1995; Cohn & Hughes, 
1994) is treated as the private return to education 
and is often interpreted as a reflection of the differ-
ential in productivity for those with more completed 
education. A considerable literature, however, has 
questioned whether the wage–schooling relation-
ship is due to learning or to sorting by employers 
(Weiss, 1995). Aside from the difficulty of determin-
ing whether current wages measure productivity, a 
key issue in the debate is whether the link between 
education and productivity is causal in nature. Em-
pirical studies using direct measures of productiv-
ity have produced inconsistent results. Indeed, the 
direct link between bachelor’s and master’s degrees 
and on-the-job productivity has not been stud-
ied extensively. Given the growing emphasis in the 
work force on formal education, additional research 
on the direct effect of postsecondary education ap-
pears warranted. This study examines the specific 
relationship between graduate education and on-
the-job performance for professional employees in 
a single large, hierarchical organization.
The study examines the effect of graduate educa-
tion on job success using a unique micro-database 
consisting of military officers. The data set contains 
relatively detailed information on promotion out-
comes, performance ratings by supervisors, and 
numerous background characteristics such as aca-
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demic achievement and early career performance 
in the organization. An advantage of the data set in 
exploring worker productivity is the organization’s 
internal labor market characterized by a vertical hi-
erarchy with a well-defined personnel system. Offi-
cer career paths are extremely structured: all officers 
begin their careers in entry-level positions and pos-
sess a bachelor’s degree; those with master’s degrees 
acquire them after joining the organization; and 
most advanced education is financed at least in part 
by the military and is viewed as a form of profes-
sional education.
The research should shed some light on the potential 
benefits of advanced education programs, for nearly 
all large private firms provide educational benefits to 
their professional and managerial employees.1 In ad-
dition, the military’s personnel system mimics private 
firms in many ways, so that studying military job per-
formance may provide information on the operation 
of internal labor markets, including the promotion 
process and the role of performance evaluations.
The next section of the paper reviews previous stud-
ies that have dealt, directly or indirectly, with gradu-
ate education and job success. We then describe 
the personnel data used in the analyses, the Navy’s 
advanced education programs, and the empirical 
strategy. Following that we present estimates of the 
performance models. In general, we find that gradu-
ate education improves measures of employee job 
productivity; however, these effects are significantly 
reduced in instrumental variable estimates that ad-
just for selection bias.
2. BACKGROUND
Only a handful of studies have analyzed the relation-
ship between human capital and job performance 
using firm-level data. Wise (1975a, b) examined 
the starting salaries, salary growth, and promo-
tion probabilities of managerial and professional 
employees in a single firm; Gerhart and Milkovich 
(1989) studied current salaries, salary growth, and 
the number of promotions over a 6-year period for 
exempt employees in a manufacturing firm. Wise 
found that those who acquired graduate degrees af-
ter joining the firm earned a 1.2 percentage point 
premium in annual salary growth, but only if they 
were ranked in the top third of their class. Promo-
tion probabilities were about 7% higher for those 
with advanced degrees. Gerhart and Milkovich 
found that type of degree mattered: an M.A. had a 
negative effect on salary growth whereas an M.B.A. 
had a positive effect.
Medoff and Abraham (1980) argued that earnings 
should be compared only within grade levels due to 
differences in the type of jobs across grades. After 
controlling for grade level in their employee data 
from a manufacturing firm the earnings premium 
for a master’s degree fell from 10 to only 1%. More-
over, while within grade earnings were higher for ad-
vanced degree holders, measured productivity was 
not. Because only one-tenth to one-fifth of the total 
return to education was due to higher within-grade 
earnings, they concluded that master’s degree hold-
ers earn more simply because at entry they are as-
signed to jobs in higher grades. Introducing controls 
for performance evaluations in the earnings models 
did not move the education coefficients toward zero, 
implying that differences in performance for those 
with advanced degrees does not explain the posi-
tive within-grade relationship between education 
and earnings. They concluded that, within groups of 
comparable jobs, there was no correlation between 
additional human capital and performance.2
Woo (1986) also found that controlling for grade and 
performance rating reduced the earnings premium 
for a master’s from 7–25 percentage points to only 1 
point. Although salary growth rates for master’s de-
grees exceeded those for bachelor’s, Woo found an 
M.B.A had no effect on within-grade performance 
ratings, and a non-business degree had a negative 
effect. Further, the probability of promotion was sig-
nificantly lower for both types of master’s degrees. 
Since performance ratings and promotion are su-
perior to earnings as measures of productivity, she 
concluded that a graduate degree does not enhance 
employee productivity.3
Several explanations have been offered for the find-
1  A 1986 survey of Fortune 1000 companies revealed that 98% of the 730 respondents had a tuition assistance program. Two-thirds of 
the companies reimbursed employees for non job-related courses, especially if they were part of a degree program (O’Neill, 1986). 
Also, an increasing number of firms are setting up in-house ‘corporate colleges’.
2  This conclusion also applied to other human capital measures, namely pre-company experience and tenure at the firm, which were 
the primary focus of their papers. These basic results were echoed by Dunson (1985) who used data on federal professional and 
administrative workers. 
3  Bartel (1995) used a company database to estimate the effects of company-sponsored formal training for professional employees on 
wage growth and performance ratings. Using an instrumental variables strategy she found that the incidence and duration of formal 
training increased salary growth rates and performance ratings.
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ing that earnings appear to increase with human 
capital variables, such as advanced degrees, but pro-
ductivity does not. Weiss and Landau (1985) point 
out that the distribution of workers on a given job 
is truncated from above and below; truncation oc-
curs because various criteria must be met initially 
to be assigned to the job and to keep it, and other 
criteria must be met (such as higher productivity) to 
get promoted. Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) note 
that the productivity indicators in these studies are 
occupation- and job-level-specific so that produc-
tivity and education are examined only for workers 
who remain in an occupation or a job. Such work-
ers may be unrepresentative in the sense that they 
do not follow the normal life cycle pattern that in-
volves occupational change and promotion.4 Finally, 
Medoff and Abrahamtype studies examine salary 
and grade level after entry. If advanced degree hold-
ers start at higher grades, subsequent promotion 
opportunities will tend to be less numerous and to 
occur at longer time intervals.
These early studies also provide little information 
on the basic structure of the personnel systems of 
the firms studied. For example, performance mea-
sures are stratified by grade level but it is not known 
how workers are distributed across current or entry 
grades by education. Similarly, no information is 
provided on the firms’ education programs, includ-
ing the timing and source of funding of advanced 
education, the number of employees who benefitted 
from these programs and how they were selected, 
and the specificity of the investments. Finally, the 
analyses fail to discuss the eligibility of workers to 
be considered for promotion and promotion rates 
by grade. Without knowledge of a firm’s career lad-
ders, it is difficult to identify the pool of personnel 
eligible and qualified for promotion within a given 
grade. Consequently, promotion rates are likely to 
be mismeasured. In short, these studies do not at-
tempt to integrate the structure of the firm, career 
paths and career ladders, or the promotion process 
into the analysis.
3. DATA AND ESTIMATION STRATEGy
The objective of this study is to examine job success 
for Navy officers. The study concentrates on promo-
tion as the performance measure; however, infor-
mation on supervisor evaluations is also used. The 
promotion model focuses on promotion to grade 4, 
which is the first significant control point in an of-
ficer’s career and involves an up-or-out decision. All 
officers enter the military at grade 1 (ensign), and 
promotions to grade 2 (lieutenant j.g.) and grade 3 
(lieutenant) are virtually automatic. Promotion to 
grade 3 occurs at 4 years of service; up-or-out review 
is at 10 years.5 Most officers attend graduate school 
prior to grade 4, and the majority utilize the Navy’s 
funded program.
The basic information is drawn from the Navy’s Pro-
motion History File, which provides background 
information on all officers reviewed for promotion 
between 1985 and 1990.6 This file is augmented with 
supervisor evaluations (fitness reports) prior to the 
grade 4 promotion review. Officers are classified 
into two occupational categories—line and staff. 
Line specialists work in the primary operational ar-
eas of the Navy: aviation, ship operations, and sub-
marine operations. Staff officers perform primar-
ily administrative functions. Within each specialty 
the set of jobs performed, the level of difficulty of 
the jobs, and career paths are similar; also, super-
visors’ evaluations and promotion are based solely 
on performance within that specific community.7 
After deleting observations with missing data, the 
merged data file contains 4230 line and 2353 staff 
officers who were reviewed for promotion to grade 4 
between 1985 and 1990.
The specification of the performance models rec-
ognizes the military’s internal labor market, which 
is characterized by a vertical hierarchy, no lateral 
entry, administrative pay setting, and up-or-out 
promotion. The organization uses contests (or tour-
naments) to motivate work effort due to the cost of 
observing and monitoring individual effort (Lazear 
& Rosen, 1981). In a contest, the organization ranks 
4  A sizeable literature has also emerged that attempts to explain the broader puzzle of the positive relationship between experience and 
earnings versus the negative relationship between experience and productivity. Bishop (1987) discusses numerous reasons why the 
optimal wage-setting rule for a firm will result in wages that only partially adjust to measured differences in productivity. Hutchens 
(1989) points out that workers who remain in a given job grade for a long time do so because they have poor evaluations. Lazear 
(1981) argues that the use of implicit, delayed payment contracts makes it impossible to closely link earnings profiles with the time 
path of productivity. The various contract and other theories are summarized in Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992).
5  For a fuller description of military officer personnel systems, see Rand Corporation (1994). 
6  The data represent ‘quasi-cohorts’, a set of employees who enter a specific state, such as grade 3, over some period. These groups were 
reviewed for promotion to grade 4 between 1985 and 1990 and thus represent entry cohorts for 1976–1980. We concentrate on this 
period because it preceded the personnel turbulence associated with the military downsizing during the 1990s.
7  Medical and legal specialities are excluded because officers in those fields often enter the Navy with master’s degrees.
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workers based on evaluations and rewards them 
on the basis of relative (rather than absolute) per-
formance. The contest determines who is promoted 
to the next higher rank (Rosen, 1992). Individual 
promotion probabilities also depend on the aggre-
gate promotion rate to grade 4. The aggregate rate 
depends on the number of vacancies in the next 
higher grade at time t, which depends in turn on the 
number who survive into grade i at t, as well as on 
survival rates at all higher grades and years of ser-
vice (Asch & Warner, 1994). Thus, an individual’s 
promotion probability, πit, in this type of organiza-
tion depends on the aggregate promotion rate, π*, 
the individual’s own ability (ai) and effort (ei) and 
the abilities and work effort of all others in grade i at 
time t, (ao,eo); that is, πit = πit (ait,eit,ao,eo,π*).
Two important implications of hierarchical organi-
zational forms are that the direct and indirect span 
of control increases geometrically with rank and 
that command decisions at higher ranks also have 
a publicness element. Individual productivity thus 
varies positively with rank and assignment policies 
must allocate the most capable individuals to the 
higher-ranking positions (Rosen, 1992). Promotion 
to grade 4 also effectively involves a tenure deci-
sion. The use of up-or-out underscores the length of 
reach of decisions at the next higher level, the po-
tential cost of mis-assigning individuals with poor 
prospects to the upper ranks, and the importance 
of a tighter screening of individuals to those ranks 
(O’Flaherty & Siow, 1995).
4. ESTIMATES Of PROMOTION MODELS
The specification of the promotion model assumes 
that relative performance depends on accumulated 
human capital (Wise, 1975a, b; Bartel, 1995). Wise 
partitions human capital into cognitive skills and 
affective skills. The latter are based on work-related 
attitudes and attributes such as perseverance, self-dis-
cipline, leadership, initiative, and the ability to coop-
erate, which is especially important in the military’s 
team production environment. In the empirical mod-
el below, cognitive abilities are specified as a function 
of college grade point average, a technical undergrad-
uate degree in science, engineering or mathematics, 
or a graduate degree. Proxies for affective skills are 
based on accession source— the Naval Academy, an 
ROTC scholarship, Officer Candidate School (OCS), 
or the enlisted ranks. Naval Academy students effec-
tively serve a 4 year apprenticeship before commis-
sioning and thus may assimilate more easily into the 
military’s team production environment.
Other demographic factors, such as gender and race 
are likely to be correlated with the accumulation of 
specific human capital, in part due to differences in 
occupational assignments. Women for many years 
were restricted from the line specialties, which of-
fered the best chances for acquiring firm-specific 
capital. Minorities are also not represented equally 
in all occupational specialties, due in part to pref-
erences and in part to academic background. These 
differences in assignments and associated opportu-
nities for accumulating firm-specific human capital 
may affect promotability both across and within 
occupational specialty areas. Marital and family 
status are captured by four categories: married with 
no children; married with children; divorced with 
children; and single, the omitted category. Finally, 
the Navy promotes to fill vacancies so that promo-
tion opportunities vary from year to year depending 
on cohort size (supply) and vacant slots in the next 
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics by degree status and occupationa
Line officers Staff officers
Variable Master’s No master’s Master’s No master’s
Promotion rate 0.86 0.76 0.84 0.70
Early performanceb rating (%) 36.22 25.63 36.54 28.77
Technical B.A. (%) 0.65 0.67 0.43 0.57
Grade point averagec 3.12 2.91 3.24 3.08
ROTC (%) 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.27
OCS (%) 0.25 0.26 0.34 0.42
NESEP (%) 0.07 0.07 0.20 0.13
Naval Academy (%) 0.41 0.37 0.12 0.18
Selective college (%) 0.51 0.55 0.65 0.67
Female (%) 0.02 0.01 0.22 0.18
Age 22.90 22.75 23.52 23.60
Married 0.24 0.25 0.19 0.19
Married with children (%) 0.56 0.51 0.54 0.49
Divorced with children (%) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Single (%) 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.29
Nonwhite 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.06
N 841 3389 858 1495
aSample based on those reviewed for promotion at grade 4.
bPercent of supervisory evaluations that received an ‘early promote’ recommendation.
cSix-point scale: 0  0–1.89; 1  1.9–2.9; 2  2.2–2.59; 3  2.6–3.19; 4  3.2–3.59; 5  3.6–4.0.
specifications. In all specifications, the graduate degree
coefficient is positive and significant. The marginal
effect of an M.A. is 0.098 and 0.145 for line and staff
officers, respectively, which is nearly the same as the
unadjusted promotion differences in Table 1. Columns
2–4 reveal that the effect of graduate education is
reduced as additional controls, some of which are likely
to be correlated with an M.A., are included. The mar-
ginal effect falls to 0.057 in column 4 of Table 2 and to
0.089 in column 4 of Table 3, roughly a 40% drop com-
pared to column 1 in both tables. Also, inclusion of the
additional controls improves model fit, as the chi-square
for the log likelihood ratio rises significantly from col-
umn 1 to column 4. A person with a higher GPA has a
promotion probability that is about 5 percentage points
higher than one with a lower GPA; having a technical
undergraduate major makes no difference.
The specification of the single equation model is such
that the coefficients of the education variables will be
biased if the error term is correlated with the schooling
choice. Individuals are assumed to base attendance at
graduate school on the expected returns. The sponsored
program imposes a cost in the form of an added military
service obligation. Hence, those who accept funding
view the benefits (in the form of higher promotion prob-
abilities or better assignments) as exceeding the cost of
the additional service time; those who reject the program
probably do not expect to remain in the Navy owing to
superior civilian employment opportunities. The coef-
ficient of the M.A. will represent a bundling of pure edu-
cation effects and differences in the motivation and
career aspirations of individuals choosing to attend
graduate school. In addition, it is likely that the organiza-
tion uses information on job performance to select indi-
viduals for the funded program. The measured effect of
funded education will be biased upward if the organiza-
tion assigns more able persons to graduate school.
One technique for addressing the selection issue is to
include controls in the models in Tables 2 and 3 for indi-
vidual ability and the administrative criteria used to
choose officers for the funded education program. The
two most important selection criteria are academic back-
ground and early career performance, attributes which
are proxied by college GPA and early performance rat-
ings. College GPA will also index one’s cognitive abili-
ties. When these controls are included in Tables 2 and 3,
the coefficient of the M.A. drops by about 20% (compare
columns 2 and 4 to column 1 in both Table 2 and
Table 3).
The above approach attempts to deal with the selection
problem by conditioning explicitly on factors likely to
be correlated with ability and the likelihood of attending
graduate school. Even though these proxies have con-
siderable explanatory power, they may fail to fully cap-
ture individual ability and educational preferences. If so,
the disturbance term in the model will include the portion
of each person’s preferences for education not captured
by the proxy variables, which may be correlated with
458 W.R. B wman, S.L. Meh y / Economics of Education Review 18 (1999) 453–463
Table 2
Probit promotion models for line officers
Dependent variable  promotion to grade 4
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4.
Master’s degree 0.376 0.342 0.345 0.265
(0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.065)
[0.098] [0.087] [0.085] [0.065]
Female 0.710 0.628 0.636 0.502
(0.244) (0.246) (0.246) (0.249)
Age  0.064  0.064  0.074  0.071
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016)
Married 0.191 0.188 0.186 0.137
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.069)
Married with children 0.260 0.257 0.255 0.252
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.062)
Divorced with children 0.014 0.037 0.035 0.006
(0.164) (0.165) (0.165) (0.179)
ROTC program – –  0.275  0.266
– – (0.054) (0.059)
OCS program – –  0.038  0.104
– – (0.069) (0.074)
NESEP program – –  0.095  0.124
– – (0.119) (0.130)
College GPA – 0.183 0.175 0.142
– (0.027) (0.027) (0.030)
Technical B.A. –  0.032  0.030  0.010
– (0.047) (0.049) (0.052)
Minority  0.227  0.164  0.181  0.103
(0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.115)
Early performance ratings – – – 0.009
– – – (0.000)
Constant 1.947 1.439 1.781 1.598
 2 Log L 4289.0 4242.9 4215.0 3590.2
N 4214 4214 4214 4039
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; marginal effects in brackets. All specifications include fiscal year dummy variables.
the actual possession of a graduate degree. Our second
approach is to address this issue using the following
bivariate probit model:
Yi  xi  IGi  yi (1)
Gi  Zi  Gi (2)
where IGi is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individ-
ual attends graduate school and equal to 0 otherwise; Yi
is the latent value of being promoted; Gi is the latent
value of completing graduate school; xi is a set of indi-
vidual characteristics and Zi includes some of the charac-
teristics in x plus a set of instruments for graduate school
completion. We observe that Iyi  1 if yi > 0 and Iyi 
0 if yi  0; we observe that IGi  1 if Gi > 0 and IGi 
0 if Gi  0. We assume that both y and G are mean
zero, given x and Z and that they are distributed bivariate
standard normal.
To obtain the instruments we first estimate a probit
model of the determinants of graduate school attendance,
which assumes that attendance is based on expected
returns and individual characteristics such as sex, age,
marital status, and race/ethnicity. The cost of attending
graduate school varies across occupational specialties.
This is because in some specialties the career ath allows
little time for leaving the operational environment, so
that there is a significant opportunity cost from attending
graduate school. In other specialties, the opportunity cost
of attending graduate school is high due to strong civilian
career opportunities. Thus, the selection model includes
dummy variables to control for sub-specialities within
the line and staff occupations.
Costs and benefits will also vary across individuals
within a subspecialty owing to one’s relative position
and long-term career interests. A proxy variable is avail-
able which indexes the individual’s (perceived) position.
Officers must keep placement officials informed about
career intentions, including whether they will attend
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highest grade (demand). Four fiscal year dummies 
are included to account for differences in each co-
hort’s aggregate promotion opportunity (π*).
The first analysis concentrates on job performance 
during the roughly 9 years prior to the up-or-out re-
view. Information from supervisor evaluations (fit-
ness reports) is used to construct a job performance 
measure. Even though the evaluation form contains 
numerous elements, most scores are highly inflated 
and there is little variation across individuals. How-
ever, one element for which there is significant varia-
tion and which has been identified as a valid measure 
of job performance is whether the officer is ‘recom-
mended for early promotion’ (Neumann, Mattson & 
Abrahams, 1989). We use the percentage of all evalu-
ations during the pre-up-or-out portion of one’s ca-
reer on which the officer received an early-promote 
recommendation as a measure of job performance. 8
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for key vari-
ables by officer specialty and degree status. About 
18% of the officers reviewed for promotion to grade 
4 possess an advanced degree. The unadjusted pro-
motion differential favors those with a degree by 10 
percentage points for line officers and by 14 points 
for staff officers. The proportion of early evalua-
tions carrying the early-promote recommendation is 
11–12 percentage points higher for those with M.A. 
degrees. For most other variables, differences in the 
means between those with and those without degrees 
appear slight due in part to the fact that the sample 
is restricted to officers whose academic background 
makes them eligible to attend graduate school.
We first estimate the probit promotion model un-
der the assumption that graduate education is exog-
enous. The probit results for line officers appear in 
Table 2 and for staff officers in Table 3. Columns 1–4 
of Tables 2 and 3 present alternative specifications of 
the promotion model to evaluate the sensitivity of 
the effect of graduate education to an increasingly 
inclusive set of controls. The estimated coefficients 
of any M.A. degree in Tables 2 and 3 have the ex-
pected signs and generally are statistically signifi-
cant. Among the demographic variables, those who 
are female, younger, and married, with or without 
children, are more likely to be promoted. Minorities 
are less likely to be promoted, but the precision of 
this estimate falls in the fuller specifications in col-
umn 4. The promotion probability for Naval Acad-
emy graduates (the omitted category) is significantly 
higher than for the other accession sources, which 
supports the notion that Academy graduates enter 
the Navy with a greater stock of human capital and 
possibly affective skills.
The results appear to be robust to the different mod-
el specifications. In all specifications, the graduate 
degree coefficient is positive and significant. The 
marginal effect of an M.A. is 0.098 and 0.145 for 
line and staff officers, respectively, which is nearly 
the same as the unadjusted promotion differences in 
Table 1. Columns 2–4 reveal that the effect of gradu-
ate education is reduced as additional controls, 
some of which are likely to be correlated with an 
M.A., are included. The marginal effect falls to 0.057 
in column 4 of Table 2 and to 0.089 in column 4 of 
Table 3, roughly a 40% drop compared to column 1 
in both tables. Also, inclusion of the additional con-
trols improves model fit, as the chi-square for the log 
likelihood ratio rises significantly from column 1 to 
column 4. A person with a higher GPA has a pro-
motion probability that is about 5 percentage points 
higher than one with a lower GPA; having a techni-
cal undergraduate major makes no difference.
The specification of the single equation model is 
such that the coefficients of the education variables 
will be biased if the error term is correlated with the 
schooling choice. Individuals are assumed to base 
attendance at graduate school on the expected re-
turns. The sponsored program imposes a cost in the 
form of an added military service obligation. Hence, 
those who accept funding view the benefits (in the 
form of higher promotion probabilities or better as-
signments) as exceeding the cost of the additional 
service time; those who reject the program probably 
do not expect to remain in the Navy owing to su-
perior civilian employment opportunities. The coef-
ficient of the M.A. will represent a bundling of pure 
education effects and differences in the motivation 
and career aspirations of individuals choosing to at-
tend graduate school. In addition, it is likely that the 
organization uses information on job performance 
to select individuals for the funded program. The 
measured effect of funded education will be biased 
upward if the organization assigns more able per-
sons to graduate school.
One technique for addressing the selection issue is 
to include controls in the models in Tables 2 and 3 
for individual ability and the administrative crite-
ria used to choose officers for the funded education 
8  The advantage of this variable is that it provides a cumulative record of performance and it covers performance for a variety of jobs 
and supervisors. Only a trivial proportion of officers are actually ever promoted ‘early’ (ahead of their peers in the cohort). Nonethe-
less, this recommendation on the evaluation signals that the supervisor views the employee’s performance as superior to his peers. 
Interestingly, this element mirrors a question on the rating forms used by the private firm in the Medoff and Abraham (1980) study.
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program. The two most important selection criteria 
are academic background and early career perfor-
mance, attributes which are proxied by college GPA 
and early performance ratings. College GPA will 
also index one’s cognitive abilities. When these con-
trols are included in Tables 2 and 3, the coefficient of 
the M.A. drops by about 20% (compare columns 2 
and 4 to column 1 in both Table 2 and Table 3).
The above approach attempts to deal with the selec-
tion problem by conditioning explicitly on factors 
likely to be correlated with ability and the likelihood 
of attending graduate school. Even though these 
proxies have considerable explanatory power, they 
may fail to fully capture individual ability and edu-
cational preferences. If so, the disturbance term in 
the model will include the portion of each person’s 
preferences for education not captured by the proxy 
variables, which may be correlated with the actual 
possession of a graduate degree. Our second ap-
proach is to address this issue using the following 
bivariate probit model:
Yi = xiβ + IGiγ + εγi    (1)
Gi = Ziα + εGi      (2)
where IGi is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the in-
dividual attends graduate school and equal to 0 oth-
erwise; Yi is the latent value of being promoted; Gi 
is the latent value of completing graduate school; xi 
is a set of individual characteristics and Zi includes 
some of the characteristics in x plus a set of instru-
ments for graduate school completion. We observe 
that Iγi = 1 if γi > 0 and Iγi = 0 if γi < 0; we observe 
that IGi = 1 if Gi > 0 and IGi = 0 if Gi < 0. We assume 
that both εγ and εG are mean zero, given x and Z and 
that they are distributed bivariate standard normal.
To obtain the instruments we first estimate a probit 
model of the determinants of graduate school at-
tendance, which assumes that attendance is based 
on expected returns and individual characteristics 
such as sex, age, marital status, and race/ethnicity. 
The cost of attending graduate school varies across 
occupational specialties. This is because in some 
specialties the career path allows little time for leav-
ing the operational environment, so that there is a 
significant opportunity cost from attending gradu-
ate school. In other specialties, the opportunity cost 
of attending graduate school is high due to strong 
civilian career opportunities. Thus, the selection 
model includes dummy variables to control for sub-
specialities within the line and staff occupations.
Costs and benefits will also vary across individuals 
within a subspecialty owing to one’s relative position 
and long-term career interests. A proxy variable is 
available which indexes the individual’s (perceived) 
position. Officers must keep placement officials in-
formed about career intentions, including whether 
they will attend graduate school if the program is of-
fered to them. These preferences are recorded in the 
data file. A positive stated preference for graduate 
school provides a gauge of the individual’s evalua-
tion of the value of graduate education. Moreover, 
this preference variable should be strongly correlat-
ed with attendance at graduate school but not with 
promotion outcomes. Finally, based on the admin-
istrative criteria for selection, the graduate school 
model includes proxies for the likelihood of being 
selected for the graduate education program. These 
include academic preparation (college GPA) and 
performance in college mathematics and science 
courses. Since superior performance as a junior of-
ficer is also an important selection criterion, the su-
pervisor evaluations variable is included as a proxy 
for early-career performance. The system is identi-
fied if at least one variable in the selection equation 
is omitted from the structural equation. The occu-
pational dummies, the preference variable, and the 
college performance variables (other than GPA) 
serve as the identifying instruments in this case.9
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Table 3
Probit promotion models for staff officers
Dependent variable  promotion to grade 4
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4.
Master’s degree 0.503 0.491 0.497 0.376
(0.063) (0.064) (0.065) (0.073)
[0.145] [0.141] [0.136] [0.089]
Female 0.161 0.141 0.181 0.160
(0.085) (0.086) (0.088) (0.097)
Age  0.036  0.037  0.036  0.036
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.018)
Married 0.314 0.319 0.308 0.227
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.104)
Married with children 0.201 0.205 0.185 0.106
(0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.089)
Divorced with children 0.107 0.112 0.107 0.163
(0.184) (0.184) (0.185) (0.224)
ROTC – –  0.271  0.155
– – (0.091) (0.103)
OCS – –  0.261  0.297
– – (0.099) (0.110)
NESEP – –  0.113  0.093
– – (0.133) (0.148)
GPA – 0.079 0.084 0.108
– (0.034) (0.034) (0.039)
Technical B.A. –  0.010  0.057 0.035
– (0.061) (0.066) (0.073)
Minority  0.246  0.219  0.236  0.069
(0.113) (0.114) (0.114) (0.129)
Early performance rating – – – 0.014
– – – (0.001)
Constant 1.135 0.913 1.115 0.633
 2 Log L 2502.3 2495.9 2485.5 1918.9
N 2349 2349 2349 2201
Notes: See Table 2.
graduate school if the program is offered to them. These
preferences are recorded in the data file. A positive stated
preference for graduate school provides a gauge of the
individual’s evaluation of the value of graduate edu-
cation. Moreover, this preference variable should be
strongly correlated with attendance at graduate school
but not with promotion outcomes. Finally, based on the
administrative criteria for selection, the graduate school
model includes proxies for the likelihood of being selec-
ted for the graduate education program. These include
academic preparation (college GPA) and performance in
college mathematics and science courses. Since superior
performance as a junior officer is also an important selec-
tion criterion, the supervisor evaluations variable is
included as a proxy for early-career performance. The
system is identified if at least one variable in the selec-
tion equation is omitted from the structural equation. The
occupational dummies, the preference variable, and the
college performance variables (other than GPA) serve as
the identifying instruments in this case.9
The probit selection model results are displayed in the
table given in Appendix A. For line officers, the coef-
ficients of college math and science background and
early performance ratings are all positive and significant
in the model. Early career evaluations have a direct
effect on promotion as well as an indirect effect
operating through graduate school selection. Individuals
from the line specialties hypothesized to have the highest
cost of attending graduate school (submarine, aviation,
and other line) are less likely to enter the sponsored pro-
gram. Finally, the preference variable is strongly posi-
9 A joint test, based on the likelihood ratios from alt rnativ
model specifications, supported the choice of exclusion restric-
tions.
9  A joint test, based on the likelihood ratios from alternative model specifications, supported the choice of exclusion restrictions.
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The probit selection model results are displayed in 
the table given in Appendix A. For line officers, the 
coefficients of college math and science background 
and early performance ratings are all positive and 
significant in the model. Early career evaluations 
have a direct effect on promotion as well as an in-
direct effect operating through graduate school se-
lection. Individuals from the line specialties hypoth-
esized to have the highest cost of attending graduate 
school (submarine, aviation, and other line) are less 
likely to enter the sponsored program. Finally, the 
preference variable is strongly positively correlated 
with the decision to undertake advanced education. 
For staff officers in column 2 the relationships are 
similar except that the subspecialty dummies are in-
significant.
Column 3a of Table 4 presents the estimated effect 
of any M.A. degree in the bivariate probit model. 
For comparison purposes, the single-stage results 
with and without controls for ability and early-ca-
reer performance are reproduced in columns 1 and 
2, respectively. The bivariate probit model provides 
evidence that a large part of the promotion effects in 
the single-stage models are explained by the selec-
tion of more able officers into the graduate educa-
tion program. The estimated error covariance in col-
umn 3b is positive and significant and the coefficient 
of the M.A. is smaller in the bivariate probit model 
(compared to single-stage estimates in column 2). 
The extent of positive selection appears to differ 
substantially between the two broad occupational 
fields. For line officers, the coefficient of the M.A. in 
the bivariate probit model is about 25% smaller than 
in the single-stage model that included controls for 
ability and performance (column 2). For staff offi-
cers, the effect of an M.A. falls by 50% and the coef-
ficient is significant at only the 0.10 level. In general, 
the bivariate probit results indicate that the controls 
for ability and performance in the single equation 
probit (in column 2) do not fully capture the selec-
tion process.10
Of the officers with graduate degrees, the major-
ity (75.1% of line officers and 70.8% of staff offi-
cers) received them via the Navy’s funded program, 
which pays tuition and salary during attendance at 
graduate school. Since the funded programs tend 
to involve more firm-specific training than civilian 
programs, a question arises as to whether the return 
to an M.A. reflects a return to general or specific 
investments. We test this hypothesis by omitting 
non-funded M.A.s from the sample and comparing 
individuals with an M.A. from a funded program to 
individuals without degrees. Table 5 displays the es-
timated coefficients of the funded M.A. variable. In 
the single-stage models the return to a funded M.A. 
for line personnel is nearly double what it is for any 
M.A. in Table 4, and for staff personnel the return 
is about 20% higher. However, the bivariate probit 
results in Table 5 also highlight the greater positive 
selection for funded degrees than for all degrees 
in Table 4. Whereas positive selection reduced the 
return to any M.A. by about one-third for line of-
ficers in Table 4, positive selection appears to reduce 
the return for funded degrees by nearly one-half in 
Table 5. For staff officers, the return to any M.A. is 
reduced by two-thirds in the IV estimates in Table 4, 
but the return to a funded M.A. is reduced by nearly 
three-quarters in the IV estimates in Table 5. Thus, 
it appears that both firm specific and general types 
of investments yield a positive return to employees 
in this organization.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper examined the promotion probabilities 
of professional and technical Navy officers. Single-
stage estimates indicate that, among those reviewed 
for up-or out promotion to grade 4, promotion 
probabilities are 10–15 points higher for those with 
any graduate degree. For those with degrees ob-
tained via the Navy’s full-time funded program the 
differential ranges from 15 to 17 points. However, 
when instruments that are uncorrelated with pro-
motion are used to predict graduate degree status, 
the results suggest that a sizeable portion of the re-
lationship between graduate education and promo-
tion is due to unobserved attributes that lead some 
people to attend (or be selected for) graduate school, 
especially for the Navy’s program, and to be more 
promotable. The selection-corrected estimates of the 
promotion effect of graduate education are reduced 
by between 40 and 50%. 
An important issue is whether the effect of graduate 
10  To conserve space only the coefficients of the M.A. variable are presented. Changes in the size of the coefficients of the other control 
variables in the models are slight between the single stage and bivariate probit estimates.
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Table 4
Coefficient of any master’s degree in single stage and bivariate probit models
1. No controls for 2. Controls for 3.a. Bivariate probit 3.b. Error covariance ()
ability/performance ability/performance
Line officers 0.376 0.265 0.198 0.124
(0.073)a (0.065) (0.077) (0.033)
[0.098]b [0.065] [0.056] –
Staff officers 0.503 0.376 0.188 0.170
(0.063) (0.073) (0.108) (0.039)
[0.145] [0.089] [0.051] –
aStandard errors in parentheses.
bMarginal effects in brackets.
tively correlated with the decision to undertake advanced
education. For staff officers in column 2 the relationships
are similar except that the sub-specialty dummies are
insignificant.
Column 3a of Table 4 presents the estimated effect
of any M.A. degree in the bivariate probit model. For
comparison purposes, the single-stage results with and
without controls for ability and early-career performance
are reproduced in columns 1 and 2, respectively. The
bivariate probit model provides evidence that a large part
of the promotion effects in the single-stage models are
explained by the selection of more able officers into the
graduate education program. The estimated error covari-
ance in column 3b is positive and significant and the
coefficient of the M.A. is smaller in the bivariate probit
model (compared to single-stage estimates in column 2).
The extent of positive selection appears to differ substan-
tially between the two broad occupational fields. For line
officers, the coefficient of the M.A. in the bivariate probit
model is about 25% smaller than in th single-stage
model that included controls for ability and performance
(column 2). For staff officers, the effect of an M.A. falls
by 50% and the coefficient is significant at only the 0.10
level. In general, the bivariate probit results indicate that
the controls for ability and performance in the single
equation probit (in column 2) do not fully capture the
selection process.10
Of th officers with graduate degrees, the majority
(75.1% of line officers and 70.8% of staff officers)
received them via the Navy’s funded program, which
pays tuition and salary during attendance at graduate
school. Since the funded programs tend to involve more
firm-specific training than civilian programs, a question
arises as to whether the return to an M.A. reflects a return
to general or specific investments. We test this hypoth-
10 To conserve space only the coefficients of the M.A. vari-
able are presented. Changes in the size of the coefficients of
the other control variables in the models are slight between the
single stage and bivariate probit estimates.
esis by omitting non-funded M.A.s from the sample and
comparing individuals with an M.A. from a funded pro-
gram to individuals without degrees. Table 5 displays the
estimated coefficients of the funded M.A. variable. In the
single-stage models the return to a funded M.A. for line
personnel is nearly double what it is for any M.A. in
Table 4, and for staff personnel the return is about 20%
higher. However, the bivariate probit results in Table 5
also highlight the greater positive selection for funded
degrees than for all degrees in Table 4. Whereas positive
selection reduced the return to any M.A. by about one-
third for line officers in Table 4, positive selection
appears to reduce the return for funded degrees by nearly
one-half in Table 5. For staff officers, the return to any
M.A. is reduced by two-thirds in the IV estimates in
Table 4, but the return to a funded M.A. is reduced by
nearly three-quarters in the IV estimates in Table 5.
Thus, it appears that both firm specific and general types
of investments yield a positive return to employees in
this organization.
5. Conclusions
This paper examined the promotion probabilities of
professional and technical Navy officers. Single-stage
estimates indicate that, among those reviewed for up-or-
out promotion to grade 4, promotion probabilities are
10–15 points higher for those with any graduate degree.
For those with degrees obtained via the Navy’s full-time
funded program the differential ranges from 15 to 17
points. However, when instruments that are uncorrelated
with promotion are used to predict graduate degree
status, the results suggest that a sizeable portion of the
relationship between graduate education and promotion
is due to unobserved attributes that lead some people to
attend (or be selected for) graduate school, especially for
the Navy’s program, and to be more promotable. The
selection-corr cted estimates of the promotion effect of
graduate education are reduced by between 40 and 50%.
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degrees observed here reflects enhancement of the 
officer’s on-the-job productivity or sorting by the 
firm. At first glance one might reject the sorting ar-
gument because the information costs that generate 
the need for signaling are not as relevant here as they 
are in the labor market where employers must assess 
applicants for entry level jobs. Rather, this is a per-
sonnel system in which employees have worked for 
6 or more years before being selected for graduate 
education, and 10 years before being reviewed for 
promotion to grade 4. In the tournament model the 
firm is assumed to observe productivity and there 
is no role for signaling. Nonetheless, screening may 
still be valuable to the organization in this situation 
because upper levels in the hierarchy require differ-
ent skills and greater ability than lower levels. More-
over, it is difficult for the organization to observe 
true ability and this information problem is not en-
tirely solved by observing performance at the lower 
levels because the difference in the skills required in 
lower and upper level jobs is so great.
The results in this paper cannot distinguish between 
these competing explanations of the observed rela-
tionship between graduate degrees and promotion. 
Nonetheless, it appears reasonable to conclude that 
graduate education in this organization works both 
directly by augmenting firm-specific skills and by 
providing a mechanism to sort individuals of great-
est value to the organization. Individuals who are 
more career-oriented and who perform well within 
this organization signal these attributes via their 
willingness to attend graduate school and incur the 
additional costs. Among career-oriented individu-
als, the Navy selects those whose early performance 
indicates greater potential for jobs at the upper lev-
els of the organization.
A final issue is whether these results would gener-
alize to the private sector. Recent research suggests 
that, except for the up-or-out policy, employment 
systems of private firms share key features with the 
Navy’s hierarchical system. Analyses of the hierar-
chical structure of managerial jobs in a major private 
firm have identified the following features identical 
to the Navy’s system: the firm has eight hierarchical 
levels; the average tenure in the lowest three grades 
is between 3 and 4 years; grade level 4 is a crucial 
choke point for career advancement; and upper level 
jobs in the firm (above grade 4) are characterized 
as pertaining to general management, managing 
larger groups, coordinating across units, or strategic 
planning (Baker, Gibbs & Holmstrom, 1994a; Baker, 
Gibbs & Holmstrom, 1994b).
Especially important are the similar patterns of out-
comes observed in private firms and the Navy. Baker 
et al. (1994a,b) confirm that private firms promote 
only those with the best relative performance and 
Bartel (1995) finds that firms select employees for 
companysponsored training on the basis of their 
early on-the-job performance and that the measured 
productivity of employees receiving sponsored 
training exceeds that of managerial employees not 
receiving the formal training. In addition, the selec-
tion corrected effect of a master’s degree acquired 
after joining the organization on the probability of 
promotion in this study is nearly identical to that 
obtained by Wise’s study of white collar workers in a 
large corporation. These similarities suggest that the 
positive relationship between human capital invest-
ment and on-the-job performance observed here 
may generalize to civilian firms.
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Appendix A
Table 6
Bivariate probit estimates of graduate school attendance
Variable Line officers Staff officers




Math background 0.402 0.179
(0.074) (0.073)
Science background 0.104 0.356
(0.058) (0.054)
Submarine specialty  0.429 –
(0.073) –
Aviation specialty  0.271 –
(0.048) –
ROTC program  0.095  0.167
(0.056) (0.101)
OCS program  0.166  0.096
(0.067) (0.102)
NESEP program  0.263 0.119
(0.120) (0.128)
College GPA 0.212 0.129
(0.025) (0.031)




Age 0.023  0.011
(0.012) (0.012)




Married with children 0.079 0.134
(0.057) (0.074)
Divorced with children  0.049  0.170
(0.179) (0.176)
General line community – 0.136
– (0.116)
Restricted line – 0.101
community
– (0.070)
Constant  2.326  1.232
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Return on Investment in 
Navy Graduate Education 
 
william R. Bowman, usna 
stEphEn l . mEhay, nps 
ANALySIS Of ROI fOR GRADUATE 
EDUCATION
OBJECTIVE: Estimate costs and benefits of three 




METHOD: Apply accepted economic principles to es-
timate monetary values of program benefits and costs2
DATA: Use data on Surface Warfare Officers
RETENTION ANALySIS
Analyze data on career progression of SWOs from 
LT through CAPT 





Retention and promotion differences (by degree sta-
tus) yield estimates of steady-state accessions need-
ed to produce one ‘career’ officer (=CAPT)
Increased retention reduces accessions and pre-
commissioning costs 
	 •	 	These	 accession	 costs	 avoided	 represent	 the	






TAXONOMy Of POTENTIAL BENEfITS Of GRADUATE EDUCATION
Program Outcomes Benefits to Navy Monetary Value
I. Increased retention




III.  Implement technology
IV.  Increased unit productivity 
V.  Faculty/Student Research 
output
VI.  Increased QOL; improved 
job and overall satisfaction
✓  Reduced accessions
✓  Increased individual or unit 
performance
✓  Reduced manpower
✓  Increased unit output/
readiness
✓  Increased unit output/
readiness
✓  Reduced manpower
✓  Research projects/reports
✓  Increased retention (indirect 
retention effect) 
✓  Reduced accession costs and 
post-accession training costs;
✓  Reduced bonuses;
✓  Reduced salaries. 
✓  Reduced labor costs.
✓  Reduced equipment costs; 
increased productivity
✓  Reduced manpower costs
✓  Improved operations;
✓  Reduced operation costs;
✓  Reduced contract research 
costs.
✓  Reduced accession and bonus 
costs
SWO O6 “yIELD RATES” By GRADUATE DEGREE
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(N=33,000+)
	 •	 	Represents	quasi-longitudinal	data
MONETARy VALUE Of RETENTION 
BENEfITS
	 •	 	Accessions	saved	
   = (required accessions via off-duty program) - 
(required accessions via funded program)
	 •	 	Costs	avoided	=	
   ∑i {(accessions saved) x (commissioning costs 
per accessioni)}
  
 where, i = commission source (USNA, NROTC, OCS)
MARGINAL COSTS Of fUNDED PROGRAM
Fully funded program costs = $66.8m
	 •	 	Include	direct	 and	 indirect	 costs	 of	NPS	 (or	
tuition at CIVINS)
	 •	 	Include	student	salaries
Off-duty program costs include tuition assistance 
costs ($14.5m); account for TA costs by deducting 
from funded program costs in the program com-
parisons:
	 •	 	($66.8m	-	$14.5m	=	$52.3m)
SUMMARy: NET RETENTION BENEfITS
	 •	 	Funded	program	has	large	net	retention	ben-
efits compared to no degree
	 •	 	However,	 net	 retention	 benefits	 of	 funded	
program are small compared to off duty pro-
gram
VALUE Of RETENTION BENEfITS
SIMULATED NUMBERS Of SURfACE WARfARE OffICERS TO 
yIELD 100 CAPTAINS By GRADUATE DEGREE STATUS
AVERAGE SWO CAREER PROGRESSION By GRADUATE DEGREE 
STATUS: fy1986-1999
NET RETENTION BENEfITS (Of fUNDED PROGRAM)
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 Dan,
  Thanks again for the opportunity to come out to NPS and participate in the 
SecNav Lecture series. It was great to see you and to spend time with the stu-
dents and professors. You are leading a remarkable institution that is front and 
center on training the Department’s future leaders. 
  I also had an opportunity to visit Camp Roberts Tactical Network Testbed 
(TNT). This is a remarkable site and a unique venue for warfighters, technical 
experts and the industrial base to investigate real needs. Ray Buettner and his 
crew are doing vital work. As we discussed, there are several technical chal-
lenges with networks and helicopters where I gained some insight via TNT. 
I will encourage Dr. Carter to spend some time at an upcoming session and 
reinforce SOCOM’s role when I next visit the command.
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Evaluating Navy’s Funded Graduate  
Education Program 
A Return-on-Investment Framework
KRisty n. KamaRcK, haRRy J . thiE , 
maRisa adElson, hEathER KRull 
 
PREfACE
The military services send substantial numbers 
of their officers to graduate school. The cost of a 
graduate school billet, coupled with the cost of the 
schooling itself, imposes a considerable financial 
burden on the services. Therefore, they are inter-
ested to know whether the return on their invest-
ment warrants the cost of the education. The RAND 
National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) was 
asked to conduct an assessment of the quantitative 
and qualitative returns on investment (ROIs) for 
funded graduate education for naval officers. This 
monograph reviews the evolution of Department of 
Defense (DoD) and U.S. Navy policy with respect 
to funded graduate education and the metrics used 
to evaluate Navy graduate education programs and 
those within the other services. The document pro-
vides an ROI framework for evaluating the benefits 
and costs of providing funded graduate education. 
The authors presume some knowledge of the termi-
nology associated with officer management, educa-
tion evaluation, and ROI. The monograph should 
interest the military manpower, personnel, training, 
and education community. Comments are welcome 
and may be sent to Harry_Thie@rand.org.
This research was sponsored by the Navy and con-
ducted within the Forces and Resources Policy Cen-
ter of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, 
a federally-funded research and development center 
sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, 
the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, 
and the defense intelligence community.
For more information on RAND’s Forces and Re-
sources Policy Center, contact the Director, James 
Hosek. He can be reached by email at James_
Hosek@rand.org; by phone at 310-393-0411, exten-
sion 7183; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 
1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, Cal-
ifornia 90407-2138. More information about RAND 
is available at www.rand.org.
SUMMARy
Background, Purpose, and Approach
The U.S. Navy and the other military services send 
a number of their officers to graduate-level institu-
tions each year to obtain advanced degrees. The pri-
mary purpose of providing these officers graduate 
education is so they can fill positions in their ser-
vices whose duties require the knowledge and skills 
gained in graduate school. Furthermore, the benefits 
of a graduate education extend beyond the specific 
assignment for which the officer was educated, ap-
plying to subsequent assignments as well, albeit 
less directly. However, at an estimated cost of about 
$245,000 per officer for a funded master’s degree, 
the cost of this education is substantial. For fully-
funded education, the service must pay not only 
the cost of the education but also the pay and al-
lowances associated with an officer’s billet allocated 
for education. Additionally, an opportunity cost is 
incurred: While the officer is attending school, his 
or her services are lost to the operational billets in 
which he or she could be gaining experience. The 
question frequently arises as to whether the benefit 
gained from a graduate education is worth the cost. 
While the quantitative effects of graduate education 
can be estimated, evaluating the qualitative effects of 
a graduate education poses a number of challenges.
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The Navy asked NDRI to assess the quantitative and 
qualitative ROI for funded graduate education. The 
NDRI research team reviewed the educational poli-
cies of DoD and the Navy, compared the Navy’s pro-
grams and metrics with those of the other services, 
and did a detailed analysis of two officer communi-
ties within the Navy: surface warfare and meteorol-
ogy and oceanography.
Findings
Key findings from the research include the following:
•	 	DoD educational policy suggests broader and 
more extensive use of graduate education than 
simply filling billets that have been determined 
to require it. The new DoD policy speaks to edu-
cating military personnel for “future capabilities.” 
While the Navy’s most recent policy guidance on 
graduate education governance appears to accord 
with the DoD policy, it is not clear that this broader 
view has permeated the Navy’s educational com-
munity. The Navy’s system for managing graduate 
education and the metrics it uses to evaluate the 
performance of that system tend to focus on filling 
validated billets—that is, it manages to meet pres-
ent needs, not to build future capabilities.
•	  Graduate education provides both technical 
skills and nontechnical competencies or “soft 
skills,” which are valued in a wide range of 
Navy billets beyond those that require gradu-
ate education. The Navy realizes additional value 
through improved officer productivity, better de-
cision making, and increased retention. Addi-
tionally, in certain billets, competencies gained 
in graduate education may compensate for lack 
of domain knowledge.
•	 	Cross-service	differences	exist	in	graduate	educa-
tion philosophy; program parameters; utilization 
rates; and, particularly, program management. 
The Navy has one of the largest requirements 
for graduate education in terms of annual quo-
tas and validated billets. It has 550 annual quotas 
to fill some 4,800 billets, compared with the Air 
Force’s 460 quotas and the Marine Corps’ 180 
quotas for far fewer billets each.1 It also has the 
lowest utilization rates for officers with graduate 
education among all the services. The Navy’s av-
erage career utilization rate for non–staff corps 
officers is about 50 percent, compared with the 
Air Force’s nearly 60 percent within one tour fol-
lowing graduation and the Marine Corps’ 96 per-
cent. Moreover, even if the Navy achieved better 
utilization rates, there is still a mismatch between 
validated billets and graduate school quotas in 
the Navy.
•	 	Differences exist among Navy communities in 
the management of officers and billets that re-
quire graduate education, particularly between 
the restricted line and unrestricted line com-
munities. The restricted line has proportionally 
more billet requirements, more-frequent utiliza-
tion, and more-frequent reutilization than the 
unrestricted line community. Cultural influences 
and career demands within the unrestricted line 
often impede demand for graduate school and 
service in validated billets.
•	 	Education	 execution,	 billet	 execution,	 and	 of-
ficer management execution are decentralized, 
and incentives and penalties for billet and quota 
management are not integrated. Community 
managers and education program managers of-
ten have different goals and metrics for assessing 
program success. Community managers focus 
on operational issues and gauge their success by 
how well they fill all the billets in the fleet. Edu-
cation managers focus on filling graduate school 
quotas with qualified officers and on placing of-
ficers with the proper educational credentials in 
validated billets. At times these goals clash, with 
the result being unfilled billets or billets filled by 
individuals who do not have the requisite experi-
ence or qualifications.
•		 	The overall benefits in terms of ROI to the Navy 
from graduate education can be measured, giv-
en certain assumptions. Although assessing the 
qualitative effects of graduate education poses 
some challenges, it is possible to make some rea-
sonable assumptions about the costs and benefits 
of a graduate education. Our approach presents a 
way to ascertain the costs and some assumptions 
to determine benefits. These parameters can be 
adjusted in the model to identify elements that 
are particularly sensitive. An order-of-magnitude 
estimate is quite feasible, and more precise as-
sessment would be possible with better data.
•		 	The current metric, which specifies one utili-
zation per career for each educated officer as 
specified in the DoD and Navy instructions, 
will not give the Navy a break-even ROI within 
a 20-year career, given our assumptions.
10  In Navy terminology, quota refers to an individual billet for a training or education course. Navy program managers control a dis-
crete number of quotas for each program, which they can allocate to individuals. Typically, the individual’s command will request a 
quota for a specific program, and the program manager will either approve or disapprove the request.
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•		 	Recouping	the	investment	in	graduate	education	
expenses based on skills gained requires long ser-
vice by officers in billets requiring the graduate 
education (multiple utilization tours) and even 
longer service in other billets.
Recommendations
In light of our findings, we have divided our recom-
mendations into three areas: policy, culture, and 
monitoring and evaluation.
Policy
To bring Navy educational practices more in line 
with DoD policy to shift graduate education toward 
development of future capabilities, the Navy needs to 
introduce a top-down approach to replace the bot-
tom up one it now employs. This shift would include 
reviewing existing graduate education instructions to 
verify that the language and intent square with cur-
rent DoD policy. Navy policymakers should consider 
the intent of DoD policy (DoD Instruction 1322.10), 
revised in April 2008, that “Knowledge is good, and 
more is preferable.” Once this policy language is clear, 
Navy leaders need to communicate their graduate ed-
ucation policy to graduate education program man-
agers, community managers, and officers.
Justifying the cost of graduate education requires ex-
tremely long service. However, the value of graduate 
education might be perceived to lie in the increasing 
productivity and decision quality that its soft skills 
and general knowledge provide. If so, the educa-
tion may be considered a cost of doing business to 
achieve future capabilities. Moreover, if developing 
future capabilities is the program goal, it seems jus-
tifiable to make graduate education a competitive 
selection for those most likely to stay in the service 
and advance to flag rank. In essence, the Navy would 
be broadly educating many to achieve future capa-
bilities and an ROI from the few.
Culture
Increasing emphasis on graduate education as a ben-
efit to the community and to the Navy-at-large will 
require a cultural shift for some Navy communi-
ties to overcome negative perceptions about career 
“breaks” for education and utilization assignments. In 
line with a top-down approach, community leaders 
should set goals for graduate education attainment. 
One example might be “90 percent of all officers ad-
vancing at the O-5 board will have a graduate degree.” 
In tandem, community leaders need to develop goals 
for the types of graduate degree curricula that would 
support their anticipated capability requirements be-
yond their current validated billet requirements.
The Navy can take some tactical steps to improve 
their utilization efficiency immediately by increas-
ing utilization rates and reutilizing officers with 
advanced degrees, thus increasing net quantitative 
ROIs. The Navy should provide incentives for more-
integrated management of officer assignments at 
the community level and also institute penalties for 
poor management of billets, quotas, and officers.2 
These should vary by community to reflect differ-
ences in billet structures and operational require-
ments. Community leaders should also seek to pro-
vide incentives for completing graduate educations 
and serving in validated billets to increase economic 
returns on their education investments. The Navy 
should consider the approach the Air Force uses, 
which includes master’s degrees in promotion de-
cisions. Additionally, because officers who serve 
in subsequent assignments that require graduate 
degrees increase the Navy’s net benefit in terms of 
ROI, promotion boards and other incentive initia-
tives should give exceptional weight to those who 
have both an advanced degree and practical experi-
ence in a given field.
Monitoring and Evaluation
The Navy should expand its utilization metric and 
enhance monitoring and evaluation of its graduate 
education program. The one-tour utilization metric 
needs to take into account additional benefits to the 
Navy that officers with graduate education offer. In 
particular, using these officers in billets not coded 
as requiring a graduate degree may offer value that 
graduate education program managers are not cur-
rently capturing. Better data collection and periodic 
evaluations of graduate education programs under 
a hierarchy of outcomes would assist in identifying 
this value.
Conclusion
The Navy possesses the necessary mix of institutions 
and curricula in its funded graduate education pro-
gram to meet its present capability requirements. 
However, the metric of one utilization tour, as de-
fined in current Navy policy, is not capturing the to-
tal value of graduate education to the Navy. In fact, 
given the current graduate school timing and career 
progression for most officers, one utilization tour 
per educated officer does not recoup the cost of edu-
cating that officer within a 20-year career. Our re-
search and analysis indicate that the knowledge and 
skills gained through graduate education are valu-
able for both the officer and for the Navy. The value 
2  One option for penalizing poor management would be a loss of graduate education quotas for communities that fail to meet certain 
threshold utilization rates for officers in validated billets.
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for the Navy lies in improved productivity, better 
decision making, and increased retention. Some of 
this value can be monetized, and costs and benefits 
to the Navy can be estimated using enhanced data-
collection methods and reasonable assumptions. 
Recent shifts in DoD policy language and intent 
suggest that the Navy should expand on the one-
tour utilization metric to establish a more-nuanced 
assessment of the value of graduate education for 
the Navy’s officer corps, especially with respect to 
future capabilities.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARy
AAD  advanced academic degree
ADSO  active-duty service obligation
AFIT   Air Force Institute of Technology
AMOS   additional military occupational 
specialty
BUPERS   Bureau of Naval Personnel
CIVINS   civilian institution
DoD   Department of Defense
DoDI   Department of Defense instruction
IGE   immediate graduate education
MA   master of arts
MAcc   master of accounting
MBA   master of business administration
MCO   Marine Corps order
METOC   meteorology and oceanography
MOS   military occupational specialty
MS   master of science
NDRI   National Defense Research Institute
NPS   Naval Postgraduate School
NWC   Naval War College
O-1   ensign (Navy), second lieutenant 
(Air Force, Army, Marine Corps)
O-2   lieutenant, junior grade (Navy), first 
lieutenant (Air Force, Army, Marine 
Corps)
O-3   lieutenant (Navy), captain (Air 
Force, Army, Marine Corps)
O-4   lieutenant commander (Navy), ma-
jor (Air Force, Army, Marine Corps)
O-5   commander (Navy), lieutenant colo-
nel (Air Force, Army, Marine Corps)
O-6   captain (Navy), colonel (Air Force, 
Army, Marine Corps)
OPNAV   Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions
OPNAVINST   Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions instruction
P code   code designating an officer having a 
funded master’s degree and a billet 
requiring such an officer
pol-mil   political-military
Q code   code designating an officer holding a 
funded master’s degree plus experi-
ence in the relevant subspecialty and 
a billet requiring such an officer
quota   in Navy terminology, an individual 
billet for a training or education 
course
R code   code designating an officer holding 
a doctorate
RL   restricted line
ROI   return on investment
ROTC   Reserve Officer Training Corps
SEP   special education program
STA-21   Seaman to Admiral-21 Program
SWO   surface warfare officer
URL   unrestricted line
USNA   United States Naval Academy
VGEP   Voluntary Graduate Education Pro-
gram
YOS   years of service
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Navy and the other military services pro-
vide training and education as part of their officer 
development programs. For the Navy, this model 
includes opportunities to gain knowledge and skills 
in a graduate school and apply them to various as-
signments at sea and ashore. The Navy funds gradu-
ate education with the expectation that the officers 
chosen to receive it will go on to apply the knowl-
edge and skills they acquire in billets (positions) for 
which that education is a prerequisite. The officers 
selected for this education are typically in grade O-3 
(lieutenant) and will use their education starting in 
grade O-4 (lieutenant commander) and continuing 
throughout their careers.
Purpose
The RAND National Defense Research Institute was 
asked to assess qualitative and quantitative measures 
for return on investment (ROI) for funded officer 
graduate education. While Navy graduate education 
is a combination of fully-funded, partially-funded, 
and unfunded programs, our focus was on funded 
programs at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), 
at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), and 
at civilian graduate institutions. Our review did not 
include graduate programs provided at institutions 
that are part of professional military education, such 
as the Naval War College (NWC).
Department of Defense and Navy Educational 
Policy
This section reviews past and present Department of 
Defense (DoD) and Navy policies for funded gradu-
ate education. In general, current policies take a 
broader view of educational requirements for officers.
DoD Policy
DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1322.10, revised in April 
2008, requires that graduate education be estab-
lished to accomplish the following goals:
	 •	 	Raise	professional	and	technical	competency	
and develop future capabilities.
	 •	 	Provide	developmental	incentives	for	military	
officers with the ability, dedication, and ca-
pacity for professional growth.
	 •	 	Fulfill	 a	 present	 need,	 anticipated	 require-
ment, or future capability.
The previous version of DoDI 1322.10 took a nar-
rower view, specifying that the purpose of funding 
graduate education was to fill billets that required 
that education. The new instruction represents a 
philosophical break from the previous directive, 
in that its view of the value of graduate education 
is much more expansive (see Table 1.1). In the 
words of a DoD official responsible for the policy, 
“knowledge is good, and more of it is preferable.”1 
This change in philosophy resulted from the experi-
ences of the military after September 11, 2001, when 
it encountered difficulty in finding officers having 
the broad range of backgrounds and academic dis-
ciplines needed for transformation, and for stability, 
transition, and reconstruction operations. Recent 
testimony from many individuals before Congress 
continues to call for a more-qualified and broadly 
educated officer corps.2
The new DoD instruction did not remove the re-
quirement to use officers who had attended graduate 
school at government expense in positions having 
specific educational requirements. However, the in-
struction does require the services to provide bien-
nial reports to DoD that include three elements. The 
first assesses utilization and outcomes. This includes 
a review of validated billets, the number of officers 
who have obtained funded graduate education, an 
evaluation of their utilization rate in validated billets, 
and the number of utilization tours served. While the 
first element focuses on utilization in validated billets, 
the second and third elements are broader assess-
ments of graduate education management. The sec-
ond discusses management of officers who have had 
a graduate education. Beyond the utilization figures, 
how is the service managing (e.g., assigning, retain-
ing, promoting) this pool of developed human capi-
1  RAND researcher interview with DoD official in July 2009. He did not say that he wished to be anonymous, but we typically start 
interviews by saying that comments will not be attributed.
2  See, for example, Lt. Gen. (ret.) David W. Barno and Professor Williamson Murray, testimony to the House Armed Services Subcom-
mittee on Investigation and Oversight, September 10, 2009.
Table 1.1 
Changes to DoD Policy
old dodi 1322.10 aug 26, 2004  new dodi 1322.10 april 29, 2008
4.1 it is dod policy to fund graduate 
education fully and partially for active 
duty military officers required to fill 
Military Service requirements for vali-
dated positions.
4.1 the intent of the department’s 
graduate education programs are 
to provide fully or partially-funded 
educational opportunities in disciplines 
that fulfill a present need, anticipated 
requirement, or future capability and 
that contribute to the effectiveness 
of the military departments and the 
department of defense.
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tal? The third assesses the service posture with respect 
to disciplines that fulfill present needs, anticipated re-
quirements, or future capabilities.
Navy Policy
The Navy also has a new instruction specifically 
pertaining to graduate education governance, which 
was issued after the new DoD instruction. The older 
instruction, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
(OPNAV) Instruction (OPNAVINST) 1520.23B 
(1991), provides general guidance on graduate ed-
ucation programs and states that the Navy offers 
graduate education to






The more-recent instruction, OPNAVINST 1520.42 
(2009), which provides guidance for the integrated 
governance of graduate education programs, states 
that education is a strategic investment in the future 
capabilities of the naval service and that education 
policies should develop a portfolio of skills and 
competencies necessary to execute Chief of Naval 
Operations guidance and maritime strategy.4
Research Approach
Our approach to the research consisted of four tasks. 
The first was to review the civilian and military liter-
ature concerning graduate education and its returns. 
The second was to compare the funded graduate ed-
ucation programs across the services to identify ad-
ditional metrics used to measure ROI. The third was 
to analyze data to understand demand (billets) and 
supply (educated officers) and how they matched, 
then to use these data as a basis for a model that al-
lowed community-level assessments of utilization. 
The fourth was to posit and assess measures of ROI. 
The central question we are addressing is, “Is there 
value to the Navy in providing funded graduate edu-
cation?” The use of the language of return of invest-
ment is meant to imply use of an ROI framework but 
not a complete ROI assessment.
Limitations
As stated earlier, we did not assess all graduate edu-
cation programs in the Navy but only those funded 
for NPS, AFIT, and civilian institutions for unre-
stricted line (URL) and restricted line (RL) officers. 
Moreover, we did not attempt to ascertain which 
institutions should provide the education or the 
costs and benefits associated with using particular 
institutions or relying on their curricula to provide 
education. We did not provide a complete assess-
ment of ROI at the program budget level but instead 
offer a rough order-of-magnitude assessment for the 
sponsor or those responsible for education to use as 
a framework.
Organization of This Monograph
The monograph has six chapters. Following this in-
troduction is a detailed review of the civilian and 
military literature. Chapter Three discusses the spe-
cifics of the Navy program and compares it with oth-
er military services. Chapter Four presents commu-
nity-level data and our observations from running 
a utilization model. Chapter Five is our assessment 
of qualitative and quantitative benefits and costs in 
an ROI framework. Chapter Six contains our con-
clusions and policy recommendations. Additional 




This chapter discusses civilian and military literature 
on the theories and empirical evidence linking grad-
uate education to organizational benefits. Figure 2.1 
shows the possible benefits of graduate education by 
categories. The first section of this chapter discusses 
human and social capital development theory in 
relation to organizational returns. The second sec-
tion takes a closer look at the contributions cited in 
civilian and military literature on quantifiable or-
ganizational returns. Finally, the chapter discusses 
various approaches for evaluating ROI and develops 
a hierarchal framework for measuring benefits from 
graduate education in the Navy.
Theories Linking Graduate Education to Human 
and Social Capital
This section reviews the theoretical literature on 
human and social capital and how they can benefit 
organizations.
Human Capital Theory
To discuss ROIs with respect to education, research-
ers often start with education’s effect on the develop-
ment of human capital. Increases in human capital, 
in turn, may generate both pecuniary and nonpe-
3  Subspecialties will be discussed later in more detail. Beyond the staff corps, Navy communities have approximately 100 subspecialties 
falling into six broad areas. The subspecialties themselves resemble academic disciplines.
4  The extent to which the Navy has institutionalized this more-liberal policy is unclear.
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cuniary returns for an organization. Human capital 
is often defined as the set of acquired knowledge, 
skills, and capabilities that enable individuals to act 
in new ways (Coleman, 1998).
The skills gained from education can generally be di-
vided into two types: hard skills and soft skills. Hard 
skills include technical capabilities that are directly 
applicable to specific tasks, for instance, data analy-
sis, financial accounting, electrical engineering, or 
undersea warfare. John McPeck (1994) describes 
hard skills as being “knowledge based” because their 
“general range of applicability is limited by the form 
of thought being called upon” (McPeck, 1994). Stud-
ies have found that these of types of vocational skills 
tend to degrade over time without frequent use or 
the additional education needed, in part, because of 
exogenous technological changes.
Soft skills, on the other hand, are not explicitly taught 
during graduate education but instead are compe-
tencies gained through the process of being educat-
ed, sometimes called “learning to learn.” These types 
of skills include critical thinking, communication, 
and leadership. While soft skills are less tangible, 
they help individuals “select pertinent information 
for the solution of a problem [and] formulate rel-
evant and promising hypotheses” (McPeck, 1994). 
Table 2.1 compares hard and soft skills.
The civilian literature is unclear on how education 
develops soft skills, but these skills are strongly 
and positively correlated with schooling (see, for 
example, Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2009; Boy-
atzis, Stubbs, and Taylor, 2002; and Hardison and 
Vilamovska, 2009). Some evidence also specifically 
suggests that graduate education increases soft skills 
that are valuable to the Navy. The services have 
used competency models to define characteristics 
of high-performing officers. One example is the 
Navy Leadership Competency Model, which defines 
five core competencies: accomplishing the mis-
sion, leading people, leading change, working with 
people, and resource stewardship.1 Additionally, 
competencies that are deemed critical for Navy flag 
officer billets are closely related to some of the skills 
developed through graduate education (see Table 
2.2). A study of naval officers who had completed a 
graduate degree at NPS found significant increases 
in the officers’ own assessments of gains in seven out 
of ten skill areas that are closely tied to competencies 
desirable for chief executive officers (Filizetti, 2003).
The evidence also indicates that skill gains from 
graduate education have benefits beyond utilization 
in subspecialty billets. Opinion surveys of naval of-
ficers having a graduate degree found that over 90 
percent of the individuals who had served in billets 
requiring graduate degrees reported that the skills 
gained in their education were necessary or desir-
able for performing their duties, while over 80 per-
cent said that they used their education in billets 
other than the designated ones (Cashman, 1994).
Competencies gained through education, regardless 
of curriculum, may also help to compensate for lack 
of domain knowledge in certain billets. In a study 
of senior Air Force officers and civilians, Scott et al. 
(2007) found that leaders use such competencies as 
people skills, problem-solving, integration skills, and 
enterprise knowledge in billets for which they lacked 
a technical background or functional expertise.
Social Capital Theory
Social capital development is closely tied to human 
fIGURE 2.1 
POSSIBLE BENEfITS Of GRADUATE EDUCATION TO THE NAVy
1  The Navy Leadership Competency Model is available on the Air Force Air University’s Strategic Leadership Studies website.
Table 2.1 
Comparison of Soft Skills and Hard Skills
Human Capital: Hard Skills  Human Capital: Soft Skills
Skills
 data analysis  communication
 drafting   critical thinking
 Modeling   Team-building
 system analysis  creativity
 design   decisionmaking
 financial accounting
Skill attributes
 Knowledge based  Process based
 degrade over time without use  increase with experience
 Easier to define, measure, and test  Difficult to define, measure, and test
 Technical degrees offer specific gains  All degree curricula offer gains
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capital and is widely assumed to be a by-product of 
education. Social capital is most commonly defined 
as the “networks, norms and trust—that enable par-
ticipants to act together more effectively to pursue 
shared objectives” (Putnam, 1995, p. 665). Social 
capital comprises both the individual’s network 
and the assets that may be mobilized through that 
network (see, for example, Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998). Putnam (1995, p. 667) found that education 
is one of the biggest contributors to the development 
of social capital:
  Highly educated people are much more likely to 
be joiners and trusters, partly because they are 
better off economically, but mostly because of the 
skills, resources, and inclinations that were im-
parted on them at home and in school.
  There is no consensus on how to measure social 
capital, but it is believed to help improve produc-
tive and allocative efficiency by increasing infor-
mation-sharing, promoting cooperative behavior, 
and reducing monitoring costs by increasing trust.
Social capital can be broken down further into 
“bonding” social capital and “bridging” social capi-
tal. Bonding social capital refers to networks that 
form inside an organization; bridging social capital 
refers to connections among heterogeneous groups 
(Schuller, Baron, and Field, 2000). Bonding social 
capital might have negative effects if it builds “in-
group” solidarity at the expense of outsiders (Fu-
kuyama, 2002). Additionally, tightly bound groups 
may cut themselves off from information, innova-
tion, or ideas with negative consequences for the 
organization. Bridging social capital, on the other 
hand, tends to increase social inclusion and encour-
age connections and cooperation between people 
from different walks of life. These ties tend to be 
more fragile because they require active reinforce-
ment to maintain, but some consider them to be 
more valuable than homogeneous bonds (Schuller, 
Baron, and Field, 2000).
In the Navy context, graduate education can affect 
both bonding and bridging social capital. For ex-
ample, while obtaining a graduate degree at NPS, an 
officer is sacrificing time he or she could be spend-
ing in an operational billet in his or her community, 
which may reduce “in-group” bonding capital. How-
ever, the officer will likely develop ties to officers 
in other Navy communities, other branches of the 
U.S. military, even with officers in foreign militar-
ies. These bridging connections may be more useful 
in future joint assignments or in combined coalition 
operations. Officers who obtain a degree at a civil-
ian institution may be exposed to an even broader 
set of viewpoints and may develop connections with 
future civilian policymakers.
Organizational Benefits of Graduate Education
Economists use two general models to describe how 
increases in human and social capital generate or-
ganizational returns. First, the productive efficiency 
model suggests that, as skills increase, individu-
als are able to get more done in the same amount 
of time for the same amount of money. This result 
might be tied to improved multitasking or to time 
management skills. Second, the allocative efficiency 
model suggests that more-skilled individuals make 
better decisions than do less skilled people facing 
similar circumstances.
While human and social capital are not directly 
measurable, they do lead to quantifiable benefits 
for an organization. The civilian literature on orga-
nizational returns to graduate education quantifies 
human and social capital gains through changes in 
productivity. Increasing employee productivity in 
the private sector leads to increases in profitability 
for a firm. In the military, increasing individual or 
unit productivity can likewise lead to pecuniary 
benefits by reducing manpower requirements and 
improving readiness (Mehay and Bowman, 2007). 
Therefore, the military literature on returns from 
graduate education focuses on education’s effect on 
Table 2.2 
Competencies Are Critical in Navy Billets
Critical flag Officer  Competencies Gained Competencies Gained 
Billet Requirementsa at NPSb  in MBAc
Influencing and negotiat-
ing with people at all 
levels
preparing and delivering 






mon sense to integrate 
priorities and eliminate 
irrelevant information
motivating, inspiring, 
and mentoring military 
personnel
guiding expectations, 




puter and information 
technology use
Ability to define and 
solve problems, Analyti-
cal reasoning, technical 
adaptability, Research and 
continuous learning
No significant gain in 
collaboration and team-
work
systems thinking and 
analysis, innovation and 
creativity
persuasiveness, negotiat-





attention to detail, use 






a Hanser et al., 2008. b Filizetti, 2003.  c  Boyatzis, Stubbs, and Taylor, 
2002.
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officer performance, promotion, and retention.
The civilian literature crosses a broad range of sec-
tors and degree types, although the bulk of the liter-
ature focuses on primary and secondary education. 
A large portion of the literature on ROI from gradu-
ate education in the military comes from research 
surveys and empirical studies that students and fac-
ulty at NPS, AFIT, and other service colleges have 
produced.
Civilian Literature
It is difficult to quantify individual productivity 
gains from education. Brown (2001, p. 1) states that
  One of the problems with measuring training’s 
influence on worker productivity is that there 
are many areas of productivity that are intangible 
and difficult to quantify, such as ideas, abilities, 
experience, insight, motivation and so forth.
Another problem with measuring productivity gains 
has to do with selection bias. Individuals who attend 
and complete graduate education may have innate 
abilities that would make them more-productive 
workers even in absence of a graduate degree. This 
means that simply comparing individuals having 
graduate educations with those who do not with-
out controlling for innate ability would overstate 
the benefits of that education. However, researchers 
have found that the positive effects of graduate edu-
cation exist apart from selection effects.
Generally, the civilian literature quantifies individual 
productivity increases through salary differentials be-
tween graduate-degreed employees and comparable 
employees without graduate degrees. These salary 
differentials are a proxy for expected worker produc-
tivity gains and vary by the type of degree obtained 
and the sector of employment. Typically, the “funder” 
reaps the reward; in the private sector, the employee 
typically has made the initial investment for gradu-
ate education, and the ROI accrues to the individual 
through increased earning potential. The employer in 
turn pays a premium for the expected productivity 
gains from the education the individual has funded.
Various studies on earnings data have found indi-
vidual rates of return between 7 and 46 percent, with 
returns generally higher for individuals who have 
earned a master of business administration (MBA) or 
technical master’s degree. A 2008 study on ROI to an 
MBA for information technology professionals found 
that these individuals earned 46 percent more than 
those with only bachelor’s degrees and 37 percent 
more than those with sector-specific master’s degrees 
(Mithas and Krishnan, 2008). If the individual does 
a full-time MBA degree, forgoing two years of work 
experience, the ROIs are 36 percent relative to a bach-
elor’s degree and 27 percent relative to a technical 
master’s degree (Mithas and Krishnan, 2008).
Firms in the private sector also measure produc-
tivity by increases in profitability. Black and Lynch 
(1996) found that the average educational level of 
a firm’s employees has a positive and significant ef-
fect on productivity in both the manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing sectors and that this positive in-
fluence was higher in the nonmanufacturing firms 
(Black and Lynch, 1996).
Hunton, Stone, and Wier (2005) conducted one of 
the largest empirical studies of the effects of graduate 
education on professional success and tacit knowl-
edge learning. The researchers combined standard-
ized job performance evaluation data for approxi-
mately 6,000 accountants with survey data from 
around 3,000 members of the sample to compare the 
performance, problem-solving ability, and manage-
rial knowledge of those with and without an MBA 
or master of accounting (MAcc) degree. Those with 
MBAs and MAcc degrees demonstrated significant-
ly higher knowledge gains and performance evalua-
tions than the employees who lacked advanced de-
grees. The authors also found that the MAcc degree 
is more beneficial for early and midcareer, and the 
MBA is more beneficial later in a career.2
Military Literature
The military’s human resource structure is character-
ized by an internal labor market, a vertical hierarchy, 
and a closed personnel system (Asch and Warner, 
1994). Military officer pay is determined by rank and 
time in service, regardless of the officer’s educational 
qualifications; officers with graduate degrees do not 
earn more. Therefore, quantifying productivity in-
creases in the military is more difficult than it is in 
the private sector. Various studies have used perfor-
mance ratings as a proxy for individual productiv-
ity. Although performance ratings are thought to be 
highly inflated, researchers have identified useful 
performance metrics. In a Navy study on the effects 
of college quality on performance, Bowman and Me-
hay (2002) used the “recommendation for accelerated 
promotion” indicator on the officer’s fitness report to 
identify highly productive performers. The authors 
2  Although Hunton, Stone, and Wier focused on the private sector, generalizing their results to the military might suggest that focusing 
on technical degrees may be more useful for officers early in their careers (O-4 to O-5), while degrees with a broader focus, such as 
the MBA, might benefit officers in grades O-6 and above.
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found that the quality of the educational institution 
does not have a significant effect on performance rat-
ings for staff officers. However, line officers with grad-
uate degrees from either public or private top-tier col-
leges had significantly higher performance ratings in 
their early careers than their peers from less-selective 
institutions.
Increased promotion potential is typically considered 
an individual, rather than organizational, benefit. 
However, military studies have also used years to pro-
motion and probability of promotion as proxies for 
increased productivity, which would benefit the orga-
nization. Faster promotion or higher promotion rates 
are assumed to equate to increased individual pro-
ductivity. Branigan (2001) found that naval officers 
who have had funded graduate degrees have shorter 
times to promotion than have officers lacking gradu-
ate degrees. Bowman and Mehay (1999) found that 
officers with graduate degrees are more likely to be 
selected for promotion at the O-4 promotion boards 
than their counterparts without graduate degrees. 
However, a large portion of the relationship between 
graduate education attainment and promotion is due 
to unobserved attributes that may lead more-pro-
motable officers to attend or be selected for graduate 
school (Bowman and Mehay, 1999).
For the organization, increasing retention provides 
quantifiable benefits: reducing recruitment and train-
ing costs and supervisory time (Fitz-Enz, 2000). 
Private corporations that pay for all or part of their 
employees to attend graduate school often stipulate 
a minimum contract term following graduation, 
which directly increases short term retention rates. 
As with productivity, a selection bias might also affect 
the retention results, although it is not clear whether 
the net effect would be to overestimate or underes-
timate retention figures. An employee who accepts 
education funding might be predisposed to staying 
with the organization and may be “signaling” these 
intentions by entering a graduate program. This effect 
may be greater in the military, which imposes an ad-
ditional service obligation on graduate students; thus, 
“a positive preference for graduate school should be 
positively correlated with retention” (Bowman and 
Mehay, 2002). Alternatively, individuals who are 
predisposed to leaving an organization may pursue 
graduate education to increase their marketability to 
external employers (Jordan, 1991).
Military studies generally show a positive retention 
effect from funded graduate education. Opinion 
surveys of naval officers having less than eight years 
of service (YOS) who had received funded graduate 
education indicate that 80 percent planned to stay 
in the Navy for 20 years or longer (Cashman, 1994). 
Jordan (1991) estimated that URL officers having 
a graduate degree were less likely to leave the mili-
tary before their O-4 promotion boards than their 
counterparts lacking a graduate degree and that this 
retention effect was more pronounced for officers 
having NPS degrees than for officers having de-
grees from other sources. Milner (2003) found that 
United States Naval Academy (USNA) officers who 
received master’s degrees through the Voluntary 
Graduate Education Program (VGEP) were more 
likely to remain in the service at the end of their 
initial commitments than were USNA officers lack-
ing a master’s degree. In a similar study, Mehay and 
Bowman (2007) found that officers who had benefit-
ted from immediate graduate education (IGE) had 
retention rates 25 percent higher than those of their 
counterparts lacking education out to seven YOS 
and 10 percent higher out to ten.
Approaches to Evaluating Graduate Education 
Benefits
The theory and empirical evidence outlined in the 
previous sections demonstrate the positive organi-
zational benefits to be gained from graduate educa-
tion. Employers who sponsor education and train-
ing are, however, particularly interested in ways to 
quantify these benefits to make efficient program-
ming decisions. The literature on the best way to 
determine the ROIs for education and training has 
been growing.
Understanding the concept of ROI analysis begins 
with understanding the evaluation methodologies 
behind it. One of the most common models was 
adapted from an existing model for evaluating train-
ing and development efforts. This adapted model 
includes five progressively complex levels of evalua-
tion (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2003):
 1.   Reactions—focused on opinions of an edu-
cation program; participant’s response to the 
program
 2.  Learning—focused on amount of knowledge 
gained from the program
 3.   Application—focused on link between learn-
ing and changes in on-the-job behavior
 4.  Impact—focused on the effect of the education 
program on the organization’s performance
 5.   ROI—compares the benefits (as quantified in 
dollars) to the costs of the education program.
Table 2.3 suggests a hierarchy of measures for the 
Navy, including recommended data collection tools 
and assessment frequency.3 Although the higher as-
sessment levels may allow more-precise calculation of 
net benefits, they also require more complex analysis, 
such as longitudinal studies, and thus may be more 
costly to conduct. Therefore, we recommend con-
ducting these assessments only every three to five 
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years. Moreover, many of these assessments could be 
accomplished as student theses. At the lower levels 
of assessment, it may be cost-effective to track per-
formance continuously, and net positive feedback at 
these levels of assessment would imply that the edu-
cation program is providing value to the organization. 
Jack Phillips has suggested four steps that organiza-
tions should take when moving along this hierarchy 
of assessment measures toward an ROI calculation 
(Phillips, Stone, and Phillips, 2001). The first step is 
to collect data to prepare for the evaluation through 
surveys, observations, or other methods. Appendix 
B includes a further discussion of recommended 
practices for data collection and analysis. The Navy 
already collects personnel data and can both improve 
and expand the educational variables that it tracks.
The second step is to isolate educational effects. This 
step can be achieved through subjective assessments 
by managers and former students on how education 
might change measurable outcomes. The literature 
suggests a number of methods for testing competen-
cy gains through both self-assessments and external 
assessments. The examples listed below are from 
Boyatzis, Stubbs, and Taylor, 2002, and Hardison 
and Vilamovska, 2009:
 Self-Assessments
	 •	 	Learning	 Skills	 Profile—individuals	 rate	 72	
skill statements on levels from 1 (no skill) to 7 
(leader and creator)
	 •	 	Self-Assessment	 Questionnaire—72	 ques-
tions assessing 21 competencies
 External Assessments
	 •	 	External	 Assessment	 Questionnaire—given	
to boss, colleagues, peers, etc., to assess com-
petencies
	 •	 	Critical	Incident	Review—an	observed	inter-
view evaluating 16 different competencies
	 •	 	Group	 Discussion	 Exercise—an	 observed	
simulation; participants are given a set of 3 
problems and must talk through their recom-
mendations to their chief executive officer (16 
competencies evaluated)
	 •	 	Presentation	Exercise—an	observed	presenta-
tion with a question-and-answer session
	 •	 	Critical	 Learning	 Assessment—rated	 tasks	 re-
quiring students to apply several aspects of criti-
cal thinking, including problem solving, analyt-
ic reasoning, and written communication skills.
The third step is to monetize the data on educa-
tion effects by assigning values to the education 
outcomes predicted in step two and calculating an 
annual program value. The direct educational costs 
and the opportunity costs should also be monetized 
in this step. Finally, ROI is calculated by dividing the 
estimated value of the education by its cost.
In the next two chapters, we take a closer look at the 
Navy program parameters and data, and in Chapter 
Five, we use existing community-level data to build 
an ROI framework for the Navy’s education program.
CHAPTER THREE 
NAVy PROGRAM AND SERVICE 
COMPARISONS
Graduate education for naval officers dates back to 
the 1800s, when USNA engineers were sent abroad 
3  Appendix B includes more specific recommendations for data tracking and analysis.
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to earn graduate degrees. In the early 1900s, when 
the Navy tried to set up additional service schools 
for its officers, it faced the trade-off between meeting 
its short-term operational needs and the long-term 
benefits of a better-educated officer corps (Powell, 
2004). A similar issue remains today: The Navy must 
determine the optimal level of officer graduate edu-
cation to meet required capabilities given finite re-
sources in terms of officer endstrength and graduate 
education funding.
The Navy’s primary goal in offering funded graduate 
education to its officer corps is to “support require-
ments for officers with specific subspecialty skills” 
(OPNAVINST 1520.23B, 1991). Thus, the Navy 
manages its education programs through an inte-
grated manpower and personnel classification sys-
tem that uses subspecialty codes to identify officer 
requirements for advanced education, functional 
training, and significant experience in various fields 
and positions. The subspecialty code identifies bil-
lets requiring specific qualifications and also identi-
fies officers who possess specific qualifications. The 
code itself has five characters. The first four charac-
ters are numbers that identify disciplines (e.g., func-
tional areas and concentrations and educational 
specialization) needed for a particular billet, while 
the fifth character is a letter that indicates the level of 
training, education, or experience needed.
For the purposes, of this study we focused on P- and 
Q-coded subspecialty designators. Officers having 
a funded master’s degree and billets that require a 
master’s degree carry P-coded designators.1 Officers 
who have served in a P-coded billet may receive a Q-
code designator, which indicates a “proven subspe-
cialist,” meaning that the officer has both a master’s 
degree and experience in his or her subspecialty. A 
Q-code qualifies the officer to serve in a Q-coded 
billet. The formal definitions for P and Q codes are 
as follows (U.S. Navy, 2010, pp. B-11, B-12):
	 •	 	P code: Requires extensive knowledge of 
theories, principles, processes, and/or tech-
niques certified through the acquisition of the 
master’s degree for optimum performance of 
duty; also requires the conception, implemen-
tation, appraisal, or management of complex 
Navy and/or DoD programs.
	 •	  Q code: All P-coded criteria are applicable; 
additionally the billet requires the combi-
nation of both professional experience and 
proven subspecialist at the master’s degree 
level.
Officers are considered funded if they attend gradu-
ate school full time for 26 weeks or more, regard-
less of whether the degree program is partially or 
fully-funded. For a fully-funded program, the Navy 
provides full pay and benefits for the duration of 
the course of study plus all tuition costs. For a par-
tially-funded program, the Navy supplies only pay 
and benefits, and the individual or an organization 
other than the Navy pays the tuition. An officer will 
typically only receive one funded graduate school 
opportunity in his or her career but may acquire 
additional unfunded degrees. Voluntary graduate 
school programs, such as tuition assistance or the 
Montgomery G.I. Bill, are considered unfunded 
graduate education. Such military institutions as the 
NPS, AFIT, and various war colleges and civilian 
institutions offer funded graduate degree programs. 
About one-half of the full-time residential programs 
are undertaken at either NPS or NWC (Moskowitz 
et al., 2008). Each fiscal year, the Navy has about 390 
funded master’s degree quotas (seats) at NPS, 25 at 
AFIT or other military institutions, and 200 at vari-
ous civilian institutions.2 About 550 of these are ful-
ly-funded, and the rest are for such other programs 
as partially-funded scholarships. Appendix A dis-
cusses some of the programs through which naval 
officers can receive a master’s degree in more detail.
By DoD policy, officers who receive funded gradu-
ate education incur an active-duty service obliga-
tion (ADSO) of three months for every one month 
of schooling for the first year of schooling. The av-
erage graduate degree program lasts approximately 
18 months. Navy policy requires a minimum three-
year ADSO for a funded master’s degree and a max-
imum five-year obligation for a funded doctorate. 
This ADSO may be served concurrently with any 
other obligation.3
P- and Q-coded billet requirements establish the de-
1  Officers who complete an unfunded master’s degree may submit paperwork to the Bureau of Naval Personnel to add a P-code des-
ignator to their personnel file. These officers are available for assignment to P-coded positions but have no utilization requirement. 
According to interviewees, there may actually be disincentives to reporting unfunded graduate education to the bureau.
2  In Navy terminology, quota refers to an individual billet for a training or education course. Navy program managers control a discrete 
number of quotas for each program, which they can allocate to individuals. Typically, the individual’s command will request a quota 
for a specific program, and the program manager will either approve or disapprove the request.
3  If the Navy funds an officer for a master’s degree through IGE, the officer’s ADSO is five years served concurrently with any other 
service obligations.
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mand for naval officers with graduate degrees (Table 
3.1). In 2008, approximately 5,960 total P-coded 
billets and approximately 760 Q-coded billets were 
available for those in grades O-3 through O-6 (cap-
tain). For the purposes of this study, we removed the 
medical, dental, law, and chaplain billets from the 
total validated billets, resulting in 4,397 P-coded and 
481 Q-coded billets.
We used the number of funded school quotas to de-
termine the supply of officers having graduate de-
grees. Every year the Navy sends approximately 550 
to 600 officers to school to receive advanced degrees. 
Most officers complete their graduate degrees be-
tween grades O-3 (lieutenant) and O-4; historically 
these two grades have accounted for 70 to 80 percent 
of all graduate degrees attained per year (Moskowitz 
et al., 2008). As of 2009, approximately 12,150 naval 
officers in grades O-3 and O-6 had master’s degrees, 
as designated by either a P-code (8,956) or Q-code 
(3,194).4 These are the officers available for utiliza-
tion in billets requiring graduate degrees. However, 
the number of officers who have had funded gradu-
ate education in 2009 was 6,683. Policy only requires 
funded officers to serve a utilization tour.
DoD utilization policy for officers who have had 
funded graduate education—which was modified in 
2008—states that officers should be assigned to a P-
coded position as soon as possible following degree 
completion and, ideally, immediately after. The cur-
rent Navy policy (OPNAVINST 1520.23B) has not 
been revised since 1991 and states that
  Officers who have received funded graduate edu-
cation will serve one tour in a validated subspe-
cialty position as soon as possible but not later 
than the second tour following graduation.
In practice, the “second tour following graduation” 
has been interpreted as the second shore tour fol-
lowing graduation to account for operational re-
quirements, which often preclude URL officers from 
immediate utilization in validated billets.
Navy education program managers currently use 
the one-tour officer utilization metric to evaluate 
and report on the effectiveness of master’s degree 
programs. Program managers track the percentage 
of officers who serve in a validated billet within one 
shore tour after receiving their degrees and within 
their careers. A qualifying utilization tour typically 
lasts from two to three years and varies by Navy 
community.
Given the number of Q-coded officers in the Navy 
in 2009, we can assume that 26 percent of all gradu-
ate-educated officers currently in the Navy between 
grades O-3 and O-6 have completed at least one uti-
lization tour. The Navy reports that 23 percent of of-
ficers complete one utilization tour within two shore 
tours following graduation. The estimated average ca-
reer assignment rate for active-duty officers to utiliza-
tion billets across the entire Navy is 53 percent, while 
URL and RL assignment rates are between 47 and 73 
percent, respectively.6 Rates also vary by community; 
for example, oceanography and civil engineering have 
the highest career utilization rates, while aviation and 
special operations have the lowest.
While approximately 86 percent of all P- or Q-coded 
billets that require master’s degrees are filled, the of-
ficers who fill them do not necessarily have graduate 
degrees or degrees specific to the billet requirements 
(Education Coordination Council, 2010). The effi-
ciency of the subspecialty billet program is evalu-
ated in terms of exact fits, exact matches of billet 
and officer subspecialty codes, and matrix fits, close 
matches of billet and officer subspecialty codes.7 The 
estimated average matrix fit rate for all communities 
is about 35 percent; the exact fit rate is lower, only 
about 24 percent. Again, the URL community per-
forms poorly in matching graduate degrees to billet 
requirements, with 15 percent being exact fits, while 
21 percent are exact fits in the RL community.8
4  This includes all staff, URL, and RL officers but excludes limited-duty officers and chief warrant officers.
5  There is no utilization requirement for unfunded education.
6  This figure may overstate career assignment rates because the data exclude officers who have received a graduate education and have 
left the Navy without completing a utilization tour.
7  In a matrix match, the first one or two numbers of the subspecialty code are the same for the billet and the officer, but the other num-
bers might not match. For instance, a billet designated 2000 for “National Security Studies—General” might be filled with an officer 
with the subspecialty 2400P for Strategic Intelligence.
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SERVICE COMPARISONS
Marine Corps Graduate Education Program
The Marine Corps has two funded graduate educa-
tion programs. The largest, which is fully-funded 
and accounts for more than one-half the service’s an-
nual quotas, is the Special Education Program (SEP) 
set out in Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1520.9G. Of-
ficers in the SEP program may attend NPS, AFIT, or 
accredited civilian universities.9 The other program, 
set out in MCO 1560.19E, is the Advanced Degree 
Program, which is intended to augment the SEP by 
partially funding degrees at civilian institutions.10 
Specific quotas for various curricula at particular 
schools are based on requirements projected three 
years in advance. Officers who are accepted and 
enroll in a graduate education program incur an 
ADSO of three YOS for the first year of school and 
four YOS for schooling that lasts more than one cal-
endar year. The ADSO is concurrent with any other 
service obligation.
With the exception of degrees awarded at staff col-
leges, all graduate degrees are awarded at grades O-1 
(second lieutenant) through O-4 (major). Although 
this rank limitation exists, there are no time-in- 
service limitations for graduate education. Officers 
must apply to a graduate education selection board, 
and the annual admission process is competitive. 
The board evaluates and selects officers based on 
“career potential, past performance of duty, previous 
academic record, and availability for assignment” 
(MCO 1520.9G, 2003). Officers are asked to list their 
top five degree curricula and are paired with degree 
programs based on program availability, aptitude, 
and military occupational specialty (MOS) require-
ments. Upon graduation, the officer is assigned an 
additional MOS (AMOS). Officers are encouraged 
to align differences would require a detailed analysis 
of billet coding, which was beyond the scope of this 
research. Navy Program and Service Comparisons 
29 their degree programs with their primary MOS 
to stay close to their career paths during their utili-
zation assignments.
The Marine Corps funds approximately 180 annual 
graduate education quotas to fill approximately 385 
billets. An officer who is eight to ten months out 
from graduation will receive orders for a follow-
on utilization tour in a validated billet. The Ma-
rine Corps SEP policy recognizes the particular 
challenges career-path restrictions aviators face in 
completing utilization tours. Because graduate ed-
ucation and utilization tours can take aviators out 
of the cockpit for up to five years (a combination of 
the length of the graduate course and the utilization 
tour), the SEP instruction requires aviators to meet 
their first “flight gate” before applying to SEP.11 On 
completing a utilization tour, Marine Corps officers 
retain the AMOS and are monitored for possible 
subsequent assignments to utilization tours; how-
ever, subsequent tours are rare (Blair, 2009).
The Marine Corps philosophy toward graduate 
education is to develop skills that fulfill immediate 
and specific requirements. In FY 2009, 385 Marine 
Corps billets required graduate educations. Officers 
are expected to serve a three-year utilization tour 
immediately after graduating. The Marine Corps 
defines utilization as work that exactly or closely 
matches the officer’s AMOS and the billet’s AMOS 
requirement. According to program managers, of-
ficers are assigned to billets that do not exactly or 
closely match their AMOSs less than 1 percent of the 
time. In 2009, the Marine Corps reported a 96-per-
cent utilization rate for officers in their first tours 
following graduate education, the highest utilization 
rate for any of the services for which researchers had 
accurate figures (Blair, 2009).
Air Force Graduate Education Program
The Air Force view of graduate education is more 
consistent with the new DoD instruction than that 
of the Marine Corps. The general philosophy is that 
graduate education gives officers critical thinking 
skills 30 Evaluating Navy’s Funded Graduate Educa-
tion Program that are used every day in an officer’s 
job, regardless of billet requirements. The Air Force 
describes graduate education programs as helping 
to manage resources and support objectives in “an 
increasingly complex international environment 
with rapidly changing science and technology” (Air 
Force Instruction 36-2302, 2001). The Air Force 
provides advanced academic degree (AAD) funding 
8  The relative efficiency of the URL communities in exact fits to billets may be due to differences in billet coding practices between 
the URL and RL communities; evaluating thes edifferences would require a detailed analysis of billet coding, which was beyond the 
scope of this research.
9  Officers must be accepted by the civilian institution, and the curriculum should be one that is not readily available at either NPS or 
AFIT.
10  Officers are responsible for their own tuition, books, and fees but receive all their regular pay and benefits while at school.
11  The first flight gate is defined as six years of operational flying in the first ten years of service. Provided the first flight gate is met, 
aviation incentive pay will continue through graduate school and in the follow-on utilization billet.
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to “prepare officers to perform the duties of a spe-
cifically designated position (or to meet the needs of 
a particular career field)” (Air Force Policy Directive 
36-23, 1993). 
The annual graduate school quota is about 460 per 
year, given funding availability and student man-
year (end-strength) limitations. Funded graduate 
opportunities are available at AFIT, intermediate 
service colleges, war colleges, and a variety of civil-
ian institutions.12 Officers typically attend graduate 
school at the O-3 and O-4 levels but may have up to 
three or four funded degrees throughout their ca-
reers.13 Graduate education is a factor in promotion 
boards, and 98 percent of officers selected for pro-
motion at their O-5 (lieutenant colonel) boards have 
graduate degrees. Officers may also have more than 
one funded degree in their career paths, including a 
doctorate or programs at war colleges and interme-
diate service colleges.
Officer selection is based on the “best available” offi-
cer, that is, the officer with the right background and 
aptitude who is at the right point in his or her career 
track. Typically, the officer’s senior rater nominates 
the service member, then the development team for 
the career field evaluates and steers him or her into 
an available program following “best fit” criteria. 
Funded master’s programs typically last two years, 
while doctoral programs typically take five years. 
The ADSO for an officer receiving funded education 
is three years for a master’s degree and five years for 
a doctorate.
After graduation, the officer is assigned a P code 
for a master’s degree or an R code for a doctorate.14 
Career-field managers validate billets that require 
graduate education every year, and the subspecialty 
areas depend on the current priorities of the Air 
Force. Air Force officers who have had funded grad-
uate education are required to serve in a validated 
billet within two assignments following graduation. 
By directive, the Air Force uses two metrics to evalu-
ate compliance with graduate education policy an-
nually:
 1.  The percentage of AFIT-produced degrees 
(master’s and doctorate) as a fraction of the 
number of AAD billet requirements.
 2.  The percentage of AFIT graduates assigned 
to AAD billets within two assignments following 
graduation.
In its 2008 biennial review of graduate programs, the 
Air Force reported that 59 percent of officers who 
had received a funded graduate degree between FY 
2006 and FY 2008 had been assigned to an AAD bil-
let within their first two assignments following grad-
uation. The remaining 41 percent, who had not been 
assigned to an AAD position, were still in their first 
assignments following graduation and were expect-
ed to fill AAD positions in their next assignments. 
The Air Force also reported an additional metric in 
this review, an evaluation of whether the individu-
als who were not assigned to an AAD billet in their 
first assignments used their graduate educations in 
the non-AAD billets. This analysis was subjective 
and based on a comparison of the observed billet re-
quirements with the degree curricula. The Air Force 
reported that 31 percent of officers in non-AAD as-
signments immediately following graduation were 
in positions that utilized their AAD skills.
Army Graduate Education Programs
The Army considers higher education to be both 
something of a sabbatical from operational respon-
sibilities and a broadening experience. GEN David 
Petraeus elaborated six reasons that he believed 
graduate education (at civilian universities in par-
ticular) was important to the Army (Petraeus, 2007):
	 •	 	It	 took	military	officers	out	of	 their	 intellec-
tual comfort zones, which is critical in devel-
oping adaptable and creative leaders.





	 •	 	It	 helped	 officers	 improve	 critical-thinking	
skills.
	 •	 	It	 imparted	 intellectual	 humility	 and	 helps	
raise individual standards of excellence.
The Army currently runs two separate graduate 
education programs. The first, the Advanced Civil 
Schooling program, focuses on meeting validated 
billet requirements. The program funds approxi-
mately 412 graduate education quotas annually to 
12  Graduate degrees at civilian institutions are sponsored by AFIT and are generally approved only if there is no comparable curriculum 
at AFIT.
13  Pilots tend to have different career timing and graduate school opportunities because of the pressures to keep them in the cockpit 
and to get an ROI for their pilot training.
14  Professional degrees, such as legal or medical doctorates, receive an “S” code. A list of data codes can be found in Air Force Instruc-
tion 36-2305.
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fill about 2,000 validated billets.15 The Army strati-
fies these quotas by low-, medium-, and high-cost 
universities and will pay up to $45,000 in total tu-
ition for high-cost universities, such as Harvard or 
Stanford.16 The Army tries to select “quality” officers 
for the Advanced Civil Schooling program and, in 
particular, tries to send high-performing, high-apti-
tude officers to elite universities.
The second program was started to provide retention 
incentives to Army officers who have seen higher 
operational tempos and increasing deployment-to-
dwell ratios in recent years because of the conflicts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Expanded Graduate 
School Program currently funds 200 to 400 quotas 
and is expected to have funding for as many as 600 
by 2012. Graduates of this program may elect to do 
a degree from a broader range of curricula and in-
stitutions and are not required to complete a utiliza-
tion assignment; however, they are required to com-
plete an ADSO.
The Army has the longest ADSOs of any of the ser-
vices. Officers who receive funded graduate educa-
tion are required to serve three months of active-duty 
for every one month of education. This requirement 
means that the typical two-year master’s degree in-
curs an ADSO of six years following graduation.
Like the other services, the Army also looks at uti-
lization rates to evaluate the performance of its 
funded education programs.17 Officers’ records are 
flagged as soon as they receive a funded degree, and 
the assignment officer is required to check with the 
utilization manager for follow-on assignments be-
fore the flag can be removed from the officer’s re-
cord. The metric for measuring performance in the 
Expanded Graduate School Program is simply re-
tention rates.
CROSS-SERVICE PRORM PARAMETERS 
AND MANAGEMENT
Table 3.2 compares advanced academic programs 
and billet requirements across the services, show-
ing that, proportionally, the Navy has more billets 
requiring officers with graduate degrees than the 
other services do. In fact, relative to the overall size 
of the officer corps, the Navy, with approximately 
5,000 billets and 25,600 officers, requires about three 
times as many as the Army or Air Force and nearly 
nine times as many as the Marine Corps.18
Again relative to the size of its officer corps, the 
Navy also has more quotas for graduate education 
than the other services do. However, these quotas 
are not proportionate to the billet requirements. 
Every year, the Navy has one quota for about every 
nine validated billets. The Army has one for every 
five validated billets, the Air Force one for every six, 
and the Marine Corps one for every two. Given the 
potential availability of eight billets to every officer 
in the Navy who has a new graduate degree, officer 
utilization rates could be expected to be very high. 
However, the one-tour utilization rate in the Navy 
is less than 25 percent within two tours after gradu-
ation and an average of 51 percent over a career. 
These are the lowest rates among the services for 
which utilization data were available.
The cross-service comparison suggests that, while 
all the services educate to fill validated billets, slight 
variations occur in services’ overall philosophy to-
ward graduate education. In addition, there are con-
siderable differences in program management and 
program parameters between the Navy’s graduate 
education program and those of the other services. 
15  In the past, the Army has had up to 5,300 validated billets.
16  This is in addition to the programming rate for each officer which includes full pay and benefits.
17  The Army was not able to provide us information on utilization rates from its most recent biennial review of graduate education 
programs.
18  It is unclear whether the high number of billets requiring graduate education in the Navy relative to other services is due to addi-
tional technical requirements in the Navy or whether the billet validation criteria for graduate education differ substantially between 
the services. This would require a detailed analysis of billet validation procedures, which was beyond the scope of this research but 
would be a valuable area for further research.
242 VALUE BOOK • A STRATEGIC VALUED INVESTMENT  NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Chapter Four explores program parameters and uti-
lization management within the Navy in more detail.
CHAPTER fOUR 
COMMUNITy-LEVEL DATA AND 
UTILIzATION MODEL
Not only do the services differ from one another in 
how they manage their graduate education programs, 
but the various communities within the Navy have 
differences from one another. Community managers 
and education program managers have highlighted 
their philosophical differences about graduate edu-
cation and the billet structure and utilization rates 
among the URL, RL, and staff corps communities.
URL officers in the Navy are officers who are quali-
fied to command operational units, ships, or aviation 
squadrons and include surface warfare, submarine 
warfare, aviation, and special warfare communi-
ties. RL officers, such as information professionals, 
information warfare officers, and naval oceanogra-
phers, are not eligible for command at sea. Career 
opportunities, including educational and utilization 
opportunities, are thought to differ between URL 
and RL communities because of the extra position 
requirements (career wickets) necessary for opera-
tional commands in URL communities.
We explored these differences further by developing 
a system dynamics leader succession model to im-
prove our understanding of how officer assignment 
decisions and career management affect utilization 
rates among various communities. This model starts 
with a pool of graduate-degreed officers and makes 
certain assumptions about how these officers prog-
ress though their careers, including promotion and 
retention rates up to grade O-5 (commander).1 Al-
though the model could be modified for any Navy 
community, we selected one representative commu-
nity from the RL and one from the URL: the sur-
face warfare officer (SWO) community for the URL 
community and the meteorology and oceanography 
(METOC) for the RL community.2
COMMUNITY DIFFERENCES
Surface Warfare Community
SWOs are required to complete four sea tours (two 
tours as a division officer and two as a department 
head) within their first 10 to 12 YOS, three of which 
are expected to be in mainstream afloat billets.3 With 
these operational demands, individuals in the SWO 
community typically have one opportunity to attend 
graduate school in their first ten YOS, during their first 
shore tour at 4 to 6 YOS and grade O-3. A very small 
percentage of officers may complete their graduate 
schooling earlier through the VGEP or IGE program, 
and some may not complete graduate education until 
they attend NWC at higher grades. Approximately 90 
to 100 funded graduate education quotas are available 
to the SWO community every year.
Subspecialty requirements in the SWO community 
fall into five broad categories and 29 subcategories. 
The subspecialty areas having the most billet re-
quirements are listed in Table 4.1. A majority of the 
billet requirements in this community are for tech-
nical subspecialties that are closely related to opera-
tional roles. In URL communities, master’s level and 
higher education requirements are not normally ap-
plied to shore duty billets for grades below O-4.4
Retention has been a frequent concern for the SWO 
community. Retention rates are typically measured 
at 7 to 9 YOS and have mainly fluctuated between 
30 and 40 percent in the past decade (Lorio, 2006). 
SWOs incur an ADSO for graduate education, 
which is the same as for other communities. Howev-
er, assignments to some graduate degree programs 
also require SWOs to sign up for SWO Continua-
tion Pay, which is designed as a retention incentive 
and awards officers up to $50,000 to stay in the SWO 
community and complete two operational depart-
ment-head tours with a deployable unit. Together, 
these two sea tours typically last five to six years, 
including training and the time involved in chang-
ing duty stations. Thus, an SWO who agrees to at-
tend graduate school is actually more likely to have 
a minimum fiveyear commitment to active service 
following his or her graduation.5
Therefore, retention rates at the 7- to 9-year point 
for SWOs who have had graduate degrees may be 
artificially higher than those for officers without 
1 See Appendix C for more details.
2  The METOC community is also sometimes called the OCEANO (for oceanography) community.
3  See Moskowitz et al., 2009, for more on the operational demands SWOs face.
4  See U.S. Navy, 2010. Shore-duty billets below the O-4 level might benefit from advanced degrees; however, these billets are not likely 
to be designated for officers with graduate educations because the timing of degree attainment in the URL communities precludes 
most officers from being available to fill these billets before grade O-4.
5  In the case of the SWO community, the “unofficial” ADSO is similar to the Army’s official ADSO for graduate education.
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graduate degrees and are thus not necessarily accu-
rate representations of the effect of graduate educa-
tion on retention.
Promotion incentives in the SWO community are 
not currently aligned to encourage graduate degree 
attainment or utilization. Although the SWO com-
munity has begun to track promotion statistics for 
officers who have graduate degrees, master’s degree 
attainment or utilization in a validated billet is not a 
required criterion for promotion at any grade. Com-
munity managers suggested that promotion is pri-
marily based on performance in operational billets 
and, at most, a graduate degree on an officer’s record 
might be a “tie-breaker” in the promotion board, 
given two officers with similar promotion potential 
in all other respects.
The SWO community in 2008 had a total of 385 P-
coded billet and 49 Q-coded billets out of 4,485 total 
SWO billets between grades O-3 and O-6; thus, bil-
lets requiring a master’s level of education account-
ed for fewer than 10 percent of all SWO billets.6 As 
Figure 4.1 shows, the distribution of P and Q billets 
increases at higher grades, and these billets account 
for 37 percent of all billets at the O-6 level compared 
with only 2.5 percent of billets at the O-3 level. This 
distribution of billets suggests that this community 
has proportionally greater requirements for gradu-
ate degrees and proven subspecialists at the higher 
grades.
METOC Community
The METOC community has designated specialty 
discipline areas in three main categories—physical 
oceanographers, meteorologists, and generalists—
which are further subdivided into 12 subdisciplines. 
Initially, officers are expected to choose a prime spe-
cialty area (meteorology or oceanography) and then 
gain strong expertise in a subdiscipline throughout 
their careers.
A majority of officers entering the METOC com-
munity are selected into the program before com-
missioning but are actually commissioned as un-
qualified SWOs and must first fulfill an initial SWO 
division officer tour. Upon qualification as an SWO, 
they are automatically redesignated into the ME-
TOC community. The METOC community also 
accepts officers who laterally transfer from other 
communities, and there are a limited number of of-
ficers who are directly commissioned into the ME-
TOC community. The first SWO tour is followed 
by an initial METOC experience tour, which helps 
the officer understand the METOC community and 
select a discipline area. At about six to nine years 
into their careers, METOC officers are expected to 
complete an education tour—a two-year course of 
study leading to a master’s degree in physical ocean-
ography and meteorology. Most of these degrees are 
completed at NPS, although a select few (typically 
6  The SWO detailer is responsible for filling a set number of discrete 1110-coded (SWO) validated billets, as well as a “fair distribution” 
of nondiscrete 1050- and 1000-coded (any URL) validated billets. For the purpose of this research, we calculated billet numbers for 
SWO-designated billets only.
244 VALUE BOOK • A STRATEGIC VALUED INVESTMENT  NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
one per year) complete their degrees through the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology–Woods Hole 
Oceanographic Institute Joint Program in Oceanog-
raphy. Each officer is strongly encouraged to choose 
a thesis topic in his or her preferred subdiscipline.
Officers receiving funded education are expected to 
do a payback tour in a coded billet. However, the 
first tour immediately following the education tour 
is an out-of-community operational tour, some-
times known as an “O-4 sea tour.” After this initial 
tour, officers are encouraged to pursue their disci-
pline track throughout the remainder of their ca-
reers, culminating in an O-5 milestone tour, which 
again utilizes their specialized experience.
The METOC community’s philosophy is that “all 
career officers will attend postgraduate education 
and obtain a master’s degree.”7 In addition, in terms 
of promotion potential, service in a P-coded billet 
is considered “necessary, but not sufficient to select 
to O-5.”8 The billet structure and distribution for 
the METOC community reflect this emphasis on 
graduate education. The METOC community has a 
total of 135 P-coded and 106 Q-coded billet require-
ments, accounting for 65 percent of the total billet 
requirements. As Figure 4.2 shows, over one-half the 
billets at every grade require a master’s degree, and 
at grades O-5 and O-6, over one-half of all billets 
require a proven subspecialist. The high percentage 
of billets requiring proven subspecialists suggests a 
need to reuse officers in validated billets throughout 
their career.
UTILIZATION SCENARIOS LEAD  
TO DIFFERENT OUTCOMES FOR  
COMMUNITIES
Researchers built a system dynamics leader succes-
sion model to test different utilization scenarios in 
the two communities. We used figures from the Na-
vy’s model for graduate school quotas and also made 
various assumptions about career progression and 
timing of graduation and utilization tours.9 In ac-
cordance with Navy policy, the researchers assumed 
that utilization tours would occur at the first oppor-
tunity following graduation. Initial model runs ex-
amined utilization possibilities given different reten-
tion rates for the SWO and METOC communities.
Table 4.2 shows outputs from various model runs in 
the SWO community. We examined retention rates 
at 40, 65, and 95 percent. We chose 40 percent as it 
was the upper bound of average retention rates for 
this community from the past decade and a maxi-
mum retention rate of 95 percent, which would be 
consistent with retention rates seen in some of the 
RL communities to make comparisons between 
communities. However, a 65-percent retention rate 
would be most realistic for the SWO community, 
7  Navy Personnel Command website, OCEANO detailer’s pages.
8  Navy Personnel Command website.
9  See Appendix C for complete model assumptions and limitations.
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in line with the literature estimations that graduate 
education improves retention by about 25 percent-
age points.
In the SWO community, one tour in a utilization bil-
let in an officer’s career was sufficient to fill all SWO-
only, P-coded billets at the O-3 and O-4 level, even at 
retention rates lower than 50 percent at seven to ten 
years. However, with nearly perfect retention rates at 
seven to ten years and only one utilization tour per 
career, less than 15 percent of the O-5 P-coded bil-
lets can be filled by officers with graduate degrees. If 
officers complete two or more utilization tours dur-
ing a career, it becomes possible to fill all the O-5 P-
coded billets, given the quotas and billets. Therefore, 
for the SWO community, the available quotas for 
graduate education and the billet structure are cur-
rently such that at least some officers must complete 
more than one utilization tour within a career for 
all the P-coded billets to be filled by officers having 
master’s degrees. Because most officers receive fund-
ed education at grade O-3, utilization possibilities at 
the O-5 level (which has the highest proportion of 
billets) are sensitive to retention rates. However, as 
Table 4.2 shows, the effects of improved retention on 
the SWO community’s ability to fill billets are small 
compared to those of reutilization. For example, in-
creasing retention from 40 to 95 percent at seven to 
ten years increases the percentage of billets filled by 
only 6 percent (46 to 54 percent); a second utiliza-
tion tour increases fill possibilities by 30 to 70 per-
cent depending on the retention rates used.
Model runs for the METOC community paint a 
somewhat different picture than those for the SWO 
community. The METOC community does not have 
the same retention issues as the SWO community, 
so we assumed a 95 percent retention rate. A single 
utilization tour in a METOC officer’s career leaves 
barely enough school quotas to fill the O-3 billet 
requirements (even with high retention). Given the 
model parameters, it was not possible to fill all the 
requirements in this community without utilizing 
officers in subspecialty-coded billets at least once in 
every grade. The percentages in Table 4.3 also do not 
reflect the Q-coded billet requirements, which are 
substantial in grades O-5 and O-6. If we added Q-
coded billets into the model, it is likely that officers 
who have had graduate degrees would have to com-
plete more than one utilization tour at every grade to 
fill all the requirements.
The results from this utilization model highlight the 
importance of career management for officers who 
have graduate degrees and of reutilization of officers 
with subspecialties. If officers who have graduate de-
grees are expected to complete only one utilization 
tour in a career, the SWO community would need 
more than double its current school quota to 190 
slots to fill all the P-coded requirements in grades 
O-3 to O-5. The number of annual quotas the ME-
TOC community would need to fill requirements 
would almost triple, to 42, if each graduate educated 
officer completed only one utilization tour.10 This re-
vised quota requirement would be substantial given 
that there are only about 96 officers at grade O-3 in 
the METOC community. The next chapter includes 
a further discussion of the billet and educational 
quota structure for these two communities and their 




Using the data and modeling results from Chap-
ter Four and assumptions drawn from the military 
and civilian literature review, this chapter uses an 
ROI framework to analyze the benefits from fund-
ing graduate education. The underlying concept is 
straightforward: trading a one-time initial cost for 
providing education for a future benefit of needed 
knowledge for service in particular billets and avail-
able skills for service in all future billets. The costs 
are providing a billet for education for each officer 
for one to two years, paying tuition or substituting 
a proxy value for tuition when it is not paid directly. 
The benefits accrue from increased officer produc-
tivity due to the knowledge and skills gained and 
from filling billets that require this knowledge and 
these skills. It is not likely that a “cash-on-cash” re-
turn is achievable or measurable. In the detailed as-
sessment below, we indicate when budget savings 
10  These estimations assume 95-percent retention rates.
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might be achievable in future years, but it is an “eco-
nomic” return that is actually assessed.
Aside from the individual investment, the annual 
cost overall needs to be taken into account. Given 
550 new quotas each year for about 1.5 years of 
graduate education, the program requires a total an-
nual investment of approximately $135 million. Fur-
thermore, the billet management program, which 
handles approximately 4,500 P-coded billets and 500 
Q-coded billets, is a $940 million annual investment 
in productivity (“readiness”) that should be consid-
ered separately. Each of these is discussed below.
RETURN ON THE INVESTMENT IN  
EDUCATION
Variables Included
The variables that make up an ROI framework are 
outlined below. The analysis could be done for the 
Navy as a whole, separately for Navy URL and RL, or 
separately for a particular community. The data for 
URL and RL combined are presented below, and fol-
lowing that are examples for particular communities.
 Inputs and Intermediate Calculations
	 •	  Number of graduate education billets to be 
filled. For URL and RL, approximately 4,500 
billets require graduate degrees, and another 
500 require graduate degrees and experience. 
These are the P- and Q-coded billets described 
earlier.
	 •	  Annual quotas for graduate education. There 
are 550 quotas each year.
	 •	  Length of education. The average is estimated 
between 1.5 years to 1.8 years. We used the 
lower bound of 1.5 years for our calculations, 
but this figure is easily modified in the analysis. 
This average and the number of annual gradu-
ate education quotas are key determinants of 
cost because a 1.5-year average for 550 new 
quotas each year translates into the equivalent 
of 825 annual school seats or billets that must 
be funded. A 1.8-year average would yield 
about 990 school seats to fund annually.
	 •	  Cost of one year of education. The typical stu-
dent is an O-3, but some O-4s also attend. We 
used a programming rate for O-3 and O-4, 
heavily weighted toward O-3, of $140,000 for 
the cost of a billet in the student portion of 
the individual’s account.1 To that, we added an 
annual proxy tuition cost of $25,000, for an 
annual cost of $165,000 each for the number 
of school seats calculated above. Multiplying 
the two numbers (825 school billets at an an-
nual cost of $165,000) yields the approximate 
cost of the education program, $135 million. 
Also, while the cost of one year of education 
(billet plus tuition) is $165,000, the cost per 
officer is about $245,000, assuming the 1.5 
years of education.
	 •	  Value of a billet and value of an officer. The 
billets of interest (P and Q) are a mix of O-3 
to O-6 billets. Weighting annual program-
ming costs by the percentage of each grade in 
the billets yields an average annual figure of 
$157,000. We assumed that the amount pro-
grammed for the billet is the value of both the 
billet and the officer who fills it.2
	 •	  Value of a billet requiring a graduate degree. 
Assuming a 20-percent productivity gain 
from graduate education,3 the value of a billet 
requiring a graduate degree is $188,000. The 
total value of all billets is thus $850 million for 
the 4,500 P-coded billets and an additional 
$90 million for the 500 Q-coded billets, for a 
total value of $940 million.
 Benefits
	 •	  Value of an officer with a graduate degree. 
With the assumption of a 20-percent pro-
ductivity gain, the officer who has a gradu-
ate degree provides $188,000 of annual value 
while serving in a billet requiring graduate 
education, or $31,000 more in value than an 
officer in that billet without graduate educa-
tion.4 This annual value is applied to the num-
ber of YOS in the billet, which we assumed to 
1  The Office of the Secretary of Defense publishes the composite standard pay and reimbursement rates for DoD military personnel 
annually. These provide data for calculating military manpower costs for program submissions and budget/management studies. The 
annual DoD composite rate, for each military service and enlisted and officer pay grade, includes average basic pay plus retired pay 
accrual, health accrual, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, incentive and special pay, permanent change 
of station expenses, and miscellaneous pay. As discussed earlier, we weighted the O-3 and O-4 Navy officer costs appropriately to 
determine the average cost for a typical billet. See Roth, 2009.
2  The billet cost is derived from the DoD programming rates discussed earlier. As discussed in the literature review, economic returns 
of education are measured in the private sector through earnings differentials. Presumably, a rational firm pays what the person is 
worth in terms of productivity. We make the similar assumption here.
3  This assumption is derived from the civilian literature discussed earlier. See Appendix D for an analysis of sensitivity to this assumption.
4  Our analysis assumed all billets to be manned with an officer either with or without a graduate degree. “Gapped” billets (that is, those 
not filled by anyone) present issues for the Navy beyond the scope of this analysis.
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be three. Longer service provides more value. 
Moreover, we assumed a 5-percent skill pro-
ductivity differential (about $8,000) for all 
future billets that were not P or Q coded but 
in which an officer having a graduate degree 
might serve.
	 •	  Increased retention. Simple logic would man-
date that officers who have graduate degrees 
would serve longer on average because their 
ADSOs following graduation would draw 
them closer to ten YOS, at which point vest-
ing of retirement at the 20-year mark be-
comes a dominant consideration. Some of the 
literature discussed earlier has measured the 
retention increase, something that the evalu-
ation chapter suggested should be done pe-
riodically. The benefit of increased retention 
is in reducing the annual costs of accessing 
and training new officers. These savings are 
potentially significant, as the studies cited 
described, but are not included in this initial 
assessment.
	 •	  Reutilization. The initial benefit described 
above is for first service in a billet requiring 
a graduate degree for an average of two years. 
Any subsequent use in P- or Q-coded billets 
provides additional annual value without ad-
ditional cost. If the system were a steady state, 
any reutilization would also reduce the num-
ber of new quotas needed to fill billets, which 
would provide further savings.
Variables Not Included in the Analysis
A more-complete analysis might make assumptions 
and include at least two additional variables: depre-
ciation and opportunity costs. Some of the litera-
ture discusses knowledge depreciation: the loss of 
knowledge when it is not used soon after it is gained. 
However, in our interviews, some indicated that 
even if not used, an officer educated in a particular 
field has an interest in staying abreast of that field 
through journal articles, symposia, etc., so deprecia-
tion might not occur. Opportunity costs affect both 
the officer and the organization. While in graduate 
school, the officer is forgoing an operational assign-
ment for the same length of time, one that might 
have provided experience that could have improved 
his or her promotion potential. The Navy’s oppor-
tunity costs derive from a possible loss of readiness 
from the officer being in school instead of an opera-
tional billet. It would be necessary to make assump-
tions about these costs because we are not aware of 
any studies that have analyzed them.
Also, as discussed above, we assumed longer service, 
given the graduate degree, but none of the benefits 
of increased retention, such as lower accession and 
training costs. We also did not account for the time 
value of money in this assessment.
Is There a Net Benefit?
Simple math would say that, for the Navy URL and 
RL, each graduate-degreed officer would need to 
serve an average of about 7.9 YOS in a designated 
billet to offset the $245,000 total educational cost at 
$31,000 in added value each year. Obviously, given 
detailing practices, the likelihood of this would vary 
by community. Introducing the variables of the skill 
productivity differential, increased retention, length 
of education, and reutilization increases the calcu-
lated benefit. For example, if at the end of education 
(at six YOS) an O-3 stays to 20 years and serves in 
one designated billet for three years and other bil-
lets for 11 years, the value (ignoring the time value 
of money) would be $31,000 for each of the three 
years plus about $8,000 for each of the other 11 years 
for a total of $181,000, which is less than the cost 
of education for 1.5 years of education but greater 
than the cost of one year of education. If the offi-
cer were to be utilized in designated billets twice for 
three years each, the benefit would be $186,000 plus 
$48,000 for a total of $230,000, or within 6 percent 
of the approximate cost of 1.5 years of education. 
Obviously, in these examples, we assumed that all 
newly graduated O-3s would stay exactly 20 years. 
In reality, some would leave earlier, and some would 
stay longer. Moreover, every officer provided gradu-
ate education would have to serve in designated bil-
lets for the benefit to accrue across all the URL and 
RL. An officer who served for 14 additional years 
after completing graduate education but who never 
filled a designated billet would provide $112,000 of 
value, and that is much less than the cost of the edu-
cation provided. The overall ROI for the Navy thus 
depends heavily on the length of education and the 
usage rate of educated officers in designated billets.5 
Also, as stated above, we are not assessing the con-
siderable savings in accession and training costs if 
officers who would otherwise have left would stay 
longer as a result of having been provided graduate 
education. That analysis is beyond the scope of this 
study, but Chapter Four outlined how this could be 
done and incorporated in the analysis.
5  Sending officers to graduate education as early in a career as possible increases payback (potential years of utilization), assuming that 
the officers are retained.
248 VALUE BOOK • A STRATEGIC VALUED INVESTMENT  NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
EFFECTS ON SPECIFIC COMMUNITIES
We can use the modeling results from Chapter Four 
to assess the effects on two communities, SWOs and 
METOC officers, in more detail. For each, we make 
the simplifying assumptions of 1.5 years of educa-
tion, three-year utilization tours, 14 years of addi-
tional service after education, $165,000 annual cost 
to educate (thus a per officer cost of $245,000 for the 
1.5 years), a 20-percent knowledge and skill produc-
tivity premium while serving in validated billets, 
and a 5-percent skill productivity premium while 
serving in other billets.6 Thus, the cost of education 
is fixed while, in the figures below, the benefits vary 
with the level of utilization.
Surface Warfare Officers
Because there are about six times more graduate ed-
ucation quotas for SWO officers (91) than for ME-
TOC officers (15), the annual cost to educate them is 
also six times larger. The break-even point for SWO 
occurs at about six total years of utilization for every 
officer provided a graduate education. Any level of 
utilization above that increases the return on the in-
vestment in education. Any level of utilization below 
that decreases the ROI. Current data show that only 
about 80 percent of graduate-degreed SWO officers 
who stay for 20 years serve at least one utilization 
tour. Many of the officers who do serve in designat-
ed billets generally serve in them for less than three 
years, and the billets often do not match their sub-
specialties.7 Given this practice, it is not likely that 
any scenario would generate an ROI for their educa-
tion without significant change in management of 
SWO officers.
Figure 5.1 shows the returns for all SWO officers for 
three different levels of utilization. Costs are in mil-
lions of dollars, representing the cost of the entire 
SWO community of officers. The Navy breaks even 
at 100-percent utilization if officers serve two three-
year utilization tours. That is to say, to break even, 
the Navy must have every SWO officer who gets 
funded graduate education serve two full utilization 
tours. The break-even point could also occur if only 
70 percent of the officers had a utilization tour, but 
this would require a total of nine years of utilization.
METOC
The costs and benefits for METOC officers have the 
same relationships as they do for the SWO com-
munity but at lower dollar levels because of the 
lower number of quotas. However, METOC officers 
generally have high levels of utilization and repeat 
assignments in validated billets, making an ROI 
achievable. As shown in Figure 5.2, this breakeven 
return would occur at about six YOS for all officers 
in designated billets or at nine YOS for about 70 per-
cent of officers.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 have different y-axes (cost) be-
cause one community has more quotas for educa-
tion than the other community. But they have the 
same utilization lines because the ROI is indepen-
7  Data from Navy N15 show that, for the Navy overall, about 30 percent of officers with a master’s degree and 20 YOS have served in a 
billet requiring that specific education.
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dent of the numbers of educational quotas that drive 
cost. The return is dependent only on the utiliza-
tion rate and productivity assumption (also given 
assumptions of completing education at seven YOS 
and staying to 20 years). That is, for any number of 
officers provided graduate educations, it takes about 
six years of use in validated billets to break even.
MANAGEMENT OF BILLETS REQUIRING 
GRADUATE EDUCATION
Overall, the Navy has about 4,500 P-coded and 500 
Q-coded billets that require graduate degrees. Given 
the weighted grades and composite programming 
rates of the officers who serve in them, these bil-
lets have a readiness or productivity value of $940 
million, of which $155 million is the premium for 
graduate education. Not filling one of these billets at 
all (gapping it) represents a readiness loss (or an op-
portunity forgone) of $188,000 for each such billet. 
If the billet is filled, but with an officer lacking the 
correct educational credentials, the loss is $31,000 
for each such billet.
Current data suggest that, across the Navy, these bil-
lets are only accurately filled at about a 36-percent 
rate, indicating that the Navy is forgoing $109 mil-
lion of readiness annually.8 Assuming that the bil-
let requirement is accurate (billets are subject to a 
zero-based review or validation annually), the Navy 
would have to either increase utilization signifi-
cantly or increase quotas for graduate education to 
reduce the annual productivity loss to zero. There is 
a trade-off between increasing quotas to reduce the 
productivity loss and the cost of the additional quo-
tas. Increased utilization in billets is also part of the 
trade-off, but even with much higher usage, it may 
not be possible to fill all the designated billets with 
appropriately educated officers.
From the previous METOC example, we know that 
six years of utilization in validated billets and seven 
years of use in other billets of all graduate-educated 
officers yields a break-even graduate education ROI. 
However, not all the P and Q billets may be filled at 
this level of use. The modeling described earlier in-
dicated that more than two utilization tours of three 
years each would be needed to fill just the P-coded 
billets. Additional annual quotas would be needed 
to fill all P and Q billets at this level of use. Alterna-
tively, nine years of utilization for each graduate-de-
greed officer both increases ROI for the educational 
benefit and reduces the cost of unfilled billets to near 
zero. Such levels of utilization might be feasible in 
this RL community, given the distribution of the Q 
billets in higher grades.
However, this is not the case for the SWO commu-
nity. Detailing practices for SWOs would have to 
change significantly to institute repetitive service 
and high utilization in validated billets. In essence, 
SWO officers who have graduate degrees would 
need to become semispecialized in their subspecial-
ties, which would decrease their opportunities for 
broadening assignments. Also, because the grade 
distribution of SWO P and Q billets skews toward 
O-4 and O-5 ranks, many officers would need to 
serve in positions one grade below their rank to fill 
all billets.
The various ratios of graduate education billets to all 
O-4 to O-6 billets and of quotas for graduation edu-
cation to P and Q billets tell the tale for both com-
munities. For METOC, 65 percent (213/326) of all 
billets are coded P or Q, but with 15 quotas, the ratio 
of billets to quotas is 14 (213/15). This implies that 
each graduate-degreed officer must serve 14 years of 
utilization in validated billets to fill all P and Q bil-
lets. But this may be feasible, given the high propor-
tion of validated to overall billets and the especially 
high proportion of 79 percent (22/28) for O-6 billets 
and 81 percent (57/70) for O-5 P and Q billets to 
total billets for that grade.
For SWO, only 16 percent (533/3,414) of total bil-
lets are P and Q coded, but with 91 quotas, the ratio 
of billets to quotas is 5.8 (533/91). This implies that 
each graduate-degreed officer needs to serve slightly 
less than six years of utilization in a validated billet 
to have all billets filled. This is a lower rate of utiliza-
tion than required for an education ROI. It is more 
likely that the SWOs could fill all designated billets 
than SWOs could use all officers in a designated bil-
let to generate a return to their educations, but nei-
ther is probable with current management practices.
The differences are stark. A high percentage of all 
METOC billets are P and Q coded. High enough 
utilization of graduate-degreed officers to achieve 
an ROI on their education appears feasible. A small 
percentage of all SWO billets are P and Q coded. 
Not enough graduate degreed officers are utilized 
for a break-even ROI: however, enough are utilized 
to make filling all validated billets feasible if some 
SWOs specialize in these billets.
8  Data from Navy N15 show that approximately 36 percent of designated billets are filled with officers holding master’s degrees that 
directly or closely align to billet requirements. Thirty-six percent of designated billets are filled by officers that hold master’s degrees. 
Thirty percent of officers have served in a billet requiring a master’s degree (from the previous footnote).
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SUMMARY: A TALE OF TWO COMMUNITIES
The SWO community educates enough officers to 
fill validated billets but neither fills the billets com-
pletely nor uses officers frequently enough in vali-
dated billets to generate a break-even ROI for the 
education provided. The METOC community uses 
officers in validated billets frequently enough to 
generate a return on the investment but, even so, 
lacks enough quotas to fill all validated billets. Com-
mon economic sense would suggest providing more 
quotas to METOC because in this community the 
marginal returns exceed the marginal costs.
CHAPTER SIX 
fINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter summarizes the researchers’ findings 
and provides recommendations to the Navy in terms 
of policy, culture, and monitoring and evaluation.
Findings
The new policy language and intent from the Of-
fice of the Secretary of Defense suggest a broader 
and more-extensive use of funded graduate edu-
cation beyond educating for validated billets. In 
particular this is expanded to include educating for 
“future capabilities.” At present, the Navy’s graduate 
education management system and metrics for per-
formance evaluation of that system focus on educat-
ing for “present needs.” This focus is mainly due to a 
legacy of a bottom-up approach to managing officer 
quotas and billets; development of future capabili-
ties implies a top-down process.
Graduate education provides technical skills 
and nontechnical competencies or “soft skills” 
which are valued in a wide range of Navy billets 
beyond billets which require graduate education. 
Although it is difficult to quantify returns to educa-
tion, evidence from the literature suggests that posi-
tive organizational gains accrue from having a more 
educated workforce. Graduate education builds hu-
man and social capital that may lead to improved 
productivity, greater retention, and better perfor-
mance in billets. Competencies gained in gradu-
ate education may compensate for lack of domain 
knowledge in certain billets.
Cross-service differences exist in graduate edu-
cation philosophy, program parameters, utiliza-
tion rates, and particularly in program manage-
ment. The Navy has one of the largest requirements 
for graduate education in terms of quotas and vali-
dated billets. It also has the lowest utilization rates 
for officers who have graduate degrees among all 
the services. Moreover, even if better once-in-a-ca-
reer utilization rates are achieved, validated billets 
and graduate school quotas are still mismatched in 
the Navy; fewer quotas are available than there are 
validated educational requirements.
Management of officers and billets that require 
graduate education varies between Navy commu-
nities, with pronounced differences between the 
RL and URL communities. The RL communities 
have proportionally more billet requirements, more-
frequent utilization, and more-frequent reutilization 
than the URL communities. Cultural influences and 
career demands within the URL communities often 
impede demand for graduate school and service in 
validated billets.
Education execution, billet execution, and officer 
management are decentralized, and incentives and 
penalties for managing billets and quotas are not 
integrated. Community managers and education 
program managers often have different goals and 
metrics for assessing program success. Community 
managers focus on operational issues and gauge their 
success by how well they fill all the billets in the fleet. 
Education managers focus on filling graduate school 
quotas with qualified officers and on placing officers 
with the proper educational credentials in validated 
billets. At times these goals clash, with the result be-
ing unfilled billets or billets filled by individuals who 
do not have the requisite experience or qualifications.
The overall benefits in terms of ROI to the Navy 
from graduate education can be measured given 
certain assumptions. As Chapter Five indicated, it 
is possible to make some reasonable assumptions 
about the costs and benefits of a graduate education. 
Our approach presents a way to ascertain the costs 
and make some assumptions to determine benefits. 
These parameters can be adjusted in the model to 
identify elements that are particularly sensitive. An 
order-of-magnitude estimate is quite feasible, and 
more-precise assessments would be possible with 
better data.
The current metric, which specifies one utilization 
per career for each officer with a funded master’s 
degree, as specified DoD and Navy instructions, 
will not give the Navy a break-even cash ROI 
within a 20-year career, given our assumptions. 
Recouping the investment in an officer’s graduate 
education based on skills alone requires long service 
in billets requiring that education (multiple utiliza-
tion tours) and even longer service in other billets.
Recommendations
Researcher recommendations are based on the find-
ings of this monograph and cover three areas: policy, 
culture, and monitoring and evaluation.
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Policy
To shift graduate education toward development 
of future capabilities, the Navy needs to take a top-
down approach. Initially, the Navy should review its 
existing graduate education instructions to verify 
that the language and intent are aligned with cur-
rent DoD policy. Recent Navy guidance on gradu-
ate education governance (OPNAVINST 1520.42, 
2009) reflects the new DoD policy more closely 
than previous versions, but the Navy’s overall pol-
icy on funded graduate education (OPNAVINST 
1520.23B) has not been revised since 1991. Navy 
policymakers should consider the intent of DoDI 
1322.10: “Knowledge is good, and more is prefer-
able.” Researchers suggest modifying the existing 
language of OPNAVINST 1520.23B as outlined in 
Table 6.1. Once this is complete, Navy leaders need 
to effectively communicate the resulting policies to 
graduate education program managers, community 
managers, and officers.
The cost of graduate education can continue to be 
justified through service requirements; however, it 
may take an extremely long time to break even. But 
if the perceived value of graduate education is the 
increases in productivity, social capital, and deci-
sion quality that soft skills and general knowledge 
offer, the expense becomes an investment in future 
capabilities, a cost of doing business. If this becomes 
the goal, it seems justifiable to make the opportunity 
for graduate education competitive, targeted toward 
those most likely to stay in the service and advance 
to flag rank. In essence, the Navy would be broadly 
educating many to achieve future capabilities and an 
ROI from the few.
Culture
Increasing emphasis on graduate education as a ben-
efit to the community and to the Navy-at-large will 
require a cultural shift for some Navy communities 
to overcome negative perceptions associated with 
career breaks for education and utilization assign-
ments. In line with a top-down approach, commu-
nity leaders need to set goals for graduate degrees, 
such as “90 percent of all officers advancing at the 
O-5 board will have a graduate degree.” In tandem, 
community leaders need to develop goals for the 
types of graduate degree curricula that would sup-
port their anticipated capability requirements be-
yond current validated billet requirements.
The Navy can take some tactical steps to improve 
its utilization efficiency immediately by increasing 
utilization rates and reutilizing officers in validated 
billets, thus increasing net quantitative ROIs. These 
steps include incentives for more-integrated man-
agement of officer assignments at the community 
level and penalties for poor management of billets, 
quotas, and officers. These should vary by commu-
nity to account for differences in billet structures 
and operational requirements. One option for pe-
nalizing poor management could be cutting gradu-
ate education quotas for communities that fail to 
meet certain threshold utilization rates for officers 
in validated billets. Community leaders should also 
seek to provide incentives for matching new gradu-
ates with assignments to validated billets to increase 
economic returns to their education investments. 
The Navy should consider the Air Force approach, 
which includes master’s degrees in promotion con-
siderations. Officers who are utilized in Q-coded 
billets increase the Navy’s net benefit in terms of 
ROI; therefore, promotion boards and other incen-
tive initiatives should also give exceptional consid-
eration to “proven subspecialists.”
Monitoring and Evaluation
The Navy should expand its utilization metric and 
enhance monitoring and evaluation of its graduate 
education program. The one-tour utilization metric 
needs expansion to account for additional benefits 
officers with graduate degrees bring the Navy. In 
particular, when these officers serve in nonvalidated 
billets, they may offer value that graduate educa-
tion program managers to not currently capture. We 
suggest enhancing data collection and periodically 
evaluating graduate education programs under a hi-
erarchy of outcomes (see Chapter Two). Appendix B 
offers some specific recommendations on improv-
ing data collection and analysis.
CONCLUSION
The Navy possesses the necessary mix of institutions 
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and curricula in its funded graduate education pro-
gram to meet its present capability requirements. 
However, the total value of graduate education to 
the Navy is not being captured by the metric of one 
utilization tour as defined in current Navy policy. In 
fact, given the current timing for graduate school 
and the typical career progression for officers, one 
utilization tour per graduate-degreed officer does 
not recoup the cost of that degree within a 20-year 
career. We found that both the officer and the Navy 
benefit from the knowledge and skills graduate edu-
cation offers. The Navy benefits from the officer’s 
improved productivity, better decision making, 
and increased retention. Some of this value can be 
monetized, allowing the costs and benefits to be esti-
mated using enhanced data collection methods and 
reasonable assumptions. Recent shifts in DoD poli-
cy language and intent suggest that the Navy should 
expand on the one-tour utilization metric to use a 
more-nuanced assessment of the value of graduate 
education for the Navy’s officer corps, especially 
with respect to future capabilities.
APPENDIX A 
MASTER’S DEGREE OPPORTUNITIES IN 
THE NAVy
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
NPS, currently located in Monterey, California, be-
gan as a postgraduate engineering school for the 
USNA and became a fully accredited graduate insti-
tution in 1955. Its mission is to “provide relevant and 
unique advanced education and research programs 
to increase the combat-effectiveness of the U.S. and 
Allied armed forces, and to enhance the security of 
the United States” (NPS, 2005). It currently supports 
about 2,000 graduate students enrolled in master’s 
and doctoral programs. At any one time, about one-
third of the students come from the U.S. Navy and 
Naval Reserve, but NPS resident and nonresident 
programs are available to all service members and to 
some government civilians and defense contractors. 
DoD finances the school and its programs directly, 
along with sponsorship funds.
NPS offers 43 degree programs focusing primarily 
on engineering, science, technology, national secu-
rity and business. Out of the 924 degrees awarded 
in 2008, there were 15 doctorates in engineering, 
169 MBAs, 565 master of science degrees, and 175 
master of arts degrees. Most naval officers complete 
a master’s degree at NPS as an O-3 during their 
first shore tour. Officers who are interested in the 
program must contact their detailers, who will de-
termine whether his or her academic background 
and professional qualifications are suitable for the 
desired program. Prospective candidates must have 
a bachelor’s degree from an accredited institution 
with a grade point average higher than 2.2 on a 4.0 
scale.
In 1998, OPNAV estimated total annual military pay 
(salaries, benefits, and housing) for an NPS-resident 
officer of $63,300; for a full-time an officer at a civil-
ian institution of $72,300 (Gates et al., 1998). When 
taking into account program duration and academ-
ic fees, OPNAV estimated the total cost of an NPS 
master’s degree to be $231,024, and the weighted av-
erage for a selection of 29 civilian institutions naval 
officers typically attended was $210,112 (Gates et al., 
1998).1
Immediate Graduate Education (IGE)
A select number of officers may pursue IGE after 
completing their undergraduate degrees. Some of 
these officers will receive partial scholarships, in 
which the granting organization pays for tuition 
costs but the Navy pays the officer’s full salary, bene-
fits, and housing (if the scholarship does not include 
housing). Some examples are the Rhodes and Mar-
shall Scholar programs. The Navy also fully funds 
various IGE programs for officers to allow them to 
complete their master’s degrees at NPS or at a civil-
ian university immediately after commissioning.
For IGE and scholarship programs an officer incurs 
a service obligation of five years for programs less 
than 20 months and six years for programs great-
er than 20 months. This service obligation may be 
served concurrently with any other service obliga-
tions (Harvey, 2006).
VGEP is available to only USNA midshipmen, ac-
commodating up to 20 per year. Students accepted 
into the program must have validated or completed 
enough of their coursework by their senior year at 
the academy to be able to pursue part-time work 
toward a graduate degree at a nearby civilian uni-
versity. In addition to being selected by the USNA, 
the midshipman must also apply to and be accepted 
by the civilian university’s degree program. The stu-
dent will continue to be assigned to the academy 
through the duration of the program for administra-
tive purposes and must be able to complete the de-
gree coursework within seven months of graduation 
from the academy. Authorized fields of study are 
those that lead to a Navy subspecialty qualification. 
1  The most expensive school was estimated to be the California Institute of Technology, at $387,947; the cheapest was the University of 
Maryland, College Park, at $175,091.
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Costs to the government are up to $10,000 in tuition 
fees and education expenses, as well as regular in-
grade active-duty pay and benefits.
Some officers may be preselected to attend graduate 
school at the time of their commissioning through 
the Navy Burke program, which provides deferred 
opportunities for selected URL officers to obtain 
graduate degrees in science and engineering fields at 
NPS. Every year, a select number of USNA, Reserve 
Officer Training Corps, and Seaman-to-Admiral 
(STA-21) officer candidates with proven academic 
performance and leadership potential are chosen for 
this program prior to commissioning. Unlike the IGE 
program, the selected officers will first complete a 
normal operational assignment and will obtain war-
fare qualification before attending graduate school. 
During their operational tours, they will need to be 
in communication with their detailers to discuss their 
curricula, which is required to be technical.2
Burke candidates are required to serve a maximum 
of three years in their warfare specialty or in a sub-
specialty utilization tour. Burke candidates who suc-
cessfully complete their master’s programs and have 
continued high professional performance in their 
follow-on tours are also eligible to apply for a Navy 
Burke assignment to a doctoral program.
Politico-Military Master’s Program
The Politico-Military program is intended to allow 
active-duty URL officers to develop a subspecialty in 
political and affairs and strategic planning through 
master’s degree programs in public policy, security 
studies, or international relations at highly selec-
tive universities.3 Program duration varies by degree 
and institution, as shown in Table A.1. Officers in 
the program are full-time students in duty-under-
instruction status. Approximately four quotas are 
funded for this program annually.
All URL officers who have not already completed a 
funded graduate degree program and are in grades 
O-3 through O-5 are eligible for the Politico-Mili-
tary program. Interested officers must apply to the 
Navy Personnel Command before the Fellowship 
Program Selection Board convenes in October or 
November. The board bases its selection on “career 
performance, academic qualifications, promotion 
potential, overall fleet requirements, needs of the 
Navy and overall billets” (OPNAVINST 1500.72F). 
Officers completing the program will be eligible to 
receive a 2000P-series subspecialty code, which de-
notes a master’s degree in the area of national secu-
rity studies.
APPENDIX B 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALySIS 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are recommended specifications for 
the personnel file that would be required to conduct 
a more thorough ROI analysis for funded gradu-
ate education in the Navy. The personnel data file 
should be longitudinal, with observations occurring 
either on a monthly basis (e.g., active-duty master 
file) or as transactions take place (e.g., work expe-
rience file). The primary variable of interest would 
indicate that an officer has earned a new master’s 
degree. Most simply, this could be an education 
variable that changes value from “bachelor’s degree” 
in one observation to “master’s degree” in the next. 
More precisely, a variable indicating the officer’s sec-
ondary occupation contains, in the fifth position, a 
letter that takes on the value P or Q if the officer has 
2  If the degree program is not available at NPS the officer may put in a request to attend a civilian university.
3  These universities include Harvard, Tufts, Johns Hopkins, Stanford, and Georgetown.
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earned a master’s degree.
The following example (Table B.1) illustrates a hy-
pothetical officer who earned a master’s degree in 
March 1993, as shown by both the education and 
secondary occupation variables. A new transaction 
is generated every time the officer changes grade, ac-
tive or reserve component, occupation, or education 
level. A file with monthly episodes would provide 
the same level of detail as a transaction-based file 
like this (which resembles the Work Experience File 
Database).
Several possible measures could yield information 
about the Navy’s return on investing in an officer’s 
education. The first is YOS after earning a master’s 
degree. In the example above, the officer completes 
a master’s degree in March 1993 and separates from 
active duty in May 1996, suggesting that the active 
component of the Navy benefited from the officer’s 
degree for two years and two months. Further, the 
officer remained in the reserve component from 
May 1996 to May 2000, and these four years could 
also be interpreted as part of the ROI. At least three 





To measure YOS beyond the date the degree was 
awarded, averages should be computed for those who 
have earned a master’s degree and compared against 
those who have not. Controls should be based on 
YOS at the time the degree was completed. So, if the 
average officer who obtains a master’s degree does so 
after five YOS, the amount of time spent on active 
duty beyond five YOS is the appropriate measure for 
those who do not obtain a master’s degree.
A similar computation would be done to measure 
YOS beyond an officer’s ADSO and total career 
YOS. These do not require an initial determination 
of the starting point for measuring YOS. Rather, the 
average number of service years beyond ADSO (or 
total YOS) should simply be compared for those 
who have earned master’s degrees and those who 
have not. Regardless of the YOS measure, the data 
could be further disaggregated by such variables as 
occupation (i.e., compare YOS for oceanographers 
who have earned a master’s degree with those who 
have not).
A second measure that provides information on the 
Navy’s return from investing in an officer’s education 
is promotion speed. In the data example above, the 
officer earns a master’s degree in March 1993 and is 
promoted to lieutenant commander in January 1994 
after spending two years and 11 months as a lieuten-
ant. Four years and ten months later, he is promoted 
to commander. To determine whether officers who 
have earned master’s degrees are promoted more 
quickly than those who have not, the average amount 
of time spent in each pay grade should be computed 
for those who have earned master’s degrees and com-
pared to those having only bachelor’s degrees. The 
relevant comparisons are the pay grades beyond the 
officer’s rank at the time of degree award. So, for of-
ficers who earn a master’s degree as a lieutenant, com-
parisons should be made for the years spent at the 
ranks of lieutenant commander and above. As with 
the YOS measures, a finer disaggregation of the data, 
by occupation, is certainly possible.
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Finally, the effectiveness and efficiency of degree 
utilization provide information on whether invest-
ing in an officer’s education helps the Navy better 
match individual skills with billet needs. The data 
set described above indicates which individuals 
have P-coded occupations, and this information 
could be used to determine which billets have been 
filled by officers having the appropriate skills. Ad-
ditionally, the secondary occupation code contains 
information on the officer’s subspecialty, as well as 
details on graduate education (“P” in the fifth posi-
tion of the field). A computation of the amount of 
time that passes between graduation and reassign-
ment to a different subspecialty (from 6042 to 6040, 
ten months after completion of the master’s degree 
in the hypothetical example above) indicates how ef-
ficiently the Navy is making use of its new graduate-
degreed officers to fill billets.
APPENDIX C 
MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND 
LIMITATIONS
We used iThink software to model career progres-
sions for officers with graduate degrees. We started 
with a pool of school quotas and billets that needed 
to be filled at each grade from O-3 through O-5. 
Officers first entered the model at grade O-3, when 
they started graduate school. From this steady-state 
stock of graduate-educated officers, we were able to 
estimate billet fill possibilities at every grade, given 
certain community-specific assumptions about pro-
motion and tour length. Table C.1 outlines the these 




For the ROI analysis, we assumed that graduate 
education supplied a 20-percent productivity gain 
in validated billets, based on the range of estimated 
productivity gains that emerged in the literature. The 
20-percent gain is actually broken down into two 
parts: three-fourths (15 percent) of the productivity 
gain comes from domain knowledge gained in the 
degree, and one-fourth (5 percent) comes from skills 
or competencies gained in the course of the educa-
tion. The 15-percent gain applies only to validated 
billets, while the 5-percent gain applies to all billets.
The literature estimates a broad range of produc-
tivity gains that vary by degree type, institutional 
quality, and other factors. Therefore, we conducted a 
sensitivity analysis to examine how varying the pro-
ductivity rate affects the ROI assessment for funded 
graduate education in the Navy. We varied our base 
rate by one-fifth in either direction while keeping 
the knowledge-to-skill ratio the same to examine 
total productivity gains at 16 percent (12-percent 
knowledge and 4-percent skills) and 24 percent 
(18-percent knowledge and 6-percent skills).
Figure D.1 demonstrates how varying the produc-
tivity rates influences the number of years required 
in validated billets to achieve positive ROIs for grad-
uate education. The ROI break-even point in terms 
of years of use in validated billets is sensitive to the 
estimated productivity gain. If we assume a produc-
tivity gain of only 16 percent, an officer would need 
to complete almost nine years (three tours) in vali-
dated billets for the Navy to recoup its cash outlay 
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on funded graduate education. With a 24-percent 
productivity gain, the officer would need to com-
plete only four years in a validated billet.
Looking at it a different way, we can vary both the 
number of years the officer spends in utilization bil-
lets and the estimated productivity gain to determine 
the number of YOS required after graduation for the 
Navy to recoup a cash return on the cost of a mas-
ter’s degree. Table D.1 estimates the YOS and likely 
rank of the officer at the breakeven point for various 
rates of productivity and years in validated billets. No 
matter what productivity rate is used within our esti-
mated range, an officer who does only one utilization 
tour must serve longer than the typical 20-year career 
for the Navy to see a positive cash ROI for graduate 
education. In fact, unless we can assume a 24-percent 
productivity gain, the Navy will not recoup its invest-
ment in a 20-year career, even if the officer completes 
two utilization tours following graduation. 
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title  Proposed White Paper to Secretary  
of the Navy 
source Third Draft, NPS Internal Document, Unknown Author, Unknown Date
abstract  This white paper assesses the feasibility of privatizing the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) and offers pro and con arguments for all possible options. NPS’ 
perspective on the quality of future graduate education that the Secretary of 
the Navy would want to provide officers as well as suggestions to improve NPS’ 
cost-effectiveness are reviewed.
excerpts  “The only two institutions offering defense-specialized Master’s and doctoral de-
gree programs are the Naval Postgraduate School and the Air Force Institute of 
Technology (AFIT). Although the Air Force attempted to close AFIT this deci-
sion was reversed in recognition of the fact that AFIT fulfills an indispensable 
function.”
  “We take pride in the statement that NPS is the ‘Navy’s flagship university’ 
which offers comprehensive high-level curricula tailored to specific Navy 
needs … You seem to agree with the arguments in favor of retaining NPS be-
cause your current initiative examines only the question whether a civilian 
university can be found which will operate NPS at reduced cost for the Navy 
while retaining current NPS faculty, students, and programs.”
  “We submit that NPS is a Category I university” [doctoral level institution]. 
“Indeed, in a number of disciplines NPS is among the internationally recog-
nized leaders. This is especially true for the meteorology and operations re-
search programs offered at NPS.”
  “We suggest that the real cost savings accruing to the Navy by operating a 
defense-specific Category I university are often overlooked. Officers who re-
ceived the proper high-level education can contribute significant cost savings 
in their follow-on assignments … Since it is likely that cost savings of the type 
and magnitude listed in Enclosure IV can be found and documented every 
year a good case can be made that the Navy’s return on investing in officer edu-
cation at NPS is excellent. Therefore, we respectfully suggest that this aspect 
ought to be considered in any objective cost/benefit analysis of officer graduate 
education at NPS.”
  “We have been remarkably successful in building up a unique defense-oriented 
research program. The numbers speak for themselves. Our research program 
is funded by various Navy, DOD and other sponsors at a level of approximately 
$39M … while the teaching funds supporting formal courses amount to only 
$42M. As a consequence, the special faculty expertise, experimental test fa-
cilities, unique defense-related computer programs etc. are made available to 
the officer students in regular courses and thesis projects without the use of 
O&MN teaching funds. Indeed, 42% of the faculty time is paid from reimburs-
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staffed by some 400 highly qualified experts specializing in military matters at 
substantially reduced cost.”
  Recommendations for improving the cost-effectiveness of NPS: “Increase the 
student enrollment by admitting civilian students … Examine the possibility 
of merging NPS and AFIT into a single Defense Institute of Technology … Re-
duce the number of courses and curricula offered at NPS.”
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Proposed White Paper to Secretary of the Navy 
OBjECTIVE
Your recent initiative to assess the feasibility of 
privatizing the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), 
and the budget cuts imposed on NPS, indicate to 
the faculty that you are considering major chang-
es in the delivery of graduate education for Naval 
and Marine Corps Officers. It is the purpose of this 
white paper to provide you with our perspective on 
the quality and quantity of graduate education you 
may wish to provide for future Naval/Marine Corps 
Officers. In preparing all possible options for your 
consideration we attempted to be entirely neutral on 
the question whether a specific option will lead to 
the curtailment or closure of NPS. Having accumu-
lated many years of experience in providing gradu-
ate education for your officers we are merely trying 
to provide you with pro and con arguments for any 
particular option.
NEED fOR GRADUATE EDUCATION
As pointed out in the position paper prepared by 
the NPS Administration (Enclosure I), the Navy is 
sending mixed signals to its officer corps about the 
importance of graduate education. For the following 
discussion we assume that you agree with the state-
ment that there is a requirement to provide graduate 
education for a certain number of officers but that 
the level of graduate education and the percentage 
of officers receiving such education remain to be de-
termined.
CATEGORIES Of UNIVERSITIES
For the following discussion it is important to dis-
tinguish between three categories of universities of-
fering graduate-level education. The American As-
sociation of University Professors (AAUP) defines:
Category I Universities (Doctoral Level Institutions) 
are characterized by a significant level and breadth 
of activity in a commitment to doctoral-level edu-
cation as measured by the number of doctoral re-
cipients and the diversity in doctoral-level program 
offerings.
Category IIA Universities (Comprehensive Institu-
tions) are characterized by diverse post-baccalau-
reate programs, but do not engage in significant 
doctoral-level education.
Category IIB Universities are characterized by their 
primary emphasis on general undergraduate bacca-
laureate-level education.
GRADUATE EDUCATION OPTIONS
We respectfully suggest that you should distinguish 
between four basic options, namely to provide the 
officer with an opportunity to acquire:
  I) a Master’s degree from ANY university in any 
field of study
  II) a Master’s degree from a Category IIA university
  III) a Master’s degree from a Category I university
  IV) a Master’s degree from a high-quality univer-
sity which also offers military-relevant courses 
and research topics
OPTION I: MASTER’S DEGREE fROM ANy 
UNIVERSITy IN ANy fIELD
In this option the requirement for particular edu-
cational skills to fill billets is dropped. The purpose 
of graduate education merely is the further develop-
ment of the officer’s intellectual abilities. Given the 
vast selection of universities available in the United 
States, ranging from top research universities to 
marginal teaching universities, it is likely that an 
officer can acquire a Master’s degree in four to six 
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quarters with minimum undergraduate qualifica-
tions. It is clear that there is no need for NPS if you 
choose this option. 
OPTION II : MASTER’S DEGREE fROM A 
CATEGORy IIA UNIVERSITy
In this option you may wish to retain the require-
ment for particular educational skills to fill par-
ticular billets. Therefore, you may wish to send a 
certain number of officers to certain Category IIA 
institutions to acquire M.S. degrees in various dis-
ciplines It is our experience that only relatively few 
officers qualify for direct entry into a high-quality 
Master’s program. Hence, depending on the entry 
standards, it may take the officer up to three quar-
ters of refresher undergraduate courses before be-
ing admitted to graduate studies. The time needed 
to complete the M.S. degree will not be significantly 
different from that needed at NPS. The faculty ex-
pertise available at Category II universities typically 
is limited to mastery of the fundamentals. Hence the 
officers are likely to receive a good education in the 
fundamentals of the chosen discipline but no/little 
exposure to advanced research problems and special 
defense-related matters.
OPTION III : MASTER’S DEGREE fROM A 
CATEGORy I UNIVERSITy
As already stated above, it is our experience that only 
relatively few officers qualify for direct entry into a 
Master’s program offered by a Category I university. 
This is especially true in the engineering fields. Many 
officers need to take up to three quarters of refresher 
undergraduate courses before being admitted to 
graduate studies. NPS has developed special exper-
tise to provide this refresher undergraduate educa-
tion in the most time and cost efficient manner. If 
you should choose to send the officers to Category 
I universities for their graduate studies, it remains 
to be examined whether it is more cost-effective to 
retain NPS or to award the refresher undergraduate 
education to a Category II university.
OPTION IV: MASTER’S OR DOCTORAL 
DEGREE fROM A CATEGORy I OR 
CATEGORy IIA UNIVERSITy WITH 
DEfENSE-SPECIALIzED PROGRAMS
The only two institutions offering defense-special-
ized Master’s and doctoral degree programs are the 
Naval Postgraduate School and the Air Force Insti-
tute of Technology. Although the Air Force attempt-
ed to close AFIT this decision was reversed in recog-
nition of the fact that AFIT fulfills an indispensable 
function.
THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
We now attempt to summarize the arguments for or 
against closing or privatazing the Naval Postgradu-
ate School.
ARGUMENTS TO CLOSE NPS
As pointed out in Option I, there is a good case to 
be made for closing NPS if you only wish to provide 
an unspecified level and type of graduate education 
for your officers.
There is only a weak case for closure if you wish to 
provide Master’s and doctoral programs at Category 
I universities because many officers will be unable to 
complete their programs within the time constraints 
imposed by other naval career demands.
ARGUMENTS TO RETAIN NPS
We take pride in the statement that NPS is the “Na-
vy’s flagship university” which offers comprehensive 
high-level curricula tailored to specific Navy needs. 
We do not want to list the specific arguments sub-
stantiating this statement, but merely refer to the 
point paper prepared by the NPS Administration, 
Enclosure II. You seem to agree with the arguments 
in favor of retaining NPS because your current ini-
tiative examines only the question whether a civil-
ian university can be found which will operate NPS 
at reduced cost for the Navy while retaining current 
NPS faculty, students, and programs.
NPS fACULTy COSTS
Since your initiative to privatize NPS appears to be 
motivated by cost considerations we respectfully 
suggest that the distinction between Category I and 
Category IIA institutions is extremely important. 
We submit that NPS is a Category I university. In-
deed, in a number of disciplines NPS is among the 
internationally recognized leaders. This is especially 
true for the meteorology and operations research 
programs offered at NPS. Furthermore, this is dem-
onstrated by the doctoral degrees awarded in most 
NPS curricula and the quantity and quality of the 
research output published in the leading profession-
al journals. As a matter of fact, the Navy has now 
instituted the Professional Military Professor pro-
gram at NPS for the specific purpose of educating 
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a (small) number of officers to serve as professors at 
the Naval Academy. However, the faculty workload 
model used at NPS is the one used at Category II 
universities. Since no or little original research and 
no doctoral thesis advising is expected at Category 
II universities, the teaching loads are typically twice 
as high than at Category I universities. NPS faculty 
members are compelled to procure their own re-
search funds from various research sponsors to buy 
release time from heavy teaching loads. We have 
been remarkably successful in building up a unique 
defense-oriented research program. The numbers 
speak for themselves. Our research program is 
funded by various Navy, DoD and other sponsors at 
a level of approximately $ 39M (Enclosure III pro-
vides a more detailed overview) while the teaching 
funds supporting formal courses amount to only $ 
42M. As a consequence, the special faculty exper-
tise, experimental test facilities, unique defense-
related computer programs etc. are made available 
to the officer students in regular courses and thesis 
projects without the use of O&MN teaching funds. 
Indeed, 42% of the faculty time is paid from reim-
bursable research funds.
COMPUTATION Of fACULTy COSTS AT 
CATEGORy I UNIVERSITIES
Faculty at Category I universities typically are re-
quired to teach both at the graduate and under-
graduate-level. This makes it possible to spread the 
faculty costs over a much larger student body than 
is possible at a pure graduate school such as NPS. 
Therefore, cost comparisons with civilian Category I 
universities must be done quite carefully. We submit 
that the Navy receives a real bargain by imposing the 
Category II workload model while insisting on Cat-
egory I faculty output. In fact, the Navy receives the 
services of a think tank staffed by some 400 highly 
qualified experts specializing in military matters at a 
substantially reduced cost.
POSSIBLE EffECTS Of NPS 
PRIVATIzATION
If NPS were to be administered by a Category I uni-
versity it is likely that the Category I faculty work-
load model would have to be used. This would re-
quire substantially higher faculty costs (apart from 
the higher salaries paid to Category I administrators 
and full professors). Furthermore, it is doubtful that 
the present strong defense-related research program 
could be maintained due to the difficulties in trans-
ferring research funds (other than OR to a civilian 
university.
On the other hand, if NPS were administered by a 
Category II university, it is likely that the Category 
II heavy teaching loads would be imposed with-
out the possibility of “buyouts” from such teaching 
loads. As a result, such an arrangement will hasten 
the departure of high-quality faculty who wish to 
pursue original research and the Navy and DoD will 
be deprived of a pool of highly competent experts 
who are specializing in defense-related research and 
consulting.
OBjECTIVE COST/BENEfIT ANALySIS Of 
OffICER GRADUATE EDUCATION
At present, it is quite customary to base cost savings 
on very narrowly defined criteria. We suggest that 
the real cost savings accruing to the Navy by op-
erating a defense-specific Category I university are 
often overlooked. Officers who received the proper 
high-level education can contribute significant cost 
savings in their follow-on assignments. Unfortu-
nately, no systematic effort is made to document 
such cases. However, we refer you to two examples 
listed in Enclosure IV. We emphasize that such sav-
ings are likely to occur only if the officer received a 
Category I education. Since it is likely that cost sav-
ings of the type and magnitude listed in Enclosure 
IV can be found and documented every year a good 
case can be made that the Navy’s return on investing 
in officer education at NPS is excellent. Therefore, 
we respectfully suggest that this aspect ought to be 
considered in any objective cost/benefit analysis of 
officer graduate education at NPS.
RECOMMENDATIONS fOR IMPROVING 
THE COST-EffECTIVENESS Of NPS
The cost-effectiveness of any university is directly 
linked to the number of students enrolled in any 
given curriculum. At NPS the student enrollment 
has declined by more than 30 percent since the end 
of the Cold War and, as a consequence, the cost-
effectiveness of NPS has suffered. Narrowly defined 
cost-effectiveness considerations therefore would 
suggest that significant changes in NPS operations 
are in order. However, before accepting such a con-
clusion the question must be answered whether the 
percentage of officers currently receiving graduate 
education is sufficient to guide the revolutionary 
changes in Navy systems and operations required to 
meet the challenges of the new century. The deci-
sions made by officers sensitized to new technologi-
cal opportunities may produce benefits which far 
outweigh the cost of an increased number of officers 
receiving graduate education. We therefore suggest 
as the first option:
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  1) Increase the number of officers receiving Cat-
egory I graduate education.
   If there is no possibility to increase the number 
of officers available for graduate education, you 
may wish to consider the following options to 
improve the cost-effectiveness of NPS:
  2) Increase the student enrollment by admitting 
civilian students. California has an urgent need to 
expand its university systems. In fact, the Univer-
sity of California at Santa Cruz (only thirty miles 
north of Monterey) is in the process of develop-
ing an engineering school. It would seem to be in 
the national defense interest as well as the overall 
national interest to find an arrangement with the 
University of California which permits the enroll-
ment of civilian students at NPS. Such an arrange-
ment will provide additional tuition income for 
NPS and thus lower the cost per Navy student.
  3) Increase the student enrollment by finding an 
arrangement with the Air Force and Army to en-
roll more Air Force and Army students at NPS. 
Examine the possibility of merging NPS and AFIT 
into a single Defense Institute of Technology.
  4) Reduce the number of courses and curricula 
offered at NPS. Consolidate the existing curricu-
la into just a few core curricula, augmented with 
only a few high-level courses requiring special 
faculty expertise. Eventually, delete the thesis re-
quirement. This action will enable significant re-
ductions in faculty and facilities. The elimination 
of most special courses and of the thesis require-
ment will cause the transformation of NPS from 
a Category I university to a Category IIA univer-
sity. As a consequence, the research-oriented fac-
ulty will depart and the faculty expertise available 
to the Navy will be greatly reduced.
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title  Letter from C. S. Faller to  
Mr. Alan Richmond 
date Sept. 26, 2011
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title Letter from C.S. Faller to Adm. Dan Oliver 
date Aug. 26, 2011
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title  Letters from Ambassador of Lebanon and  
the President of the Republic of Lebanon 
date January 4, 2012
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title  Letter from Mayor of Chicago, Rahm  
Emanuel to CHDS Director Woodbury
date December 15, 2011
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title  Letter from Rear Adm. Stephen R. Loeffler, 
USN (Ret.) to Dean Jim Wirtz
date January 14, 2012
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14 Jan 2012
Your Deanship/Jim,
On Thursday and Friday I exchanged email with, talked to, J3 and J5 folks at PACOM, and the 
N3/N5 crowd at PACFLT, about RSEP support for upcoming special deployments of interest to 
them, namely the Pacific Partnership Program and CARAT in Southeast Asia. In both cases, 
at the flag/general officer level, they mentioned how important they think RSEP is and what a 
difference the program has made for Naval Forces deploying to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 
Apparently they had seen feedback reports from the MAKIN ISLAND ARG, JOHN C STENNIS 
Strike Group and others with very positive comments about the program and RSEP teams.
They also reiterated how much they appreciate us offering the services of our RSEP teams to 
them and their staffs when we pass through Hawaii. Noting how important your interaction, 
as well as SIGS and NSA in general, are to them, the SUBPAC commander and staff, and the 
COMPACFLT Reserve Component, they could not have been more appreciative. I mentioned 
that CDR Wang had just set up a weekend program on campus for the CPF RC, and Rear Ad-
miral Wehterald could not have been more appreciative. Citing recent briefs by Michael Rubin, 
Bob Rook, Will Norris and me, they asked to be included any time an RSEP team begins or ends 
a program in the Hawaiian Operating Areas. I told them that you, as Dean, ensured that any 
faculty working in or passing through Oahu offered their knowledge and lectures to their com-
mands and COMSUBPAC. They send a sincere ‘mahalo’.
On another subject, I picked up Wade Huntley following his nephew’s graduation from boot 
camp at MCRD on Friday. We had a good meeting over local brews at Point Loma Seafood (Pete 
Lavoy’s and Ahmad’s favorite spot). I gave him the 2012/2013 RSEP schedule and we talked about 
ways to get more NSA faculty involved in RSEP. We’ll discuss this and other issues, and then we 
would like to meet with you, when I am on campus 30 Jan-3 Feb if you are in town.
Have a great holiday weekend ~ thought the positive feedback from PACFLT and PACOM would 




Rear Admiral Stephen R. Loeffler, USN(Ret) 
Senior Lecturer and Director, Regional Security 
Education Program 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  
Office: 619-556-3284 
Cellular: 619-647-7833
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title  Email from Rear Adm. Stephen R. Loeffler to 
NPS Leadership
date February 24, 2012
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From: Loeffler, Stephen (Steve) (CIV) 
Sent: Friday, February 24, 2012 4:24 PM
To: Oliver, Daniel (VADM); Ferrari, Leonard (CIV); Haska, Christine (CIV); Wirtz, James 
(CIV)
Cc: Moran, Daniel (CIV); Horvath, R (Fran) (CIV); Wang, Bernard (Bernie) (CDR); Huntley, 
Wade (CIV); Richmond, Alan (CIV); Stewart, Karen J CIV USFF, N7
Subject: USS GREEN BAY (LPD 20) CHANGE OF COMMAND
President, Provost and All,
Normally I would not report on ship and squadron changes of command, but today’s was 
unusual. Deborah and I attended the ceremony for USS GREEN BAY (LPD 20) aboard the USS 
MIDWAY Museum (GREEN BAY is in the shipyard) because we know the incoming Com-
manding Officer, CDR Putnam Browne, who was Executive Officer in USS CARL VINSON 
(CVN 70) until recently. CDR Browne also plans to enroll in the NPS MSSA program later this 
year, so Craig Turley and I have counseled him on the MSSA as well as SA and SE Certificate 
Programs here in the office.
What made the ceremony unusual was that the guest speaker, Rear Admiral Gerard Huber, 
Commander Expeditionary Strike Group 3, began his speech with a five-minute thank you to 
NPS and me for the RSEP programs we have conducted for his deploying ships and ARG’s (am-
phibious ready groups). He noted that the programs we provided for individual ships and two 
ARG’s with their embarked Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU’s), have had a significant impact 
on their performance both at sea an ashore. Gerry went on to say that he had been on Skype 
early this morning with his son who is an ensign aboard USS PEARL HARBOR visiting the 
UAE and warned him to conduct himself wisely in Dubai, at which time his son said something 
to the effect that he and the entire crew had watched Rear Admiral Loeffler’s brief on culture 
and conduct in the Middle East, as well the other RSEP briefs, and they know exactly what to 
do and what not to do on liberty in Dubai. Dean, Dan, Wade and Bernie: It’s working!
Admiral Huber went on to thank NPS for continuing to support the fleet, and then he thanked 
me for being one of his mentors (I have known him since he was a lieutenant) and for the en-
ergy that Deborah and I continue to inject into the Navy with United Through Reading, RSEP 
and the USO (where I am a member of the BofD).
Since this small tribute was the lead in to his remarks as the ceremony’s guest speaker, I thought 
I should pass it along. After the change of command ceremony, Admiral Huber went on to say 
that the Commodore of the MAKIN ISLAND ARG had sent a message this morning to him 
and the Commodore of the PELELIEU ARG, schedule to deploy in September, reiterating how 
important RSEP has been for his Sailors and Marines. Bernie, please pass this to the rest of the 
MAKIN ISLAND ARG/11th MEU RSEP Team.
Thought you would like to know and have a great weekend, Steve
RADM Stephen R. Loeffler, USN(Ret) 
Director, Regional Security Education Program and Senior Lecturer 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943
